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After roughly 15 years of merger control application in the Federal Republic of 
Germany a reassessment of the significance of this instrument of antitrust policy 
seems necessary. This is particularly so in view of the reorientation of merger 
control policy in the United States which has been - in its original version - the 
model for the German merger control system.
Concerning merger control, the reorientation is characterized by the notion that 
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm which has dominated U.S. antitrust 
for a quarter of a century is imprecise or even incorrect and “that bigness in 
business does not necessarily mean badness”.
This makes the fundamental question arise of whether the German merger control 
system is still up to date in terms of the underlying market theory and of whether 
the German Act Against Restraints of Competition by means of a Fifth Amendment 
needs a reorientation towards aspects of market conduct and performance instead 
of market structure.
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Introduction: Antitrust Eoonomlcs, Polley, and Law at the Crossroads: A 
Reorientation 
I. The Context 
The body of U.S. antitrust laws and its developments and changes over 
nearly one hundred years have had significant Influence on antitrust legis-
lation and enforcement worldwide. 1 
Developments and changes in antitrust policy have so far always been ac-
companied by two characteristics. On the one hand, there has been a close 
linkage between the improvement of price theory and the development of 
antitrust theory2, a linkage that to some extent is being given up within the 
context of recent changes. On the other hand, changes in antitrust theory 
have always been supported by particular schools of thought.3 One of these 
schools of thought, the Chicago School, which in contemporary economics is 
mainly known within the context of monetarism (Karl Brunner, Milton Fried-
man, Allan Meltzer et al.), has developed a legal and economic approach to 
antitrust, mainly throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
This approach is supported by a group of economists and lawyers (Bork, 
Demsetz, Director, Posner, Stigler et al.) who have gained considerable influ-
ence on contemporary U.S. antitrust policy.4 
This is not only shown by the "turnaround" in antitrust policy announced 
by former Secretary of Justice William French Smith in 1981 but also by the 
new Merger Guidelines of 1982/1984, the Vertical Restraints Guidelines of 
1985, the Antitrust Law Reform Package of 1986, and by the fact that judges 
This significant influence has mainly two reasons. The U.S. antitrust sta-
tutes are nearly one hundred years old and they represent the largest 
experience In application to date, cf. Schmidt, Ingo, Wettbewerbspolitlk in 
den USA, in: Cox, Helmut, et al. (eds.), Handbuch des Wettbewerbs, M0n-
chen 1981, pp. 533-556, 535; Moschel, Wernhard, Antitrust and Economic 
Analysis of Law, 140 JITE (1984), pp. 156-171, 156. 
2 Cf. Sullivan, Lawrence A., Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflecti-
ons on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CLR (1980), pp. 1-12, 6. 
3 For a short survey on the history of the different schools of antitrust, cf. 
Audretsch, David B., Divergent Views on Antitrust Economics, 33 AB (1988), 
pp. 135-160; Hovenkamp, Herbert, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MLR 
(1985), pp. 213-284, 213-217; for a detailed survey cf. Singleton, Ross C., 
Industrial Organization and Antitrust: A Survey of Alternative Perspecti-
ves, Columbus, Ohio 1986. 
4 For a survey on this school cf. Schmidt, Ingo, and Jan B. Rittaler, Die 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis. Wettbewerbstheoretlsche und -poli-
tische Analyse eines Credos, Baden-Baden 1986. 
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on the unofficial "waiting list", to be appointed to U.S.Federal Courts, are 
preeminent Chicago scholars (e.g., Easterbrook, Posner):5 
w.....J.; The U.S. Pederal Supre•e Court in 1987/88 
... lppai.JtN Pr•i·••t Political 0,iaioa 
lraau 1956 Eiunhover liberal 
nit, 1962 lennedy center-conservative 
llruall (black l 1967 Johnson liberal 
ll1cau 1970 li1on liberal 
...... ilt 1972 li1on conunative 
( Chief Justice l 
ltfflD 1975 Pord independent 
O'CGuor (fmlel 1980 Reagan conservative (Chicago) 
kalil 1986 Reagan conserutive ( Chicago l , .... ,. 1987 leagan center-conservatin'' 
' The appointmt of Justice Bori: vas not confined by Congress and Justice Ginsburg 
resigned fro• the appoint•ent •ade by President Reagan 
" Political opinion vaa not confined yet 
The controversy between the Chicago School and another school of thought 
- the Harvard School - which has dominated U.S. antitrust policy for nearly 
half a century, Is of eminent relevance to competition policies In Europe, 
especially with regard to the European Economic Community (EEC). Further-
more, major developments in U.S. antitrust policy tend to be adopted by the 
German Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC), the so-called Gesetz 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen (GWB)8 with a certain time-lag. This 
5 For evidence cf. Toepke, Utz P., Antltrustspruchpraxls 1985/86, in: FIW 
(ed.), Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1985/86, Verwaltungs- und Recht-
sprechungspraxis Bundesrepubllk Deutschland, EG und USA, Koln et al. 
1987, pp. 175-200, 184 f. The Committee on.the Judiciary and the U.S. Se-
nate have approved the nomination of Judge Scalia but refused to appoint 
Robert H. Bork, one of the leading representatives of the Chicago School, 
as a member of the Federal Supreme Court In November 1987. The majority 
vote against him was based on the belief that he represented extreme 
conservative views not in accordance with the constitution In various 
legal fields. 
6 The German Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC) was passed by 
parliament In 1957 and was heavily influenced by the Decartellzatlon Laws 
of the WW II Allies as well as U.S. antitrust philosophy after WW II. This 
Is documented by the fact that parliament sent a commission to the United 
States In order to study antitrust. 
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Interdependence between German competition policy and U.S. antitrust policy 
becomes even more Important under the impression that the revision of anti-
trust enforcement and adjudication in the United States Is rather radical 
and could lead to a "de facto repeal" of several sections of the antitrust 
laws7 and, therefore, could exert strong influence on German antitrust 
legislation and policy, esp. in the field of mergers.11 
II. Developments In u.s. Antitrust Polley During the 19706 and 1980& 
Interpretation and enforcement of the United States antitrust laws have 
gone through several stringent as well as lax phases over the nearly one 
hundred years since the Sherman Act was passed. 
Although it is difficult to determine at what point in time dissenting opini-
ons which have formed current antitrust philosophy under the Reagan Admi-
nistration appeared as a counterpart to mainstream antitrust, one can Iden-
tify certain landmarks. These have their roots partly In the developments of 
the 1970s but are centred malnly in the current decade, in which the depar-
ture from mainstream antitrust theory has become more obvious. 1 
The main concern of the contribution submitted is to analyze the economic 
basis behind the recent evolution of U.S. antitrust policy. The recent evolu-
tion of U.S. antitrust shall be presented against the background of the 
7 Cf. Mueller, Dennis C., United States' Antitrust: At the Crossroads, In: de 
Jong, Henk W., and William G. Shepherd (eds.), Mainstreams in Industrial 
Organization - Book 2, Dordrecht et al. 1986, pp. 215-241, 215; It should 
be noted that if this tendency continues, it wi II mean that European cartel 
laws will be more severe than the U.S. statutes, thus reversing previous 
historical trends. 
8 The discussion has just recently begun in the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny and has led to calls for a reorientation of German competition policy 
by business representatives, cf. Holzler, Heinrich, Die Reagan-Administra-
tion hat im Kongrel3 eln Novellen-Paket zur Reform der Kartellgesetze ein-
gebracht, Handelsblatt No. 72, April 15 (1986), pp. 6 f. 
The basic ideas of Chicago antitrust reach back to pre WW II Chicago eco-
nomics; Kitch, Edmund W., The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and 
Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 JLE (1983), pp. 163-233, 231: "The 
problem with that story is that the basic truths that were being taught 
at Chicago •.. were not really new truths. They were old truths. The prin-
cipal effect ... has been to return economics to its older traditions." 
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dominant political and constitutional principle governing most western hemis-
phere states, I.e. the separation of power Into three separate and largely 
independent sectors: the legislative, the executive, and the Judicative.2 
1. Antitrust Economics 
Numerous and complex factors, among them a variety of political and social 
developments, account for the recent changes In the field of antitrust. 
Among these factors, however, the one that played the most prominent role 
was the change in thinking within the economics professlon.3 
An efficiency-oriented approach to antitrust law and economics has emerged 
from a newly developed field called "the economic analysis of /aw" 4, which 
inquires into actual and potential legislative rules and their public and pri-
vate enforcement under efficiency conslderations.5 This approach has led to 
a dramatic shift in the mainstream economic tenet concerning the size of 
monopoly welfare losses and efficiency gains, resulting from various market 
structures and business practices. The approach mainly discards the former 
belief that increased industrial concentration causes significant losses in 
welfare. The new approach gives an increased weight to economic evidence, 
efficiency, and overall economic welfare effects.8 
Antitrust law and economics became increasingly the current antitrust para-
digm. It did not develop from a full-blown antitrust philosophy, but was 
rather the result of reflexions on specific questions raised by several anti-
trust cases.7 The basic features of the Chicago School of Antitrust Law and 
2 The presentation of recent developments will be restricted to landmark 
changes which for practical reasons will be categorized and dealt with, 
according to the following sequence: economics, executive, judicatlve, le-
gislative. 
3 Cf. Mueller, United States' Antitrust .•. , op. cit., 221. 
4 For some of the first contributions cf., e.g., Calabresi, Guido, Some 
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YLJ (1960/61), pp. 
499-528, and Cease, Ronald, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JLE (1960), pp. 
1-44. 
5 Cf. Borchert, Manfred, and Heinz Grossekettler, Preis- und Wettbewerbs-
theorle, Stuttgart et al. 1985, p. 162. 
6 Cf. Mueller, United States' Antitrust ... , op. cit., 215, 221. 
7 Cf. Posner, Richard A., The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 UPLR 
(1979), pp. 925-949, 926. For further explanation and details, cf. Infra. 
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Economics can be attributed to the works of Aaron Directo,. and George J. 
Stigle,. in the 1950s and 1960s. Chicago School theory emerged from these 
basic works and applies neoclassic price theory to antitrust problems. The 
Chicago School criticizes the structural approach of the Harvard School for 
doing particularistic industry studies, as being untheoretlcal, and discarding 
or playing down Important principles of economic theory. 10 
What began as criticism and the rejection of the mainstream position, later 
crystalized into a body of new theories and an orthodox position, put for-
ward in particular by Bork. 11 It centres around four fields of economic 
research: 
(1) The most advanced and elaborated field of economic research that has 
shaped the Chicago approach to antitrust Is the deregulation issue. 12 
It can be shown that under certain conditions free competition among 
firms Is not efficient in producing socially optimal allocation of resources 
and a socially desirable distribution of income. 13 This can be the case 
for economic (market failure) or non-economic (e.g., protection of a natu-
ral resource) reasons. 14 The first instance, as a rule, results in a natu-
8 Cf. Director, Aaron, and Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Re-
gulation, 51 NWULR (1956), pp. 281-296. 
Director was strongly influenced by the works of Frank H. Knight, cf. 
Knight, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty, and Profits, Boston, New York 1921, 
and idem, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 QJE 
(1924), pp, 582-606. 
So were his colleagues and students, such as Bork, Bowman, McGee, Tel-
ser et al. who elaborated on Director's key ideas. For further reference 
cf. Posner, The Chicago School ... , supra, 926: note 2. 
9 For a summary of Stlgler's works, cf. Stigler, George J., The Organization 
of Industry, Homewood, Ill. 1968. 
10 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School ... , supra, 931; we will carry out an tho-
rough analysis of the main differences In the features of the schools, In 
the contribution presented. 
11 Cf. Bork, Robert H., The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, 
New York 1978. 
12 Although this Is not exclusively a Chicago domain, preeminent Chicago 
scholars have contributed to the emergence of the field and have been 
predominant ever since, cf. Joskow, Paul L., and Roger C. Noll, Regulation 
In Theory and Practice: An Overview, In: Fromm, Gary (ed.), Studies in 
Public Regulation, Cambridge, Mass. 1981, pp. 1-65, 36, and Pascher, Hein-
rich, Die U.S.-amerikanische Deregulation Policy im Luftverkehrs- und 
Bankenberelch, Frankfurt a.M. et al. 1987. 
13 Cf. Koch, James V., Industrial Organization and Prices, 2nd ed., Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J. 1980, p. 436; and Shepherd, William G., The Economics of Indu-
strial Organization, 2nd ed., Englewood Cllffs, N.J., 1985, p. 349. 
14 For details on these reasons cf. Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 
436-440. 
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ral monopoly, which is characterized by increasing returns to scale along 
relevant demand. This constellation Inevitably leads to a (natural) mono-
poly. In the case of a natural monopoly the public steps in, leaves the 
monopoly with the supplier, but regulates the monopolist's parameters of 
action by the promulgation and enforcement of rules constraining the 
monopolist's behavior. 15 
From 1960 to 1975, a series of economic studies showed that regulation 
caused lnefficiency. 18 Since 1970, new insights have shown that political 
causes frequently motivate the regulation of particular industries. 17 
These insights supported the view that changes in regulatory policy as 
well as regulation itself were often not economically justified but were 
the result of attempts by Interest groups to obtain a more favorable 
redistribution of wealth. 18 Since economic analyses showed that public 
regulatory policies did not operate in the traditional public interest 
sense (economic efficiency and equitable distribution of Income), regula-
tory reform movement emerged. 19 This deregulation movement calls for 
an end to the entry and price regulation of Industries with basically 
competitive structures and precise economic impact analysis for cases In 
15 Cf. Noll, Roger c., The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy, 139 JITE 
(1983), pp. 377-404, 387 f.; regulation, in fact, is not restricted to single 
supplier markets. There can be numerous market participants, the other 
possibility being that the public is itself the supplier, cf. Shepherd, The 
Economics ... , op. cit., 349. 
16 Cf., e.g., Averch, Harvey, and Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm 
Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AER (1962), pp. 1052-1069. 
17 Cf. Noll, The Polltlcal Foundations ... , supra, 377; for a survey on what is 
termed "capture theory", cf. Schroter, Klaus, Die wettbewerbspolitische 
Behandlung von Ausnahmebereichen - dargestellt am Beisplel der Fern-
warmewirtschaft in der BRD, Frankfurt a.M. et al. 1986, pp. 93-108. 
18 For the original essay cf. Coase, Ronald, The Federal Communications 
Commission, 3 JLE (1959), pp. 1-40; for the basic works cf. Demsetz, 
Harold, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 JLE (1968), pp. 55-65; Peltzman, Sam, 
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 JLE (1976), pp. 211-240; 
Posner, Richard A., Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BJE (1974), pp. 
335-358; and Stigler, George J., The Theory of Economic Regulation, 5 BJE 
(1974), pp. 335-358. 
For some fundamental treatment of the issue cf. Kahn, Alfred E., The 
Economics of Regulation, vol 1: Economic Principles, New York et al. 1970; 
idem, vol 2: Institutional Issues, New York et al. 1971; and Weldenbaum, 
Murray L., The Future of Business Regulation, New York 1979. 
19 Cf. Keeler, Theodore E., Theories of Regulation and the Deregulation 
Movement, 44 PC (1984), pp. 103-145, 103. 
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which market failure is a more plausible explanation.20 
As a result of this change in economic thinking, Congress, the Reagan 
Administration, as well as the regulatory agencies, have jointly deregu-
lated airlines, railroads and trucking. 21 
(2) The second field of economic research centres around the transactlon-
<XJSt approach. 
Vertical contractual linkages, as well as vertical integration, can be seen 
as institutions for mediating economic activities at some cost. 22 Some 
contractual ties such as exclusive dealings and requirements contracts 
used to be found Illegal under Sec. 3 of the Clayton Act because of their 
effects on competition. 23 
Recent research has focused on the costs arising from the use of diffe-
rent contractual linkages and has emphasized possible economic advanta-
ges of contractual ties over other linkages leading to cost savings. 24 
This has led to the notion among economists that vertical arrangements 
in general and vertical mergers in particular are efficiency-enhancing, 
carry little or no anticompetitive effects and, therefore, should not be 
per se illegal.25 
20 Cf. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics ... , supra, 5; and Noll, 
The Political Foundations ••• , supra 402. 
21 Cf. Keeler, Theories of Regulation ... , supra, 104. 
22 For the basic works on different mechanisms of economic coordination cf. 
Cease, Ronald, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economlca (1937), pp. 386-405; 
and for a detailed up-to-date survey cf. Ouchi, WIiiiam G., Markets, 
Bureaucracies, and Clans, 25 ASQ (1980), pp. 129-141. For basic works on 
the transaction-cost approach and for further details cf. Williamson, Oli-
ver E., Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New 
York 1975; idem, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contrac-
tual Relations, 22 JLE (1979), pp. 233-262; Klein, Benjamin, et al., Vertical 
Integration, Appropriate Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, 
21 JLE (1978), pp. 297-326; and De Alessi, Louis, Property Rights, Trans-
action Costs, and X-Efficlency: An Essay in Economic Theory, 73 AER 
(1983), pp. 64-81. 
23 Cf. Mueller, United States' Antitrust ... , op. cit., 221 f. 
24 Cf. Klein, Benjamin, Transaction Cost Determinants of 'Unfair' Contractual 
Arrangements, 70 AER (1980), pp. 356-362; Monteverde, Kirk, and David J. 
Teece, Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration, 25 JLE (1982), 
pp. 321-328. 
25 Cf., e.g., Williamson, Oliver E., Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: 
Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 UPLR 
(1979), pp. 953-993, 992 f., although not being considered Chicagoan; for 
a jurist's view on the issue cf. Easterbrook, Frank H., Vertical Arrange-
ments and the Rule of Reason, 53 ALJ (1984), pp. 135-173, 135 f., and 168 
f., confirming the economist's view. 
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(3) The third field of research is associated with the so-called new-learnlng 
hypothesis. 
Assuming the presence of economies of scale, the traditional industrial 
organization approach assumed that It was necessary for firms In an 
industry to achieve a certain size in order to be efficient in the sense 
of having lower average costs.28 This led to the reasoning that size 
would cause lower costs and, therefore, bring about increased efficiency. 
The new-learning hypothesis reverses this causal chain, stating that it 
Is efficiency which is responsible for size as an important component of 
Industry structure. It is argued that firms often differ in their degree 
of efficiency, and that the more efficient firms grow more rapidly than 
their relatively inefficient competitors.27 Therefore, size is determined 
by efficiency, not vice versa. A variety of empirical studies have tried 
to support this hypothesis.28 
(4) The fourth field of research Inquired Into the question of how competi-
tive behavior in setting prices was to be distinguished from predatory 
conduct that would eliminate competitors from the market and, therefore, 
was considered anticompetitlve.29 Predatory pricing or conduct In this 
context can be defined as hindering competitors by price-cutting which 
alms at disciplining them or driving them out of the market. Such a 
price policy can result in the crowding out of the attacked firm and, at 
26 Cf. Bain, Joe S., Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of 
Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AER (1954), pp. 15-39. 
27 Cf. Brozen, Yale, Bain's Concentration and Rates of Return Revisited, 14 
JLE (1971 ), pp. 351-369; idem, Concentration and Structural and Market 
Dlsequilibrla, 16 AB (1971 ), pp. 241-248, Demsetz, Harold, Industry Struc-
ture, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 JLE (1973), pp. 1-9, and Idem, 
Two Systems of Belief about Monopoly, in: Goldschmld, Harvey J., et al. 
(eds.), Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, Boston, Torcinto 1974, 
pp. 164-184. 
28 Cf. Carter, John R., Collusion, Efficiency, and Antitrust, 21 JLE (1978), 
pp. 435-444; Demsetz, Industry Structure ••. , supra; and Peltz1man, Sam, 
The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 JLE (1977), pp. 
229-263. On the rising skepticism towards that view, cf. Bri•ggs, John 
DeQ., and Stephen Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and Access. (Part 1 ), 
32 AB (1987), pp. 275-333, 326-328. 
29 For the landmark essay on the issue, cf. Areeda, Phillip, and Donald F. 
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 88 HLR (1975), pp. 697-733, and for a part of the subse-
quent discussion, cf. Areeda, Phillip, and Donald F. Turner, Scherer on 
Predatory Pricing: Reply, 89 HLR (1976), pp. 891-900; Joskow, Paaul L., and 
Alvin K. Klevorlck, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing, 89 YLJ 
(1979), pp. 213-270; and Scherer, Frederic M., Predatory Prlcin g and the 
Sherman Act: A Reply , 89 HLR (1976), pp. 869-890. 
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the same time, in a disproportionate internal growth of the attacked firm. 
Nonreallzed profits or losses of the first period can then be compensated 
by Increased profits in the second period after having disciplined the 
other firm or after the disappearance of this firm. 
What came to be called the Areeda/ Turner-rule, placed economic effi-
ciency gains above all other objectives.30 The rule treated conduct as 
anti-competitive if It led to prices below the short-run marginal costs of 
the alleged predator, whereas before the advent of the rule the courts 
used to compare prices to long-run average cost estimates.31 These pro-
posals by Areeda and Turner have stimulated a lively discussion on the 
question of what criteria should be applied by the courts in order to 
distinguish predatory from non-predatory conduct. This change In eco-
nomic thinking, which later played a key role in several private anti-
trust suits, had an almost immediate Impact on judicial thinking.32 
2. Antitrust Enforcement 
The enforcement of the United States antitrust laws is characterized by a 
dual system encompassing the Antitrust Division (AD) of the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as enforcement agencies. 33 
Although the Federal Trade Commission has an Independent legal status, its 
enforcement duties and general policies can be Influenced by the legislative 
powers (budget). The AD's overall antitrust policy is framed by the Secre-
tary of Justice who executes government policy and is responsible politi-
cally. The administration's appointments to both agencies have led to wide 
fluctuations in the severity and emphasis of enforcement In the past, and to 
broad implicit limitations of the agencies' permitted range of action.34 
30 Cf. Mueller, United States' Antitrust .•. , op. cit., 218. 
31 Cf. Utah Pie. v. Continental Baking, 1967 CCH Trade Cases § 72,074. 
32 Cf. Mueller, United States' Antitrust ..• , op. cit., 219; for this case made, 
see also the reasoning on predatory pricing In this Introduction. 
33 For details on antitrust law enforcement cf. Schmidt, Ingo, Wettbewerbs-
politl k und Kartellrecht: Eine EinfUhrung, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1987, pp. 
182-185; Shepherd, William G., Public Policies Toward Business, 7th ed., 
Homewood, Ill. 1985, pp. 137, 147-153; and Sullivan, Lawrence A., Handbook 
of the Law of Antitrust, St. Paul, Minn. 1977, pp. 751-754. 
34 Cf. Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 132-139, and 148 for the main 
steps of antitrust decisions and lltigatlon; for the development of the 
agencies' resources, see Tab. 2. 
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After President Reagan came to office, the former heads of the enforcement 
agencies Baxter and Miller III announced a 'New Deal' in antitrust which was 
strongly supported by former U.S. Secretary of Justice William French 
Smlth.35 
This new enforcement policy of antitrust is based on the view that the mis-
taken concepts of the past Admlnlstration(s) have generated anticompetitive 
effects by not placing enough emphasis on economic efficiency, and that 
there is a greater need for clarity and, hence, certainty in the laws.311 
Under the influence of this new direction and emphasizing this new philoso-
phy, the antitrust authorities have increasingly concentrated their activities 
on prosecution for horizontal cartel agreements, whereas prosecution for 
strategic behavior (unilateral action), as well as stringent merger enforce-
ment, have declined in importance. 37 Furthermore, vertical arrangements of 
competitors are not seen as per se anti-competitive because of anticipated 
efficiency gains along the chain of production and dlstributlon.38 
a. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (AD) and the offices of 
the United States Attorneys have statutory power to enforce the antitrust 
laws of the United States.39 
The most drastic change in antitrust policy since the depression days40 Is 
also reflected by the policy of the AD. As has been noted supra this policy 
of the agencies is being influenced by staffing and funding. 
The AD is being headed by civil servants that were appointed by the Rea-
gan Administration because they were close to Chicago economics and, the-
35 Cf. Blechman, Michael D., Neue Entwicklungen in der amerikanischen Wett-
bewerbspolitlk, 32 WuW (1982), pp. 173-188, 173; address of U.S. Secretary 
of Justice Smith, CCH TRRer TB: Current Comment 1969-1983, § 50,430. 
36 Cf. Smith, supra, pp. 55,973 f. 
37 Cf. Moschel, Antitrust ... , supra, 156. 
38 Cf. Smith, supra, p. 55,975; for the economic reasoning cf. supra as well 
as Part 4 of this contribution. 
39 Cf. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-4; whether this is done by civil or criminal procee-
dings, depends on the act to be enforced; for further details cf. Sullivan, 
Handbook ... , op. cit., 751, as well as Sullivan, Thomas E., and Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: Policy and Procedure, Charlottesville, Va. 1984, 
pp. 61-63. 
40 Cf. Weston, Glen E., Neue Entwicklungen im U.S. Antltrustrecht und die 
kartellrechtliche Beurteilung von Beschrankungen In Patentlizenzvertra-
gen, 86 GRUR Int (1984), pp. 125-136, 128. 
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refore, strictly followed government policy.41 The fiscal request by the AD 
for the years 1981 - 1986 shows a trend towards relaxation in enforce-
ment. 42 
fil.....l; Fiscal Requests of the Antitrust Enforce•ent Agencies: 








btitrut DiYi1io1 of Ue 
















1 Reflects the transfer of 20 positions fro• the Civils Aeronautics Board 
to the AD, including the corresponding budget 
1 In contrast, I 18,5 million were authorized by the Couittee of Congress 
3 Request fully authorized 
Source: Adapted fro• CCB Trade Regulation Reports; and Briggs, John DeQ., 
and Stephen Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and Access (Part 1), 
32 AB ( 1987), pp. 275-333. 
In addition to the decrease in funds, there has been a significant re-
allocation of internal resources supporting action against government 
maintained monopolies in order to repell the influence of regulatory 
commissions and foster competition in exempted industries.43 
This recent policy is characterized by what might be called 'bread and but-
ter antitrust'44, and encompasses two general directions: 
41 For the four Assistant Attorneys General Baxter, McGrath, Ginsburg, and 
Rule that were appointed by the Reagan Administration, cf. TRR No. 478, 
February 23, 1981, No. 626, December 12, 1983, No. 713, July 23, 1985, and 
No. 818, July 21, 1987, respectively. 
42 Cf. CCH TRR No. 827, September 21, 1987, p. 3. This is not true for 1987 
and 1988 since 'new policy' has been established via personnel staffing 
already, making restrictive funding obsolete. 
43 Cf. Tollison, Robert D., Antitrust in the Reagan Administration: A Report 
from the Belly of the Beast, 1 IJIO (1984), pp. 211-221, 216; and FIW 
(ed.), Internationale Kartell rechtspraxis 1983/84. OECD-Liinderberichte 
Uber Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, FIW-Dokumentation Heft 8, Koln et al. 
1986, pp. 28-56, 30. 
44 Cf. Tollison, Antitrust In the Reagan Administration ... , supra, 216. 
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- non-interference in the market process (as far as possible); 
- rigorous prosecution of cartels, especially in areas where the use of 
sealed bidding procedures by the government promotes collusion of its 
input suppliers (bid-rigging). 
With regard to the evaluation of mergers, there is a strong trend towards 
taking into consideration possible efficiency effects as well as effects resul-
ting from foreign competition. 45 
As a result, the Merger Guidelines of 1984, issued by the AD, have raised 
the thresholds for challenging a merger in order to attain possible effici-
ency gains. In essence, these guidelines contain changed enforcement rules 
along the following lines: 
- critical market shares in merger cases have been augmented; 
- the boundaries of the relevant market have been enlarged; 
- the efficiency-defense has been introduced; 
- the failing firm defense has been extended to falling divisions of otherwise 
healthy firms; 
- vertical mergers have to have significant horizontal effects before being 
challenged; and 
- conglomerate mergers are being considered a non-problem. 
This objective is furthermore attained by bringing less enforcement actions 
to the courts and transforming merger antitrust practice into an "agency 
negotiation policy" by working with merging parties to achieve relief by 
consent. This can be viewed as an application of relatively permissive 
"shadow guidelines" reserving the stricter guidelines for litigation. However, 
this does not change the opinion of many courts obviously since there seems 
to be a rather strict application of merger standards by the courts even 
after the issuance of the 1984 Merger Guidelines.48 
Pure conglomerates are seen as a non-problem47 and the essence of the new 
policy towards vertical restraints48 is that they are considered procompetl-
tive and efficiency enhancing. They should be treated accorlng to a "rule of 
45 Cf. OECD-Landerbericht 1983/84 ... , op. cit. 30. 
46 Cf. TRR No. 655, June 18, 1984, Part II: "Merger Guidelines 1984"; and on 
the issue, Briggs/Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87 ••• (Part 1 ), supra, 301-305. 
47 Cf. Moschel, Antitrust ... , supra, 156. 
48 Cf. Vertical Restraints Enforcement Guidelines, Issued by the Department 
of Justice, TRR. No. 687, Part II. 
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reason"49 and only be subject to legal action if they lead to negative hori-
zontal effects in a particular market. In cases of tying arrangements and 
resale price maintenance, the AD has tried to change existing per se rules 
of illegality by friend-of-the-court briefs (amicus curiae-procedure) into 
rules of reason, in order to take Into consideration possible efficiency 
effects. However, a bill designed to codify the per se rule against resale 
price fixing and to overturn the ruling from the Monsanto case (rule of 
reason judgment) was brought in and approved by Congress.!10 With regard 
to monopolization, the Justice Department has dropped its legal action 
against IBM because the company's market position was considered a result 
of its superior efficiency.51 
The monopolizing case against AT & T was settled by consent decree52, ur-
ging the company to divest its unprofitable local telephone companles.!13 
In order to change the antitrust laws, the AD has prepared two reform 
packages that were presented in 1983 and 1986. They are intended to 
increase the efficiency and the productivity of the American industry as 
well as its international competitiveness.54 
49 For the meaning and difference in the legal doctrines 'rule of reason' 
and 'per se rule', cf. Sullivan, Handbook ..• , op. cit., 171-186, and for a 
brief description cf. Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 480. 
50 Cf. CCH TRR No. 831, Oct. 19, 1987, p. 6, and No. 848, Febr. 17, 1988, p. 1. 
An amlcus-curiae- or friend-of-the-court brief is a petition that might be 
submitted to court in a proceeding by a participating party "with strong 
interest In or views on the subject of an action ... , ostensibly on behalf 
of a party but actually to suggest a rationale consistent with Its own 
views.", Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., St. Paul, Minn. 1979, p. 75. 
51 Cf. Tollison, Antitrust in the Reagan Administration ... , supra, 216, as well 
as Weston, Neue Entwicklungen •.. , supra, 128. 
52 "Agreement by defendant to cease activities asserted as Illegal by 
government (. .. ). Upon approval of such agreement by the court the go-
vernment's action against the defendant is dropped.", Black's Law Dic-
tionary, op. cit., 370. Consent decrees can be regarded as material com-
promises between parties involved In a court proceeding about the Issue 
in question. The agreement has to be filed with the court and needs the 
judge's approval, cf. Shepherd, Public Policies .•. , op. cit., 145. 
53 Currently, consent decrees are used by the AD to help companies to re-
structure their mergers in a way that eliminates antitrust problems, cf. 
Weston, Neue Entwicklungen ... , supra, 129. 
54 Cf. National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983, TRR No. 649, May 16, 
1984, Part II, and Antitrust Law Reform Package of 1986, TRR No. 744, 
February 24, 1986, Part II; for more details cf. sec. II. 4. of this intro-
duction. 
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b. The Federal Trade Commission 
The second authority or agency to enforce the antitrust laws of the United 
States Is the Federal Trade Commission.55 The agency was established in 
1914, is headed by five commissioners, one of whom is appointed chairman58, 
enforces antitrust and consumer protection statutes and has developed rule-
making power.57 
As has been noted in the case of the Antitrust Division with regard to its 
heads, all the chairpersons and commissioners that have been appointed to 
the FTC by the Reagan Administration, have been and are close to govern-
ment policy and, therefore, to Chicago economlcs.58 After assuming duties as 
FTC Chairman55, James C. Miller III proposed a cut In the FTC's budget of 
12% for the fiscal year of 198211C>, holding that, accompanied by cutbacks in 
programs, management improvements and program refinements, this would 
enhance the agency's efficiency.e1 
55 For a survey on the agency cf. Sullivan, Handbook ... , op. cit., 752-754; 
for the development of the agency's resources, see Tab. 2; for the main 
steps In the agency's prosecution action, see Shepherd, Public Policies ... , 
op. cit., 151. 
56 Cf. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-51. 
57 The ability to issue rules ("Trade Regulation Rules") that govern all 
members of an industry instead of carrying out precedents, was formally 
enacted by Congress through the Magnuson-Moss Act In 1975, cf. Magnu-
son-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 4 CCH 
TRRer, § 25,515-25,528, at pp. 30,331-30,340, esp. § 25,525, at p. 30,337.; 
cf. Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 152; the attempt to veto these 
rules was declared unconstitutional by the Federal Supreme Court. 
58 For evidence cf. Weston, Neue Entwicklungen ... , supra, 129; for the re-
alignment of staff positions and new appointments of bureau directors cf. 
TRR No. 511, October 12, 1981, pp. 3 f., and the realignment of policy, cf. 
TRR No. 518, November 30, 1981, p. 3; evidence Is also provided by the 
fact that commissioners that stated dissenting opinions in FTC cases 
either resigned voluntarily or their term of office ceased, which lead to 
decisions in favor of the new policy, cf. TRR No. 560, September 20, 1982, 
p. 10, and No. 616, October 3, 1983, p. 5. 
59 Cf. TRR No. 510, October 5, 1981, p. 10; Senator Arlen Specter (R-Penn) 
pointed towards the aspect that lower funding could be an Indirect way 
of phasing out the FTC's antitrust function at all, cf. ibid., 6. 
60 The long-term perspective has been a 25% cut, partly due to the closing 
down of regional FTC offices, cf. Weston, Neue Entwicklungen .•. , supra, 
129. 
61 Cf. TRR No. 532, March 8, 1982, p. 3. 
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As in the case of the Antitrust Division, there has been a sharp increase In 
the emphasis on economic efficiency as general policy82 and there has been 
a reallocation of Internal resources in order to fight government maintained 
monopolies and the exemption of free professions from antitrust.83 Consumer 
protection issues as well as pro-competitive effects of unilateral action, such 
as resale price maintenance, are being emphasized.&! 
Critics state that an all time low in proceedings started by the FTC has 
been reached.es Due to the new philosophy, the divestiture proceedings 
partly pending for more than ten years agains Exxon Corp., Kellogg et al., 
and IBM have been dropped; the case against AT & T has been settled by 
consent decree.• 
There have been two additional policy changes that have contributed to the 
low number of proceedings started by the FTC. On the one hand, there have 
been strong attempts to help merging firms to restructure potential mergers 
in order to file consent decrees and not to issue complaints or orders97 and 
on the other hand, there is now a strong tendency to consider other rele-
62 As has been pointed out by former Chairman Miller In remarks prepared 
for delivery before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association 
in Washington, D.C., cf. TRR No. 540, May 3, 1982, p. 6 f. 
63 Cf. OECD-Liinderbericht 1980/81, 33 WuW (1983), pp. 545-555, 552, and 
Tollison, Antitrust in the Reagan Administration ••. , supra, 217. 
64 Cf. TRR No. 540, supra, 7. 
65 Cf. Weston, Neue Entwicklungen ... , supra, 130. One has to notice a turn-
around to some extent, however. The FTC has been notably successful re-
cently in winning cases in the courts of appeals, cf. Briggs/Calkins, Anti-
trust 1986-87 ... (Part 1 ), supra, 322. 
66 Cf. FTC v. Exxon Co., CCH TRRer TB: FTC Complaints and Orders 1979-
1983, § 21, 866; FTC v. Kellogg Co. et al., CCH TRRer TB: FTC Complaints 
and Orders 1979-1983, § 21, 899, as well as U.S. v. IBM Co., 4 CCH TRRer, 
§ 45, 070 Case 2039, and U.S. v. AT & T, 4 CCH TRRer, § 45,070 Case 2416. 
67 Cf., e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, CCH TRRer TB: FTC Com-
plaints and Orders 1979-1983, § 22, 144, and FTC v. American Medical In-
ternational, Inc., et al., CCH TRRer TB: FTC Complaints and Orders 1979-
1983, § 22, 058; for further details on the cases, cf. FIW, Internationale 
Kartellrechtspraxis 1983/84 ••. , op. cit., 52-54. 
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vant factors in merger cases, In addition to the murket share criterion 
which in fact makes merger policy more lenient.ea 
Furthermore, the FTC has stopped or cancelled several programs that collec-
ted relevant economic data on American industry for the purpose of govern-
ment filing and legislative control (e.g., Statistical Report on Mergers and 
Acquisitions, and FTC Line of Business Reporting Program).59 
3. Antitrust Adjudication 
During the past fifteen years, economic efficiency considerations have Incre-
asingly been introduced Into the findings on antitrust cases in United 
States' courts. 70 
The increasing shift in antitrust cases away from possible anticompetitive 
effects to possl ble pro-efficiency effects that led courts71 away from extra-
economic interpretation of the antitrust statutes, was first initiated by the 
dissenting opinions put forward by Justices Harlan and Stewart in the Von's 
Grocery case72, they demanded the Supreme Court to confine its analysis to 
68 Cf., e.g., FTC v. Schlumberger Ltd., CCH TRRer TB: FTC Complaints and 
Orders 1979-1983, § 21, 989, and FTC v. Echlin Manufacturing Co., 3 CCH 
TRRer, § 22, 268; although a manufacturer of automotive carburetor kits 
with almost 38% of the market purchased the third largest competitor 
with 10% of the market, the acquisition would not lessen competition sub-
stantially because of low barriers to that market, according to the ruling 
of an administrative law judge of the FTC In the Echlin case, cf. TRR No. 
669, September 26, 1984, p. 3. 
69 Cf. TRR No. 545, June 7, 1982, p. 6, and TRR No. 645, April 17, 1984, p. 1. 
70 Cf. Blechman, Neue Entwicklungen .•. , supra, 180; though we will confine 
our observations to landmark changes in the adjudication of the Supreme 
Court, It can be noted that the emphasis on efficiency as a dominant 
social value has been even more noticeable in lower court cases (i.e., 
Courts of Appeals and District Courts), cf. Sullivan, Antitrust, Micro-
economics, and Politics ... , supra, 2 and 4; for a survey on procedures, 
sanctions and the relationship of public and private suits, cf. Areeda, 
Phillip, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases, 2nd ed., Boston, Toronto 
1974, pp. 49-62, 68-90, and Schmidt, Ingo, US-amerikanische und deutsche 
Wettbewerbspolitik gegen0ber Marktmacht, Berlin 1973, pp. 101-103. 
71 Comparing the reasonings in antitrust cases by former Warren and pre-
sent Burger Courts, named after the Chief Justices heading them, this 
transition seems remarkably distinct, cf. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeco-no-
mics, and Politics ... , supra, 4, as well as Blechman, Neue Entwicklun-gen 
.•. , supra, 176 f. 
72 Cf. U.S. v. Von's Grocery, 1966 CCH Trade Cases, § 71,780, pp. 82,596-
82,609, 82,601- 82,609; the merger of the third and sixth ranking retail 
grocery chains in the Los Angeles area was declared unlawful for viola-
ting Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act, although they only had a joint market 
share of nine percent. 
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the probable effect of the merger on competition in the relevant market and, 
in doing so, pleading for an economic analysis.73 The efficiency emphasis 
became even more important at the point when it was ruled that a monopo-
list might use power in one market to gain advantage in another, if this was 
accompanied by a yield In efficiencies.74 
The effect of certain trends in economic thinking on legal proceedings was 
most clearly demonstrated by the adoption of what came to be called the 
Areeda/Turner rule, which established marginal costs as a criterion for legal 
action against predatory pricing.75 The rule, emphasizing efficiency, was 
almost immediately adopted by the courts and in 90% of such cases led to a 
verdict In favor of the defendant.79 
Efficiency has also been the predominant underlying value in judging fur-
ther unilateral action, such as tying arrangements, exclusionary practices, 
and the like. This tendency was initiated by a rule of reason approach jud-
ging territorial restrictions in dealer contracts.n Whereas such restrictions 
had in the past been condemned as per se illegal, courts now came to consi-
73 In later cases, the Supreme Court has stated that market shares are re-
levant in the sense of a prlma facie proof, but have to be supplemented 
by additional features of the market structure, cf. Brown, David, Neue 
Entwicklungen in der amerlkanischen Wettbewerbspolitik, 32 WuW (1982), 
pp. 180-188, 185, and for the case, cf. U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 
1974-1 CCH Trade Cases, § 74,967. 
74 Cf. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics ... , supra, 3, and for 
the case, cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1979-1 CCH Trade 
Cases, § 62,718, and Idem, 1980-1 CCH Trade Cases, § 63,182 cert. denied. 
Similar reasoning underlay the decisions in the cases raised against IBM, 
cf., e.g., Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 1977-2 Trade Cases, § 60,127; Grey-
hound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 1977-2 Trade Cases, §61,603; Memorex 
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 1980-81 Trade Cases, § 63,645, with al I certioriaries 
being dismissed or denied and Courts of Appeals' decisions being affir-
med. 
75 The rule played a key role in several of the private antitrust suits 
against IBM; cf., e.g., California Computer Products v. IBM Corp., 1971-1 
CCH Trade Cases, § 62,713. 
76 Cf. Mueller, United States' Antitrust •.. , op. cit., 218. 
77 Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE-Sylvania, Inc., 1977-1 CCH Trade Cases, § 
61,488, pp. 71,892-71,907, 71,892; the overruling of the per se rule was 
confirmed in Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers Ltd., 1981-2 CCH 
Trade Cases, § 64,744; for further discussion cf. Toepke, Utz P., Antl-
trustspruchpraxis 1981/82, in: FIW (ed.), Schwerpunkte des Kartell-rechts 
1981 /82. Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungspraxis Bundesrepubll k Deut-
sch land, EG und USA, Koln et al. 1983, pp. 137-152, 146-148. 
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der them positively in the light of efficiency gains. This reasoning was 
affirmed by a number of court decisions.78 
Certainly such restrictions continue to be regarded intrinsically illegal in 
the case of tying arrangements79 and resale price maintenance90 Thus far 
the doctrine of per se illegality has been retained. 81 Nevertheless, efficiency 
evaluations have been introduced into the proceedings even here.82 
Following the reasoning that the inhibition of intra-enterprise conspiracies 
yielded economic inefficiencies, the Supreme Court overruled the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrlne83 which held that common ownership and 
78 Cf. U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 1967 Trade Cases, § 72,126; cf. also 
Toepke, Antitrustspruchpraxis 1985/86 ... , op. cit., 194 on the recent case 
Business Electrics Corp. v. Sharp Electronic Corp.; and Briggs, John DeQ., 
and Stephen Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and Access (Part 2), 32 AB 
(1987), pp. 699-730, 704-706. But on the limits of such considerations, cf. 
also CCH TRR No. 798, March 2, 1987, p. 1. 
79 Cf. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Edwin G. Hyde, 1984-1 CCH 
Trade Cases, § 65,908, reversing and remanding a Court of Appeals deci-
sion, cf. idem, 1982-2 Trade Cases, § 64,945. 
80 Although the arrangements are seen as per se violating Sec. 1 Sherman 
Act, a Supreme Court ruling has shown that the per se rule in resale 
price maintenance cases, introduced in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons in 1911, is seen as having lost its intellectual basis; for this 
evaluation cf. Toepke, Utz P., Antitrustspruchpraxis 1983/84, in: FIW 
(ed.), Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1983/84, Verwaltungs- und Recht-
sprechungspraxis Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EG und USA, Koln et al. 
1985, pp. 89-119, 92 and for the ruling cf. Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite 
Service Corp., 1984-1 CCH Trade Cases, § 65,906; the attempt to abolish 
the per se rule was supported by a friend-of-the-court brief of the An-
titrust Division of the Department of Justice. It has been stopped by 
Congress through the means of budgetary regulations which prevent the 
Department of Justice from using its resources to try to abolish the per 
se rule for resale price maintenance, cf. TRR No. 767, July 28, 1986, at p. 
4. 
81 Cf. Toepke, Antltrustspruchpraxis 1983/84 ... , op. cit., 91. 
82 Cf., e.g., CCH TRR No. 786, December 1986, p. 1: "Resale Price Maintenan-
ce: Airline's Discount Ticket Advertising Restriction not Per Se Illegal." 
There is a current tendency in adjudication to apply the per se rule on-
ly to cases of market power, whereas other cases are to be judged under 
a rule of reason, cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Okla-
homa, 1984-2 CCH Trade Cases, § 66, 139, affirming the Court of Appeals 
ruling, cf. idem, 1983-1 CCH Trade Cases, § 65,366; and Northwest Whole-
sale Stationers v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 1985-1 CCH Trade 
Cases § 66,640, p. 66,174. 
83 Cf. Holzler, Heinrich, Supreme Court 0berpr0ft Doktrln konzerninterner 
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, 33 WuW (1983), p. 784; for the case cf. Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 1984-2 CCH Trade Cases, § 
66,065. 
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control of various corporate executives are unable to liberate the alleged 
conspiracy from the impact of the Sherman Act.&1 
Rather important for the attempt to foster competition in areas that were 
thus far exempted from the antitrust laws was the Supreme Court's decision 
that communities' actions ("state-action immunity doctrine")85 would no lon-
ger enjoy immunity from antitrust liability.88 
Furthermore, the current Supreme Court seems to have followed the reaso-
ning that not every arrangement over prices must necessarily be seen as a 
conspiracy and, therefore, as eo ipso illega1.e7 
4. Antitrust Legislation 
The antitrust policy of the present government of the United States has 
only transient character because statutory law is not dominant in the legal 
system and, therefore, law is shaped mainly by the courts. Hence, the cur-
rent administration is trying to change legislation according to its general 
policies in order to overcome this transient character. 118 
Before the efforts to change the existing statutes were started, however, 
84 But cf. the revival of the doctrine in Lousiana Power and Light Co. v. 
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 1986-2 CCH Trade Cases, § 67,272, and CCH TRR 
No. 775, Sept. 22, 1986, p. 1; and Briggs/Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87 ... 
(Part 2), supra, 700-704. For the initial ruling of the Supreme Court on 
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, cf. U.S. v. Yellow Cab Co., 1946-
1947 CCH Trade Cases, § 57,576. 
85 First ruled in Parker v. Brown, 1940-1943 CCH Trade Cases, § 56,250; the 
doctrine held that state action exemption reflects Congress' intention to 
embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States pos-
sess a significant measure of sovereignty under the Constitution of the 
United States. 
86 For the case cf. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 1982-1 
CCH Trade Cases, § 64,448, and for an earlier case cf. City of Lafayette 
v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 1978-1 CCH Trade Cases, § 61,936. 
87 Cf. Blechman, Neue Entwicklungen ..• , supra, 178, and for the case, cf. 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 1980-2 CCH 
Trade Cases, § 63,289, cert. and reh. before the Supreme Court denied; 
the court pointed out that the crucial question was not, whether the 
licence agreed upon was to be seen as a price conspiracy, but, whether 
it unanimously had anticompetitive effects in order to justify per se ille-
gality. 
88 The most recent and comprehensive attempt, has been the Administrati-
on's Antitrust Law Reform Package of 1986, which we will take up again 
in the following; cf. TRR No. 744, supra, Part II. 
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prior efforts at the legislative level that were aimed at tightening the anti-
trust laws had been definitely abandoned.119 
Based on an allegedly growing consensus that public regulation of private 
economic activity is likely to do more harm than good90, there are strong 
legislative efforts to put an end to entry and price regulations of industries 
that basically dispose of competitive structures have so far been exempt 
from the full application of the antitrust laws.91 
Three major material changes or supplements to antitrust legislation that 
emphasize current policy can be discerned: 
(1) The Export Trading Company Act of 198292, that is supposed to streng-
then the International competitiveness of U.S. firms, limits the appli-
cation of the antitrust laws to export commerce.93 The formation of ex-
port trading companies Is promoted by reducing restrictions on trade 
financing and by modifying the application of the antitrust laws to cer-
tain export trades.94 
(2) The National Cooperative Research Act of 198495, that is aimed at relax-
ing the antitrust laws insofar as they affect joint research and deve-
lopment ventures. The Act provides for the introduction of the rule of 
reason for the judging of such ventures and for llmition of recovery in 
89 Cf. Moschel, Antitrust ... , supra, 156; these efforts encompassed legislative 
proposals for the possibility of deconcentration of industries as well as 
various no-fault monopolization proposals to protect small business, cf. 
also idem, Entflechtungen im Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, TU-
bingen 1979, pp. 89-91. 
90 Cf. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics ... , supra, 5. 
91 Congress has deregulated airlines, railroads, and trucking, and the poli-
tical momentum for deregulation of other industries Is growing, cf. ibid., 
5, and Moschel, Antitrust ... , supra, 157. In the case of the deregulation 
of the airline industry, the remaining tasks have been transfered to the 
Department of Transportation by the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act 
of 1984, cf. Pascher, op. cit. 
92 Cf. TRR No. 554, Ay:;i1Jst 9, 1982, Part II, being the first part of the An-
titrust Improvement Act of 1982. 
93 Cf. Toepke, Utz P., Antitrustspruchpraxis 1982/83, in: FIW (ed.), Schwer-
punkte des Kartellrechts 1982/83. Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungs-
praxis Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EG und USA, Koln et al. 1984, pp. 61-
85, 64. 
94 Cf. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 4 CCH TRRer § 27,000. 
95 Cf. TRR No. 649, May 16, 1984, Part II: National Cooperative Research Act 
of 1984, 4 CCH TRRer § 27,080, which was originally presented as National 
Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983, cf, TRR No. 614, September 19, 
1983, Part II. 
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antitrust cases to actual damage. 915 
(3) The Local Government Antitrust Act of 198497, that Is supposed to limit 
the antitrust liability of communities resulting from the change of the 
state-action immunity doctrine by the Supreme Court. 911 
The Antitrust Law Reform Package that has been elaborated on by the Pre-
sidential Commission on Industrial Competitiveness99 and presented as pro-
posed legislation, consists of five legislative proposals, amending the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts and the Trade Act of 1974. In essence, these proposals 
weaken the standards for determining whether mergers are anticompetitive; 
they also provide for an antimerger relief for U.S. Industries Injured by 
foreign competition, and lower treble damages to the actual damage sustained 
by a competitor. 100 With regard to mergers, the bill contains two significant 
aspects in its proposed Merger Modernization Act:101 
- the attempt to substitute the incipiency doctrine by a significant proba-
bility doctrine, and 
- the attempt to substitute the substantially lessening of competition as the 
criterion of Intervention by the ability to exert market power in the long 
run, measured by price-quantity relationships. 
The proposals are pending for the time being, not having a significant pro-
bability of being passed because of changed majority relationships in Con-
gress after the 1986 elections.102 
96 Cf. Toepke, Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1983/84 ... , op. cit., 93. 
97 Cf. 4 CCH TRRer, § 27,104. 
98 Cf., e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, op. cit., pp. 
72,502-72,516, and FIW, Internationale Kartellrechtspraxls 1983/84 ... , op. 
cit., 29, as well as for further details, Briggs/Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87 
... (Part 2), supra, 728-730; and Toepke, Utz P., Antitrustspruchpraxls 
1984/85, in: FIW (ed.), Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1984/85. Verwal-
tungs- und Rechtsprechungspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
EG und USA, Koln et al. 1986, pp. 103-150, 127-130. 
99 Cf. TRR No. 691, February 19, 1985, at p. 4. 
100 Cf. TRR No. 744, supra, at p. 3. For a detailed survey cf. Toepke, 
Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1985/86 •.. , op. cit., 176-183. 
101 Cf. Proposed Legislation: Administration's Antitrust Law Package, CCH 
TRR No. 744, February 1986, Part II, rebrought in the overall legislative 
proposal "Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987", cf. CCH TRR 
No. 799, March 9, 1987, p. 6; and for the evaluation, Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspollti k und Kartel I recht, op. cit., 187. 
102 Cf. Briggs/Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87 ••. (Part 1), supra, 319-321, parti-
cularly note 154 who quote Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio); and Toep-
ke, Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1985/86 .•. , op. cit., 183 note 24. 
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Two final legislative issues that have been of some importance, concerned 
legislative vetoes over enforcement agencies' rules103, and the rejection of 
the Vertical Restraints Guidelines (VRG) by the Senate and the House of Re-
presentatives. 104 
In the first issue, congressional veto over agency rules was declared uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court105 because it violated the separation-of-
powers principle. The vetoes were used by the legislature to control the 
enforcement agencies' action and, therefore, partly government policy. 
Regarding the second Issue, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives approved a resolution that the VRG of the Department of Justice 
"do not have the force of law, do not accurately state current antitrust law, 
and should not be considered by the Federal Courts as binding or persua-
sive".10S The House as well as the Senate is trying to impose budget re-
strictions that are supposed to reflect the resolution. 107 
Furthermore, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) adopted 
Merger Guidelines of Its own which are strikingly different from the ones 
issued by the Department of Justice, although not differing markedly in re-
sults except concerning market definltion. 108 
Regarding formal or procedural changes, the abandonment of treble damages 
has been part of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, the Foreign Sove-
reign Recoveries Act109, as well as the National Cooperative Research Act of 
1984.110 
103 Cf. TRR No. 602, June 27, 1983, and No. 604, July 11, 1983. 
104 The Guidelines were issued by the Antitrust Division, cf. FIW (ed.), Ver-
ti kale Vertrage - US Guidelines 1985 und EG-Kartel I rec ht, FIW-Dokumen-
tatlon Heft 7, Ki:iln et al. 1986, p. 4. 
105 For the cases cf. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy 
Council of America, 1983-1 CCH Trade Cases, § 65, 474 at pp. 70, 718 f., 
and Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103 Sup. Ct. 
(1983), p. 2764. 
106 T RR No. 731, November 25, 1985, at p. 2. 
107 Cf. FIW, Vertikale Vertrage .•. , op. cit., 5; and CCH TRR No. 767, July 28, 
1986, p. 4. 
108 Cf. CCH TRR No. 800, March 16, 1987, p. 1; and as well, Briggs/Calkins, 
Antitrust 1986-87 ... (Part 1), supra, 316-319. 
109 Cf. TRR No. 575, January 3, 1983. 
110 Cf. Toepke, Antitrustspruchpraxis 1984/85 ... , op. cit., 109. Restricting 
the claim in antitrust cases to the actual damage that has occured, is 
supposed to deter plaintiffs which sue for 'tactical reasons'. 
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III. The Source Qf Reorientation: The Chicago School of Antitrust Anmvsls 
1. The Foundations 
The question of whether there is a distinctive Chicago approach to (anti-
trust) economics 1 and how this approach can be characterized, has to be 
answered from the view point of the historical context. 2 
The roots of the Chicago style of antitrust economics, have on the one hand 
to be seen within the legal realism movement that arose in American law 
schools in the 1920s and that tried to study the operation of law in relation 
to social reality, i.e., how law would affect (economic) behavior in society. 3 
The practical need to teach economics at the law schools emerged from this 
movement and led to the appointments of various economists to law schools, 
such as Frank H. Knight, Jacob Viner, and later Aaron Director and Henry C. 
Simons, who were Knight's students.4 The basic features of Chicago antitrust 
economics are attributable to these scholars. 
At first, it was mainly through the personal Impact of Knight who generated 
highly Idiosyncratic ideas on a few influential students (Director, Simons) 
that the subsequent course of Chicago economics was determined. 
What all these early Chicago scholars had in common, however, was their 
sceptical view towards empirical work in the social sciences that set them 
apart from the main body of Chicago economists.5 The small group of 
Knight's students built a loosely coupled group to jointly advance their 
common ideas. 
It was just around this time when Oscar Lange, a Polish born economist, be-
came assistant professor at Chicago (1938) and tried to constitute a distinct 
Dlehard Chicagoans promote such a distinctive approach, whereas others, 
that are willing to refine the original ideas, perceive a certain conver-
gence of the antitrust schools of thought, cf. Posner, The Chicago School 
... , supra, 925. 
2 For a survey, cf. Kitch, The Fire of Truth ... , supra, 163-233, and Reder, 
Melvin W., Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change, 20 JEL (1982), 
pp.1-38. 
3 Cf. Kitch, The Fire of Truth .•• , supra, 164. 
4 Cf. Kitch, The Fire of Truth ... , supra, 167; for the main works, cf. supra; 
and Simons, Henry C. , A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire: Some Propo-
sals for a Liberal Economic Policy, Chicago 1934. 
5 Cf. Reder, Chicago Economics ... , supra, 6. 
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alternative to the earlier view of Chicago economists.8 This, in fact, can be 
viewed as a further root of the development of Chicago economics. 
Lange was to be associated with the so-called "institutional schooI"7 which 
was in opposition to the standard theoretical tradition of price theory. This 
led to ideological tensions. 
When Lange withdrew from Chicago to become Polish Minister for Economic 
Affairs after World War II and the Cowles Commission& came to Chicago, this 
tension was emphasized and led to an ideological battle between Knight and 
his former students on the one hand, and the Cowles Commission and its ad-
herents on the other hand, about topics such as research methodology, poli-
tical ideology, and faculty appolntments. 9 
Although the original ideas were jointly advanced by colleagues and 
students of Knight, Director, and Simons, there was a lack of coordination. 
This coordination, that brought together single efforts, was finally cemented 
by a conference on the topic of industral concentration that was held by 
the Columbia Law Faculty10 and by a later and direct confrontation with the 
Harvard School11 ( Bain, Caves, Mason, D. Mueller, Scherer, Shepherd, Sulli-
van et al.) through a symposium held at the University of Pennsylvania. 12 
6 Cf. Lange, Oscar, Price Flexibility and Employment, Bloomington 1944. 
7 Institutionalism was to be associated with interventionism, I.e., public po-
licy was strongly used to reach predefined economic goals; Kitch, The 
Fire of Truth ... , supra, 178: "It was an environment in which the general 
intellectual atmosphere was strongly prosocialist. It was strongly in favor 
of government going all the way to take over the whole economy." 
8 For details, cf. Reder, Chicago Economics ... , supra, 10. 
9 Cf. Reder, Chicago Economics ... , supra, 10. 
10 For a collection of the contributions presented, cf. Goldschmid, Harvey J. 
et al., Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, Boston, Toronto 1974. 
11 For comprehensive statements of the Harvard position, cf. Bain, Joe S., 
Industrial Organization, 2nd ed., New York et al. 1968, Scherer, Frederic 
M., Industrial market structure and economic performance, second ed., 
Chicago 1980, Shepherd, The Economics •.. , op. cit. 
1 2 For the collection of the contributions presented, cf. the omnibus volume 
127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1979). 
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2. Chicago Antitrust Philosophy 
In the following, the system of values and beliefs that characterize the Chi-
cago approach to (antitrust) economics will be stated. 13 
Regarding overall contemporary Chicago economics, the system of values and 
beliefs adhered to, is best described by Milton Friedman: 14 
" ... , 'Chicago' stands for the belief in the efficiency of the free market 
as a means of organizing resources, for scepticism about government 
intervention into economic affairs, and for emphasis on the quantity of 
money as a key factor in producing inflation." 
This philosophy encompasses the premises of methodological individualism 
that is historically associated with John Stuart MIii and Adam Smith. It con-
tains a strong belief that all social phenomena should be traced back to 
their foundation in individual behavior. 15 
Regarding antitrust, this philosophy finds its correspondence in the theore-
tical model of competition since there is the belief that It "can be utilized to 
provide empirical proof that laissez-faire capitalism maximizes both personal 
freedom and economic welfare" •18 
This view led to a distinct change in - or rather, renewal - of intellectual 
climate among economists. There was a shift not only away from mainstream 
economics, 17 but also to the view that government itself is undesirable. 19 
13 It has to be noted that this is a statement of contemporary Chicago an-
titrust philosophy, since this position is viewed as a misinterpretation of 
the traditional Chicago view by some authors, cf. Martin, David D., Indu-
strial Organization and Reorganization, in: Samuels, Warren J. (ed.), The 
Chicago School of Political Economy, East Lansing (1976), pp. 295-310, esp. 
296 and 311; Samuels, Warren J., The Chicago School of Political Economy: 
A Constructive Critique, in: Samuels, The Chicago School ... , op. cit., 1-18. 
14 Friedman, Milton, Schools at Chicago, University of Chicago Magazine 
(1974), pp. 11-16, 11, quoted after Mishan, Ezra J., The Folklore of the 
Market: An Inquiry into the Ecomomic Doctrines of the Chicago School, in: 
Samuels, The Chicago School •.• , op. cit., 95-166, 95. 
15 Cf. Paque, Karl-Heinz, How Far Is Vienna from Chicago? An Essay on the 
Methodology of Two Schools of Dogmatic Liberalism, 38 Kyklos (1985), pp. 
412-434, 413. 
16 Wilber, Charles K., and Jon D. Wisman, The Chicago School: Positivism or 
Ideal Type, In: Samuels, The Chicago School ... , op. cit., 79-93, 79. 
17 Cf. Paque, How Far ... , supra, 412. 
18 Cf. Martin, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 302; this strongly resembles 
the anti-institutionalist stance of the founding fathers of antitrust Chi-
cago style, cf. supra. 
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In addition to this view, a strong analogy between a free market system and 
the Darwinian theory of natural selection and evolution is drawn 19 by Chi-
cago antitrusters:20 
"The environment to which the business firm must adapt Is defined, ul-
timately, by social wants and the social costs of meeting them. The firm 
that adapts to the environment better than its rivals tends to expand. 
The less successful firm tends to contract - perhaps, eventually, to be-
come exti net." 
As has been shown supra, Chicago antitrust did not emerge from a full-
blown philosophy, but was rather a product of specific questions raised by 
antitrust cases against the background of a system of values and beliefs 
that can be summarized as follows:21 
- The market process is observed with regard to the "survival of the fit-
test" in a long-run perspective. 
Without government interference, a Pareto-optimal state is reached by the 
market process (so-called tight prior equilibrium). 
- Governmental or public influence has to be repelled and restricted to the 
setting of a minimal legal framework. 
The analysis of the market process is carried out by using the concepts 
of monopoly and perfect competition as standards of reference. 
- Economics is also applied to other socio-political fields (e.g. 'economics of 
marriage', 'economics of crime'). 
19 Cf. Adams, Walter, Public Policy in a Free Enterprise Economy, in: Adams, 
Walter, (ed.), The Structure of American Industry, 7th ed., New York 
1986, pp. 395-427, 406-412. 
20 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 118, as well as Stigler's survivor 
test, cf. Stigler, The Organization ... , op. cit., 72-74. 
21 Cf. Borchert/Grossekettler, op. cit., 161-163, and Schmidt/Rittaler, Die 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 13. 
With regard to other schools of thought within the field of antitrust 
theory, there seems to be a certain similarity between the Chicago School 
and the (Neo-) Austrian School (v. Mises, v. Hayek, Kirmer et al.) as far 
as the transaction cost approach is concerned. Both approaches are quite 
different in terms of their theoretical notion but they show a consi-
derable amount of similarity with respect to policy implications and, the-
refore, are often compared with each other, cf. Paque, How Far ... , supra, 
412-434. 
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IV. Definition of the field of eocenrch and Course of Inaulcv 
For the adherents of theory underlying current antitrust policy associated 
with the Chicago School the only performance criterion by which business 
conduct is to be evaluated is the criterion of consumer welfare respectively 
economic efficiency. Whereas the traditional tenet was characterized by a 
close relationship between the structure of a particular industry, the resul-
ting conduct of the industry's competitors, and the quality of performance 
flowing from that conduct, the current tenet emphasizes that performance is 
solely determined by the conduct of the competitors, regardless of how the 
structure of that particular industry looks like. 
Traditional theory held that in addition to some other influential factors, the 
degree and development of an industry's concentration can be ascribed to a 
large extent to the number and size distribution of the industry's sellers 
and buyers, the conditions of entry to that particular industry, the scale 
economies to be realized, and the stage in the Industry's maturity. Hence, 
the main purpose of the contribution submitted, is to evaluate critically the 
position towards industrial concentration taken by the Chicago Schoo/1 with 
regard to the importance of the structural factors in particular industries 
and to draw possible conclusions and consequences for the competition poli-
cy of the Federal Republic of Germany.2 Since the emphasis of our inquiry 
will be on external Industrial concentration our conclusions are aimed at 
merger policy primarily. 
After having dealt with recent changes in U.S. antitrust economics, execu-
tive, adjudication, and legislation in the Introduction and summarized land-
mark changes In the direction of antitrust in the United States, we will pro-
pose an analytical framework for the evaluation of restraints of competition 
by Industrial concentration in Part 1 as a standard of reference. Although 
we will mention various approaches to antitrust shortly, our preference will 
be with a modification of the so-called effective competition approach, assu-
ming the validity the structure-, conduct-, performance-paradigm and a 
A critical discussion of the differences between various Chicago scholars 
would be an overwhelming undertaking; therefore, we will restrict oursel-
ves to statements of preeminent Chicago scholars who are fairly orthodox 
representatives of this school; we will deal with deviant positions as far 
as necessary. 
2 This will be done with special reference to antitrust legislation. 
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structural predominance within the paradigm. This shall serve as a working 
hypothesis only since evidence for the paradigm's validity will be tested 
primarily in Parts 2 and 3 of the contribution submitted. 
In Part 2 we will Inquire into the main elements of the theoretical edifice of 
the current tenet associated with the Chicago School. This will In essence be 
an evaluation of several premises, assumptions, and hypotheses which are 
crucial for the current attitude towards industrial concentration. This part 
will comprise three sections. In the first section we will determine whether 
or not efficiency considerations were and are the exclusive concern of anti-
trust policy In the United States, comparing the results to the concerns and 
goals of the cartel law (ARC) of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Section two will comprise an analysis of the adequacy and usefulness of 
neoclassical price theory and the static partial equilibrium trade-off model 
used by adherents of current theory for antitrust analysis. 
Section three will treat the conditions of entry to a particular industry, 
trying to extract impediments to new competition and determine their impor-
tance for an Industry's concentration process and the resulting performance. 
Parts 3 and 4 will encompass the evaluation of horizontal and vertical mer-
gers as the most common forms of external industrial concentration; this will 
be done with special reference to the so-called concentration-collusion doc-
trine concerning horizontal mergers and the importance of transaction-cost 
efficiencies concerning vertical mergers. We will present the traditional as 
well as the current approaches underlying public policy towards horizontal 
and vertical mergers, critically evaluate the Chicago view against the back-
ground of empirical findings, and finally draw policy conclusions. 
The Ruum'8 will finally emphasize the question of whether the German Act 
against Restraints of Competition (ARC) needs a reform along the lines of the 
Chicago School as a result of the conclusions from Parts 2, 3 and 4 of this 
contribution. If a need for a reform is confirmed on the basis of these re-
sults, we have to answer the question of how such a reform should look like 
and whether it should contain elements of currently discussed theory. 
Special reference Is paid to the importance of the role that structural ele-
ments, such as level of concentration, market share, market barriers, and 
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the like play. There will not be a thorough evaluation of antitrust institu-
tions and sanctions. However, we will refer to them in as much detail as 
necessary at relevent points in the argument. The same applies to premises 
and assumptions, not closely connected to the view of current theory on 
industrial concentration. 
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fAr.L.1: Analytical Framework for the Evaluation of Restraints of Competition 
by Industrial Concentration 
In order to evaluate the effects of industry concentration we have to pre-
sent a theoretical approach or standard of reference as a theoretical basis 
of antitrust policy. This particularly includes 
- that we find competition to be the most adequate instrument for the coor-
dination of economic activities and for securing an economic and political 
order; 
- the confirmation that free enterprise systems tend towards self-destruc-
tion if not protected by public policy; 
to base a rational policy approach on predefined objectives as stated in 
constitutions, laws, or government programs; 
- the search for operational criteria to separate competitive from noncompe-
titive conduct; 
to demonstrate the interrelatedness of economic concentration with econo-
mical, social, and political power; and 
- to present the main features of industrial concentration. 
I. free Enterprise system. Competition, and PubUc Polley 
1. Economic Order and Competition 
The economic use of scarce resources has led to the recognition of the divi-
sion of labor principle which has been discovered as the driving force of 
economic growth and progress since Adam Smith. 1 
The division of labor, in turn, has created problems of allocation of economic 
resources and the distribution of economic outcome which required the coor-
dination of economic activity2 and, therefore, made necessary a regulative 
mechanism to steer and control economic processes. 3 
Cf. Bobe!, Ingo, Wettbewerb und Industriestruktur: Industrial Organization 
- Forschung Im Oberblick, Berlin et al. 1984, p. 1. 
2 Cf. Knight, Frank H., The Economic Organization, New York 1951, p. 14; 
Scherer, Frederic M., Industrial market structure and economic perfor-
mance, second ed., Chicago 1980, p. 1. 
3 Cf. Cox, Helmut, and Harald Hubener, Wettbewerb: Eine Einfuhrung in die 
Wettbewerbstheorie und Wettbewerbspolitik, in: Cox, Helmut et al. (eds.), 
Handbuch des Wettbewerbs, Munchen 1981, pp. 1-48, 3. 
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Different mechanisms for the coordination of economic activity can be discer-
ned.4 Most western hemisphere countries rely mainly on markets and a free 
enterprise system5 to coordinate economic activity because the phenomenon 
of competition that takes place in such systems leads to a stimulation of in-
novation, a minimization of resource waste and generally to a satisfaction of 
consumer needs at minimum cost. 6 Within this framework, the price mecha-
nism can be seen as an instrument and general Institution for the analytical 
comprehension of economic interdependencies. 7 
The choice of a free enterprise system is at the same time a choice of a 
distinct political order; that is to say, there is a structural complementarity 
between this system and a democratic political order and a civil legal order, 
which provided the basis for an economic constitution of this type:8 
4 Essentially, these are three mechanisms. The coordination may be achieved 
to conform with tradition, by central planning, by the market system, or 
by a mixed system of these three mechanisms, cf. Scherer, Industrial mar-
ket structure ... , op. cit., 1. 
5 A market can be viewed as "an organized process by which buyers and 
sellers exchange goods and services for money, the medium of exchange.", 
Greer, Douglas F., Industrial Organization and Public Policy, 2nd ed., New 
York 1984, p. 3. A free enterprise sytem Is "an economy the members of 
which rely on the forces of competitive markets to allocate resources and 
organiie the productive process.", Stocking, George W., Workable Competi-
tion and Antitrust Policy, Nashville 1961, p. 1. 
6 Cf. Areeda, Phillip, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ALJ (1983), pp. 
523-537, 523; and Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 9. 
Nevertheless, there are different views on the functions a free enterprise 
system should perform, cf. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allo-
cation, 7th ed., Hinsdale, Ill. 1979, pp. 20-27. 
7 Cf. Kaufer, Erich, Nochmals: Von der Preistheorie zur Wettbewerbstheorie, 
18 ORDO ( 1967), pp. 95-114, 95. 
8 Caspari, Manfred, Joint Ventures Under EEC Law and Policy, paper pre-
sented at a seminar on "Antitrust and Trade Polley in the United States 
and the European Community" at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
October 23, 1987. Cf. Miller, J.P., Economic Goals and the Role of Competi-
tion: Introduction, in: Miller, J.P. (ed.), Competition, Cartels and their Re-
gulation, Amsterdam 1962, pp. 1-6, 2; Bohrn, Franz, Privatrechtsgesellschaft 
und Marktwirtschaft, 17 ORDO (1966), pp. 75-151. 
In Germany this complementarity of economic and political or legal order 
has been espoused as a principle especially by the so-called Ordoliberal 
School led by Walter Eucken, WIiheim Repke, Alfred MUller-Arrnack et al. 
For these economists the essential basis for successful economic policies is 
a sound legal and institutional framework (ordo) in which technical policy 
issues must be subordinated to the requirements of this framework; for a 
survey cf. Hutchison, Thomas W., The Politics and Philosophy of Econo-
mics: Marxians, Keynesians and Austrians, New York and London 1981, pp. 
155-175; for some basics cf. Eucken, Walter, Grundsatze der Wi rtschaftspo-
liti k, 5th ed., TUbingen 1975, esp. p. 21. 
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Another essential aspect of competition policy is what the Germans call 
the "ordnungspolitische" function. Competition, acting as a controlling, 
selecting and driving force through decentralized decision-making pro-
cesses, is the only basic economic principle appropriate for free, demo-
cratic states." 
For the pupose of analysis we will also rely on the free enterprise system, 
the market mechanism, and competition. Although we will not inquire into the 
legal and Institutional framework, we will take a closer look at the nature 
and meaning of competition that ought to take place in an economy of this 
kind. 
2. Nature and Meaning of Competition 
Although competition is a political, social, and economic desideratum in a 
market-based free-enterprise system9, no adequate definition of competition 
has so far been formulated 10; the term competition is thus used ambi-
guously.11 
9 Cf. McNulty, Paul J., Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 
QJE (1968), pp. 639-656, 639. 
10 Cf. McNulty, Economic Theory ... , supra, 639; Schmidbauer, Allokation ... , 
op. cit., 18. In this sense, one could use any definition of competition 
such as, e.g., Webster's Thi rd New International Dictionary, vol. 1, Chica-
go et al. 1971, which defines competition as "a market condition in which 
a large number of independent buyers and sellers compete for identical 
commodities, deal freely with each other, and retain the right of entry 
and exit from the market." 
11 Cf. Leftwich, The Price System ... , op. cit., 29. 
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In order to avoid the shortcomings which characterized previous attempts to 
define competition 12, we will dispense with a formal definitlon. 13 Instead, we 
will circumscribe competition and name its main characteristics, in order to 
find out how competition works and have a rationale for it. 14 
Competition as a socio-economic principle for the organization of economic 
activity has to be seen as an instrument for the realization of certain goals. 
It cannot be seen in the absence of ulterior motives, therefore. 15 In this 
sense, it can be seen as a dynamic process that is characterized by initia-
tory moves and imitative responses. Within this process, market imperfecti-
ons are the result of initiatory competitive action and, at the same time, 
prerequisites for imitative competitive action. 1e The anonymous pressure on 
prices and costs that is exerted by competition, and that is not verifiable 
by the market participants, tends to contribute to the realization of goals 
by forcing on the market participants an economically rational form of beha-
12 For attempts to define competition in positive terms cf. Bohm, Franz, Die 
Ordnung der Wlrtschaft als gesellschaftliche Aufgabe und rechtsschopfe-
rische Leistung, Stuttgart and Berlin 1937, p. 124. Clark, John M., Compe-
tition As A Dynamic Process, Washington 1961, p. 13. On the absence of a 
concrete definition of competition cf., e.g., Knight, Frank H., The Ethics 
of Competition, 37 QJE (1922/23), pp. 579-624, esp. 589: "The critical rea-
der of general economic literature must be struck by the absence of any 
attempt accurately to define that competition which is the principal sub-
ject of the discussion." 
13 Some authors are of the opinion that for the purpose of analysis there 
has to be a clear definition of competition, cf. Schmidbauer, Allokation ... , 
op. cit., 25. The proposal for the Act Against Restraints of Competition 
did not contain a legal definition of competition since it was seen as a 
phenomenon changing over time, cf. Schriftlicher Berlcht des Ausschusses 
fur Wirtschaftspolitik Ober den Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Wettbe-
werbsbeschriinkungen, BTDr. 3644, p. 13; cf. as well Cox/H0bener, Wettbe-
werb ... , op. cit., 5. 
14 If not a definition, at least this is necessary as a basis for erecting a 
rigorous analytical system adequate both for economic analysis and for 
public policy, cf. McNulty, Economic Theory ... , supra, 639, 641. 
15 Cf., e.g., Stigler, The Organization of Industry, op. cit., 5; Zohlnhofer, 
Werner, Wettbewerbspolitik im Oligopoi. Erfahrung der amerikanischen An-
titrustpolltik, Basel and T0bingen 1968, p. 5; a deviant position is stated 
by Hoppmann, Erich, Zurn Problem einer wirtschaftspolitisch praktikablen 
Definition des Wettbewerbs, in: Schneider, Hans K. (ed.), Grundlagen der 
Wettbewerbspoiiti k, Berlin 1968, pp. 9-49, 12, who views competition as an 
end in itself and rejects competition as an instrument for the attainment 
of goals since by this it is assumed that the economy and its participants 
are part of a constructivist system and, therefore, manipulable. 
16 Cf. Schmidt, Ingo, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht: Eine Einfuhrung, 
2nd ed., Stuttgart 1987, p. 60. 
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vior. 17 The profits gained by initiatory competitive action will not disappear 
at once, but will be eroded over time. 18 
In addition to the consensus position that competition has to be considered 
a dynamic process19, further characteristics by which competition can be 
described are relevant:20 
- competition can only take place if there are markets; 
- the consumer must be able to choose among alternative suppliers; 
- the competitive process must be open and free; 
- competition must proceed under uncertainty; 
- the competitors have to act antagonistically towards one another. 
If we want to define a concept of competition which is relevant and ade-
quate both for economic analysis and economic policy21, we will have to de-
termine the goals that competition as an instrument is supposed to 
17 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 38; and as well 
Zohlnhofer, Wettbewerbspolitik im Oligopol, op. cit., 11. 
18 In order to find out how competition works, to carry out economic analy-
ses and draw policy conclusions, we will have to develop a model of com-
petition which will be done in Part 1, II., 1.b.; for basic sources on the 
nature of competition cf. Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Economics, 8th 
ed., London 1920, Robinson, Joan, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 
London 1933; Chamberlin, Edward H., The Theory of Monopolistic Competi-
tion, Cambridge, Mass. 1933; Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy, New York 1942; Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit.; and 
Stigler, The Organization of Industry, op. cit. 
A survey on the development of the idea of competition is found in Stig-
ler, George J., Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 JPE 
(1957), pp. 1-17; McNulty, Paul J., A Note on the History of Perfect Com-
petiton, 75 JPE (1967), pp. 395-399; and idem, Economic Theory ... , supra. 
19 The dynamic aspect of competiton has mainly been emphasized by Abra-
movitz, Arndt, Clark and Schumpeter. Although competition has to be dy-
namic and, therefore, cannot be primarily related to structural aspects of 
markets, it has been described most ambiguously in behavioral terms, cf. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. von, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago 1960, p. 
265. 
20 Cf. Armentano, Dominick T., Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy 
Failure, New York et al. 1982, p. 14; Clark, Competiton As A Dynamic Pro-
cess, op. cit., 9, 13, 63; Cox/Hi.lbener, Wettbewerb ... , op. cit., 6; Greer, 
Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 3; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspoliti k und 
Kartellrecht, op. cit., 2; Shepherd, The Economics ... , op. cit., 11; and 
idem, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 34-36. 
21 Cf. McNulty, Economic Theory ..• , supra, 641. 
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achieve.22 Furthermore, we will have to find out whether we are able to 
specify conditions that are necessary and sufficient In order to achieve 
effective competition.23 
Before doing this, it is important to find out whether competiton is self-
maintaining, whether its existence has to be secured by public policy, or 
whether it is possible at all. 
3. Competition and Public Polley 
There would not be a need for antitrust policy if the competitive mechanism 
was self-maintaining; then attempts of business organizations to extinguish 
competition would be fruitless. 24 According to a strict natural rights per-
spective, there would not be any reason whatsoever to justify antitrust re-
gulation. Even if competition were bound to be destroyed the economic free-
dom to contract would have to be left untouched by the public.25 
22 There is the notion that different constellations of conditions are respon-
sible for different Intensities of competition and, therefore, the different 
degrees by which goals are attained, cf., e.g. Schmidbauer, Allokation ... , 
op. cit., 31, 49. 
23 Cf. Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 36 f.; and Schmidbauer, Alloka-
tlon ... , op. cit., 47. 
24 In fact, this position would foster a laissez-faire approach by denying 
the basic idea of a legal system as an instrument for correcting reality, 
cf. Moschel, Wernhard, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen Koln et al. 
1983, p. 52. 
Another reason for this position would be a general belief in the bene-
volence of business organizations in the competitive process that would 
leave competition untouched, cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartell-
recht, op. cit., 143. 
25 This strict natural rights perspective "holds that individuals have alien-
able rights to life, liberty, and property. These rights imply the liberty 
of any person or persons to enter into any noncoercive trading agree-
ment on any terms mutually acceptable, to produce and trade any factor 
or good that they own, and to keep property realized by such free 
exchange.", Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly ... , op. cit., 8; on this 
position cf. as well Pilon, Roger, Cooperations and Rights: On Treating 
Corporate People Justly, 13 GLR (1979), pp. 1245-1370; and Hessen, Ro-
bert, In Defense of the Corporation, Standford 1979. 
There has been a denial of the laissez-faire principle through history, 
however, that has always led to a minimal level of public policy, inclu-
ding the classic economists, such as , e.g., Adam Smith, cf. Armentano. 
Antitrust and Monopoly ... , op. cit., 5; Clark, Competition As A Dynamic 
Process, op. cit., 67; Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. 
cit., 51; and as well Kulp et al., op. cit., 176. 
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Antitrust policy would be impossible if the competitive process was self-
destructive, an economic tenet that peaked in the 1920s28 but which can 
also be found nowadays.27 Actually, this view embodies the assumption of 
the impossibility of a legal system as such and , therefore, has to be rejec-
ted.28 
We will take the position that there Is a "construction default"29 in the free 
enterprise system which will inevitably lead to the destruction of this 
system if there is no public policy. 30 Within the market process31 , market 
participants decide under uncertainty. In this context, uncertainty is a 
necessary condition for the effectiveness of competltion.32 Public policy ob-
jectives will only be attained if market participants behave competitively. 
During the market process, however, competitors will try to impair the 
socioeconomic instrument of competition by noncompetitive action since this 
will bear individual advantages. 33 
Competition impairment in this context, has to be viewed as a legal and/or 
factual restriction of relevant formal and material alternatives of choice In 
using competitive parameters. 34 It is obvious that the attempt to impair 
26 Cf. Robinson, Joan, The Impossibility of Competition, in: Chamberlin, Ed-
ward H. (ed.), Monopoly and Competition and their Regulation, 1954, pp. 
245-254. 
27 Cf. Galbraith, John K., The Affluent Society, Boston 1956; idem, American 
Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, London 1957; and Idem, 
Economic Development, Cambridge, Mass. 1968. 
28 Cf. Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. cit., 51. 
29 The expression was coined by the German ordoliberal economist Franz 
Bohm, cf. Cox/Hubener, Wettbewerb ... , op. cit., 8. 
30 Cf., e.g., Clark, Competition As A Dynamic Process, op. cit., 66; and Roper, 
Burkhardt, Die Konkurrenz und ihre Fehlentwicklungen: Untersuchungen 
uber Storungen der Marktwirtschaft, Berlin 1952, pp. 24 and 27. 
31 A market process can be understood as action of market participants In 
and through which the economic exchange of goods and services is per-
formed, cf. Hoppmann, Erich, Zurn Schutzobjekt des GWB, in: Mestmacker, 
Ernst-Joachim (ed.), Wettbewerb als Aufgabe. Nach zehn Jahren Gesetz 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, Bad Homburg v.d.H. et al. 1968, pp. 
61-104, 89. 
32 Cf. Hayek, Friedrich A. v., Die Arten der Ordnung, 14 ORDO (1963), pp. 3-
20, 16. 
33 For details on the discrepancy between individual behavior and collective 
results cf. Schelling, Thomas C., Micromotives and Macrobehavior, New 
York 1978, pp. 25-32. 
34 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 109, and text 
infra. 
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competition makes public policy necessary since otherwise competition will be 
destroyed. Antitrust policy in this sense encompasses measures that will 
protect, maintain, and promote competition as an instrument for the attain-
ment of objectives. 35 This can be characterized as an Instrumentalist-utili-
tarian position.38 
The measures of public policy have to be based on the law provided by the 
legislator; only within such a legal framework, will individualistic rational 
behavior constitute a competitive process that can be protected from de-
struction. 
The rationale for the U.S. antitrust laws is the protection of economic free-
dom and free and unfettered competition37, whereas the rationale of the Act 
Against Restraints of Competition (ARC) is the protection of a free enterprise 
system, the protection of the freedom to compete, and the restriction of eco-
nomic power.38 With regard to the main aspects we juxtapose the alternative 
policy approaches: 
35 Cf. Preiser, Erich, Die Zukunft unserer Wirtschaftsordnung, 5th ed., Got-
tingen 1968, p. 18; Zohlnhofer, Wettbewerbspolitik im Oligopol, op. cit., 16. 
36 Cf. Bjork, Gordon C., Private Enterprise and Public Interest: The Deve-
lopment of American Capitalism, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1969, esp. chs. 1, 
3, and 5. The question to what degree public policy increases public 
welfare and at the same time is efficient, is heavily disputed nowadays, 
cf. Llebhafsky, H. H., American Government and Business, New York 1971, 
pp. 23-26; Rothbard, Murray N., Towards a Reconstruction of Utility and 
Welfare Economics, New York 1978. 
37 Cf. Lange, Bernd-Peter, et al., Konzentrationspolitik in den USA, T0bingen 
1972, p. 2; Schmidbauer, Allokation ... , op. cit., 54; furthermore this inclu-
des a restriction of economic power, Edwards, Corwin, Control of Cartels 
and Monopolies: An International Comparison, New York 1967, p. 197: 
"They (the goals; added by the author) consist In a) keeping prices low 
and the price of goods adequate for the needs of consumers, and promo-
ting improvements in technology and business organization that con-
tribute to these results; and bl preventing private action that Impairs 
business opportunity or access to markets." (emphasis added). 
38 Cf. Schmidbauer, Allokation ... , op. cit., 45 f. 
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fil.....1; Survey of the Different Approaches Dealing with Restraints of 




horizontal restraints 10s tly per se rule accord. per se rule in Sec . I AIC 
&..1!..ill to Sec . I Sherm Act with a nu1ber of eu1ptions 
1n Secs . 2-8 ARC 
vertical restraints 
of trade 
- price restraints - per se rule accord . to - per &e rule in Sec. !SAIC 
Sec . I Sher•an Act 
- nonprice restraiots - rule of reason - rule of reason 
urgers only cautious application relatively strict 
of Sec . 7 Clayton Act and application of Sec . 21m 
•ainly towards large hori-
zontal •eners 
• This applies for the current policy based on Chicago views 
11. Econanlc Evaluation Qf Industrial Concentration: Theoretical Approach and 
pubUc eoucv 
1. Antitrust Polley Objectives 
Antitrust cannot be evaluated In the abstract. 1 A rational policy approach 
towards antitrust violations Is only sensible with regard to predefined ob-
jectives as stated in constitutions, laws or government programs.2 It Is the 
public Interest to attain these standards as closely as possible by means of 
public pollcy.3 
As the disagreement over the effectiveness of antitrust is commonly a dis-
agreement over Its goals, the evaluation of antitrust requires a clear un-
derstanding of goals, cf. Kauper, Thomas C., The Goals of United States 
Antitrust Policy: The Current Debate, 136 JITE (1980), pp. 408-434, 408 
and 416. 
2 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 33. To make 
goals explicit means also to avoid hidden value judgments. 
3 Cf. Shepherd, Public Policies .•• , op. cit., 6. 
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a. Objectives and Interrelations 
At first sight, a vast number of goals appears to be presented in antitrust 
literature.4 However, the variety can be reduced to a few main goals5 which 
can be grouped into the categories of economic and noneconomic objectives.8 
Within the category of economic objectives, which comprises economically 
desirable results, the following objectives can most commonly be found:7 
- economic efficiency, Including allocative and productive efficiency; 
- equity, meaning distribution of economic benefits according to the input 
into the economic process; 
- consumers' sovereignty; 
- technological progress; 
- facilitation of high and stable employment. 
4 For a general treatment of the economic policy objective issue cf. Boul-
ding, Kenneth E., Principles of Economic Policy London 1959, pp. 131-158; 
and Giersch, Herbert, Grundlagen der Wirtschaftspolltlk, 1st vol.: Grund-
lagen, Wiesbaden 1961, pp. 59-90. For a basic treatment of antitrust objec-
tives cf. Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 498-501; Clark, Competition 
As A Dynamic Process .•• , op. cit., 63-88; Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy 
••. , op. cit., 11-16; and Kantzenbach, Erhard, Die Funktionsfii.hlgkelt des 
Wettbewerbs, 2nd ed., Gottingen 1967, pp. 12-19. 
On the interrelatedness of economic and antitrust objectives cf. Bartling, 
Hartwig, Leitbilder der Wettbewerbspolitlk, MUnchen 1980, pp. 1-8. 
5 The positive evaluation of the goals embodies a normative value judgment, 
cf. Bain, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 23; as well as Kantzenbach, 
Die Funktlonsfii.higkeit ••• , op. cit., 14. 
6 Cf. Kauper, The Goals ..• , supra, 416 f.; Dirlam, Joel B., and Alfred E. Kahn, 
Fair Competition: The Law and Economics of Antitrust Policy, Westport, Ct. 
1970, p. 17, Greer, Douglas F., Industrial Organization and Public Polley, 
2nd ed., New York, 1984, pp. 17 f., Scherer, Industrial market structure 
..• , op. cit., 12 f.; Shepherd, Public Policies ••. , op. cit., 501. 
7 Cf. as well Zohlnhofer, Werner, Wettbewerbspolitik Im Oligopol. Erfahrungen 
der amerlkanischen Antltrustpolitlk, Basel and TUbingen 1968, pp. 6 f. 
It should be pointed out that It is a matter of operationality whether 
these objectives can serve as specific market performance goals, cf. Bain, 
Industrial Organization, op. cit., 501. 
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Noneconomic objectives comprise political as well as social considerations. 
The most Important ones can be summarized as follows:8 
- freedom of choice or opportunity; 
- prevention of undue concentration of economic and, therefore, social and 
political power; 
maintenance of competition as an end in Itself; 
- protection of small business; 
- redistribution of income. 
The development of a system of antitrust objectives and instruments is 
based on commonly accepted values which can be viewed as ethical premi-
ses.9 A set of functions can be stated on a second level, the fulfllment of 
which furthers the attainment of the more basic alms and underlying values. 
We will base our considerations on a set of functions Introduced by Kan-
tzenbach10 and enlarged on by 5chmidt11 
- equitable income distribution; 
- allocative efficiency; 
- consumers' sovereignty; 
flexibility according to changes in economic conditions; 
- technological progress; 
8 Cf. Dirlam/Kahn, Fair Competition .•• , op. cit., 17; Kauper, The Goals .•• , 
supra, 417; Pitofsky, Robert, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 UPLR 
(1979), pp. 1051-1075, 1053-1057; Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 6. 
It Is not a question of whether to include such noneconomic motives, but 
how to implement these objectives, cf. Schwartz, Louis B., "Justice" and 
other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 UPLR (1979), pp. 1076-1081. 
There is a tendency, however, to displace such noneconomic considera-
tions, cf. Schmidbauer, Allokation ... , op. cit., 48. This position neglects 
that "(a)ntitrust has a broader base than the findings of economists as 
to the conditions required for optimum economic performance.", Neale, 
Alan D., and D. G. Goyder, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A.: A Study of 
Competition Enforced by Law, 3rd ed., Cambridge et al. 1980, p. 441. 
9 Cf. Sosnick, Stephen H., A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition, 
72 QJE (1958), pp. 380-423, 393. We will base our considerations on a 
threefold set of values which are situated on a first level In a hierarchy 
of goals: liberty, welfare and Justice, cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitlk und 
Kartellrecht, op. cit., 33. 
10 Cf. Kantzenbach, Die Funktionsfiihigkeit .•. , op. cit., 16-19. 
11 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitl k und Kartell recht, op. cit., 33-37. 
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- freedom of choice or opportunity through prevention of undue concen-
tration of economic power. 12 
Furthermore, on a third level, norms within the market categories structure, 
conduct and performance can be utilized to operationalize these functions 
and measure their fulfilment. 13 
The procedure results in the statement of a hierarchy of basic objectives, 
functions and norms, all of which are lnterrelated. 14 
b. Confllctlng Objectives 
Three different kinds of interrelations between policy objectives can be 
discerned. Objectives can be Indifferent to each other, complementary or 
competing, i.e. conflicting. 15 As in social life, conflicts can be seen as re-
gular concomitants In the field of economic policy objectives. 18 
The consensus that no single objective shall be treated as an absolute, 
makes it necessary to indicate which objective should prevail In situations 
12 This catalogue of goals does not represent a closed system in the sense 
of achieving optimal results. It comprises more or less the most important 
functions from the author's point of view, cf. for this position Zohlnhofer, 
Wettbewerbspolltik Im Ollgopol, op. cit., 8. 
In addition to the five economic functions mentioned, the socio-political 
function of freedom of choice through prevention of undue concentration 
of economic power Is seen by the author as furthering the prevention of 
social and political power, the protection of small business, as well as the 
maintenance of competition as an end In itself. For this reason, these 
functions are taken into account explicitly. Redistribution of income is not 
seen as a matter of antitrust. 
13 Cf. Sosnick, A Critique ... , supra, 393. 
14 Cf. Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ••• , op. cit., 45; and Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 33. For an extensive historical 
survey on general economic objectives and antitrust objectives within 
different theoretical approaches cf. Alsmoller, Horst, Wettbewerbspolitische 
Ziele und kooperationstheoretische Hypothesen im Wandel der Zeit, T0bin-
gen 1982, who make objectives explicit that have been mentioned only im-
plicitly by some authors. 
15 On the interrelations of economic policy objectives In general cf. Boul-
ding, Principles of Economic Policy, op. cit., 131-157; Giersch, Grundlagen 
.•. , op. cit., 59-90; on the Interrelations and esp. conflicts between anti-
trust objectives cf. Kantzenbach, Die Funktionsfiihigkelt ... , op. cit., 49-
54; Scherer, Industrial market structure .•• , op. cit., 81-118 and 407-438; 
as well as Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., ch. 5. 
16 Cf. Dirlam/Kahn, Fair Competition .•• , op. cit., 18; and Giersch, Grundla-
gen ... , op. cit., 59. 
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where various objectives conflict. 17 
Resolving the conflict of objectives is not an economic issue but a matter of 
political choice. A trade-off is not easy to achieve, nor do per se-rules exist 
for resolving such conflicts, since different antitrust approaches will lead to 
different prioritles.1e 
Three categories of conflict can be distinguished:19 
- conflicts between static and dynamic functions within the category of eco-
nomic objectives;20 
conflicts between the economic functions and the socio-political objectives 
of prevention of undue concentration of economic power; 
- conflicts between the antitrust functions as such and other meta-economic 
objectives. 
The main potential for conflicts lies within the second category since in 
situations of conflict it has to be decided whether desirable economic per-
formance (economic functions) or the decentralization of economic power to 
17 Cf. Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ..• , op. cit., 45; Kauper, The Goals ... , 
supra, 408: "To the degree that ( ... ) economic, political and social goals 
are consistent, i.e., when the achievement of efficiency also results in 
diffusion of power more generally, the controversy may seem purely aca-
demic. But such goals are often inconsistent, and a choice between them 
is necessary In order to resolve specific cases." 
The Chicago School, on which we will elaborate in the following, treats 
consumer welfare as the sole purpose of antitrust policy, cf. Schmidt/ 
Rittaler, Die Chicago School ... , op. cit., 37-44. 
18 Cf. Dirlam/Kahn, Fair Competition ... , op. cit., 18-21; on the one hand, one 
can justify an approach that is oriented totally towards economic objec-
tives, cf. Kantzenbach, Die Funktlonsfii.hlgkeit •.. , op. cit., 13; whereas 
others prefer an approach that is solely oriented towards the freedom to 
compete, denying possible conflicts, cf. Hoppmann, Erich, Zurn Schutzob-
jekt des GWB, in: Mestmacker, Ernst-Joachim (ed.), Wettbewerb als Auf-
gabe - Nach zehn Jahren Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrii.nkungen, Bad 
Homburg v.d.H. 1968, pp. 61-104, 103 f.; Mestmacker, Ernst-Joachim, Das 
Verhii.ltnls des Rechts der Wettbewerbsbeschrii.nkungen zum Prlvatrecht, 
21 DB (1968), pp. 787-799, 790; yet others see surprisingly few difficul-
ties, or at least accord little explicit discussion to possible goal conflicts, 
since they acknowledge that deviant objectives have to be subordinated 
to the protection of competition as an end In Itself, cf. Sosnick, A Cri-
tique ... , supra, 394. 
19 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 81-104. Since 
this is an optional taxonomy, others are viable as well, cf. Dirlam/Kahn, 
Fair Competition ... , op. cit., 22-24; Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ... , 
op. cit., 82-84. 
20 For an accurate distinction, cf. Kantzenbach, Die Funktionsflihigkeit ... , 
op. cit., 16-18. 
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protect individual freedom should prevail. 21 In fact, this conflict is heavily 
disputed.22 
It can be summarized that the conflicts described can possibly occur but do 
not have to occur. 23 We will present our antitrust approach on the basis of 
the objectives presented and by taking into consideration conflicting objec-
tives. 
2. Elements of the Approach to an Evaluation of Industrial Concentration 
The attainment of predefined antitrust objectives can only be secured by 
promoting desirable forms of competition. Within this context, the primary 
purpose of a model of antitrust is to distinguish competitive from noncom-
petitive market conduct and, therefore, competitive from noncompetitive mar-
ket processes. The competitive process has to be standardized, as it were, 
since deviations from that standard indicate competition impairment and, 
therefore, deficient attainment of antitrust objectives.24 
a. Models of Competition 
Whereas free and unfettered competition in the view of classical economists 
would lead to an adjustment and harmony of interests of market participants 
if placed in a legal framework 25, neoclassical economists inquired into the 
conditions which would constitute the market equilibrium, following a compe-
21 Cf. Kantzenbach, Die Funktionsfahigkeit ... , op. cit., 52-54; Kauper, The 
Goals ... , supra, 418; Schmidbauer, Allokation ... , op. cit., 50 f.; Scherer, 
Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 81-88. 
Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ... , op. cit., 82: "In our proposed standard 
of policy we have given primacy to the limitation of market power over 
the promotion of desirable economic performance." 
22 The same applies to the question whether competitors or competition 
should be protected, although there does not necessarily have to be a 
conflict, cf. Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ... , op. cit., 19; Schmidbauer, 
Al lokation ... , op. cit., 45; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspoliti k und Kartel I recht, 
op. cit., 81-83; and Schwartz, "Justice" ... , supra, 1076. We will judge on 
a case by case basis. 
23 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspol iti k und Kartel I rec ht, op. cit., 105. 
24 "(T)he formuation of public policy requires a distinction between situati-
ons and practices which are in the public interest and those that are 
not", Mason, Edward S., Monopoly In Law and Economics, 47 YLJ (1937), 
pp. 34-49, 49. 
25 Cf. Bartling, Leitbi Ider ... , op. cit., 9; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspoliti k 
und Kartell rec ht, op. cit., 3. 
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titive process. 26 The recognition that this model of perfect competition con-
tained no reliable standards for evaluating real-world conditions since the 
conditions for equilibrium were unrealistic themselves27, led to a "pessimis-
tic" attitude towards the notion of competition; it was asserted that real-
world market imperfections would lead to economically undesirable perfor-
mance (inefficient resource allocation, overcapacity, etc.).28 
In a seminal article29 John Maurice Clark made a first attempt to induce a 
search for operational norms which would serve to Indicate "workable com-
petition".30 The development of the basic idea of this concept has been done 
in two steps. In a first step, Clark acknowledged that perfect competition 
does not exist and cannot exist and has presumably never existed, recogni-
26 For a survey on the classics cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartell-
recht, op. cit., 2-5; Bartling, Leitbilder ... , op. cit., 9-11; Schroter, op. 
cit., 10-13. 
The first systematic inquiries into these conditions have been done by 
Walras, Leon, Elements of Pure Economics or the Theory of Social Wealth, 
2nd ed. London 1965 (orginal title: Elements d'economie politique pure ou 
theorie de la richesse, Paris-Lausanne 1901 ); the conditions were syste-
matically listed first by Knight, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 
London and Chicago 1971 (original: 1921 ), pp. 76-81. 
For up-to-date statements of the conditions cf. Henderson, James M., and 
Richard E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach, 3rd 
ed., Auckland et al. 1980, pp. 136 f.; and Koutsoyiannis, Anna, Modern 
Microeconomics, 2nd ed., 2nd reprinting, London et al. 1981, pp. 484-504. 
27 We will not state an indepth critique of the neoclassic model of perfect 
competition since this is not within the scope of the contribution and, in 
addition, has been done elsewhere, cf. Bartling, Leitbilder ... , op. cit., 14-
19; Mc Nulty, A Note on the History ... , supra; and Stigler, Perfect Com-
petition, Historically Contemplated, supra; Clark, Competition As A Dynamic 
Process, op. cit., chs. 2 and 3. 
28 Cf. Chamberlin, Edward H., The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 8th 
ed., Cambridge, Mass. 1962; Robinson, The Impossibility of Competition, op. 
cit.; idem, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 2nd ed., London 1969; 
and Sraffa, Piero, The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions, 36 
EJ (1926), pp. 535-550, 542: "It is necessary, therefore, to abandon the 
path of free competition and to turn in the opposite direction, namely, 
towards monopoly." 
29 Cf. Clark, John M., Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AER 
(1940), pp. 241-256; and for extensions idem, Competition: Static Models 
and Dynamic Aspects, 45 AER (1955), pp. 450-462. 
30 One could also use the synonyms 'healthy' or 'effective'. In fact, Clark 
used the term 'effective' in his later publications, cf. Gay Fortman, 
Bastiaan de, Theory of Competition Policy: A Confrontation of Economic, 
Political and Legal Principles, Amsterdam 1966, p. 84. 
Workable competition can be seen as "a set of operational norms or stan-
dards by which markets may be evaluated", Greer, Industrial Organization 
... , op. cit., 40. 
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zing that some departures from the model of perfect competition would not 
be as harmful as formerly assumed; even if further imperfections ("remedial 
imperfections") were added, this form of competition could nonetheless serve 
as an Inferior substitute to perfect competition (second-best solution).31 
Strongly Influenced by Joseph A. Schumpeter,32 Clark turned away from the 
static model as a public policy standard in a second step. 33 Competition 
would only allow for dynamics, technological progress, and innovation if 
market Imperfections occured. These imperfections were viewed as a result 
of initiatory moves and, at the same time, prerequisites for Imitative respon-
ses in the competitive process.34 They therefore became fundamental to the 
emergence of competition as such. The crucial question which followed from 
this new view was which imperfections were desirable for effective compe-
tition and which combinations of them would be most conduclve.35 Clark's 
31 For this evaluation cf. Poeche, Jurgen, Workable Competition als wettbe-
werbspolitlsches Leitbild, in: Poeche, Jurgen (ed.), Das Konzept der 'Wor-
kable Competition' in der angelsachsischen Literatur, FIW-Dokumentation 
Heft 1, Koln et al., pp. 9-32, 12; Schmidt, US-amerlkanlsche ... , op. cit., 
25; and Idem, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 11. 
Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, supra, 242: "If there 
are for example, five conditions, all of which are essential to perfect 
competition, and the first is lacking in a given case, then it no longer 
follows that we are necessarily better off for the presence of any one of 
the other four. In the absence of the first, it is a priori quite possible 
that the second and the third may become positive detriments; and a 
workable satisfactory result may depend on achieving some degree of 
'imperfection' in these other two factors." 
32 Clark was influenced mainly by Schumpeter's theses on Innovation; cf. for 
the original sources Schumpeter, Joseph A., Theorle der wirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung, Leipzig 1912, and idem, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 
op. cit. 
33 Cf. Clark, Competition As A Dynamic Process, op. cit. For this evaluation 
cf. e.g., Kantzenbach, Erhard, and Hermann H. Kallfass, Das Konzept des 
funktionsfahigen Wettbewerbs - workable competition, in: Cox et al. (eds.) 
Handbuch des Wettbewerbs, op. cit., pp. 103-127, 107. 
34 Clark, Competition As A Dynamic Process, op. cit., IX: "And I have become 
increasingly impressed that the kind of competition we have, with all its 
defects - and these are serious - is better than the 'pure and perfect' 
norm, because it makes for progress. Some departures from 'pure and 
perfect' competition are not only inseparable from progress, but neces-
sary to it. The theory of effective competition is dynamic theory." 
(emphasis added). 
35 Cf. Hoppmann, Erich, Workable Competition als wettbewerbspolitisches 
Konzept, in: Besters, Hans (ed.), Theoretische und institutionelle Grund-
lagen der Wirtschaftspolitik, Berlin 1967, pp. 145-197, 154; Schmidt, Wett-
bewerbspolitik und Kartelirecht, op. cit., 12. 
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works resulted In innumerable publications on workable competition, many of 
which were in substantial disagreement with one another.38 
Whereas the main disagreement between promoters of workable competition 
centered around the question of which norms or standards in what combina-
tion would make competition effective37, a number of economists rejected the 
model as such.:ia 
We will deal with the problem of standardization of the competitive process 
in the following. 
36 For an excellent survey on the most important publications within the 
field cf. Poeche (ed.), op.cit; and for a critical review of the literature cf. 
Sosnlck, A Critique ..• , supra. For a classification of the numerous con-
cepts of workable competition cf. Hoppmann, Workable Competition ... , op. 
cit., 146-148. 
Whereas Clark formulated his approach with regard to the economic per-
formance of the individual firm, attempts have been made to shift the 
emphasis to Industry performance, cf. Markham, Jesse W., An Alternative 
Approach to the Concept of Workable Competition, 40 AER (1950), pp. 349-
362, or to the performance of an economy as a whole, cf. Ferguson, 
Charles E., A Macroeconomic Theory of Workable Competition, Durham 1964. 
37 For an indepth evaluation of standards proposed by different models of 
workable competition cf. Sosnick, A Critique ... , supra. 389-391. 
"To determine whether any industry is workably competitive, therefore, 
simply have a good graduate student write his dissertation on the indu-
stry and render a verdict. It is crucial to this test, of course, that no 
second graduate student be allowed to study the industry.", Stigler, 
George J., Report on Antitrust Policy-Discussion, 46 AER (1956), p. 505. 
38 Cf., e.g., Bartling, Leitbilder ... , op. cit., 36-40; Schmidtchen, Dieter, Wett-
bewerbspolitik als Aufgabe. Methodologische und systemtheoretische 
Grundlagen fur eine Neuorlentlerung, Baden-Baden 1978, esp. pp. 82-110; 
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, supra, 930 f. 
Hoppmann, for example, criticizes that the workable competition model Is 
as static as the neo-classical model since it excludes the aspect that 
constitutes competition: the freedom to compete, cf. Hoppmann, Zurn Pro-
blem ... , op. cit., 28. Further, the criticism states that it is impossible to 
determine a set of standards in general in order to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of competition. 
It has to be noted critically, however, that the history of models of com-
petition has always been a search for such standards, cf. Kaufer, Noch-
mals ... , supra. 97; even if the prevention of undue restrictions of free-
dom to compete was the sole purpose of antitrust policy, one would have 
to find a standard In order to determine at what point such undue re-
striction would start. 
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b. The Structure-, Conduct-, Performance-Paradigm, and the Competitive 
Process 
As has already been noted, the standardization of the competitive process 
and, therefore, the evaluation of desirability of competition in a particular 
market, is carried out by setting up norms, the combination of which deter-
mines the intensity of competition. These norms or standards can be grou-
ped into three categories: structure, conduct and performance. 39 
Market structure comprises those elements that tend to exert a long-run In-
fluence on the nature of competition and on the pricing within an indu-
stry:40 
"'Market structure' we use to mean those conditions external to the 
firm which are relatively permanent or which change only slowly, and 
which affect, if they do not determine, the way the firm operates." 
Among the variables of market structure are the number of sellers and 
buyers, their size distribution, the degree of product differentiation, the 
conditions of entry, the stage in market maturity, the underlying cost 
structures, scale eco,~omies, the degree of vertical integration et al. 41 
Market conduct or behavior is concerned with the strategic and tactic opti-
ons which are at an enterprise's disposal in specific markets. It comprises 
"aspects of a market which are the result of specific decisions of firms and 
39 Structure, in turn is shaped by so-called basic conditions or determi-
nants of a particular market: "The basic conditions may be thought of as 
characteristics that are either inherent to the product (as is largely true 
of price elasticity of demand, purchase method, and product durability) 
or relatively impervious to easy manipulation by policy (as is largely true 
of growth rate, technology, and historical background).", Greer, Indus-
trial Organization ... , op. cit., 9; cf. as well Koch, Industrial Organization 
... , op. cit., 5; and Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 7. 
40 Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ... , op. cit., 59; cf. as well Bain, Indus-
trial Organization, op. cit., 7, 9, 295. 
41 Numerous variables of market structure can be discerned cf., e.g., the 
surveys in Schmidt, US-amerikanische ... , op. cit., 55; and Sosnick, A 
Critique ... , supra, 389-391. Our emphasis will be placed on the number of 
sellers and buyers, their size distribution, the degree of product diffe-
rentiation, and the conditions of entry, since these factors play a crucial 
role with regard to Chicago School analysis. The relation of these struc-
tural variables to performance in general and to efficiency in particular 
will be analyzed in Parts 2, 3 and 4 of the contribution. 
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which are, at least conceivably, alterable in relatively short periods of 
time ... Crudely put, conduct is subject to alteration by injunction " 42 
This category primarily contains the instruments an enterprise uses with 
regard to marketing its goods and services, such as, for instance, price 
strategies, production strategies, promotion strategies, product quality. 43 
'Conduct' or 'behavior' is taken to mean the actual use of competitive para-
meters, the aspect of cooperation with competitors, and the forms of rivalry 
chosen.44 
Market performance, as a third category for the standardization of market 
processes, is a concept referring to the economic and noneconomic results 
that a market process is supposed to bring about. These can be seen with 
regard to different dimensions, such as economic efficiency, product quality, 
costs, technological progress, output, dispersion of economic power, and the 
Ii ke. 45 
These three categories by which a market process can usually be standar-
dized, are closely interrelated and determine each other to a certain degree. 
This interrelation has been named "structure-conduct-performance para-
digm". It emphasizes the causal links between structure, conduct, and per-
formance, thereby holding that "market structure is important because the 
structure determines the behavior of firms in the industry and that beha-
vior in turn determines the quality of the industry's performance":4& 
42 Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ... , op. cit., 59; cf. as well Bain, Indu-
strial Organization, op. cit., 9 f.; and Sosnick, A Critique ... , supra, 386 f. 
43 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ..• , op. cit., 10. 
44 Cf. Poeche, Workable Competition als wettbewerbspolitisches Leitbild, op. 
cit., 18; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 58 f.; 
62, 64. 
45 Cf. Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 10; Greer, Industrial Organiza-
tion ... , op. cit., 10; and Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ... , op. cit., 62-
70. It has been noted al ready that the performance category can be re-
garded on different levels of aggregation. 
Some authors only include economic performance values: "'Performance' 
will refer to dimensions which represent the realization of normatively 
significant 'economic results'.", Sosnick, A Critique ... , supra, 387. 
46 Caves, Richard E., American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance, 
6th ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1987, p. 17. 
This traditional analytical model of industrial organization became the 
dominant methodology soon after having been introduced by Edward S. 
Mason, cf. Mason, Edward S., Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale 
Enterprise, 29 AER (1939), pp. 61-74. Cf. as well Kantzenbach/Kallfass, Das 
Konzept des funktionsfahi gen Wettbewerbs ... , op. cit., 116. 
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liLJ.; Circular Interdependence of Structure, Conduct, and Perfonance 
as the Traditional Framework for Industrial Organization Analysis 
BASIC CONDITIONS 
SUPPLY DEMAND 
Price elasticity and Price elasticity 
cross~lasticity Rate of growth 
Raw materials Substitutes and 
r- Technology cross-elasticity 
I Product durability Marketing type 
I Value/weight Purchase method 
I 
I Business attitudes Cyclical and seasonal 
I Unionization character I 
I location Location 
I 
I 
I MARKET STRUCTURE I 
I Industry maturity Barriers to ent!y L- Governmental participation Cost structures 
r- Product differentiation Vertical integration 
I Number and size distribution Diversification 
I of sellers and buyers Scale economics I 
I 
' I I CONDUCT I 
I Collusion Research and innovation 
L- Pricing strategy Advertising 
Product strategy legal tactics 
Responsiveness to change 
' PERFORMANCE 
Output Al locative efficiency 
Growth in output X-efficiency 
Tec:hnologic:al odvonce Equity 
Employment 
~ Koch, Ja•es V., Industrial Organization and Prices, 2nd ed., 





A crucial question is whether structure or conduct is essential to the deve-
lopment of an operational theory of industrial organization. The issue is still 
disputed since some economists empasize structure (e.g., Bain, Shepherd), 
whereas others emphasize conduct (e.g., Scherer). 41 
A further point is that there is no one way chain of causation between 
structure, conduct, and performance, as was formerly assumed by traditional 
47 Cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 6 f.; and Singleton, 
Ross c., Industrial Organization and Antitrust: A Survey of Alternative 
Perspectives, Columbus, Ohio 1986, pp. 3-5. 
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promoters of this approach48, nor is the relationship between these market 
characteristics deterministic in nature.49 Rather, these market categories 
show a circular interdependence on one another:!50 
"Whereas price theory and empirical evidence support the contention 
that there is some sort of causal relationship in which structure deter-
mines performance, the same tools may be utilized to demonstrate pos-
sible causation in the reverse direction. Conduct and performance do 
alter market structure. Tactics such as predatory pricing and frequent 
product style changes may drive competing firms out of the market and 
alter market structure. The direction of causation is therefore often 
two-way." 
The main critical Issues with regard to the structure-conduct-performance 
model can be summarized as follows: 
- it is controversial which norms should be included in the categories51 ; 
48 Cf. Sosnick, A Critique ... , supra, 387; and Koch, Industrial Organization 
..• , op. cit., 92. 
There have been attempts to find optimal intensities of competition by 
combining structural characteristics, such as the number of competitors, 
the degree of product heterogeneity et al., cf. Kantzenbach, Die Funk-
tlonsfiihlgkeit ... , op. cit., 39-49, referring to Phillips, Almarin, Market 
Structure, Organization, and Performance, Cambridge, Mass. 1962. These 
attempts, however, have failed and thus have to be rejected, cf. Witkow-
ski, Helmut, Zur Mil3brauchsaufsicht Qber Prelse marktbeherrschender Un-
ternehmen, Frankfurt a.M., Bern 1981, p. 210. 
49 Cf. Kantzenbach/Kallfass, Das Konzept des funktionsfiihigen Wettbewerbs 
.•. , op. cit., 118; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 59 
f.; and Schroter, Klaus, Die wettbewerbspolitische Behandlung von Aus-
nahmebereichen - dargestellt am Beispiel der Fernwarmewirtschaft in der 
BRD, Frankfurt a.M. et al. 1986, pp. 14 and 25. 
It is crucial to acknowledge that this approach is basically pragmatic, 
largely judgmental, and can only result In pattern predictions: "Such an 
approach is not satisfactory to anyone who either believes that it is pos-
sible to achieve absolute certainty or who is driven into an attempt to 
achieve it as a matter of his personal emotional make-up.", Liebhafsky, 
American Government and Business, op. cit., 261. 
For a detailed inquiry Into this issue cf. McKle, Market Structure and 
Function: Performance versus Behavior, in: Markham, Jesse, W., and 
Gustav G. Papanek (eds.), Industrial Organization and Economic Develop-
ment: Essays in Honor of E. S. Mason, Boston 1970, pp. 3-25. 
50 Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 92. For this circular interdepen-
dence cf. Fig. 1. 
51 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 41; Sosnick, A Critique ... , 
supra, 389-391; and Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 43. 
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- it has to be determined how many norms should be included and which 
weight should be given to each of them52; 
- it has to be made explicit whether the three categories should be sepa-
rated from each other53; 
- it has to be determined to what degree the norms can be made operatio-
nal54; and 
- conflicts among norms have to be made explicit. 55 
Even if we neglected these considerations "'(t)he ultimate virtue of the tra-
ditional structure-conduct-performance approach, is crucially dependent 
upon the empirical evidence that can be marshalled in its support"'. 58 
D...:e to this question of empirical proof, the basic tenet of the paradigm has 
been weakened by some authors57 and has been rejected by others.58 
As has been emphasized, the interrelations among the categories which stan-
dardize the competitive process are complex, and there is a lack of secure 
knowledge. 59 Nevertheless, evidence for structural predominance can be 
52 Cf. Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 300; Bartling, Leitbilder der 
Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., 23; and Schmidt, US-amerikanlsche ... , op. 
cit., 56 f. 
53 Cf. Gay Fortman, op. cit., 88; Kantzenbach/Kallfass, Das Konzept des funk-
tionsfiihigen Wettbewerbs ... , op. cit., 113 f.; for a somewhat different 
view Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 93: ""Except for possible 
increased clarity of nomenclature, there seems to be little to be gained 
from arguments about what features of industrial markets are to be ter-
med basic conditions and which should be labeled elements of market 
structure."' 
54 Cf. Lange et al., Konzentrationspolitik in den USA, op. cit., 13. 
55 Cf. Sosnick, A Critique ... , supra, 393. 
56 Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 93. 
57 Cf., e.g., Hoppmann, Zurn Problem ... , op. cit., 39; Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust 
Policy ... , op. cit., 60 f.: "' ... we can neither predict market performance 
from market structure, nor can we tell from structure alone how competi-
tive the processes of the market are"' (emphasis added). 
58 Cf. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly, op. cit., 33; Posner, The Chicago 
School of Antitrust Analysis, supra, 928: "' ... , industrial organization, the 
field of economics that studies monopoly questions, tended to be untheo-
retlcal, descriptive, 'institutional', and even metaphorical."' 
59 Cf. Gay Fortman, op. cit., 89 f.; and Ruppelt, Hansj0rgen, Wettbewerbs-
polltik und wirtschaftliche Konzentration, T0blngen 1978, p. 24. 
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confirmed 110 which makes the paradigm an auxilliary means with regard to 
judging competition intensity. Therefore, the fulfilment of the paradigm's 
norms becomes a necessary condition, although not a sufficient one.81 
c. Effective Competition and Competition Impairment 
In order to standardize the competitive process unequivocally, there is a 
necessity for mutually consistent norms for structure, conduct, and perfor-
mance as market characteristics, the constellation of which determines the 
degree of effectiveness of competition with regard to predefined objec-
tives.52 
Even if we do not follow the contention that there is no necessary relation-
ship between structure and performance83, the paradigm is neither rigidly 
deterministic, nor does it show a one way chain of causation. There is evi-
dence for structural predominance, but If market structure constantly chan-
ges over time, the real causal relationship is difficult if not impossible to 
60 Cf. Adams, Walter, The Case for Structural Tests, in: Weston, J. Fred, and 
Sam Peltzman (eds.), Public Policies Toward Mergers, Pacific Palisades 
1969, pp. 13-26; Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit., chs. 4-7; Blair, 
John M., Economic Concentration, Structure, Behavior and Public Policy, 
New York 1972, ch. 4; and Weston, J. Fred, Structure, Performance and 
Behavior, in: Weston/Peltzman, Public Policies ... , op. cit., pp. 67-78. 
Clark, Competition As A Dynamic Process, op. cit., 421: "It is not true, as 
contended by some lawyers engaged in antitrust practice, that structure 
is irrelevant and behavior is the only thing that counts - especially that 
two firms are sufficient if they behave competitively" (emphasis added). 
61 For further criticism of the paradigm cf. Herdzina, Klaus, Marktstruktur 
und Wettbewerb, 3 ZfWuS (1973), pp. 267-284; and Phillips, Almarin, 
Structure, Conduct and Performance - and Performance, Conduct and 
Structure, in: Markham/Papanek, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., pp. 
26-37. 
On the empirical problems of the approach cf. Caves, Richard E., The 
Determinants of Market Structure: Design for Research, in: Jacquemin, 
Alexis P., and Henk W. de Jong (eds.), Markets, Corporate Behavior and 
the State, The Hague 1976, pp. 3-7. 
62 Whereas the kind and strength of the relationship between market cha-
racteristics and their norms is a positive issue, the question of which 
objectives to pursue, is a normative one, cf. Kantzenbach/Kallfass, Das 
Konzept des funktionsfahigen Wettbewerbs ..• , op. cit., 115. 
63 Asserted as early as 1938, cf. Nourse, Edwin G., and Horace B. Drury, In-
dustrial Price Policies and Economic Progress, Washington, D.C., 1938. 
" ... market structures, or market structure changes, reveal nothing a 
priori concerning competition or welfare", Armentano, Antitrust and Mono-
poly ... , op. cit., 33. 
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trace.54 In addition to these problems and to the ones already pointed out, 
structure, conduct, and performance are not only shaped by the competitive 
process but also by other economic, social and legal conditions.es 
Finally, it should be pointed out that present knowledge on the relationship 
between structure, conduct, and performance allows no policy implications to 
be drawn which are uncontradictory. 1111 Although a "positive" standardization 
of the competitive process seems to be impossible for the time being, how-
ever, specific norms can serve as necessary conditions for effective compe-
tition and certain structures may endanger the workability of the competi-
tive mechanism.57 
These uncertainties can partly be circumvented by taking into account the 
freedom to compete as an extra criterion.58 It can be used as a preliminary 
sufficient condition o criterion to separate competitive from noncompetitive 
behavior by asking whether the freedom to compete is restricted in an 
actual situation.&9 
The basic notion thereby holds that - as a rule - good performance and the 
attainment of objectives Is reached most likely when freedom to compete is 
64 Cf. Bain, Joe S., The Comparative Stability of Market Structure, in: Mark-
ham/Papanek, Industrial Organization and Economic Development, op. cit., 
38-46. Policy implications solely based on the paradigm have to be consi-
dered a "presumption of knowledge"; only pattern predictions can be de-
rived, cf. Hayek, Friedrich A. v., Die Anmal3ung von Wissen, 26 ORDO 
(1975), pp. 12-21; cf. as well Herdzina, Klaus, Wettbewerbspolitik, 2nd ed., 
Stuttgart 1987, p. 112. 
65 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 60. 
66 Cf. Herdzina, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., 71-75; Moschel, Recht der Wett-
bewerbsbeschrankungen, op. cit., 50; Scherer, Industrial market structure 
... , op. cit., 44; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 59 
f., and 77; and Zohlnhofer, Werner, Wettbewerb - Medell und Wirklichkeit, 
in: Andreae, Clemens-August, and Werner Benlsch (eds.), Wettbewerbsord-
nung und Wettbewerbsrealitat, Koln, et. al., pp. 15-36, 24 f. 
67 Cf. Herdzina, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., 81-85, who refers to degrees of 
concentration, the exceeding of which will lead to an increased risk of 
anticompetitive behavior. 
68 This seems rather to be a 'must' because otherwise only economic featu-
res are emphasized and, in addition, the aspect of 'social control of indu-
stry' would be neglected, cf. Gay Fortman, Theory of Competition Policy, 
op. cit., 89. The social control of industry is often termed 'dispersion of 
economic power', cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 
35; we will treat this issue below. 
69 Cf. Hoppmann, Workable Competition .•. , op. cit., 169. 
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unrestricted.70 Freedom to compete, therefore, is considered a basic condi-
tion for effective competition as well as one of Its objectives.71 
Freedom in this context cannot be stated as a positive norm because it can-
not be executed by competitors using their freedom to compete according to 
a prescript.72 It has to be comprehended, therefore, by the determination of 
the restriction of that freedom in an actual situation; by identifying com-
petition impairment, as It were, we arrive at a sort of "negative" standar-
dization. 
Freedom to compete consists of two components. Formal freedom of action, 
which actually means equal treatment through jurisdiction and protection 
from political arbitrariness, and the material freedom of choice which Is con-
sidered the ability to attain predefined objectives by choosing one's own 
course of action. 73 Material freedom of decision can be defined, therefore, 
by the absence of economic power. 
A competitor's freedom to compete has to be related to the freedom of other 
competitors to compete.74 It is for this reason that not every restriction of 
such freedom Is considered an Impairment of competition. Only "undue" re-
strictions of the freedom to compete will be considered an impairment of 
competition. The theory of effective competition therefore becomes a theory 
of competition impalrment.75 
70 This does not necessarily lead to favorable results, cf. Aberle, Gerd, 
Wettbewerbstheorle und Wettbewerbspoliti k, Stuttgart et al. 1980, pp. 63-
68, who mentions market failure and cutthroat competition as an example 
of bad performance despite the freedom to compete. 
71 As has been mentioned, goal conflicts can occur between freedom to com-
pete and good economic performance. Since no generalization can be 
made, however, they have to be treated on a case by case basis. 
72 A positive definition of freedom is as hard to formulate, as a definition of 
what competition means, cf. Giersch, Grundlagen ... , op. cit., 73 f.; In such 
a positive economic interpretation it would mean autarky and autonomy in 
the sense of economic freedom of action and choice, cf. Herdzlna, Wettbe-
werbspolitik, op. cit., 11, and Hoppmann, Erich, Das Konzept der optlmalen 
Wettbewerbsintensitat, 179 JNSt (1966), pp. 286-323, 289. 
73 Cf. Giersch, Grundlagen .•. , op. cit., 73. 
74 In this sense, It Is relative freedom, cf. Giersch, Herbert, Aufgaben der 
Strukturpolltik, 9 HJWG (1964), pp. 61-90, 75; Herdzina, Wettbewerbspoll-
tik, op. cit., 12; and Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. 
cit., 48 f. 
75 Cf. Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. cit., 48-50; and 
Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 79. 
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In addition to this more individualistic aspect of freedom to compete, the 
issue also contains an institutional aspect, namely, the dispersion of econo-
mic power.78 
Dispersion of economic power is seen as an appropriate complementary part 
a decentralization among competing decision makers. Such a decentralized 
structure among competitors will not be formulated in positive terms; rather, 
any structure will be accepted that has been reached without undue re-
striction of freedom to compete.n The individualistic aspect is most closely 
furthered by this procedure as well. 
What is considered "undue" in this context, is not a matter of positive eco-
nomics, but a question of normative judgment. This judgment will be per-
formed on a case by case basis, with reference to market characteristics 
such as structure and conduct that raise the probability of the appearance 
of competition impairment. 78 
Not every impairment of competition can be viewed as relevant, especially 
with regard to the scope chosen in this contribution. We are able to classify 
natural and artificial causes of impairments of competition. 
Natural causes are due to anomalies of market characteristics, such as unde-
sirable market structures, economic externalities, and the like. 79 They are 
not very often removable by means of antitrust policy. 
76 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspoliti k und Kartel I rec ht, op. cit., 35 f.; Bain, 
Industrial Organization, op. cit., 37: "The policy conclusion drawn from 
this line of theorizing is that concentration of the control of economic 
affairs, through concentrated big business or other similar concentrations 
should be opposed per seas a matter of political principle." 
77 Cf. Willeke, Franz-Ulrich, Wettbewerbspolitik, T0bingen 1980, p. 8, noting 
that remedial action (e.g., abuse control) would nonetheless be taken if 
this constellation led to bad performance. 
78 Attempts have been made to determine schedules of competitive and non-
competitive action, cf. Herdzina, Klaus, Marktentwicklung und Wettbe-
werbsverhalten, in: Bernbach, Gottfried, et al. (eds.), Industrieokonomik: 
Theorie und Empirie, TQbingen 1985, pp. 105-120, 108. 
79 Cf. Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 436 f. Commonly this discus-
sion is conducted under the heading of 'market failure'. For some treat-
ment of the issue cf. Bator, Francis M., The Anatomy of Market Failure 72 
QJE (1958), pp. 351-379; Boadway, Richard, and David E. Wildasin, Public 
Sector Economics, 2nd ed., Boston, Toronto 1984, pp. 60-66; Eickhof, Nor-
bert, Wettbewerbspolitische Ausnahmebereiche und staatl iche Regul ierung, 
36 JS (1985), pp. 63-79; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, 
op. cit., 42-48. 
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In the following, we will deal with artificial causes8Cl of competition impair-
ment, which are due to the action of competitors or institutions; we will put 
our emphasis on action by competitors.81 
Impairment of competition, in this context, will be viewed as a legal or actual 
restriction of relevant formal and/or material alternatives of choice in using 
competitive parameters. There are numerous ways of classifying such impair-
ments. They can either be classified according to their impact on different 
levels in the chain of production and distribution 82, or by their causes that 
is to say by the means by which they are brought about. 83 We will distin-
guish according to their causes between 
- strategies which impair competition by contract or concerted action of le-
gally independent enterprises (negotiation strategies); 
- strategies which impede competitors by contract, e.g., tying arrangements 
or exclusionary practices, or actual conduct, e.g., discrimination and refu-
sal to sell (strategies of restrictive practices); and 
- strategies which reduce the number of economic agents as decision makers 
by external or overproportionate internal corporate growth (concentration 
strategles).M 
80 There is not really a clear distinction between these causes, and not 
even an unambiguous classification; cf. Hoppmann, Workable Competition 
... , op. cit., 172-174, who has termed sectors in which competition will not 
operate 'naturally exempted areas', and politically exempted areas sectors 
in which competition is not desirable. For comparable classifications cf. 
Bartling, Leitbilder ... , op. cit., 46; Herdzina, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., 
88-91. 
81 Cf. Herdzina, Wettbewerbspolitl k, op. cit., 89; and Willeke, Wettbewerbspo-
1 iti k, op. cit., 66. 
82 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 109, who 
mentions 
- horizontal impairments among side-by-side competitors within a single 
relevant market; 
- vertical impairments among economic agents that are linked to each 
other by a supplier-user relationship; and 
- diagonal impairments among economic agents that are neither side-by-
side competitors within a relevant market, nor linked to each other by 
a supplier-user relationship. 
83 Cf. for the commonly used classification Zohlnhofer, Wettbewerbspolitik im 
Oligopol, op. cit., 26-39 who identifies strategies of monopolizing, coope-
ration and integration. 
84 Cf. Schmidt, US-amerikanische ... , op. cit., 79, and idem, Wettbewerbspoli-
tlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 109. 
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Our emphasis, as has been mentioned above, will be on the evaluation of the 
third category. Within this framework, Impairments of competition have to be 
comprehended and evaluated. This is done by applying certain tests. 
d. Intensity of Competition and the Adequate Test 
The evaluation of the degree of effectiveness of competition in an actual 
situation is performed by competition tests which are based on the market 
characteristics and standards mentioned above.85 The tests are intended to 
determine the tolerable degree of deviation from ideal standards. These 
standards have to be relevant empirically. 
Whether economic or noneconomic standards are to be evaluated is a matter 
of normative judgment. 811 According to the three categories of market cha-
racteristics, we can apply tests of market structure, market conduct, and 
market performance87, complemented by a test of market power that is to 
say, freedom to compete.88 It seems necessary to include such a test since 
freedom to compete Is not only an objective but a basic condition of effec-
tive competition. 119 
An evaluation of these tests shows that our purpose is best served by 
adopting a market process test, which refers to structure and conduct,90 
This will be tested according to the question of whether freedom to compete 
85 Cf. Cox/HUbener, Wettbewerbspolitik ... , op. cit., 16; Herdzina, Wettbe-
werbspolitik, op. cit., 49; and Schuster, Helmut, Wettbewerbspolitik, MUn-
chen 1973, pp. 50-57 for a survey. 
86 Whereas some authors rely predominantly on the test of economic criteria, 
cf., e.g., Kantzenbach/Kallfass, Das Konzept des funktionsfiihigen Wettbe-
werbs, op. cit., 113-115, others reject a test of economic criteria, holding 
that only the change in the extent and relative distribution of economic 
freedom is the crucial issue, cf., e.g., Hoppmann, Zurn Problem ... , op. cit., 
38 f. and 45. 
87 Cf. Klauss, op. cit., 24-30; Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ... , op. cit., 59; 
Schmidt, Wettbewerbspol iti k und Kartell rec ht, op. cit., 75-80, who I ists 
types of tests (p. 75); and Schuster, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., 50 and 
53. 
88 Cf. Herdzina, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., 86-99; and Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 78-80. 
89 Cf. Herdzlna, Wettbewerbspolltik ... , op. cit., 86. 
90 Cf. Herdzina, Wettbewerbspolitik ... , op. cit., 99; Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust 
Policy .•. , op. cit., 60; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, 
op. cit., 50 f. 
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Is Impaired unduly, since the latter is a sufficient condition of effective-
ness.91 
The authors who actually reject the tests of structure, conduct, and perfor-
mance92 propose a market power test with regard to competitors, or a test 
of the bargaining process with regard to the economic agents involved in 
the direct line of the chain of production and distribution93; or they do 
measure the effectiveness but solely by performance criteria.94 It has to be 
noted, however, that this neglects the fact that these tests are used impli-
citly at any rate. 95 
Performance tests as the sole basis for the evaluation of effectiveness have 
to be rejected since "formulating performance norms entails inelegant com-
parisons and subjective judgments of distributionally different nonoptimum 
alternatlves".!NI 
91 For a critical evaluation of the tests cf. Herdzina, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. 
cit., 50, 60, 69 and 81 f.; Hoppmann, Zurn Problem ... , op. cit., 38 and 45; 
as well as Schuster, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., 51 f. and 54-56. 
92 Cf. Hoppmann, Zurn Problem ... , op. cit., 38 f. and 45; but see as well pro-
ponents of the Chicago School, cf., e.g., Posner, The Chicago School ... , 
supra, 928. 
93 Cf. Edwards, Corwin D., Maintaining Competition, New York, 1964, pp. 9 f.: 
" ... competition consists in access by buyers and sellers to a substantial 
number of alternatives and in their ability to reject those which are re-
latively unsatisfactory," Cf. as well Adelman, Maurice A., Business Size 
and Public Policy, 24 JB (1951 ), pp. 272-279; and Hoppmann, Zurn Problem 
... , op. cit., 39 and 45. These tests are specious, however, for the notion 
of adequate alternatives is actually a structural criterion, cf. Sosnick, A 
Critique ... , supra, 388. 
94 Such as the proponents of Chicago antitrust, cf. Schmldt/Rittaler, Die 
Chicago School ... , op. cit., 44-53. In addition, performance-oriented ap-
proaches were suggested by Griffin, Clare E., An Economic Approach to 
Antitrust Problems, New York 1951; and Smith, Blackwell, Effective Com-
petition: Hypotheses for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws, 26 NYULR (1951), 
pp. 405-450. 
95 Cf. Herdzi na, Wettbewerbspol iti k, op. cit., 91 f. 
96 Sosnick, A Critique ... , supra, 394. Cf. Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Polley ... , 
op. cit., 53 f., 61 and 82: " ... , we view any over-all evaluation of perfor-
mance as impossible and therefore delusive as a basic standard of what 
workable competition is."; as wel I as Stegemann, Klaus, Workable Com-
petition nach zwanzig Jahren: Bemerkungen zu elnem Buch von John Mau-
rice Clark, 9 HJWG (1964), pp. 237-255. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
60 
In addition to a general lack of operationallty of performance norms for 
such purpose,97 there exists a lack of consistency regarding the free enter-
prise and the democratic political system. Tests are, therefore, preferred 
" ... that foster and maintain impersonal market processes as the main 
direct regulators of enterprise activity ... , (I)t may be argued substan-
tively that impersonal regulations by the market is preferable to exten-
sive bureaucratic regulation by men, and more consistent with our 
democratic political system. " 98 
Good and bad performance can have the character of indicia, however, poin-
ting towards different intensities of competition and, therefore, to structural 
or behavioral deficiencies, or the boundaries of the relevant market.99 
3. The Treatment of Competition Impairment and Public Polley Alternatives 
Public policy has to be viewed as a reversal of the theoretical analysis of 
the chain of causation, taking as a starting point the prerequisites or con-
ditions of competition and not from its effects. 100 
Public policy measures have to be taken If competition is impaired, the com-
petitive process deviates from Its ideal setting and antitrust objectives 
remain as a result unfulfilled. 101 There are various approaches and rules 
that may be discerned in this context. 102 
97 Cf. Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ... , op. cit., 53 f.; Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 76; and Sosnick, A Critique ... , 
supra, 393 f. 
98 Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 498 f.; cf. as well Kantzenbach/ 
Kallfass, Das Konzept des fun ktionsfah I gen Wettbewerbs, op. cit., 115. 
99 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 51; and 
Schuster, Wettbewerbspolltlk, op. cit., 57, who takes the market process 
as his starting point and then evaluates the performance. 
100 Cf. Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. cit., 53. For the 
comprehension of public policy as a part of an approach cf. Bartling, 
Leitbilder ..• , op. cit., 59. 
101 Cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 491; Schmidt, Wett-
bewerbspoliti k und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 141; and Schuster, Wettbe-
werbspoliti k, op. cit., 132. 
102 We will neither treat procedures, nor institutions in depth. These can be 
found in Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. cit., ch. 
13; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 162 f. for 
the Federal Republic of Germany; for the United States these can be 
found in Sullivan/Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ... , op. cit., ch. 3; and 
Neale/Goyder, The Antitrust Laws ... , op. cit., chs. 12-14, all of them 
including further reference. 
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The various approaches can be crossclassified by 
- the degree of constraint that is put on the firm (e.g., laissez-faire vs. re-
gulation), and 
- the form of ownership (e.g., totally private vs. totally public). 103 
Public policy approaches can overlap each other, are partly substitutable for 
each other and might even be complementary over wide areas. 
Within this context we will neither consider a laissez-faire approach to anti-
trust, since this would lead to a destruction of the competitive system, 104 
nor will we take Into account public ownership since this is not seen as a 
policy appropriate to the functioning of a free enterprise system. 105 
Points of departure are once again the market characteristics structure, 
conduct, and performance which Is In accordance with the quest for a policy 
which is appropriate to the functioning of a free enterprise system. 1015 
Actual public policy is characterized by two types. On the one hand, compe-
titive market structure can be upheld or renewed (structure approach). On 
the other hand, if impairment of competition has already taken place, con-
103 Cf. Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 12; for some additional classi-
fications of public policies cf. Bartling, Leitbllder ... , op. cit., 60 f.; 
Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 14-16; Scherer, Industrial 
market structure ... , op. cit., 475-496; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltlk 
und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 141-145. 
104 Cf. as well, Rlttaler, Jan B., Industrlekonzentration und Macht - Notwen-
digkelt elner Neuorientierung?, 28 liberal (1986), pp. 29-36, 29; Schmidt, 
Wettbewerbspolltik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 141 f.; and Hayek, Friedrich 
A. von, The Road to Serfdom, Chicago 1956, p. 58: "Liberalism teaches us 
that we should make the best use of the forces of competition In order 
to harmonize economic activities of Individuals, it does not teach us to 
leave things to themselves." 
105 Cf. Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 9; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbs-
polltlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 143 f. The same applies to regulation, 
which will be excluded from our inquiry because price regulations as a 
means of abuse control will not be treated. For some recent treatment of 
the issue cf. Pascher, op. cit. 
106 For this position cf. as well Kantzenbach/Kallfass, Oas Konzept des 
funktionsfahigen Wettbewerbs, op. cit., 115 and 121; and Schuster, Wett-
bewerbspolltl k, op. cit., 134-138. For the meaning of 'adequacy' cf. 
Repke, Wilhelm, Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, Erlenbach, ZUrich 
1942, p. 253. 
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duct and performance have to be corrected ex post (regulation approach). 107 
There is a distinct preference for the structure approach: 
"Where it" (i.e. competition) "does not work satisfactorily, preference Is 
regularly given to attempting to Improve the conditions of its operation, 
as against abandoning it and resorting to direct controls. The areas in 
which free and competitive market adjustments have been displaced by 
direct controls •.. do not offer such conspicuous examples of success as 
to make us eager to Increase their number unnecessarily." 108 
Since neither approach by Itself is considered to be a safeguard for the 
maintenance of effective competition, a combination of elements of structural 
and conduct control will be considered as the appropriate solution In the 
following. 109 
b. Rules 
In addition to the combination of structure and regulation approach, rules 
and/or principles are necessary for the shaping of a well-founded approach 
to antitrust. Three categories are important. These are established according 
to the criterion of what kind of impact a competitor's action is likely to 
have:110 
- per se-rules vs. rules of reason, 
- ex ante- vs. ex post-controls, and 
- burden of proof with the public vs. burden of proof with the enterprise. 
Competitors' actions are prohibited per se if they impair competition beyond 
all doubt. This means that under this condition competitors cannot plead 
certain circumstances or the reasonableness of their activity. 111 
107 Cf. Bartllng, Leltbilder ... , op. cit., 60 f.; Herdzina, Wettbewerbspolitlk, 
op. cit., 114 f., 116-118 and 120; Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , 
op. cit., 491; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 
142-144, stating the case for concentrated industries showing undesir-
able performance (abuse control). 
108 Clark, Competition As A Dynamic Process, op. cit., 486; and Schmidt, 
Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 144 f. 
109 Cf. OECD (ed.), Market Power and the Law: A Study of the Restrictive 
Business Laws of the OECD Member Countries and of the EEC and ECSC 
dealing with Market Power, Paris 1970, pp. 15 f. and 196 f. 
110 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 145-148; for an 
additional survey cf. Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, 
op. cit., 55 f. 
111 Cf. Koch, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 480. 
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A rule of reason is applied if the impact of competitors' actions is ambi-
guous. In such a case the parties are permitted to make their case as to the 
reasonableness of their actions. This means that competing evidence, proba-
bilities, tendencies, and circumstances are weighed. 112 This can be done 
through judicial or administrative procedure. 
Per se-rules can also be combined with exemptions for actions which have 
minor effects on competition. This actually has the effect of raising the level 
for public interference. 
Per se rules with exemptions as well as rules of reason can be shaped by 
applying an ex post- or ex ante-control. 113 Ex post-control is applied If -
as a rule - the competitor's action is beneficial to competition, whereas ex 
ante-control will be chosen if competition - again, as a rule - Is impaired by 
the competitor's action. 
Crucial to the shaping of the per se-rule with exemptions and the rule of 
reason is the question of whether the burden of proof lies with the public 
or with the competitor.114 
112 The rule of reason in the United States originates in Standard Oil Com-
pany of New Jersey v. United States In 1911. 
Per se rules have the advantage of clearly informing the competitors 
what is or is not permissible. They are therefore prefered, cf. Mtischel, 
Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. cit., 54 f.; or per se rules 
are seen as the only viable solution, cf. Hoppmann, Erich, Fusionskon-
trolle, Tubingen 1972. 
113 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 146 f. In this 
sense the rule of reason can be viewed as a substitute to the per se 
rule with exemptions. 
114 With regard to public enforcement, the German as well as the U.S. bo-
dies of law are characterized largely by a burden of proof which lies 
with the public. 
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111. canoetttton and Industrial Concentration 
In the following, we will try to reveal principles governing the behavior of 
concentrated industries, and find out their implications for public policy. 1 
Our emphasis will be on economic concentration but especially on the effects 
of Industrial concentration on competition and the attainment of Its objec-
tives. The use of public policy objectives as guideposts is necessary in 
order to separate desirable outcomes of economic concentration from unde-
sirable ones and in order to determine at what point public policy has to 
i nterfere.2 
1. Concentration and Economic Theory 
Since the appearance of Keynes' general theory In 1936, the interest of eco-
nomists has mainly been on macroeconomic issues. In assuming that the 
model of perfectly competitive structures was irrelevant to real Industry 
structure, economists took quite some time to realize that concentrated indu-
stry sectors did work under principles not only different, but often exactly 
the reverse of those applicable to competitive Industry structures.3 
a. Nature and Meaning of Economic Concentration 
Concentration in economic theory has largely been an ambiguous phenome-
non. For the field of industrial concentration at least this is true from the 
point In time when economists left the path of belief, asserting that indu-
strial concentration was unpreventable due to a sort of technological impe-
Again, we have to emphasize that the free enterprise system does not 
possess a kind of natural protection but has to be protected by measures 
of public policy, cf. Schneider, Hans K., Beelnflussung der Konzentration 
als Ziel und Mittel der Wlrtschaftspoliti k, in: Arndt, Helmut (ed.), Die 
Konzentration in der Wlrtschaft: On Economic Concentration, 2nd ed., vol. 
1, Berlin 1971, pp. 437-457, 437. It is a question whether these principles 
governing concentrated industries are objective In nature or are the 
results of ideological premises, i.e. the belief In a distinct economic 
system, cf. Arndt, Helmut, and Gunter Ollenburg, Begriff und Arten der 
Konzentration, in: Arndt (ed.), Die Konzentratlon In der Wirtschaft ••• op. 
cit., pp. 3-39, 17 f. 
2 Cf. Giesel, Unternehmungswachstum und Wettbewerb, Baden-Baden 1975, p. 
193; and MUiier, JUrgen, and Rolf Hochreiter, Stand und Entwicklungsten-
denzen der Konzentration in der Bundesrepubllk Deutschland, Gottingen 
1975, p. 6. 
3 Cf. Blair, Economic Concentration •.. , op. cit., 1 f. 
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ratlve.• Although there is strong evidence that no such imperative exists, 
tendencies to concentration are inherent to economic systems to a certain 
degree. So the question of evaluating concentration becomes a question of 
Judging different economic systems with regard to thel r attitude towards 
Industrial concentration and the objectives to be attained.5 
A certain contradiction or dilemma results from the fact that free enterprise 
systems need a certain extent of decentralization of the structure of their 
economic decision units in order to function properly; on the other hand a 
minimal level of industrial concentration seems necessary as well, in order to 
reap economic advantages.8 However, too much concentration Is associated 
with negative non-economic consequences for a society.7 
Concentration can therefore be neither preferred nor condemned in an a 
priori sense. What we need in order to arrive at a sound economic evalua-
tion is rather a theoretical basis - confirmed by empirical evidence -upon 
which we can determine the economic and non-economic outcomes at different 
4 Cf. Arndt, Helmut, Wettbewerbsprozesse, horizontale Konzentratlon und 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, in: Arndt (ed.), Die Konzentration .•• , op. cit., 
185-199, 197; Eucken, Walter, Technik, Konzentration und Ordnung der 
Wlrtschaft, in: Barnlkel, Hans-Heinrich (ed.), Probleme der wirtschaftlichen 
Konzentration, Darmstadt 1975, pp. 43-59, 43 f.; Robert, Rudiger, Konzen-
tratlonspolitik In der Bundesrepubllk Deutschland: Das Beispiel der Entste-
hung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, Berlin 1976, p. 17. 
5 Cf. Arndt/ Ollenburg, op. cit., 18.; Haussmann, Fritz, Konzentratlonsgrunde: 
Theorien und wirtschaftspolitlsche Beurteilung der Konzentratlon, In: Bar-
nlkel (ed.), Probleme •.. , op. cit., pp. 1-42, 18. 
6 Cf. Grosser, Dieter, Elnfuhrung, in: Grosser, Dieter (ed.), Konzentration 
ohne Kontrolle, 3rd ed., Opladen 1974, pp. 9-22, 11; Kantzenbach, Erhard, 
Konzentration als Problem der Konkurrenzwirtschaft, In: Arndt (ed.), Die 
Konzentratlon ••• , op. cit., 159-183, 162 and 167; and Schneider, Beelnflus-
sung der Konzentration als Ziel und Mlttel der Wlrtschaftspolitik, in: Arndt 
(ed.), Die Konzentration ... , op. cit., 440 f. 
7 Cf. Giesel, Unternehmungswachstum und Wettbewerb, op. cit., 193-195; 
Koch, Industrial Organization ..• , op. cit., 182. 
"Mergers (being a form of concentration, added by the author), like price 
fixing agreements, eliminate competition among the parties and do so per-
manently. But antitrust law has always been more hospitable to mergers 
than to cartels, perhaps because a merger might acaxnpllsh socially bene-
flclent objectives without slgnlflcantly affecting market prices; the 
Integration of production, for example, may permit genuine economic effi-
ciencies without any offsetting disadvantages when the merging parties 
have little market power" (emphasis added), Areeda, Phillip, Antitrust Ana-
lysis: Problems, Text, Cases, 2nd ed., Boston and Toronto 1974, p. 657. 
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stages or levels of concentration.a Only on such a basis Is it possible for 
public policy to optimize the objectives to be attained. 
The term 'concentration' has a variety of meanings.9 If it is considered on a 
high level of abstraction It is hard to handle in economic analysis and, 
therefore, lnoperational. It is for this reason that definitions are formulated 
with regard to the field actually under inquiry, such as, concentration of 
income, of property, of lndustries. 10 
Defined in general terms, economic concentration can be viewed as an accu-
mulation of economically relevant quantities including discretionary disposi-
tion over means of production. 11 
Different aspects of concentration can be discerned by cross-classification: 
- The degree of concentration can be examined at an actual point in time, or 
concentration can be viewed as a process over time. 
- There can be an even distribution of the concentration variable (e.g., 
sales) among the population units (e.g., firms) or an uneven distribution 
8 Cf. MOiier/ Hochreiter, Stand und Entwicklungstendenztm der Konzentra-
tion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op. cit., 6 f. 
9 Cf. Matschuk, Hans-Joachim, Arten und Messung der wirtschaftlichen Kon-
zentration, in: Barnikel (ed.), Probleme ••. , op. cit., pp. 584-612, 584. For 
some examples cf. Adelman, Maurice A., The Measurement of Industrial 
Concentration, 33 RESt (1951 ), pp. 269-296, 269; Arndt/ Ollenburg, op. cit., 
7; Blair, John M., Statistical Measures of Concentration in Business, 8 
BOIS (1956), pp. 351-372, 351; and Eucken, Technik, Konzentration ..• , op. 
cit., 43 f. 
10 Cf. Robert, Konzentrationspolitik ••• , op. cit., 14; and Willeke, Franz-Ulrich, 
Wettbewerbspolitik, TObingen 1980, p. 193. 
11 Cf. Pohmer, Dieter, and Franz X. Bea, "Konzentration", in: HWB, 4th, rev. 
ed., Stuttgart 1975, cols. 2220-2234, 2221. It has to be noted that In 
Anglo-American literature attempts to define economic concentration have 
always been oriented towards empirically relevant facts, cf., e.g., Blair, 
John M., Seeds of Destruction, New York 1938, p. 237; Lintner, John, and 
J. Keith Butters, Effect of Mergers on Industrial Concentration, 1940-1947, 
32 RESt (1950), pp. 30-48, 46; and Rosenbluth, Gideon, Concentration In 
Canadian Manufacturing Industries, Princeton 1957, for whom concentra-
tion means "the degree to which a small number of firms account for a 
large proportion of an industry's output.", p. 11. 
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of the concentration variable among the population units (absolute concen-
tration versus disparity ). 12 
- Qualitative issues can only be examined to a certain extent by the mea-
surement of concentration variables. Qualitative outcomes, such as, for 
instance, power can often be clarified via soft research (e.g., hearlngs). 13 
b. Economic Concentration and Power 
In traditional price theory the phenomenon of power has been a non-prob-
lem, since power has not been considered a relevant variable for the ex-
planation of the economic process and was, therefore, considered an exo-
geneous factor, which was held constant during economic inquiries by means 
of the ceteris par I bus clause. 14 
It was not before the emergence of the German Historical School during the 
second half of the nineteenth century 15 that this view was explicitly criti-
cized by Gustav Schmoller, then one of the leading economists; it was only 
12 Cf. Arndt/ Ollenburg, op. cit., 7; Piesch, Walter, and Ingo Schmidt, The 
suitability of concentration measures for EEC competition policy. Commis-
sion of the European Communities Studies Collection. Competition - Appro-
ximation of legislation series No. 35, p. 20; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltik 
und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 126 f.; and Wllleke, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., 
194. 
13 Cf. Arndt/ Ollenburg, op. cit., 7; Seraphim, Hans-Jurgen, Theorie der All-
gemeinen Volkswlrtschaftspolitik, 2nd ed., Gottingen 1963, p. 81 we will 
give this Issue a closer look in the sections on economic power and 
concentration measures. 
14 "If we look at the main run of economic theory .•. we find that it is 
characterized by a strange lack of power considerations. More or less 
homogeneous units - firms and households - move in more or less given 
technological and market conditions and try to improve their economic lot 
within the constraints of these conditions. This model has been explored 
in great detail by modern economic science and very important insights 
of the market mechanism have been gained. But that people use power to 
alter the mechanism Itself; that people may strive for economic power as 
much as for economic wealth; these facts have largely been neglected.", 
Rothschild, Kurt, Power In Economics, London 1971, p. 7; and idem, Macht: 
Die Lucke in der Prelstheorle, In: Schneider/ Watrin (eds.), Macht und 
okonomisches Gesetz, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 1097-1111. 
Arndt notes that the only form of economic power which existed for the 
neoclasslclsts was monoply power, cf. Arndt, Helmut, Wirtschaftllche 
Macht, Munchen 1974, 2nd ed. 1977, p. 129. 
On this inclusion of power in traditional and modern price theory cf. 
Sohmen, Egon, Machttheorle oder Preistheorie, in: Schneider, Hans K., and 
Christian Watrin (eds.), Macht und okonomisches Gesetz, vol. 2, Berlin 
1973, pp. 1137-1153. 
15 Cf. Hutchison, Thomas W., The Politics and Philosophy of Economics: Mar-
xians, Keynesians and Austrians, New York, London 1981, p. 176. 
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then that traditional economics departed from the myth that in economic in-
quiries contracting parties Involved with each other were of equal education, 
comparable knowledge and equally urgent needs. 18 
This can be viewed as the first attempt to inquire into the relationship be-
tween economics or competition and power. From this point in time, power 
has been widely accepted as a relevant endogeneous variable within the eco-
nomic process. 
Until recently, the need to inquire further into this multidimensional rela-
tionship was commonly accepted. The current streams of antitrust policy, 
however, again tend to consider economic power as a variable external to 
the economic process and not having any Influence on it. The political eco-
nomy of power is largely neglected, therefore, and the assumption is made 
that the free market regulates economic activity and that therefore corpo-
rate sl ze and power can be Ignored. 17 
At least two reasons can be discerned for which power considerations are 
inevitably inherent in antitrust matters. 18 For one, power does exist, alt-
hough It may appear in many guises as economic or political, personal or 
organizational, private or public power. To paraphrase Justice Louis D. 
Brandeis, power may be exerted upon rivals, buyers, sellers, upon employers 
or upon employed by different and often changing means. The essence of 
this power Is dominance which might simply arise from disproportionate 
size. 19 
Secondly, power is basically rooted In the organizational structure of an In-
dustry which, on the one hand, has decisive Influence on Industrial perfor-
16 Cf. Schmoller, Gustav, Ober Bestrafung des Arbeltsvertragsbruches, in: 
Schrlften des Verelns fur Socialpolitik 1874, vol. 7, p. 93. The first in-
depth Inquiry into power as a dominant factor influencing the economic 
process and, thus, denying a sort of self-perpetuating economic process, 
was done by Bohm-Bawerk, Eugen v., Macht oder okonomlsches Gesetz?, 
23 zvsvw (1914), pp. 205-271. 
17 "Unlike the political economists who founded our discipline, we largely 
Ignore the power element in economic statecraft; and, lacking a theory of 
power, we seek to minimize the use of power In matters affecting the 
production and distribution of wealth.", Adams, Walter, and James W. 
Brock, The Bigness Complex: Industry, Labor, and Government in the 
American Economy, New York 1986, pp. 14 f. 
18 Cf. Adams/Brock, The Bigness Complex ... , op. cit., 7-9; and Sohn, Karl-
Heinz, Zur Philnomenologie der wirtschaftlichen Konzentratlon, in: Barnlkel 
(ed.), Probleme •.. , op. cit., pp. 103-141, 122 f. 
19 Cf. the statements of Justice Brandeis In American Column & Lumber Co. 
v. U.S., 257 U.S. (1921), p. 377. 
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mance, but, on the other hand, has also social consequences and, therefore, 
entails social costs.20 
If we want to analyze the anatomy of power, Its physiology, and its con-
sequences for the competitive process, we need a sound definition, or at 
least a description, of the phenomenon. 
The essence of economic power is the firm's ability to insulate itself from 
the discipline imposed by the market or by the government or by both.21 
Stated In positive terms, the firm Is able to influence the operating conditi-
ons of the market and the judgments and evaluations of other economic 
agents, which would otherwise be fixed data for every one participating in 
the competitive process. In a generally encompassing formulation this means 
that economic power entails the option to change fixed data into variables or 
variables into fixed data, respectively. 22 
Economic power Is positively correlated to economic concentration in the 
sense that any kind of economic concentration tends to confer economic 
power.23 Economic power may also exist without economic concentration but 
its degree might become inacceptable if economic concentration increases. 
In the context of industrial concentration, the number and size distribution 
of firms are Important determinants of market power. There are many ways 
of measuring this power.24 The same applies to the Interrelatedness of cor-
porate size and market power or overall economic power.25 
20 Adams/Brock, The Bigness Complex •.• , op. cit., 7 f. 
21 Cf. Adams, Walter, Antitrust, Laissez-Faire, and Economic Power, In: Neu-
mark, Fritz, et al. (eds.), Wettbewerb, Konzentration und wlrtschaftllche 
Macht, Berlin 1976, pp. 11-17, 11. Power is the firm's actual capacity to 
avoid market or political sanctions for poor performance in the sense of 
predefined objectives. 
22 Cf. Arndt, Helmut, Okonomische Theorie der Macht, In: Arndt (ed.), Die 
Konzentratlon ... , op. cit., pp. 99-135, 105 f. 
23 Cf. Sohn, Zur Phiinomenologle der wirtschaftlichen Konzentration •.. , op. 
cit., 122; and for industrial concentration and market power cf. Schmid-
bauer, Allokation, technischer Fortschrltt und Wettbewerbspoliti k, T0bln-
gen 1974, p. 169 who states the commonly accepted hypothesis that con-
centration within an Industry and market power as measured by proxy 
variables are positively correlated. 
24 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 96; and Schmidbauer, Allo-
kation, ... , op. cit., 161. 
25 Cf. Adams/Brock, The Bigness Complex •.• , op. cit., 7; and Nagel, Bern-
hard, Fusion und Fusionskontrolle, in: Cox et al. (eds.), Handbuch des 
Wettbewerbs, M0nchen 1981, pp. 331-365, 336. 
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The emergence of economic power and its extent depend on a variety of 
economic and non-economic conditions28 which determine the power potential 
of economic units. Although they lack a final enumeration, these conditions 
can be grouped Into the four categories Income and property, individual 
qualification, organizational structure, and the efficiency potential of econo-
mic units.27 
The power potential of economic units that Is determined by these conditions 
results In the units' ability to change economic conditions and use their 
competitive parameters more freely than they would be able to do If power 
was distributed more evenly. Such power comprises the broad discretion to 
determine how society's resources are to be utilized. This, in fact, covers 
more than the ability to influence prices in a particular market. It also com-
prises the power to exploit mutual interdependencies, to erect barriers 
against new competition and thus stifle the emergence of new sources of 
supply.28 
Nevertheless, economic power can have the function of a market Imperfection 
which initiates competitive moves; in this sense It is the factor which makes 
competition possible at all. In this function, power unleashes what Joseph A. 
Schumpeter called "the gales of creative destruction that control monopoly 
and neutralize the exercise of monopoly power".29 It depends on whether 
power has a transient character or whether it becomes a permanent market 
characteristic due to strategies which restrain competition.30 
26 The emphasis lies on economic conditions, however, cf. Robert, Konzentra-
tlonspollti k ... , op. cit., 13 f. 
27 Cf. Nicolini, Hans-J., Untersuchungen zu Erfassungen unternehmerlscher 
Marktmacht, Gottingen 1978, pp. 42-52, referring to the sociological bases 
of power, heavily drawing on French, John R., and Bertram Raven, The 
Bases of Social Power, in: Cartwright, Dorwin (ed.), Studies In Social 
Power, Ann Arbor 1959, pp. 150-167, 155-164; and Seraphim, Theorle ••• , 
op. cit., 81-103. 
28 Cf. Adams, Antitrust, Laissez-Faire, and Economic Power, op. cit., 11. 
29 Adams/Brock, The Bigness Complex ... , op. cit., 21; cf. as well Arndt, Wlrt-
schaftllche Macht, op. cit., 9 f. 
30 Cf. Adams, Antitrust, Laissez-Faire, and Economic Power, op. cit., 11; 
Holzler, Heinrich, and Wolfgang Winkler, Wlrtschaftllche Macht als Storfak-
tor von Wettbewerbsprozessen, in: Neumark, Fritz et al. (eds.), Wettbe-
werb, Konzentration und wirtschaftliche Macht, op. cit., pp. 71-93, 76; and 
Robert, Konzentrationspolitik ••• , op. cit., 12. 
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Therefore, it is crucial whether power is used to stimulate the competitive 
process or whether It is abused to restrain competition. The permanence of 
undue power, as a rule, leads to a further restriction of competition or even 
to Its elimination. 
c. Features of Industrial Concentration 
The current orientation of U.S. antitrust policy ascribes a minor role to the 
perils flowing from industry concentration. As is the case with economic 
concentration, which we have just dealt with, industrial concentration is a 
priori neither good nor bad; it simply has to be evaluated with regard to its 
underlying features, which Is supposed to allow insights into the quality of 
its economic consequences. 
aa. Significance 
Under certain conditions Industrial concentration can have undesirable eco-
nomic and non-economic effects. In addition to this, further aspects seem 
crucial in justifying the dedication of research resources to the problem of 
industrial mergers. 
Firstly, mergers are a significant factor among all formal components contri-
buting to industrial concentration. In this context we will follow the line of 
reasoning of the German Monopolies Commission, which distinguishes between 
internal growth, mergers, entries of new firms and exit of existing firms as 
formal components dct'.:'rminlng the level of Industry concentration. 31 
Secondly, mergers contribute to a significant extent to overall or aggregate 
concentration in an economy in general and in the German economy in parti-
cular.32 This is a valid aspect since our research conclusions concern the 
German Act Against Restraints of Competition.33 German circumstances have 
31 Cf. Monopol kommission, Hauptgutachten der Monopol kommisslon IV: Fort-
schritte bei der Konzentrationserfassung, Baden-Baden 1982, para. 706 f. 
32 The terms overall concentration and aggregate concentration will be used 
as synonyms hereafter; there will not be a distinction between different 
sectors. 
33 It is mentioned that the merger statutes play a crucial role in the anti-
trust laws of the Federal Republic and the U.S. This can be viewed as an 
indication of the significance, cf., e.g., Markert, Kurt, Stand und Entwlck-
lungstendenzen des US-Antitrustrecht 1987 aus der Sicht eines deutschen 
Kartellrechtsanwenders, in: FIW (ed.), Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 
1985/86. Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungspraxis Bundesrepubllk 0eut-
schland, EG und USA, Koln et al., 1987, pp. 201-224, 218. 
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to be considered, therefore. 
The extent of external concentration in the form of mergers is closely linked 
to the functioning of our economic system. The reason for this is that the 
system needs a certain level of decentralization among its economic decision 
units, as has been noted supra.34 It therefore seems necessary to inquire 
into the question of whether such a level is determinable or what the line of 
reasoning should be for public policy if this is not the case (cf. Part 5 of 
this contribution). 
First, we will try to answer the question of to what extent an Increase in 
Industry concentration is due to mergers, and second, we will characterize 
the connection between industry concentration and aggregate concentra-
tion.35 
The basic hypothesis is that industry concentration Is due to a significant 
extent to mergers and that - as a consequence - market power as well as 
general economic power are essentially determined by mergers. 311 
A variety of studies for different countries has been performed on this hy-
pothesis. The studies have primarily been based on a concept that has been 
developed by Weiss for the separation of different components determining 
industry concentration. This analytical tool is also used by the German 
Monopolies Commission,37 For the Federal Republic the studies using this 
analytical tool show that observed changes in industry concentration were 
34 Cf. on this point again, e.g., Giesel, Unternehmungswachstum und Wettbe-
werb, op. cit., 167. 
35 We will not be able to look closely at the merger pattern In the Federal 
Republic and the U.S. On the development cf. Adams/Brock, The Bigness 
Complex ... , op. cit., 152; Hughes, Alan, et al., Hypotheses about Mergers, 
in: Mueller, Dennis C. (ed.), The Determinants and Effects of Mergers: An 
International Comparison, Konigstein/Ts., pp. 27-66, 17 and 22; Nelson, 
Ralph L., Merger Movements in American Industry, 1895-1956, Princeton 
1959; and Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 70-73 and 124-
126. 
36 Cf. Giesel, Unternehmungswachstum und Wettbewerb, op. cit., 220. For a 
similar opinion Stigler, George J., 69 Fortune, May 1953, p. 162: "If big 
businesses are not more efficient, how did they get so big? The answer 
Is that most giant firms arose out of mergers.", which implies a signifi-
cant contribution to concentration by mergers. 
37 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten IV ... , op. cit., para. 718. 
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initiated to a large extent by mergers.38 
As in Germany, industry concentration In the United States is also strongly 
determined by the merger component. But this is true to a lesser degree in 
comparison to the Federal Republic. This is attributed to the fact that the 
U.S. has a higher percentage of conglomerate mergers, which leads to a 
somewhat lower Impact of market level concentration. This might be taken as 
evidence that merger control and its enforcement were very effective In 
terms of horizontal and vertical mergers in the U.S. before the Reagan 
Administration. An increase in the number and percentage has Just recently 
been observed in the Federal Republic as well.39 
In summary, despite possible differences in methodology, emphasis, or parti-
cular features in the studles40 mergers have an impact on industry concen-
tration which justifies a closer inquiry from the view of empirical impor-
tance. 
Two basic hypotheses may be postulated with regard to the interrelation of 
industry concentration and aggregate concentration:41 
- enterprises that possess significant shares of the economy are often domi-
nant in particular markets as well, and 
38 Cf. the main studies Muller/ Hochrelter, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen 
der Konzentration in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op. cit., 241 f.; 
Muller, Jurgen, The Impact of Mergers on Concentration: A Study of Ele-
ven West German Industries, 25 JIE (1976), pp. 113-132. The same applies 
to the United Kingdom, cf. Hannah, Leslie, and J. A. Kay, Concentration in 
Modern Industry, London 1977, as well as Hart, Peter E., et al., Mergers 
and Concentration in British Industry, Cambridge 1973. 
For the analytical tool used, cf. Weiss, Leonard W., An Evaluation of Mer-
gers in Six Industries, 47 RES (1965), pp. 172-181; and Muller/ Hochrei-
ter, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen der Konzentration In der Bundes-
republik Deutschland, op. cit., 228-235. 
39 Cf. Hughes et al., Hypotheses about Mergers, op. cit., 19. 
For the U.S. studies cf. Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on 
Mergers, Washington, D.C. 1969; McGowan, John J., The Effect of Alterna-
tive Anti-Merger Policies on the Size Distribution of Firms, 5 YEE (1965), 
pp. 423-474, esp. 455-459; and Preston, L. E., Giant Firms, Large Mergers 
and Concentration, Patterns and Policy and Policy Alternatives, 1954-1968, 
1 IOR ( 1973), pp. 35-46. 
40 For the problems of such studies In trying to separate the merger com-
ponent from others affecting industry concentration, cf. Prais, S. J., The 
Evolution of Giant Firms in Britain, Cambridge 1976, pp. 16-24; Singh, 
Ajlt, and Geoffrey Whittington, The Size and Growth of Firms, 42 RES 
( 1975 ), pp. 15-26, 24 f. 
41 Cf. Utton, Michael A., Aggregate versus Market Concentration: A Note, 84 
EJ (1974), pp. 150-155. 
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- aggregate dominance may augment the enterprise's power within a specific 
market.42 
Aggregate or economy-wide concentration encompasses the share of total 
economic activity accounted for by the largest enterprises in that economy, 
regardless of their specific markets or the economic sector (e.g., manufactu-
ring, mining, transportation, services) they are ln.43 The interrelation of in-
dustry concentration and overall or aggregate concentration is quite easy to 
compute, although the generation of the underlying data is a serious prob-
lem. With regard to the foregoing factors its implications are difficult to 
assess.44 
For the U.S. it can be shown that overall concentration within the entire 
private economy has not changed significantly during the past two decades. 
Overall concentration has rather declined slightly in recent years if mea-
sured, for instance, by non-financial assets:45 
Tab. 4: Overall Industry Concentration and Aggregate Concentration• 
1958 1963 1967 1972 1977 
Top 50 23,9 24,2 24,5 23,2 22,7 
Top 100 31,6 31,3 31,9 30,5 29,7 
Top 200 40,0 39,9 41,0 39,7 38,3 
• Percent of total non-financial corporate assets held by the 50, 100, and 200 largest 
non-financial corporations: 1958-1982 
Source: Huorandum of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Coa•ission, 
Washington, D. C., 1986 





43 Cf. Hughes et al., Hypotheses about Mergers, op. cit., 13 f., also on the 
reasons for a predominant role of aggregate concentration in the econo-
my; for a somewhat imprecise definition cf. Greer, Industrial Organization 
... , op. cit., 122, who speaks of "relatively small groups of enterprises". 
Aggregate concentration is often used to describe the share of total eco-
nomic activity accounted for by the largest firms in the specific economic 
sectors. 
44 Cf. Shepherd, WIiiiam G., Public Policies Toward Business, 7th ed., Home-
wood, Ill. 1985, p. 219. Cf. as well Tab. 4. 
45 Cf. White, Lawrence J., What Has Been Happening to Aggregate Concen-
tration in the United States?, 29 JIE (1981), pp. 223-230; and idem, 
Mergers and Aggregate Concentration, in: Keenan, Michael, and Lawrence 
J. White (ed.), Mergers and Acquisitions, Lexington, Mass. and Toronto 
1982, pp. 97-111, 107. 
For some authors it has not increased si nee the 1930s, Hughes et al., 
Hypotheses about Mergers, op. cit., 17. 
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Aggregate economic concentration being largely constant, there has been a 
steady turnover among the leading companies. In addition, the structure of 
aggregate concentration has changed in the sense that low concentration 
sectors of the U.S. economy such as services, trade, finance, enjoyed a 
rather rapid growth In comparison to high concentration sectors such as, 
for instance, transportation, communications, and public utllitles. 411 This 
development was also influenced by the different sizes of the sectors: 
Tab. 5: Structural Change of Aggregate Concentration in the U.S.• 
1968 1970 1972 197( 
All Industries 
Top 50 20,8 21,4 21,4 23, 1 
Top 200 34,3 35,5 35,3 36,9 
Top 500 45,9 47,3 47, 1 48,6 
Manufacturing 
Top 50 36,6 37,7 37,5 38,0 
Top 200 57,2 59,8 59,7 60,5 
Top 500 68,6 71,6 71,9 73,2 
Trade 
Top 50 20,0 21, 1 20,6 21,7 
Top 200 28,2 30,0 29,4 30,9 
Top 500 33,6 35,6 35,2 37, 1 
Services 
Top 50 21,3 20, 1 20,6 20,2 
Top 200 31,8 31,0 32,0 33,5 
Top 500 n.a. 38,4 39,8 41,2 
• Percent of total corporate assets held by the 50, 200, and 500 largest 
corporations in various sectors: 1968-1974 
~ Shenefield, John H., State•ent in the Hearings on Mergers and Econo1ic 
Concentration, Part 1, U.S. Senate Subco11ittee on the Antitrust, Monopoly, 
and Business Rights, Washington, D.C. 1979, pp. 81-92. 
46 Cf. on the turnover Stonebraker, Robert J., Turnover and Mobility among 
the 100 Largest Firms: An Update, 69 AER (1979), pp. 968-973; and on the 
structure of aggregate concentration, Greer, Industrial Organization ... , 
op. cit., 124 f. 
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While overall concentration has not changed significantly, industry concen-
tration has greatly increased in the U.S. and, with it the chances that 
undesirable effects might occur.47 
For the Federal Republic it has been shown that aggregate concentration 
steadily increased in the period during 1954 and 1971, coming nearly to a 
standstill between 1971 and 197348; since then it has slightly decreased, as 
shown by the Main Reports of the German Monopolies Commission.49 
With regard to industry level concentration, the MC has begun measuring 
the levels and trends of concentration on the basis of production statistics 
(so-called commodity groups) which comes close to the concept of the rele-
vant market. 50 Although official regulations on classified statistical informa-
tion made substantial modifications necessary, it has been made obvious that 
there is a predominance of commodity groups characterized by rising con-
centration (93 groups) over commodity groups falling in concentration (64 
groups) in a medium-term analysis. 51 
bb. causes 
The clarification of the causes of concentration is impeded by the fact that 
these causes are multivariate in nature and Interwoven with each other. 52 
This makes it difficult to separate single causes from each other and to 
determine their individual importance. In addition, methodological problems 
contribute to the difficulty as well. 53 
The crucial finding In dealing with the causes of concentration is that no 
concentration imperative exists in the sense that concentration is an inevl-
47 Cf. Hughes et al., Hypotheses about Mergers, op. cit., 15-17 
48 Cf. Hughes et al., Hypotheses about Mergers, op. cit., 17; MOiier/ Hoch-
relter, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen der Konzentratlon in der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland, op. cit., 118 f. 
49 Cf., e.g., Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten V: Okonomische Kriterien fur 
die Rechtsanwendung, Baden-Baden 1984, para. 56; and Monopolkommis-
sion, Hauptgutachten VI: Gesamtwirtschaftliche Chancen und Rislken wach-
sender U nternehmensg rof3en, Baden-Baden 1986, para 66. 
50 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten IV ... , op. cit., para. 33. 
51 Cf. Monopol kommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., paras. 39-41. This 
tendency is not as distinct if measured by the developments In industry 
branches (para. 56). 
52 Cf., Eucken, Walter, Grundsatze der Wirtschaftspolitik, 5th ed., TObingen 
1975, p. 235. 
53 Cf. Lenel, Hans 0., Ursachen der Konzentratlon, 2nd ed., TObingen 1968, 
pp. 42 f., and 51-53. 
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table Industrial process as Karl Marx has stated.54 This does not disprove 
the hypothesis that two categories of concentration causes exist. There is 
one category in which the causes are more or less objective in nature such 
as technological developments and capital market imperfections, and a second 
category of causes rather subjective in nature, such as speculation motives 
of economic agents and aggrandizing (empire building).55 
Numerous possibilities for the classification of concentration causes exist in 
the economic literature. It is rather a matter of actual practicability for a 
special purpose than a matter of justification or falsification of single clas-
sifications that determines our choice.58 
In its Fourth Main Report, the German Monopolies Commission (MC) has intro-
duced a classification which distinguishes so-called first-line and second-line 
causes of concentration. Whereas the second-line causes are simply the 
actual visible outcomes of the concentration process, namely internal growth, 
external growth, market entry and market exit, the fl rst-iine causes are the 
underlying determinants of the visible outcomes. The MC discerns the fol-
lowing first-line causes though it may not be claimed that the list is 
ex hausti ve:57 
public legal framework, encompassing legal rules such as, certain corpo-
rate or personal tax laws; 
- capital market Imperfections, as a result of unequal access to capital mar-
kets due to corporate size; 
54 Cf. Johr, Adolf, Konzentration als Problem der Theorie der Wirtschaftspo-
litik, in: Arndt (ed.), Die Konzentration ... , op. cit., pp. 459-512, 475 f. 
The thesis that industrial concentration is an inevitable phenomenon was 
later also adopted by some modern economists, cf., e.g., Salin, Edgar, 
Karteilverbot und Konzentration, 16 Kyklos (1963), pp. 178-200, 195. 
55 Cf. Haussmann, KonzentrationsgrOnde ... , op. cit., 1; for this reason we 
often find a rough classification in the Anglo-American literature which 
differentiates between real changes in demand or cost conditions and 
speculative or managerial motives, cf., e.g., Shepherd, Public Policies .•• , 
op. cit., 217 f. 
56 For some of the common classifications cf. Hughes et al., Hypotheses 
about Mergers, op. cit., 29-38; Johr, Konzentration als Problem ... , op. cit., 
pp. 470 f.; Kantzenbach, Konzentration als Problem der Konkurrenz-
wi rtschaft ... , op. cit., 168; Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 217 f.; 
and Sohn, Zur Phanomenologie der wirtschaftlichen Konzentratlon ... , op. 
cit., 110-112 
57 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten IV ... , op. cit., ch. VI, esp. para. 
705-715; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspoliti k und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 127; and 
similar Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 113 f. 
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economies of large size, due to cost savings in production, distribution or 
administration; 
- restrictive practices, possibly decreasing the number of firms In a market 
or possibly stimulating competition; 
- patents, banning entry of newcomers or protecting newcomers; 
- research and development, due to economies of size In R & D and finan-
cing; and 
advertisement, due to economies of size in advertising. 
Two causes deserve special attention. Firstly, there is the hypothesis that in 
addition to systematic determinants of concentration processes, chance plays 
a significant role in determining the degree of concentration (Gibrafs 
Law).!58 The large extent of systematic variations in similar markets across 
different nations, however, shows that chance is responsible for some degree 
of concentration in every industry but nonetheless plays a relatively minor 
role In determining industry concentration levels.59 
Second, public policy in the fields of antitrust, government procurement, 
regulation, and the setting of the institutional framework (e.g., rules and 
laws) have to be considered as major determinants of Industrial concentra-
tion. The hypothesis holds that the government can heavily Influence indus-
try concentration by the setting of the framework, which comprises the set-
ting of particular tariffs, quotas, licenses, franchises, and patents."° This Is 
of particular importance since public policy which is restricted simply to 
changing of the framework is unlikely to Impair the freedom to compete. 
This kind of public policy therefore seems to be appropriate to our appro-
ach, therefore. 
58 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 114-116; for one of the most 
prominent findings cf. Marcus, Matltyahu, A Note on the Determinants of 
the Growth of Firms and Gibrat's Law, 3 CJE (1969), pp. 580-589. 
59 Cf. Pryor, Frederic L., An International Comparison of Concentration Ra-
tios, 54 RESt (1972), pp. 130-140, 138 f. 
60 Cf. for the most prominent authors, Adams, Walter, and Horace Gray, 
Monopoly in America: The Government as Promoter, 2nd ed., New York 
1957; and Machlup, Fritz, Political Economy of Monopoly, Baltimore 1952, p. 
182: "Governments, apparently, have never been able to make up their 
minds as to which they dislike more, competition or monopoly." 
For some recent findings with regard to corporate and personal taxation 
policy In the Federal Republic, cf. Monopolkommlsslon, Hauptgutachten IV 
... , op. cit., para. 740-774. 
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The economic rationality assumption is the basis of most empirical studies on 
merger motives.81 This assumption is reflected by objective variables or 
proxies, such as size, growth, economies of scale, market share, profits etc. 
Although the separation of individual merger motives poses empirical pro-
blems because of possible fake-motives, a lack of consistency In the motives, 
the problem of operationalization etc., the multivariate nature of merger 
motives has been documented by a variety of empirical studies; this was 
noted supra. 112 In addition, there Is the theoretical problem of whether cau-
ses and effects can be separated from each other accurately. Very often it 
is the interdependence that dominates the field. For instance, economies of 
size cause concentration, whereas concentration can then be a major cause 
of restrictive practices which - in turn - can be a major cause of increased 
industrial concentration again. 
If we take a closer look at the question of which motives are decisive in 
determining the various levels of concentration or merger activity, we very 
quickly discover that there are only surmises and no hard and reliable fin-
dings. For Instance, it is assumed that economies of size and speculation 
dominated the first merger wave from 1897 until 1904 in the U.S., whereas it 
was thought to be speculation during the second wave (1920-1931) and spe-
culation and diversification in the conglomerate movement of the recent 
past.13 
The German Monopolies Commission has stated that the only reasonable 
hypothesis that can be held currently is that mergers determine Industrial 
concentration to a large extent and that the framework of public and private 
61 Cf. Goldberg, Walter H., Mergers: Motives, Modes, Methods, New York 1983, 
p. 9, who notes (p. 12) that motives inconsistent with this rationality as-
sumption (e.g., empire building) are often only available via "soft re-
search", I.e., personal questionnlng. 
62 Cf., e.g., Aldrich, Howard E., Organizations and Environment, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J. 1979; Ansoff, Igor H. et al., Acquisition Behavior of U.S. Manu-
facturing Firms, 1946-1965, Nashville, Tenn. 1971; Economic Concentration, 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington 1964-1969, vol. 
1-88; and Steiner, Peter O., Mergers: Motives, Effects, Policies, Ann Arbor 
1975, esp. pp. 31 ff., who classifies merger motives into broader catego-
ries. 
63 Cf. Kantzenbach, Erhard, Konzentration als Problem der Konkurrenzwirt-
schaft ••. , op. cit., 169. 
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law plays a major role In determining the level of concentration. Further 
inquiries are still to be carried out.&1 
cc. Effects 
We have pointed out supra that industrial concentration can have un-
desirable economic and non-economic effects. The siginificance for antitrust 
issues results from the stochastic character of the interrelatedness between 
different levels of concentration, competitive conduct and performance crite-
ria, the latter serving as operationalizations of predefined antitrust objec-
tives. We will try to specify these effects in the following by presenting 
possible effects on our objectives which have the function of standards. 85 
The effects of concentration are ambiguous since concentration neither indi-
cates an Inevitable decrease in the effectiveness or the vigor of competition 
- as can be shown, for instance, in relation to the world economy during 
the last two decades - nor a lower degree in the attainment of the prede-
fined objectives chosen, although this can be the case. 118 
With regard to general economic consequences of mergers, the effects can be 
grouped into three categories: effects on competition, effects on perfor-
64 Cf. Monopoikommission, Hauptgutachten IV ... , op. cit., para. 715 and 730. 
65 This has been stated concisely by Sullivan, Lawrence A., Handbook of the 
Law of Antitrust, St. Paul, Minn. 1977, p. 576, who emphasizes the signifi-
cance of particular levels of concentration and the need for additional 
empirical data for the purpose of assessing the possible consequences of 
mergers, making possible reliable predictions about competitive effects, 
and developing useful generalizations that will reduce the need for case 
by case analysis. 
Effects that are due to the different forms of mergers will be presented 
In the second part of Part 2 of this contribution when the different 
forms are analyzed with regard to the special problems they pose for 
antitrust. 
66 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 82; Schuster, 
Helmut, Wettbewerbspolitik, MOnchen 1973, p. 112; as well as Hughes et 
al., Hypotheses about Mergers, op. cit., 20 and esp. 48 f.: "Thus, merger-
induced Increases in firm size, in addition to the consequences mentioned 
... , may also have Important threshold effects and enable successful ex-
porting and innovative activity to occur. Mergers may also lead to rapid 
plant rationalization in response to industrial change and can have simi-
lar effects to certain kinds of interfirm cooperation aggreements in redu-
cing uncertainty and promoting higher levels of investment and of pro-
duct and process innovation than might otherwise be the case." 
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mance, and effects on global aggregate concentration.97 
If the vigor of competition is reduced this leads to a reduction in economic 
performance by an impairment of efficiency and a slowing down of innova-
tion, although there is no precise quantification of the underlying correla-
tion.99 There have been attempts to measure the allocational efficiency losses 
due to industrial concentration by a welfare model introduced by Harberger. 
These attempts have come to ambiguous results, however, either seeming to 
understate or to overstate the losses actually occuring in allocative effi-
ciency and posing serious methodological problems, to which we will recur 
infra.89 
However, efficiency might on balance be raised if economies of scale, econo-
mies due to vertical integration (transaction cost economies) and other be-
nefits or synergisms (e.g., economies of scope) outweigh the above mentioned 
efficiency losses.70 These are difficult to assess, however. This consideration 
shows that even in terms of a rough analysis we are in an area of uncer-
tainty for the time being. We will therefore inquire further into this issue in 
Part 3 of our contribution. 
With regard to the freedom to compete - which is the non-economic objective 
we will consider - the crucial question is whether a systematic interdepen-
dency between concentration and the actual degree of freedom of the compe-
titors can be found in the sense of a general rule (per se-rule) or whether 
a case by case evaluation has to be applied (rule of reason). For the time 
being all that can be said is that rising industry concentration increases 
the possibility of the freedom to compete to be impaired, just was mentioned 
67 Cf. Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 219 f. The effects on competition 
will be treated infra and the relation to aggregate concentration has al-
ready been sketched supra. We will therefore look at performance In the 
following. 
68 Cf. Kantzenbach, Konzentration als Problem der Konkurrenzwirtschaft ... , 
op. cit., 179; and Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 220. 
69 Cf. for a survey Kaufer, Industrieokonomi k, op. cit., 287-295; Sobel, Wett-
bewerb und Industriestruktur, op. cit., pp. 177-192; and for the studies, 
Harberger, Arnold c., Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AER (1954), 
pp. 77-87; Kamerschen, David R., An Estimation of the "Welfare Losses" 
from Monopoly In the American Economy, 4 WEJ (1966), pp. 221-236; and 
Worcester, Dean A., New Estimates of the Welfare Loss to Monopoly: 1956-
1969, 40 SEJ (1973/74), pp. 234-245. 
70 Cf. Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 222. 
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above with regard to restraints of competition.71 At what level of concentra-
tion this becomes 'undue' in the sense of the yardstick of our approach of 
effective competition still has to be determined. 
d. Forms of Industrial Concentration 
We are able to distinguish a variety of different forms in examining Industry 
concentration, depending on the criteria we use for classificatlon.72 If the 
criterion of geographic delineation is chosen, for example, we are able to 
discern regional, national, and international concentration. Choosing the cri-
terion of productivity, we have to distinguish between concentration which 
Increases productivity and concentration which decreases it. 
Within the scope of industry concentration, market power is determined 
mainly by the market share the firm holds, the barriers to entry to this 
market, the level of market concentration, and the financial potential of the 
market participants. In the context of industrial concentration it Is the mar-
ket share criterion which is the one primarily referred to. 
The process of industrial concentration can be cross-classified by the diffe-
rent ways of growth, whether It is achieved by internal growth or external 
growth73, and with regard to the direction of the concentration process, 
whether it occurs in a horizontal, vertical, or diagonal direction.74 
Internal as well as external growth are distinguished by the techniques that 
are chosen by the firms in order to increase their capacity in a market. 
These techniques encompass internal growth strategies of existing companies, 
71 Cf. as well Kantzenbach, Konzentration als Problem der Konkurrenzwirt-
schaft ..• , op. cit., 172 f. and 178; and similar Robert, Konzentratlonspoll-
tlk ... , op. cit., 20. 
72 Cf. Arndt, Helmut, et al., in: Enzyklopadle, col. 905 ff. 
73 Cf. Wllleke, Wettbewerbspolltik, op. cit., 189, 195 and 198; Neiser, Jens, Die 
Praxis der deutschen Fusionskontrolle, Berlin 1981, p. 72; Schuster, Wett-
bewerbspolltlk, op. cit., 103. 
74 Cf. Blair, Economic Concentration ... op. cit., 2; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspoll-
tik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 130-134; and Shepherd, Public Policies •.• , 
op. cit., 216. 
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the building of horizontal, vertical, or diagonal concerns by the existing 
firms, and Joint ventures.75 
aa. Internal Growth 
Internal growth is characterized by an increase in production capacity by a 
firm through the building of new capacity that has not been in that market 
before.78 Only If Internal growth is overproportionate is concentration raised 
within a market.n 
bb. External Growth 
External growth integrates capacity which has already been in the market 
and which, therefore, Is not additionally built up by the growing firm.78 
The most common form of external growth is mergers. Putting our emphasis 
on mergers In the following, we will use the term "to describe a permanent 
union of previously separate enterprises ... generally Irrelevant whether 
either or both corporations survive as a matter of corporate law'".79 As has 
been noted above, growth and, therefore, mergers as well - as the most im-
75 Cf. Wllleke, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., 195-198, who adds new entries of 
firms, the owners of which have not been entrepreneurs before. We will 
treat this as new entry, instead. For consideration of Joint ventures as 
an external form of growth, cf. Neiser, Die Praxis der deutschen Fusions-
kontrolle, op. cit., 74. 
76 Cf. Schuster, Wettbewerbspolitik, op. cit., p. 103; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspo-
lltl k und Kartell rec ht, op. cit., 135; Wi II eke, Wettbewerbspolltl k, op. cit., 
189. 
It is possible to discern different directions of the concentration process 
within internal growth as well, but it does not seem useful to pursue 
them further since Internal growth as a rule is horizontal growth. 
77 This is not quite right since the degree of concentration - as has been 
mentioned supra - is formally determined by internal growth, external 
growth, exits of firms as well as new entries, cf. Monopolkommission, 
Hauptgutachten IV ... , op. cit., para. 706 f., and p. 196. 
78 Cf. Willeke, Wettbewerbspolltik, op. cit., 198; and Schmidbauer, Allokatlon, 
... , op. cit., 238 f. 
79 Areeda, Antitrust Analysis ... , op. cit., 657. The corporate law definition 
Is judged to be too narrow for antitrust applicability "since the conse-
quences for competition on the market may be the same if an enterprise 
directly or Indirectly adds resources of another enterprise to its own.", 
Hopt, Klaus J., Merger Control in Germany: Philosophies, Experiences, Re-
forms, in: Hopt, Klaus J. (ed.), European Merger Control: Legal and Eco-
nomic Analyses on Multinational Enterprises, vol. 1, Berlin and New York 
1982, pp. 71-99, 83. The specification of the criteria (such as, percentage 
of stock or assets) 'union' or of the term 'corporate influence' Is carried 
out by the legislator according to relevant circumstances (e.g., laws). 
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portant form of external growth - can be distinguished by the direction 
which the economic integration process takes: i.e. horizontal, vertical, and 
diagonal (conglomerate) mergers. 
(1) Horizontal Mergers 
Horizontal market concentration is the form of concentration which has re-
ceived the most attention in the past. With regard to the supply side, It em-
bodies the control of a given industry or market by a rather small number 
of producers that are totally or at least significantly engaged In that indus-
try.eo In this context, a horizontal merger is the union of two or more 
direct competitors that have the emphasis of their activities within the same 
relevant market and, therefore, at the same stage within the chain of pro-
duction and dlstrlbution.91 
(2) Vertical Mergers 
Vertical mergers are characterized by the fact that the acquiring firm and 
the acquired firm produce different economic goods. In order to be judged a 
vertical Integration, these products, however, have to be within the same 
stream of production and distribution process, although at different levels.82 
There is either the possibility that the acquiring firm engages in a later 
stage of the production process (forward integration) or that it engages in 
an earlier stage of the production-distribution process (backward integra-
tlon).93 
80 Cf. Blair, Economic Concentration ... , op. cit., 2; and Wllleke, Wettbe-
werbspolitl k, op. cit., 189. 
81 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 127; Schmidt, Wettbewerbs-
politlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 130; and Shepherd, Public Policies ..• , 
op. cit., 216. 
82 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 127 f.; Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspolitlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 131; and Shepherd, Public Policies 
••• , op. cit., 216. 
83 Cf. Blair, Economic Concentration ..• op. cit., 2 and 25: "Vertical concen-
tration refers to operations by a company in 2 or more industries repre-
senting successive stages In the flow of materials or products from an 
earlier to a later stage of production or vice versa. The degree of an in-
dustry's vertical concentration Is the share of its output produced by 
companies primarily engaged in an earlier or later stage in the flow of 
materials or products."; and Willeke, Wettbewerbspolitlk, op. cit., 189 f. 
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(3) Conglanerate Mergers 
Diagonal concentration which leads to the conglomeration of firms can be 
defined either In negative or in positive terms. Negatively defined, "conglo-
merate mergers are all those that are neither horizontal nor vertical" 114 
(emphasis in the original). Since conglomerate mergers, in turn, cover diffe-
rent forms and, as a rule, pose special problems in actual merger cases, as 
has to be shown infra, it is necessary to subdivide them into different 
classes.85 
Four classes have been developed and commonly accepted in the antitrust 
literature:1111 
- market extension mergers link companies that act In different geographic 
areas but produce within the same relevant market; 
product extension mergers are characterized by the fact that the acqui-
ring firm adds to Its product line products which are related In terms of 
the uses, the distribution channel etc.; 
- reciprocal mergers, which enable the parties to perform reciprocal dealings 
by being situated indirectly along the same line of production and distri-
bution (e.g., a dealer merging with a producer squeezing the wholesa-
ler)87; 
84 Greer, Industrial Organization ••. , op. cit., 128; cf as well Blair, Economic 
Concentration ••. , op. cit., 2 and esp. 41: "Conglomerate concentration may 
be defined as the possession of a share of a given industry's resources 
or activity by companies that are primarily engaged In other industries 
but are not suppliers or users of the given industry's products." 
85 "Because it is so hard to grapple with this 'all-other' conglomerate cate-
gory, elaborate efforts are sometimes made to define quasi-horizontal or 
quasi-vertical subcategories or even to escape the problem by insisting 
that anticompetitive mergers are not really conglomerate. But the essen-
tial question is not one of definition but of the merger's competitive con-
sequences.", Areeda, Antitrust Analysis •.. , op. cit., 780. 
86 Cf., e.g., Nelser, Die Praxis der deutschen Fuslonskontrolle ..• , op. cit., 73; 
Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 216. From a slightly different point 
of view, Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 132 f.; and 
Greer, Industrial Organization •.. , op. cit., 128; the latter does not include 
reciprocal dealings. With a certain extent of justification, the German 
Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) judges product extension mergers 
within the category of horizontal mergers, cf. Bundeskartellamt, Tii.tig-
keitsbericht 1977, p. 118. 
87 This is often characterized by the expression "I wlll buy from you if you 
buy from me", and may exclude rivals from the affected markets; it is 
close to a vertical merger, cf. Greer, Industrial Organization .•• , op. cit., 
134; and Neiser, Die Praxis der deutschen Fusionskontrolle ... , op. cit., 74. 
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pure oonglomerate mergers, involving merging parties who do not have 
anything In common with regard to the features of their economic output 
as is true the case for example with, say, a retail grocer and a furniture 
manufacturer. 
We will henceforth emphasize horizontal and vertical mergers and provide a 
thorough treatment of them In Parts 3 and 4 of this contribution by an 
analysis of their economic bases as well as of former and present public 
policy towards these forms of mergers. 
2. Measurement of Economic Concentration 
a. Analysis of Economic Concentration 
An analysis of concentration in a group of commodities, in an industry and/ 
or In an economy can be performed in two ways. Firstly, there can be a 
quantitative analysis of Interdependencies among economic variables which 
characterize the market process. This sort of formal analysis is performed as 
a rule by statistical methods. 
Secondly, the primary shortcoming of this kind of analysis (e.g., the pos-
sible neglect of other economic factors influencing market power) leads to 
the necessity of a complementary qualitative analysis emphasizing the de-
pendent variable. In the context of the analysis of Industrial concentration 
this would mean that the consequences of rising Industrial concentration on 
power cannot always be made comprehensible by statistical instruments be-
cause power might change without affecting statistically relevant variables. 
This can be compensated for by hearings In which experts on the Issue at 
stake are being questioned on the qualitative interdependencies of these 
variables. 
Changes in economic quantities such as sales and market share, however, 
can be fairly good Indicators or proxies for qualitative outcome changes.88 
The analysis of industrial concentration mainly relies on the market as a 
basis quantity. However, this can lead to deficiencies measuring other forms 
88 Cf. Schmidbauer, Allokation, ... , op. cit., 163. 
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of industrial concentration than horizontal.89 
Market power can be considered as only one aspect of the total socio-econo-
mic phenomenon of power. Additional criteria for the judgment of economic 
power have to be considered, therefore, which are external to the scope of 
markets, such as the impact of the firm's financial abilities or its political 
influence,90 
b. Defining the Relevant Market 
Some further specification of the term 'market' seems necessary if It is to 
serve for antitrust purposes.91 This is the case because an actual analysis 
of competition can only be performed in the context of markets. Therefore, 
the area of competitive interaction within which monopoly power as a coun-
terpart to competition is exercised has to be determined.92 If these actual 
market conditions are to be precisely characterized by statistical measures, 
the relevant market does serve as a basis for measurement as well. 93 The 
need for further specification has also risen from the wording of the rele-
89 "This purpose supplies an answer to our earlier question of how to mea-
sure the size of firm: two firms are equal in a market ff they sell or buy 
equal quantities in that market. Hence measure a firm's size by safes, In 
a product market;", Stigler, George J., The Organization of Industry, 
Homewood, Ill. 1968, p. 30. 
There is a Jack of adequacy, for instance, In attempts to comprehend 
conglomerate concentration or mergers by the traditional market concept, 
cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 55. As in the 
case of material concentration analysis, other approaches have to be 
developed for this purpose. 
90 Cf. Freitag, Dieter, Wirksamer Wettbewerb und potentielle Konkurrenz, 21 
WuW (1971), pp. 294-305; Matschuk, Arten und Messung ..• , op. cit., 594. 
91 For an introductory survey, cf. Turner, Donald F., The Role of the "Mar-
ket Concept" in Antitrust Law, 49 ALJ (1980), pp. 1145-1153. 
92 Cf. Kaufer, Erich, Die Bestimmung von Marktmacht: Dargestellt am Problem 
des relevanten Marktes In der amerikanischen Antltrustpolitik, Bern and 
Stuttgart 1967, p. 89; Klauss, Gerd, Die Bestimmung von Marktmacht, Ber-
lin 1975, p. 111, and Sullivan, Antitrust Law ... , op. cit., 41 and 605. 
93 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 102; Schmidbauer, Alloka-
tion, ... , op. cit., 175. 
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vant sections of the German and U.S. American antitrust laws.94 If this need 
were taken to its logical extreme and the chain of reasoning thus reversed, 
a market would be considered relevant only If effective competition accor-
ding to our approach, could be diagnosed within its boundaries.95 
A market in antitrust is termed relevant if its boundaries are chosen In a 
way that all firms915 , or, more precisely products that compete with each 
other, are within these boundaries:97 
"A 'relevant market,' then, is the narrowest market which is wide 
enough so that products from adjacent areas or from other producers 
in the same area cannot compete on substantial parity with those Inclu-
ded in the market." 
Different aspects of a relevant market have to be distinguished. The market 
has to be defined with regard to its product scope, Its geographic extension 
as well as to its time dimension.98 Whereas the geographic dimension is 
mainly relevant in cases where transportation costs amount to a significant 
part of the product's price or value or in cases of selling services, the time 
94 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten V •.• , op. cit., para. 606. 
" A monopoly involves the power to raise prices or to exclude competi-
tion, when the monopolist desires to do so ... Since by definition monopoly 
Involves the power to eliminate competition it is clearly relevant in the 
determination of the existence of a tendency to monopoly In ... any ... 
line of business the area or areas of existing effective competition In 
which monopoly power might be exercised must first be determined" (em-
phasis added), Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 1953 CCH Trade 
Cases § 67,536 at p. 68,600. 
95 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspollti k und Kartell recht, op. cit., 54, as well as 
Sullivan, Antitrust Law ... , op. cit., 74. For a similar position, cf. 
Lanzillotti, Robert F., Market Structure and Antitrust Vulnerability, 8 AB 
( 1963), 853-871, 859. This criteria cannot be considered operational, how-
ever, although it is analytically precise. 
96 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization .. '., op. cit., 103. 
97 Sullivan, Antitrust Laws •.. , op. cit., 41. 
98 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization .•. , op. cit., 103; M0ller/Hochreiter, 
Stand und Entwlcklungstendenzen ... , op. cit., 41; and Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 49. 
Some authors add a personal dimension, cf. Lampe, Hans-Eckhard, Wettbe-
werb, Wettbewerbsbezlehungen, Wettbewerbsintensitat, Baden-Baden 1979, 
p. 67. Whether this is theoretically correct, can be disputed since It can 
be considered a part of consumers' preferences. At any rate, it is an im-
practical dimension for antitrust purposes. 
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dimension is relevant if the economic exchange is restricted to certain peri-
ods of time.99 
The product scope, i.e. the question of what products with regard to their 
actual features are to be included in the relevant market poses the most 
serious problems. 
Different approaches to the definition of product scope can be dlstln-
guished.100 All the approaches that have been considered viable in defining 
the relevant market are comparable with each other because they have the 
substitution possibilities in consumption as a common basls. 101 They should 
therefore lead to similar results if applied in an actual case of definition. If 
the products are held to belong to the same relevant market this means that 
in the view of the consumer the products should be substitutable for each 
other with regard to the consumers' needs. Some authors are of the opinion 
that products should be included in the relevant market as well if a high 
flexibility in the producer's production facilities and equipment exists. 102 
This basic idea of substitution or production flexibilities has led to the 
attempt to measure these flexibilities by cross-price elasticities of demand 
and supply. On the demand side the concept holds that goods belong to the 
99 Cf. Monopol kommission, Hauptgutachten der Monopol kommission III: Fusl-
onskontrolle bleibt vorranglg, Baden-Baden 1980, ch. 5; MOiier/ Hoch-
reiter, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen •.. , op. cit., 44; Schmidt, Wett-
bewerbspolitlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 54; and Sullivan, Antitrust Laws 
..• , op. cit., 42. 
100 For a survey cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht,_ op. cit., 
49-54. 
101 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., para. 611 f.; MUl-
ler/Hochrelter, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen ..• , op. cit., 41 f.; Sche-
rer, Industrial market structure ••. , op. cit., 60; and Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspol iti k und Kartel I rec ht, op. cit., 52. 
102 Cf. Kaufer, Die Bestimmung ••• , op. cit., 11 f.; Kaysen, Carl, and Donald F. 
Turner, Antitrust Polley: An Economic and Legal Analysis, Cambridge, 
Mass. 1959, p. 295: "In order to define a market we attempt to obtain 
information on cross-elasticities of both demand and supply. Such Infor-
mation Is rarely available directly, but must be approximated by evi-
dence on consumer behavior ... and on the degree of specialization of 
equipment ... " (emphasis added). 
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same relevant market if they show significant cross-price elasticlties. 103 It 
has to be noted critically, however, that the measure is manipulable because 
suppliers have an Interest in deliberately determining the boundaries of the 
relevant market: 104 
"In these cases, defendants may argue for a narrow market so that the 
merger contemplated or affected would be one between firms not com-
peting in the same market, or they may seek to broaden it so that any 
combination would generate a firm that has only a small market share." 
Therefore, the measure is the outcome rather than the determinant of the 
competitive process. The concept must therefore be rejected or restricted to 
special cases.105 
In order to determine whether substitute products should be included in the 
market, the concept of reasonable interchangeability1oe has been developed. 
The concept is a paraphrase of the basic idea of product substitutability. 
According to the concept of reasonable interchangeability, all goods belong 
to a relevant market that - in the consumers' view - are interchangeable for 
103 Cf. Kaufer, Die Bestimmung ... , op. cit., 6-8; Klauss, Die Bestimmung ... , 
op. cit., 114-118; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 
51; Sosnlck. Stephen A., A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition, 
72 QJE (1958), pp. 380-423, 401. 
This does not mean that attempts are made to extract precise numerical 
values. Rather a 'soft' evaluation of the substitution possibilities is car-
ried out, cf. for the difficulties Boyer, Kenneth D., Degrees of Differen-
tiation and Industry Boundaries, In: Calvani, Terry, and John Siegfried 
(eds.), Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law, Boston 1979, pp. 88-106; and 
Stegemann, Klaus, Cross Elasticity and the Relevant Market, 130 JITE 
(1974), pp. 151-165. 
104 Karsh, Bruce A., The Role of Supply Substltutabllity in Defining the Re-
levant Product Market, 65 VLR (1979), pp. 129-151, 129 note 1. 
105 Cf. Klauss, Die Bestimmung ... , op. cit., 115; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbs-
politik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 51. 
106 Cf. Henrichs, H., Die Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes Im Licht der 
neueren Rechtsprechung zum Antitrustrecht, 17 WuW (1967), pp. 255-273, 
262-264; and Singer, Eugene M., Antitrust Economics: Selected Legal 
Cases and Economic Models, Englewood Cllffs, N.J., 1968, pp. 56-61. 
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., op. cit., at p. 71,593: 
"In considering what Is the relevant market for determining the control 
of price and competition, no more definite rule can be declared than 
that commodities reasonably Interchangeable by consumers for the same 
purposes make up 'part of the trade or commerce,' monopolization of 
which may be illegal.", (emphasis added). 
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a specific purpose. 107 It differs from the idea of cross-price elasticity in 
that It tries to include competitive parameters in addition to the price, such 
as the quality of the product and product features. 1011 Its theoretical accu-
racy Is widely accepted nowadays, although It is characterized by a number 
of practical difficulties. 109 These can be found not only within the field of 
data collection but are also involved in the question of how to consider 
imports and exports for the definition of the relevant market. 110 
The concept is refined by two additional criteria (peculiar characteristics 
and uses). 111 Firstly, goods are interchangeable with regard to their basic 
function if they serve an identical or at least a similar purpose with regard 
to their actual features. Primarily this means a comparison of their chemical 
and physical characterlstics. 112 Secondly, this functional interchangeability 
has to be verified by the actual choice of the consumer. The actual inter-
changeability is determined by the price and the quality of the product as 
well as by the consumers' preferences. 113 
The actual procedure takes the form of questioning dealers and/or consu-
mers by means of panels or related methods. 114 
107 Cf. Kaufer, Die Bestlmmung ••. , op. cit., 21; Neiser, Die Praxis der deut-
schen Fuslonskontrolle, op. cit., 55. 
108 Cf. Singer, Antitrust Economics ... , op. cit., 56-58. 
109 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., para. 616; for a 
similar evaluation cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. 
cit., 51. 
110 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization •.. , op. cit., 104 f.; MQller/Hochreiter, 
Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen •.• , op. cit., 43; and Schmidbauer, Allo-
kation •.. , op. cit., 176. 
It has to be noted, however, that the U.S. Bureau of Census attaches 
great importance to similarity of production processes as well as of pro-
duct uses by using four digit industries in its standard Industrial 
classification (SIC). The same applies to the German Monopolies Commis-
sion, which has enlarged Its index in its Fourth Main Report from the 
Industry concept to a concept acknowledging product classes, so-called 
groups of commodities, cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten IV ••• , op. 
cit., para. 33. These so-called four digit numbers represent definitions 
of about the right amount of detail for the purpose of delineating the 
relevant market, cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 104. 
111 Cf. Kaufer, Die Bestimmung ... , op. cit., 91 f. 
112 Cf. Klauss, Die Bestimmung ... , op. cit., 128. 
113 Cf. Kaufer, Die Bestimmung ... , op. cit., 24 f. 
114 Cf. Schmidt, Ingo, US-amerikanlsche und deutsche Wettbewerbspolitlk 
gegen0ber Marktmacht, Berlin 1973, p. 49; and Klauss, Die Bestlmmung 
... , op. cit., 129. For a similar opinion cf. Monopolkommisslon, Hauptgut-
achten V ... , op. cit., para. 618. 
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An additional issue is whether and to what extent potential competition has 
to be considered for proper delineation of the relevant market. On the one 
hand, this seems relevant from the consumers' view since potential competi-
tion might Include substitution possibilities, whereas on the other hand, 
potential competition is closely related to the question of supply flexibility 
of short run and/or long run alternatives of existing products. 115 
Mainly for the reason that the consideration of such additional criteria poses 
practical judgmental problems, potential competition should only be taken 
into account by the concept of barriers to entry. 118 
c. Measures of Industrial Concentration 
The attempt to measure economic concentration originates in the field of in-
come distribution where it has been elaborated on and developed especially 
considering questions of interpersonal income distribution. These attempts 
considered largely the extent of deviation from an even income distribution 
using fairly simple statistical technlques. 117 
For a profound analysis of industrial concentration, there is a need for a 
variety of statistical preconditions, such as the selection of the population 
units (e.g., firms), the determination of the population (e.g., sales), the 
population value, or the distribution of the population total over the units, 
and the period of time being considered. 118 
115 Cf. on this question Monopol kommission, Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., 
para. 631-633; and Karsh, The Role of Supply Substitutability .•• , supra, 
131: "Supply substitutability occurs when a firm engaged in the produc-
tion of one good can shift its operations quickly and inexpensively to 
producing another good," 
116 Cf. for this opinion Klauss, Die Bestimmung ... , op. cit., 143; Monopol-
kommission, Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., para. 654 and 657; Schmidt, 
Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 53, who points out that the 
neglect of potential competitors in the context of the delineation of the 
relevant market is in accordance with the legal wording of Sec. 22 para. 
1 ARC; cf. however, Scherer, Industrial market structure .•. , op. cit., 61: 
"At the risk of being somewhat arbitrary, we should probably draw the 
line to include as substitutes on the production side only existing 
capacity that can be shifted in the short run, i.e. without significant 
new investment in plant, equipment, and worker training." 
117 Cf. Matschuk, Arten und Messung ... , op. cit., 594 f. 
118 Cf. Schuster, Wettbewerbspollti k, op. cit., p. 100; for the terminology cf. 
Piesch/Schmidt, The suitability of concentration measures ... , op. cit., 20 
f. 
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The intention behind measuring industry concentration Is somewhat different 
in comparison to other fields of economic concentration. Effective competition 
is associated with the attainment of predefined antitrust objectives. Power 
as a counterpart to effective competition is associated with a lesser degree 
of goal attainment. Within the field of industry concentration, therefore, the 
need arises to determine market power and thereby identify potentials for 
the abuse of power. 119 
The choice of the actual statistical index is determined by the basic under-
standing of the competitive process underlying the inquiry. This, however, 
may make such inquiries arbitrary and limit their explanatory power. 120 The 
choice of measurement is therefore closely connected with the underlying 
theoretical model :121 
"Ideally, the choice should be based upon how well an Index accords 
with relevant underlying economic theory. Certain theories do support a 
definite preference. Nevertheless, theory provides conflicting guidance" 
(emphasis added). 
There are two main approaches in measuring industrial concentration and 
monopoly power, a performance approach and a structural approach. With 
regard to the structural dominance within our approach to effective compe-
tition, we prefer the latter as it focuses on observable dimensions of market 
structure. The measurement of industrial concentration then becomes the 
119 Cf. MUller/Hochreiter, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen •.. , op. cit., 29. 
Stigler instead gives a formal definition of the purpose consistent with a 
performance orientated measurement: "The purpose of a measure of con-
centration is to predict the extent of the departure of price (or, alter-
natively, of rate of return) from the competitive level." (italics in origi-
nal), Stigler, The Organization of Industry, op. cit., 30. 
120 Cf. Arndt, Wirtschaftliche Macht, op. cit., 46; MUiier/ Hochrelter, Stand 
und Entwlcklungstendenzen •.. , op. cit., 31 f.; cf. as well Greer, Indus-
trial Organization .•. , op. cit., 97, for whom indices for the measurement 
of concentration and power are structural indices in nature and in 
order to be effective they must provide fairly accurate predictions of 
market conduct and performance. 
Piesch/Schmidt, The suitability of concentration measures ... , op. cit., 39: 
"The conventional statistical approach to measuring concentration starts 
from the idea of a firm holding a dominant position on the market, ... 
When statistical concentration increases, the intensity of competition can 
then be presumed to decrease and market power to increase." 
121 Scherer, Industrial market structure .•. , op. cit., 58. 
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measurement of the relationship between changes In structural dimensions as 
independent variables and performance criteria as dependent variables. 122 
Attempts have been made to postulate sets of criteria which serve as theo-
retically accurate yardsticks in chosing measurement indices of Industrial 
concentration. As a consequence, adequate statistical indexes of con-
centration should be congruent with reality and should provide a descrip-
tive illustration of the phenomenon to be measured. The choice of the actual 
index determines the requirements that the quality and quantity of the data 
have to fulfill. 123 This leads to the fact that no one Index by itself is an 
ideal index since individual indices contain advantages and disadvantages 
depending on the actual circumstances of the inquiry, i.e. its immediate pur-
pose. The same applies to most of the summarlcal indexes that try to take 
account of different aspects of concentration. The disadvantages can only be 
got around by combining individual indices and thus minimizing their indivi-
dual shortcomings. 124 
122 The main performance-oriented measure is the so-called Lerner-index 
which is defined as (price - marginal cost) divided by price and direct-
ly reflects the allocatively inefficient departure of price from marginal 
cost associated with monopoly, cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure 
... , op. cit., 56; and for the original source cf. Lerner, Abba P., The 
Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 RES 
(1934), pp. 157-175. 
123 Cf. Hannah/ Kay, Concentration in Modern Industry, op. cit.; Monopol-
kommission, Hauptgutachten IV ... , op. cit., para. 716 f. 
Greer proposes a more pragmatic approach, postulating three requl re-
ments. Indexes must be (1) easy to calculate, (2) sensitive to major 
structural changes over time, and (3) indicative of structural power 
across diverse markets and firms, cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ••• , 
op. cit., 97. 
124 Cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 64; and Shepherd, 
Public Policies ... , op. cit., 388. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
95 
The most commonly accepted and used indices are the concentration ratios 
and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. 125 The concentration ratio is an index 
which combines the absolute numbers of the population units (e.g., firms) 
and the fractions of the population total that each population unit holds. It 
presents the percentage of revenues or sales accounted for by an absolute 
number of the largest firms in the market. Usually the 4, 8 or 20 largest 
firms are considered (CR4, CRa or CR20). Nevertheless, this method has 
several shortcomings. 129 Only one slice out of all firms is described, no 
information about the size distribution within the slice is provided and 
structural factors other than market share are neglected. 
The Hirschman-Herfindahl index is the sum of the squares of the size shares 
that the firms have in a particular market. The size shares are expressed 
by the firm's proportion of total market revenues or sales.121 In mathemati-
cal notation this can be represented as: 
n [5]2 HHI = E J. 
i=l 
where T represents total market sales, Xi stands for the sales of Individual 
firm i, and n is the number of the firms in the market. The main shortco-
ming of the index is the lack of data available. For this reason, mostly con-
centration ratios are used. 
125 Cf. Schmidt, Ingo, and Wolfgang Ries, Der Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index 
(HHI) als wettbewerbspolltisches Instrument in den neuen US-Fusions-
richtlinien, 33 WuW (1983), pp. 525-534. 
For some comparative studies on the suitability of concentration mea-
sures cf. Kilpatrick, Robert W., The Choice Among Alternative Measures 
of Industrial Concentration, 49 RESt (1967), pp. 258-260; Marfels, Chri-
stian, A Bird's Eye View to Measures of Concentration, 20 AB (1975), pp. 
485-501; Kwoka, John E. Jr., Does the Choice of Concentration Measure 
Really Matter?, 29 JIE (1981), pp. 445-453; and Plesch/ Schmidt, The 
suitability of concentration measures ... , op. cit., 33-37, and 40, who also 
present the Linda index for the determination of further details of an 
oligopolistic group structure. 
126 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization •.. , op. cit., 99-101. 
127 Cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ••. , op. cit., 58; and Schmidt/ 
Ries, Der Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index ..• , supra. The Herfindahl measure 
decreases as the number of firms Increases, and increases as the dis-
persion of firm market shares from the industry average increases. 
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1v. eonciudlns Remarks 
In Part 1 of the contribution submitted we have presented the theoretical 
foundation of our approach. In subpart I we have started with the premise 
that competition is the most adequate instrument for the coordination of eco-
nomic activities and securing an economic order because of its nature and 
because of its preferable effects on predefined economic objectives. 
We have found competition to be a dynamic process which is characterized 
by initiatory moves and imitative responses. Within this process, market im-
perfections are viewed as the result of initiatory competitive action and, at 
the same time, prerequisites for imitative competitive action. The anonymous 
pressure on prices and costs that is exerted by competition, and that cannot 
be influenced by the market participants, tends to contribute to the realiza-
tion of goals by forcing on the market participants an economically rational 
behavior. 
It has been found that competition as a control and steering instrument is 
not self-maintaining. There is a "construction default" in the free enterprise 
system which will Inevitably lead to the destruction of this system if it Is 
not protected by public policy because competitors will try to Impair the 
socioeconomic Instrument of competition by noncompetitive action since this 
will bear individual advantages. We have concluded this Issue by juxtaposing 
the U.S. American and German policy approaches to antitrust violations. 
In subpart II we suggested three levels of objectives for the purpose of a 
rational policy approach. Level one comprised commonly accepted values 
which can be viewed as ethical premises. A set of functions was stated on a 
second level, the fulfilment of which furthered the attainment of the more 
basic alms and underlying values. Furthermore, on a third level, norms 
within the market categories structure, conduct and performance were seen 
as operationalizations of these functions. As a result, conflicts among these 
functions can possibly occur but do not have to occur. 
Hereafter, we evaluated the possibility of finding operational criteria for the 
purpose of separating competitive from noncompetitive conduct. We empha-
sized that the interrelations among the structure of an Industry, the con-
duct of firms In the industry, and the industry's performance which stan-
dardize the competitive process are complex, and there Is a lack of secure 
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knowledge. An evidence for a structural predominance was confirmed, never-
theless, which makes the paradigm an auxilllary means with regard to jud-
ging competition intensity. Therefore, the fulfilment of actual norms within 
the paradigm became a necessary condition, although not a sufficient one. 
For this reason, freedom to compete as a preliminary sufficient condition 
resp. criterion was introduced in order to separate competitive from noncom-
petitive behavior. This was done by asking whether the freedom to compete 
would be restricted unduly in an actual situation. For the purpose of deter-
mining the intensity of competition, we have found our purpose to be served 
best by adopting a market process test, defined by structure and conduct. 
Rejecting a laissez-faire approach to antitrust just as well as public owner-
ship since they were not seen as policies adequate to the functioning of a 
free enterprise system, we stated a distinct preference for a structure 
approach of public policy in a following step. 
Within the economic treatment of concentration in subpart III, industrial 
concentration was seen a priori as neither preferable nor condemnable. In 
order to reach a sound economic evaluation, we testified a need for a 
theoretical basis confirmed by empirical evidence for the determination of 
economic and non-economic outcomes at different levels of concentration. 
The current tenet of antitrust theory was presented as to consider economic 
power only a variable external to the economic process and not having any 
influence on it. The political economy of power was seen as being largely 
neglected, assuming that the free market would regulate economic activity 
and, therefore, corporate size and power could be Ignored. 
We found mergers to contribute to aggregate concentration significantly. The 
underlying causes for mergers were seen as multidimensional, just as well as 
the forms of internal and external corporate growth. 
We have completed the treatment of industrial concentration by evaluating 
options for measurement. We stated a distinct preference for concentration 
ratios and the Hirschman-Herflndahl Index. The adequate delineation of the 
relevant market within this scope was done on the basis of the concept of 
reasonable interchangeability. 
In the following Part 2 of the contribution submitted, we will now try to 
analyze the essential hypotheses and assumptions underlying the current 
theoretical edifice. This will be completed in Parts 3 and 4 with special 
regard to horizontal and vertical mergers. 
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fArl..2: The Central Elements of the Current Theoretical Edifice 
Particularly, as far as the economic subject of Industrial concentration is 
concerned, the current tenet In antitrust theory In the United States, asso-
ciated with the Chicago School, is based on the belief that given a particu-
lar structure of an industry large-sized companies In concentrated Indu-
stries have achieved their size only because of distinct efficiency advanta-
ges over smaller competitors. 
This is compounded by the belief that the various factors of the particular 
industrial structure play only a minor role in determining performance levels 
In specific Industries, and that therefore solely business conduct should be 
of importance. 
We will, therefore, analyze the central elements of the current theoretical 
edifice with regard to: 
- whether or not efficiency considerations were and are the exclusive con-
cern of antitrust In the United States, comparing the results to the con-
cerns and goals of the Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC) of the 
Federal Republic of Germany; 
the adequacy and usefulness of neoclassical price theory and the static 
partial equilibrium model used by adherents to the current tenet in their 
analyses of antitrust problems; and 
- the Impact of market share, degree of industrial concentration, and Impe-
diments to new competition as the most important factors of Industrial 
structure Influencing economic efficiency and the Interrelations among 
each of these factors. 1 
1. The current Debate on The Gaols of Antitrust: Economics or Soclopolltlcs? 
We have already emphasized the importance of an explicit system of antitrust 
goals to provide a link between antitrust theory and policy on the level of 
positive economics. Antitrust policy cannot be understood, Implemented, and 
evaluated until the ends are defined that such policy should pursue. There 
In this Part of the contribution we will restrict our analysis to the role 
that impediments to new competition play and their Interrelation with eco-
nomic efficiency. The Impact of the degree of Industry concentration and 
different market shares on efficiency will be treated In Part 3. 
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are no policy objectives which are generally valid. Therefore, the setting of 
antitrust policy goals reflects a choice of normative character. 2 
The Importance of a precise definition of goals becomes obvious in the fol-
lowing remarks by former Professor, now Judge, Robert H. Bork: 
"Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a 
firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law - what are 
Its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give. Is the anti-
trust judge to be guided by one value or by several. If by several, 
how is he to decide cases where a conflict in value arises? Only when 
the issue of goals has been settled Is It possible to frame a coherent 
body of substantive rules. " 3 
Although the term 'competition' that the law is to preserve has not been 
clearly defined in the sense of what goals are supposed to be pursued 
through this competition and which of these goals are meant to prevail in 
situations where they conflict, the U.S. Federal Supreme Court has stated on 
several occasions that the object to be protected Is competition itself, and 
that the antitrust laws have a variety of goals within this overall object of 
protection.4 It was held that "under the existing antitrust statutes the 
courts may properly implement a variety of mutually Inconsistent goals, most 
notably the goals of consumer welfare and small business welfare''. 5 
This view was challenged some time ago by proponents of the Chicago 
School. This challenge led to a considerable dispute over the ultimate goal(s) 
the various U.S. Congresses had in mind when they passed the antitrust 
statutes. The controversy arose largely because the antitrust statutes are 
2 For the reasoning along this line cf. Fox, Eleanor M., The Modernization of 
Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CornLR (1981), pp. 1140-1192, 1155; Kau-
per, Thomas E., The Goals of United States Antitrust Polley: The Current 
Debate, 136 JITE (1980), pp. 408-434, 408 and 416; M0schel, Wernhard, 
Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, Koln et al. 1983, p. 74; and 
Schmidt, Ingo, Wettbewerbspolitlk und Kartellrecht: Eine Einfuhrung, 2nd 
ed., Stuttgart 1987, p. 33. 
3 Bork, Robert H., The Antitrust Paradox: A Polley at War with Itself, New 
York 1978, p. 50. 
4 Cf. Lande, Robert H., Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Con-
cern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HastLJ 
(1982), pp. 67-151, 67 note 2. 
5 Bork, Robert H., Antitrust and Monopoly: The Goals of Antitrust, 57 AER 
(1967), pp. 242-253, 242 (emphasis added); and Hovenkamp, Herbert H., Dis-
tributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GWLR (1982), pp. 1-31, 20. 
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rather vague. Their wording Is frequently ambiguous, and therefore needs 
Interpretation with regard to legislative history and Intent, especially in 
cases of individual appllcatlon.8 
In the following, we will characterize the current single-goal efficiency 
orientation in the U.S. and its anti-posture as documented by scholarly com-
mentary. We will then analyze the legislative history of the antitrust sta-
tutes, the adjudicative development on the Supreme Court level and critical-
ly add some plausibility considerations, all of these referring to Sec. 7 of 
the Clayton Act. In addition, we will present a recent "rent-seeking" expla-
natory attempt. Finally, we will analyze the German circumstances with 
regard to the legislator's motives in introducing antitrust laws and a merger 
control system by the Second Amendment to the Act against Restraints of 
Competition. 
1. The Current Efflclency~rlentatlon 
Whereas the economists adhering to the traditional tenet were not able to 
discover a singular congressional Intent with regard to antitrust legislation, 
proponents of the Chicago School hold that all policy making by the govern-
ment and the enforcement agencies - especially In the field of antitrust -
should be exclusively concerned with the notion of consumer welfare which 
6 "(WJhen the words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final 
expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or sub-
tracted from by considerations drawn ... from any extraneous source.", 
Camlnettl v. United States, 242 U.S. (1917), pp. 470 ff., 490. On the reli-
ance of courts on legislative history cf. Posner, Richard A., Economics, Po-
litics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 UChlLR (1982), 
pp. 262-291, esp. 272-280. 
On the history of this debate cf. Blake, Harlan M., and WIiiiam K. Jones, In 
Defense of Antitrust, 65 ColLR (1965), pp. 377-400, esp. 377-382; and for 
the original dispute cf. Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium of the Eco-
nomic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 UPLR (1977), pp. 
1182 et seq. 
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finds Its equivalent In the concept of efficlency.7 The term 'competition', the 
protection of which Is unambiguously the official rationale of the antitrust 
statutes, Is supposed to describe a specific state of the market in which 
consumer welfare cannot be increased by judicial decree.8 
A primary criticism Is that the U.S. Federal Courts - in over 80 years -
have not been able to agree for any extended period of time upon a defini-
tive statement of the law's goals, despite the fact that this should have 
been a matter of some Importance. Accordingly, extensive confusion may have 
arisen that "is likely to leave the impression that antitrust Is a cornucopia 
of social values, all of them rather vague and undefined but infinitely 
attractive",9 
Proponents who claim that efficiency should be the primary concern of anti-
trust policy attempt to find support in legislative history as well as In the 
interpretation of legislative and adjudicatlon. 10 Because of the difficulties In 
perceiving the ratio legls, they argue, not only legal wording should be 
taken Into account, but also the intentions that are Inherent in the applica-
tion of the law. As a result, it is concluded that 
"(t)he language of the antitrust statutes, their legislative histories, the 
major structural features of antitrust law, and considerations of the 
scope, nature, consistency, and ease of administration of the law all 
Indicate that the law should be guided aolely by the criterion of consu-
mer welfare". 11 
7 Cf., e.g., Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly ... , supra, 243 f., idem, The Anti-
trust Paradox, op. cit., ch. 2; Bork, Robert H., and Ward s. Bowman, The 
Crisis in Antitrust, 65 ColLR (1965), pp. 363-376, 369; Posner, Richard A., 
The Economics of Justice, pp. 92-94; idem, The Ethical and Political Basis 
of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HofLR (1980), pp. 
487-507; Idem, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 UPLR (1979), 
pp. 925-952, 933 f.; and Areeda, Phillip, and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust 
Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Boston 
and Toronto 1978, vol. 1, §§ 111-113. 
8 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 50 f. 
9 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 50. 
10 Cf. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 1146. 
11 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 57, emphasis added. For the common 
Interpretation, cf., e.g., Audretsch, David B., An Evaluation of Horizontal 
Merger Enforcement, In: Craven, John (ed.), Industrial Organization, Anti-
trust and Public Policy, Boston 1982, pp. 69-88, 71: "The goal of antitrust 
Is apparently multidimensional. It Includes the prevention and elimination 
of monopoly prices and restricted output, the redistribution of wealth 
away from monopolistic power, and the diffusion and decentralization of 
aggregate concentration of economic resources in society." 
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The necessity for reform Is not primarily seen as a matter for Congress 
since from this point of view legislative Intentions seem obvious. Rather, It 
is the U.S. Supreme Court and its adjudication that make the necessity for 
reform arlse:12 
"I am not suggesting a judicial coup d'etat. Rather, I Intend to argue 
that an exclusive adherence to a consumer welfare test Is the only legi-
timate policy for the Supreme Court under present statutes precisely 
because of the Court's elitist, unrepresentative nature." 
In addition, there are attempts to justify the exclusiveness of the consumer 
welfare goal by claiming certain virtues for It. This can be characterized as 
a sort of plausibility approach. A single-goal orientation of consumer beha-
vior Is seen as being superior to a multiple-goal approach for at least five 
reasons. 13 
Firstly, the consumer welfare goal gives fair warning to business men affec-
ted by the antitrust laws by providing a small number of relatively simple 
rules, which allow firms to predict judicial opinions and legal decisions more 
accurately. It "makes changes In the law predictable and less likely to 
produce unfal rness" .14 
Secondly, the approach offers a relatively precise and polltlcally neutral set 
of standards, minimizing the fear of excessive Judicial power. The approach 
documents the legislature's primary role In correctly enforcing the law In 
12 Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly ... , supra, 243. For a similar opinion cf. 
Areede/Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles, op. 
cit., § 111 d; and Areeda, Phillip, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 
ALJ (1983), pp. 523-538, and esp. 536, emphasizing a discrepancy between 
consumer welfare and efficiency not acknowledged by Bork: "'Consumer 
welfare' embraces what individual consumers are entitled to expect from a 
competitive economy. If the efficiency extremists insist that only their 
definition of consumer welfare Is recognized by economists, we would 
answer that ours is clearly recognized by the statutes. The legislative 
history of the Sherman Act Is not clear on much, but It is clear on this." 
13 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 81-86. 
14 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 81. 
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comparison to the courts. 15 This Is actually a strict application of the per 
se-rule Instead of the rule of reason, the latter allowing too much discretion 
to the courts as well as to the enforcement agencies: 18 
"Courts are the wrong Institution for these unstructured interpersonal 
comparisons both because political choices of this nature should, ... , be 
made by elected and representative Institutions, and because the courts 
do not have the facilities for fact-finding on a broad scale that are 
available to the legislature. The admission by a court of goals in con-
flict with consumer welfare Into the adjudicative process, therefore, in-
volves a serious usurpation of the legislative function by the judicial 
arm. 
Thirdly, making consumer welfare the only antitrust goal is seen as a viable 
means for courts to force leglslature to face and to decide questions that 
had been left hitherto unanswered. Therefore the consumer welfare is sup-
posed to have the function of making the legislative Institutions more 
responsible and not allowing them to leave important questions to the 
courts. This would maintain the Integrity of the legislative process. 
Fourthly, by using the basic principles of price theory as criteria for deci-
sion, real rather than unreal economic distinctions can be made with regard 
to the anticompetitive market conduct of competitors. The consumer welfare 
goal provides principles and concepts of assessment that allow the courts to 
determine deviations from the guiding concept of competition. In this con-
text, the concept of 'efficiency' and the yardstick of 'output restriction' 
serve as central elements. 
Avoiding arbitrary or antlconsurner rules is the fifth and final argument in 
favor of the consumer welfare goal as stated by Bork. It is contended that 
In a case-by-case approach courts are very unlikely to balance different 
15 Cf. Kauper, The Goals of United States Antitrust Polley ... , supra, 409 and 
421; and Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 1146. 
It is pointed out, however, that Congress did not have sufficient econo-
mic knowledge and therefore deliberately allowing the Judiciary to wield a 
certain amount of discretionary power, cf. Pitofsky, Robert, The Political 
Content of Antitrust, 127 UPLR (1979), pp. 1051-1075, 1060. 
Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly ... , supra, 253: "The kind of uncertainty 
which a legal system ought not to tolerate, particularly where statutes 
are involved, Is that which arises because Judges are making case-by-
case and ex-post facto the pol ltical choices." 
16 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 83. 
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values which are partly contrary to consumer welfare since "(t)hey are 
much more likely to arrive at rigid rules which will either be arbitrary or 
completely anti-consumer. " 17 
The notion that public policy should be solely guided by consumer welfare 
and, therefore, according to these proponents, by efficiency considerations, 
has strongly influenced current government policy as well as courts' decl-
slons.18 
Although Supreme Court decisions have not given the term efficiency a spe-
cific Interpretation, they have strengthened the claim that antitrust Is only 
a means to promote efficiency. Thus, with Chief Justice Burger who headed 
the Supreme Court then 
"majority opinions by some members of the Court began to reveal a 
strong undercurrent that business should be left presumptively free to 
do what it wishes, apparently on the theory that greater private busi-
ness freedom Is crucial to a free society". 1s 
However, a variety of authors from both the economic and the legal profes-
sion disagree with the viewpoint that consumer welfare, as measured by a 
criterion of efficiency, should constitute the sole goal of antitrust. It is 
contended that with regard to antitrust policy It can be shown that legisla-
17 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 86. 
18 Cf. Gerhart, Peter M., The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The 
(Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 10 SCR (1982), pp. 319-349; 
Schwartz, Louis B., The New Merger Guidelines: Gulde to Governmental 
Discretion or Propaganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CLR 
(1983), pp. 575-603, 575; and Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust •.. , sup-
ra, 1152. 
Former Assistant Attorney General and then head of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, William F. Baxter: "The sole goal of antitrust is economic efficien-
cy.", The Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1982 at p. 28; and: "The statutes 
talk In terms of competition and restraints on trade - which I take to 
mean restraints on output and therefore a reference to the economists' 
concept of efficiency - and that's a challenging undertaking In itself.", 
'Today's Policies on Antitrust', San Francisco Chronicle, December 15, 
1982, at A-6 and A-8, col. 1, respectively. 
19 Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust ••. , supra, 1152. For the cases cf. 
most notably U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 1974-1 CCH Trade Cases § 
74,967; U.S. v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 1974-1 CCH Trade Cases § 75, 
125; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE-Sylvania, Inc., 1977-1 CCH Trade Cases 
§ 61,488, esp. at pp. 71,900 f.; National Society of Professional Engineers 
v. U.S., 1978-1 CCH Trade Cases § 61,990; U.S. v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 1978-1 CCH Trade Cases § 62,103; and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc., 1979-1 CCH Trade Cases § 62,558. 
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tive history, the ratio legis, and the interpretation of the laws by the Fede-
ral Supreme Court contradict the assertion by the single-goal proponents 
that the basis of the American antitrust laws is only the promotion of effi-
ciency. Rather, It comprises several goal complexes, all of which are lnterre-
lated.20 
There is no consensus among the scholars of anti-Chicago persuasion about 
the goal which originally predominated and about the goal that Is supposed 
to predominate in cases where goals are in conflict with each other. The 
principle of a multiple goal approach is unequivocally emphasized, however, 
as is distinctly pointed out by Robert Pitofsky, a former Commissioner of the 
Federal Trade Commission, whose statement implies that several values other 
than efficiency should be regarded as axlomatic:21 
"It Is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political 
values In Interpreting the antitrust laws. By 'political values', I mean, 
first, a fear that excessive concentrations of economic power will breed 
antidemocratic political pressures, and second, a desire to enhance Indi-
vidual and business freedom by reducing the range within which pri-
vate discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of 
all. A third and overriding political concern is that If the free-market 
sector of the economy is allowed to develop under antitrust rules that 
are bllnd to all but economic concerns, the likely result will be an eco-
nomy so dominated by few corporate giants that It will be impossible 
for the state not to play a more Intrusive role in economic affairs. 
(Fourth), an antitrust policy that failed to take political concerns Into 
account would be unresponsive to the will of Congress and out of touch 
with the rough political consensus that has supported antitrust enfor-
cement for almost a century." 
20 Cf. Brodley, Joseph F., Limiting Conglomerate Mergers: The Need for 
Legislation, 40 OhioStLJ (1979), pp. 867-894; Dirlam, Joel, and Alfred E. 
Kahn, Fair Competition: The Law and Economics of Antitrust Polley, West-
port, Ct. 1970, pp. 9 f. and 15 f.; Elzinga, Kenneth G., The Goals of Anti-
trust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, 125 UPLR (1977), pp. 1191-
1213, 1191 and 1212 f.; Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 
1154; Hofstadter, Richard, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and 
other Essays, London 1966, p. 199; Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and 
the Antitrust Laws, supra, 19; Kauper, The Goals of United States Anti-
trust Policy ••• , supra, 414 and 416; Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Origi-
nal and Primary Concern of Antitrust .•. , supra, 68 f., 70, 128, 130, 135 f. 
and 140-142; Pitofsky, The Polltical Content of Antitrust, supra, 1055 f.; 
Sullivan, Lawrence A., Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, St. Paul 1977, p. 
153; Thorelli, Hans B., The Federal Antitrust Polley: Origination of an 
American Tradition, Baltimore 1955, ch. 4. 
21 Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, supra, 1051 f., emphasis 
added. 
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2. Evidence of the Goals of Antitrust 
Evidence of the actual motives of the legislator in passing certain statutes 
can primarily be found not only in the legislative history of the body of 
antitrust laws as a whole but also in the legislative history of the Individual 
statutes. Furthermore, the Inquiry has to be guided by plausibility conside-
rations which account for the logical background of the legal body, as it 
were, and by the tenets of Supreme Court adjudication, as It is the Supreme 
Court which Is responsible for ruling along the lines of the statutes and 
which, in arriving at such rulings makes use of the range of discretion 
granted to it by Congress. 
L Leglalatlve History of the Antitrust Statutes 
The examination of the legislative history of the antitrust statutes shows 
that Congress followed a multiple-goal approach with a limited number of 
specific goals.22 The rationale underlying the American antitrust laws com-
prises welfare considerations (efficiency approach), the protection of freedom 
22 Cf. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust .•. , supra, 150. 
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to compete, as well as the control of economic power (populist approach).23 
It was this second goal complex which was emphasized originally. 
This contention Is already documented by the remarks Senator Sherman 
made when the Act named after him, as the first of the antitrust statutes, 
was passed in 1890:2• 
"If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure 
a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the ne-
cessaries of life. If we would not submit to an emperor we should not 
submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent competition and 
to fix the price of any commodity." 
Especially with regard to Sec. 7 of the original Clayton Act, together with 
the Geller-Kefauver Antimerger Act as the new Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act, 
23 Analogous to Neale, Alan D., and D.G. Goyder, The Antitrust Laws of the 
U.S.A.: A Study of Competition Enforced by Law, 3rd ed., Cambridge et al. 
1980, pp. 439 ff., who have isolated three different motives behind Ameri-
can legislation: 
- the so-called radical populist approach (ensuring the freedom to com-
pete and the control of economic power), 
- the small business approach, and 
- the economic efficiency approach. 
They view "the provision of legal checks to the exercise of power as the 
mainspring of antitrust", p. 339. 
A variety of findings can be presented on the issue which resemble the 
one just described, cf. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust, supra, 1053-1057; 
Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 1154; Hovenkamp, Distri-
butive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, supra, 16 f.; Kauper, The Goals of 
United States Antitrust Policy ... , supra, 416-418; Pitofsky, The Political 
Content of Antitrust, supra, 1053-1057; and Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style 
... , op. cit., 199 f.: "The goals of antitrust were of three kinds. The first 
were economic; the classical model of competition confirmed the belief that 
the maximum of economic efficiency would be produced by competition, 
and at least some members of Congress must have been under the spell 
of this Intellectually elegant model, insofar as they were able to formulate 
their economic intentions in abstract terms. The second class of goals was 
political; the antitrust principle was intended to block private accumulati-
ons of power and protect democratic government. The third was social 
and moral; the competitive process was believed to be a kind of dlsclpll-
nary machinery for the development of character, and the competitiveness 
of the people - the fundamental stimulus to national morale - was be-
lieved to need protection", emphasis added. 
24 Quoted from Scherer, Frederic M., The Posnerian Harvest: Separating 
Wheat from Chaff, 86 YLJ (1977), pp. 974-1001, 980. 
For an extensive survey of quotes regarding the legislative history of 
the antitrust statutes, and proving the contention presented submitted, 
cf. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 1148-1155. 
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legislative history indicates that improved efficiency was not a central goal 
and, moreover, that Congress did not mean to provide an efficiency defense 
in Individual merger cases. 25 The legislative documents clearly and 
overwhelmingly emphasize the social evils of concentration, as is shown by 
the remarks of Senator Kefauver, one of the fathers of the Caller/Kefauver 
Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, who emphasized the links bet-
ween economic and political order:211 
"Through monopolistic mergers the people are losing power to direct 
their own economic welfare. When they lose the power to direct their 
economic welfare they also lose the means to direct their political 
future .... A point Is eventually reached, ••. where the public steps in 
to take over when concentration and monopoly gain to much power." 
The assertion that so-called non- or metaeconomic goals were at the core of 
Congress' design In passing the Sherman as well as the Clayton Act has 
been repeatedly affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court. This has been varl-
25 Cf. Bok, Derek, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and 
Economics, 74 HLR (1960), pp. 226-335, 318: "There is little basis for con-
cluding that the achievement of lower costs as such should give rise to 
favored treatment under Section 7. The possibility of lower costs was 
brushed aside in the legislative deliberations and there is every reason 
to believe that Congress preferred the noneconomic advantages of decon-
centrated markets to I lmlted reductions in the cost of operations."; cf. as 
well Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust ... , supra, 140-142. 
This was adopted in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 1967 CCH Trade Cases 
§ 72,061 asserting that efficiency gains cannot offset Illegality that would 
lead to a lessening of competition. But cf. Areeda, Phillip, and Donald F. 
Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their 
Application, Boston and Toronto 1980, vol. 4, p. 151, who are of the opin-
ion that Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act does not in principle compel the courts 
to reject a defense on the basis of economies of size or scale. 
26 Quoted from Pltofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, supra, 1051. 
Similar remarks were made by Representative Celler: "I want to point out 
the danger of this trend toward more and better combines. I read from a 
report flied with (the former Secretary of War) as to the history of the 
cartelization and concentration of industry In Germany: 'Germany under 
the Nazi set-up built up a great series of monopolies in steel, rubber, 
coal and other materials. The monopolies soon got control of Germany, 
brought Hitler to power and forced virtually the whole world Into war.' ... 
I do not want to see my country go the way of Japan or the way of Italy 
or the way of Germany or even the way of England.", quoted from Fox, 
The Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 1151, note 56. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
110 
ously criticized as a simple deviation from the criterion of economic effl-
ciency.27 
b. Adjudicative Development 
Evidence for the actual goals of antitrust leglslatlon can also be found in 
the verdicts of the courts. Adjudication before the 1970s was characterized 
by a strong reliance on sociopolitical goals, the pursuance of which was 
seen as Congress' primary objective in passing the antitrust statutes. 
In the Alcoa case, Judge Learned Hand declined to distinguish good from 
bad monopolies. This was Justified by pointing to the soclopolltical goals of 
the Sherman Act:28 
"(C)ongress ... did not condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; It 
forbade all. Moreover, in so doing It was not necessarily actuated by 
economic motives alone .... We have been speaking only of the economic 
reasons which forbid monopoly; but as we have already Implied, there 
are others, based upon the belief that great Industrial oonaolldatlons 
are Inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results. In the 
debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself ... showed that among the 
purposes of Congress In 1890 was a desire to put an end to great 
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of individual before 
them." 
In Northern Pacific and Brown Shoe the Federal Supreme Court refers to 
both soclopolitlcal and economic preferences on the part of the legislator for 
maintaining a large number of Independent firms. The Supreme Court pre-
sented the following rationale In his attempt to justify the sociopolltical 
preferences of the legislator for a large number of independent firms:29 
27 Cf. Kauper, The Goals of United States Antitrust Polley ... , supra, 420, 
who crltlcally comments on Bork's criticism of the adjudication as follows: 
"Whether they are 'wrong', or part of a 'deviant' theme (as Bork states), 
is ultimately a question of judgment," 
Kauper, though, defends the view that the question of the size at which 
a firm gains too much polltlcal and social power cannot be an issue for 
judges but has to be decided ultimately by the legislature. 
28 U.S. v. Alcoa, 1944-47 CCH Trade Cases § 57,342 at p. 57,682 f., emphasis 
added. This Interpretation can be found in Elzinga, The Goals of Anti-
trust, supra, 1203; Pltofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, supra, 
1053; and Schmidt, Ingo, and Jan B. Rittaler, Die Chicago School of Anti-
trust Analysis: Wettbewerbstheoretlsche und -polltlsche Analyse elnes 
Credos, Baden-Baden 1986, p. 42. 
29 Brown Shoe v. U.S., 1962 CCH Trade Cases § 70,366 at p. 76,500, emphasis 
added. 
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"(E)xpansion (of Integrated chains) is not rendered unlawful by the 
mere fact that small Independent stores may be adversely affected. It Is 
competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fall 
to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the pro-
tection of viable, small, locally owned business. Congress appreciated 
that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the mainte-
nance of fragmented Industries and markets. It resolved these oom-
pettng considerations In favor of decentralization. We must give effect 
to that decision." 
In Northern Pacific Railway it also becomes apparent that the Sherman Act 
embraces soclopolltlcal as well as economic functions of competition In the 
interpretation of statutory Intentions by the Supreme Court:30 
"The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as 
the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained Inter-
action of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our econo-
mic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest 
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment 
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and aoclal In-
stitutions." 
Both cases show that the Federal Supreme Court prefered less concentrated 
market structures in the 1950s and 1960s and they provide strong evidence 
that Congress was willing to accept this even In cases when such decentra-
lized structures would Imply possible efficiency losses.31 
However, verdicts by the District Courts and the Courts of Appeals In the 
1970s and 1980s are characterized by a stronger emphasis on economic ana-
lysis and efficiency, a fact which has not been pointed out nearly as em-
phatically as the original Intent. 
Efficiency considerations have been introduced Into court cases In different 
ways, depending on the actual conduct of competitors dealt with In the pro-
30 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 1958 CCH Trade Cases § 68,961 at p. 
73,864, emphasis added. 
31 Cf. Sullivan, Lawrence A., Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflecti-
ons on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CLR (1980), pp. 1-12, 4. 
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ceedings.32 With regard to the first actual case, a merger of the third and 
sixth ranking retail grocery chains declared illegal for having a nine per-
cent market share, Justice Stewart stated his dissenting opinion with regard 
to legislative history:33 
"(T)hrough a simple exercise in sums, it" (i.e., the court) "finds that 
the number of Individual competitors In the market has decreased over 
the years, and, apparently on the theory that the degree of competition 
is invariably proportional to the number of competitors, it holds that 
this historic reduction in the number of units Is enough under § 7 to 
invalidate a merger within the market ... This startling per se rule is 
contrary not only to our previous decisions, but contrary to the langu-
age of I 7, contrary to the leglslatlve history of the 1950 amendment, 
and contrary to economic reality", (Italics in original, emphasis added). 
With regard to unilateral action, efficiency considerations have been Intro-
duced by changing the per se-rule into a rule of reason. 34 Concerning col-
lusive agreements, some of them are not held to violate the relevant sta-
tutes.35 In most of the recent cases, however, the rulings of the courts do 
not refer to the legislative backup of such changed rulings by the Court 
which constitltes a serious shortcoming. 
32 This was first documented by a dissenting opinion of Justices Harlan and 
Stewart In U.S. v. Von's Grocery, 1966 CCH Trade Cases, § 71, 780, p. 82, 
601: "The Court makes no efforts to appraise the competitive effects of 
this acQuisition In terms of the contemporary economy of the retail food 
industry in the Los Angeles area.", emphasis added. Sociopolitical consi-
derations are obviously rejected or pushed back: "(T)he court's opinion 
is hardly more than a reQuiem for the so-called 'Mom and Pop' grocery 
stores ... that are now economically and technologically obsolete in many 
parts of the country." 
33 U.S. v. Von's Grocery, op. cit., at 82,603. 
34 Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE-Sylvania, Inc., op. cit., at p. 71,900: 
"Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the 
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his 
products. These 'redeeming virtues' are implicit in every decision sustai-
ning vertical restrictions under the rule of reason. Economists have Iden-
tified a number of ways In which manufacturers can use such restrictions 
to compete more effectively agal nst other manufacturers." 
35 With regard to the Sherman Act it is held in U.S. v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., op. cit., at p. 74,860 that "(t)he exchange of price data and 
other information among competitors does not invariably have anti-compe-
titive effects; indeed such practices can in certain circumstances Increase 
economic efficiency and render markets more rather than less competitive. 
For this reason, we have held that such exchanges of information do not 
constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act." 
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c. Plauslblllty Considerations 
Several theoretical considerations support the view that Congress promoted 
a multiple-goal approach when passing the antitrust statutes. 
First of all, the 'imprecise' wording of the statutes leads to the conclusion 
that legislators did not feel in a position to quantify social and political 
considerations, and therefore left the solution of possibly conflicting goals 
to the judiciary.311 
If Congress wanted business firms simply to achieve economic efficiency by 
their own individual action, a system of legal antitrust statutes would have 
been obsolete since anticompetitive practices according to that view would 
tend to correct themselves,37 The original promoters of efficiency as the 
only legislative intent opposed all of the attempts to introduce multiple goal-
oriented antitrust bills on the grounds that this would induce corrective 
public action that would interfere with efficient results of the free enter-
prise system. The fact that the opponents' opinion was obviously overthrown 
by the majority of legislation, can be seen as an indication of the hypothe-
sis that efficiency was neither the sole aim of Congress, nor was it meant to 
prevail in cases of conflict. The same applies to laws which are related to 
antitrust statutes,38 
Whereas the effects of income distribution of monopolies were largely known 
by the time when fundamental antitrust legislation was passed, not much was 
known about economic efficiency. This also supports the hypothesis that one 
36 Cf. Kauper, The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy ... , supra, 409 f.; 
and Schmidt/Rlttaler, Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 
94. 
37 Cf. Mcchesney, Fred s., On the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 
GeorgeLJ (1980), pp. 1103-1111, 1104. 
38 Cf. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 1152 f.; Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MLR (1985), pp, 213-284, 250; Schwartz, 
Louis B., 'Justice' and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 UPLR 
(1979), pp, 1076-1081; and Blake, Harlan M., Conglomerate Mergers and the 
Antitrust Laws, 73 ColLR (1973), pp. 555-592, 577: "If anything, the ten-
dency of the American Economic Association (in 1890) was to question the 
wisdom of any legislation directed against 'monopoly' In the economic 
sense, since the prevalent economists' view was that monopoly power, un-
buttressed by legal supports such as patents, tariffs, licensing and the 
like, was by its nature rapidly eroded by market forces, and that legisla-
tive intervention would either impede that process or involve unnecessa-
ry social costs." 
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of the major goals of the antitrust laws was the prevention of welfare 
transfers from consumers to monopolists. This also applies to the resulting 
conclusion that "(t)he concept of net welfare loss was too technical to enter 
into the political debates over antitrust policy, and antitrust advocates 
generally believed that the goals ... were consistent with each other". 39 
With regard to the interplay between legislature and legal practice, the 
single-goal, consumer welfare-oriented position has to admit an Inconsistency 
within the chain of causation of its argumentation. All of the alleged non-
efficiency goals of antitrust were given specific meaning during the period 
when the Supreme Court was headed by Chief Justice Warren, without Con-
gress opposing. If, In the opinion of Congress, the courts had misinterpre-
ted original legislative Intent in that they deviated from the original will, 
new legislation could have been drafted containing precise wording and lea-
ving no doubt as to the intended interpretatlon.40 
However, when the Antitrust Division tried to assist in overruling the per 
se-rule against resale price maintenance in order to impose the new effi-
ciency-orientation In Monsanto by means of amicus curiae, the attempt was 
curtailed by Congress through budgetary regulations restraining the 
Department of Justice from using certain means in order to de facto abolish 
39 Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, supra, 17; cf. 
Idem, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra, 250; Lande, Wealth Transfers 
as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust ... , supra, 65. 
Pltofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, supra, 1060: "This failure to 
address the efficiency/political effects trade-off is not hard to under-
stand. Comprehensive antitrust regulation was a new concept to all legis-
lators, and the most authoritative and exhaustive reviews of the legisla-
tive have detected a series of vague and not always consistent strands 
of legislative intent. As many have observed, Congress elected generally 
to leave specific enforcement decisions to the Judiciary"', emphasis added, 
citation omitted; and similarly Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest ••. , supra, 
977-979: "To be sure, Congress took exception to monopoly output re-
striction, elevated prices, and bloated profits, but It •.• was concerned at 
least as much with income distribution effects (which were well under-
stood in 1890) as with efficiency effects (which were not).", reviewing 
Posner, Richard A., Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, Chicago 1976. 
40 Cf. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 1155, note 77; Schmidt/ 
Rlttaler, Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 94; and Kauper, 
The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy ••. , supra, 419: "The ultimate 
question, after all, is what Congress Intended. The courts have Interpre-
ted the Sherman Act for ninety years, and those interpretations carry 
great weight, if for no other reason than in large part the Congress has 
left their decisions intact." 
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the per se-rule.41 Even more drastically, the Committee on the Judiciary 
passed a resolution on the Vertical Restraints Guidelines issued by the 
Department of Justice, declaring the guidelines to be Inconsistent with exi-
sting antitrust laws.42 This provides further evidence that the current 
single-goal enforcement orientation reflects an unlawful minority position on 
the part of the executive. 
Were the efficiency argument to be accepted, It would mean that the public 
would have agreed to centralized government control of resource allocation, 
if this was seen to be more efficient than the private enterprise system. The 
free enterprise system Is felt to protect business freedom by means of de-
centralization. This is primarily the reason why It is accepted, even though 
efficiency considerations may be pushed Into the background occasionally. 43 
Moreover, It can be argued that the achievement of efficiency is neither 
necessary nor sufficient as a criterion of Ideal policy because 
"the question of the means by which the social outcomes are achieved 
is more Important than the social allocation outcome Itself: for many, an 
allocation that is Inefficient but arrived at in a spirit of voluntary co-
operation under law Is far better than an Ideal allocation established by 
dictatorial decree".44 
In fact, this is the acceptance of 'political values'. 
3. Antitrust Legislation and Rent-Seeking Behavior 
Proponents of the current tenet have come up with an alternative to the 
sort of legislative history explanation as to why consumer welfare in the 
41 Cf. TRR No. 767, July 28, 1986, at p. 4. 
42 Cf. TRR No. 733, December 9, 1985, at p. 1. The National Association of 
Attorneys General (NAAG) has Joined this resolution and have Issued so-
called Counter Vertical Restraints Guidelines, cf. 5 CCH TRRer § 50,478. 
43 Cf. Lindblom, C., Politics and Markets, New York 1977; and Ward, B., The 
Ideal Worlds of Economics, New York 1979. 
Cf. as well Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 1153, note 70, 
who notes that "(t)he United States embraced a market system rather 
than government ownership of business or governmentally directed allo-
cation of resources because freedom of private economic action and de-
centralized centers of declslonmaklng were components of American demo-
cracy. (I)t seems likely that most Americans ... gladly have sacrificed ••. 
Increased efficiency for Increased freedom." 
44 Geroskl, Paul, and Alexis P. Jacquemin, Dominant Firms and Their Alleged 
Decline, 2 IJIO (1984), pp. 1-22, 21 f. 
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form of efficiency-orientation should be the sole goal of antitrust.45 It is 
argued in this context that two different kinds of legislation have to be 
distinguished. On the one hand, there are 'public Interest statutes', which 
are considered to be efficient in that they create more social gains than los-
ses and, therefore, are supposed to be interpreted broadly by the courts 
because they serve the goal of welfare maximization. Secondly, and in 
contrast, there are 'private interest statutes', which are characterized by 
the fact that interest groups purchase favorable legislation from Congress 
which decreases net welfare of society. These statutes are supposed to be 
interpreted narrowly by the courts since they do not contribute to consu-
mer welfare. 411 
This approach of explanation has serious shortcomings, however, and has to 
be rejected concerning the debate on the goals of antitrust, therefore. For 
one thing, any kind of legislation is by its nature 'private Interest legisla-
tion', since private Interest groups try to interfere with the legislative pro-
cess and It "depends on the ability of Congress to listen to the arguments 
from all sides, 'net them out,' and then pass a statute that, on balance, does 
more good than harm to all affected lnterests". 47 
Secondly, an insurmountable difficulty arises, if special interest legislation is 
supposed to be discerned from public interest legislation by Judges. Propo-
nents of this approach do not agree upon definitive criteria for such 
discrlmination.48 This strongly creates the Impression that deciding which is 
45 For a survey cf. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra, 252-
255, and for the orlglnal sources, Posner, Economics, Politics, and the 
Reading of Statutes •.• , supra, esp. 269; and Easterbrook, Frank H., For-
word: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HLR (1984), pp. 4-60, 15-17; 
and Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 
ArizLR (1981), pp. 1267-1282. 
46 Cf. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra, 252. Chicago scho-
lars do apply a theoretical basis which is strongly consistent with the 
discussion along the lines of public choice considerations In the field of 
deregulation (capture theory); cf. Peltzman, Sam, Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation, 19 JLE (1976), pp. 211-240; Posner, Richard A., The 
theory of economic regulation, 2 BJE (1971), pp. 3-21. 
47 Hovenkamp, Antitrust Polley After Chicago, supra, 251, emphasis added. 
48 Cf. Easterbrook, Forword: The Court and the Economic System, supra, 16 
f., who finds it difficult to distinguish the two different kinds of legis-
lation at all, and Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes 
•.• , supra, 270 f., who tries to develop a scheme for classification in 
actual cases. 
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which is a rather subjective and arbitrary matter. 
Thirdly, such vague discriminations can be used to deny considerations of 
Congress which were undoubtedly intended, although they were not formu-
lated in statutory language, as in the case of protection of small competi-
tors. The protection of small competitors could easily be brushed away by 
ascribing it to an interest group legislation, although for instance both the 
Robinson-Patman as well as the Caller-Kefauver Act show that it was pre-
cisely such protection that the legislature had in mind when the laws were 
passed.49 
4. The German case 
Sociopolitical as well as economic considerations underlay the original draft 
of the Act against Restraints of Competltion.50 The soclopolltical con-
siderations encompass the protection of the freedom to compete as well as 
the protection of competition as a mechanism for the control of economic 
power and as an adequate equivalent to the democratic system. Encompas-
sing optimization of economic welfare by the best possible supply of consu-
mers is the actual Intended aim of the economic considerations. These two 
rather broadly defined goals together form the nucleus and heart of the 
ARC.51 The same applies to European antitrust legislation documented by the 
Treaty of Rome.s2 
The basic question Is which goal complex should prevail in situations where 
different goals conflict. In particular situations of conflict, the prevailing 
theory holds that history, ratio legis, and the constitution show that the 
ultimate objective of the ARC is the protection of the freedom to compete, 
which is upheld by the verdicts of the German Federal Supreme Court as 
49 Cf. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra, 254. 
50 Cf. Slicker, Franz-Jurgen, Zielkonflikte Im deutschen und europalschen 
Kartellrecht, DOsseldorf n.a., p. 17; and Schmidt, Ingo, Wettbewerbspolitik 
und Kartellrecht ... , op. cit., 151 f. 
51 Cf. Gloy, Wolfgang, Handbuch des Wettbewerbsrechts, MOnchen 1986, p. 
20; Sacker, Zielkonflikte im deutschen und europaischen Kartellrecht, op. 
cit., 15 f.; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht ... , op. cit., 152; 
and ReglerungsbegrOndung zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Wettbe-
werbsbeschrlinkungen, BTDr. Il/1158, pp. 21 ff., presenting the official 
government rationale. 
52 Cf. the wording of Arts. 85 and 86 Treaty of Rome. 
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well.53 The primary intent of the protection of the freedom to compete is 
found In the legislative history of the U.S. antitrust laws which served as a 
guiding star to the draft of the German ARC. In contrast to German legisla-
tion and adjudication, however, the U.S. courts have always completely 
denied taking market performance criteria Into consideration for the purpose 
of relief from illegality, therefore, when Judging whether a particular action 
was competitive or anticompetitive.54 
Emphasis has been put on economic considerations, in the case of the ex-
emptions of Sec. 1 ARC (Secs. 2-8 ARC), in the case of the control of abuses 
of market dominating position, and In the case of mergers, even at the risk 
of sacrificing to a certain extent freedom to compete.55 
current legal norm, there is predominance either 
Depending on the 
of soclopolltlcal 
considerations or economic considerations, or a conflict between the two 
complexes of objectives arlses. 511 
53 Cf. Tiitigkeitsberlcht des Bundeskartellamts 1985/1986, BTDr. 11/554, p. 
III; Hoppmann, Erich, Zurn Schutzobjekt des GWB, In: Mestmacker, Ernst-
Joachim (ed.), Wettbewerb als Aufgabe: Nach zehn Jahren Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, Bad Homburg v.d.H. et al., pp. 61-104, 102-
104; Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. cit., 23-25 and 
77; Sacker, Zielkonfllkte Im deutschen und europaischen Kartellrecht, op. 
cit., 20-26, esp. 24; and for the cases, "Grote-Revers", BGHZ 38, 90, 102; 
and "Schlelfscheiben und Schlelfkorper", WuW/E BGH 1758, 1761. 
54 Cf. Edwards, Corwin D., Big Business and the Polley of Competition, West-
port Ct. 1956; Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Stu-
dy the Antitrust Laws, Washington 1955; and Sacker, Franz-Jurgen, Zlel-
wandlungen und Zlelkonfllkte in der Wettbewerbspolltlk: Von der Slche-
rung der Freiheit zur Organisation des Wohlstandes?, Diss., Koln 1971, p. 
46. 
55 Cf. Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. cit., 23-25 and 
75, 77 f., 154, 606-608; Raiser, Ludwig, Antlnomlen im Recht der Wettbe-
werbsbeschriinkungen, in: Festschrlft fur E. Fechner, 1973, pp. 57 ff.; 
and Sacker, Zlelkonfllkte im deutschen und europaischen Kartellrecht, op. 
cit., 27. 
56 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitlk und Kartellrecht ... , op. cit., 81 note 1, 
who asserts, e.g., that competition as well as competitors are supposed to 
be protected by Sec. 26 para. 2 ARC, whereas Sec. 18 para 1a and 1b 
primarily protect competitors, and Sec. 18 para. 1c primarily competition. 
For the original source on the issue whether competition or competitors 
are to be protected, cf. Wurdinger, Hans, Freiheit der personlichen Ent-
faltung - Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrecht, Karlsruhe 1953, p. 9, asserting 
that the U.S. American law Is primarily oriented towards Individual free-
dom, whereas the German law is supposed to be dominated by an overall 
economic rationale. 
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The dual goal complex has been maintained also by the Fourth Amendment to 
the Act against Restraints of Competition, although the amendment has put a 
far stronger emphasis on economic considerations, especially concerning mer-
gers. The legislator has aimed directly at sociopolitical considerations, but 
has taken these considerations Into account only indirectly by referlng to 
the concept of power in a relevant market, and therefore using economic 
criteria.57 The current de lege lata situation, as stated above, is still based 
on the predominance of the protection of the freedom to compete. Certain 
efficiency considerations have been introduced, however, by not prohibiting 
mergers per se, but basing a possible prohibition of a merger on refutable 
assumptions documented by market shares. These market shares represent a 
sort of borderline or limit, after which significant economic efficiencies can 
no longer be reaped, but freedom to compete Is allegedly impaired or re-
stricted unduly. 
Recent large-sized company merger cases in the Federal Republic have revi-
ved the discussion about sociopolitical aspects of such mergers. In this 
context, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has re-affirmed again that 
the legislator was concerned with the protection of the freedom to compete 
as well as the dispersion of economic power but that he restricted the 
actual design of the statutes to the protection of competition in actual mar-
kets. The refutable size assumption In Sec. 23a para. 1, lit. 2 ARC does not 
liberate the FCO to prove market dominance In every single case. Hence, 
large-sized mergers cannot be declared unlawful, just because of their 
size. 511 
57 Cf. the official government rationale, RegierungsbegrQndung zum Entwurf 
eines Vierten Gesetzes zur Anderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbe-
schriinkungen, BTDr. VIII/2136, p. 12; Immenga/Mestmiicker, Kommentar 
zum Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, MQnchen 1981, p. 778; 
Sacker, Zlelkonflikte im deutschen und europiiischen Kartellrecht, op. cit., 
17 and 30; and Moschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, op. cit., 
452, who notes that a merger control policy that is oriented towards the 
protection of competition can only be viewed in the context of markets 
since economically based criteria cannot be deduced from metaeconomic 
objectives. Competition policy that is directly aimed at soclopolitical 
considerations therefore loses its economic basis. 
58 Cf. Tiitlgkeltsbericht des Bundeskartellamts 1985/1986, op. cit., p. 12; for 
the official government rationale along this line, implementing a merger 
control system, cf. as well Regierungsbegrundung zum Entwurf elnes 
Zweiten Gesetzes zur Anderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriin-
kungen, BTDr. VI/2520, p. 16. 
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11. Method<>losy and Theoretical Model UnderMng the Evaluation of the 
Competitiveness of Mergers 
The current tenet bases its theoretical edifice on the belief that consumer 
welfare In the form of efficiency should be the only underlying value for 
antitrust policy. Since structural factors are perceived to be unimportant in 
determining an industry's performance, business conduct and the model for 
evaluating Its effects on consumer welfare and hence efficiency become the 
central issues. This poses the question as to whether a certain antitrust 
goal Implies or even requires a certain method of research. If representa-
tives of the current tenet view consumer welfare as the sole antitrust goal, 
it has to be found out: 
- whether they must accept neoclassical analysis as a method of research, 
simultaneously; 
whether neoclassical price theory can serve as an adequate instrument of 
analysis; and 
- whether the partial equilibrium model used by the adherents of the cur-
rent tenet offers an appropriate basis for policy decisions. 
1. The General Methodology of Analysis 
a. Neoclassical Price Theory as an Instrument of Analysis 
In analyzing the links between economics and law, the substance of different 
approaches to antitrust theory can be reduced to two core issues. These are 
the goals or values the law may legitimately and profitably Implement, and 
the validity of the law's vision of reality. 1 
Since consumer welfare is accepted as the sole legislative objective of the 
antitrust statutes and, in essence, this consumer welfare is determined by 
the effects of business practices on economic efficiency, "(a) consumer-ori-
ented law must employ basic economic theory to judge which market struc-
tures and practices are harmful and which are beneficiai".2 In this context, 
1 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 7. 
2 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 7. Cf. as well Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Polley After Chicago, supra, 226, critically emphasizing the Chicago tenet: 
"(T)he best policy tool currently available for maximizing economic effici-
ency in the real world is the neoclassical price theory model". 
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neoclassical price theory is regarded as the only adequate instrument of 
analysis. 
Consumer welfare is considered to be the result of economic behavior in 
general and of business conduct in particular. Productive and/or allocative 
efficiency are the measurable outcomes of business conduct, therefore, and 
these effects can in turn be analyzed by means of neoclassical price theory. 
In this context, the advantage of this kind of price theory Is demonstrably 
in that It 
"enables us to identify, with an acceptable degree of accuracy, those 
activities whose primary effect is output restricting, leading to the 
inference that all other activity is either efficiency creating or neu-
tral".3 
The primary question which has to be answered is by what standards an 
economic model is to be judged. In the context of the contribution submit-
ted, it will be evaluated by Its ability to explain reality and to make 
valuable prognoses.4 There are crucial objections to the belief, however, 
that neoclassical price theory is able to serve either purpose.5 Its assumpti-
3 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 116; cf. as well Posner, Richard A., 
The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 UPLR (1979), pp. 925-952, 
928: "The Chicago School has largely prevailed with respect to Its basic 
point: that the proper lens for viewing antitrust problems is price theo-
ry.", and with regard to the industrial organization approach of the Har-
vard School: "(I)ndustrlal organization, the field of economics that studies 
monopoly questions, tended to be untheoretical, descriptive, 'institutional', 
and even metaphorical •.• The result was that Industrial organization regu-
larly advanced propositions that contradicted economic theory.", p. 930. 
4 Cf. Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law, 2nd ed., Boston and To-
ronto 1977, p. 13, noting that the true test of theory is its utility In pre-
dicting or explaining reality. 
5 Cf., e.g., Harris, Robert G., and Thomas M. Jorde, Market Definition In the 
Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CLR (1983), 
pp. 464-496, 468, who state that neoclassical price theory as used by the 
Chicago School cannot reflect reality because of the assumptions made: 
"Neoclassical price theory is a powerful theoretical construct because It 
simplifies reality. Assumptions such as perfect information, costless trans-
actions, profit-maximizing firms, and utility-maximizing consumers can be 
entirely appropriate In some situations ••. One should be wary, however, of 
drawing policy Inferences from models founded on assumptions that are 
incongruent with reality."; Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 
supra, 256: "(T)he neoclassic efficiency model Is not sophisticated enough 
to describe or predict the consequences of real world behavior."; cf. as 
well Schmldt/Rittaler, Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 33-
37. 
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ons far from correspond to conditions met In reality. This is not surprising, 
since the neoclassical price theory model tendentially reflected the business 
conditions prevailing during the Marshallian era. However, the limited scope 
of economics in general and price theory in particular was then and Is now-
adays clearly recognized, however.a 
If this objection is accepted, a valid explanation has to be looked for, in 
order to explain why a number of developments in price theory have been 
dismissed. Such an explanation Is lacking, however. In essence, these were 
developments which dealt with insufficiencies of neoclassical price theory.7 
The main objection can be stated with regard to the selective use of price 
theory. Definitions, premises, and assumptions chosen by the antitrust tenet 
currently emphasized tend to protect the model against falsification.a This 
can be documented for a variety of examples. The terms productive efficien-
cy and allocative efficiency, for instance, are defined In a way that make 
any kind of business conduct efficiency-increasing. The definition tells what 
6 Cf. Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Economics, 8th ed., London 1920, p. 37: 
"(E)very age and every country has its own problems; and every change 
in social conditions is likely to require a new development of economic 
doctrines."; cf. on this point as well, Rowe, Frank M., The Decline of Anti-
trust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Econo-
mics, 72 GeorgeLJ (1984), pp. 1511-1570, 1547-1553, citing Kaldor and 
Knight, holding the identical tenet. 
7 Cf. Markovlts, Richard A., Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and the 
Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MLR (1979), pp. 567-640; for a 
summarizing survey of these developments, cf. Schmldt/Rlttaler, Die Chica-
go School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 36 f. 
Wilber, Charles K., and Jon D. Wisman, The Chicago School: Positivism or 
Ideal Type?, in: Samuels, Warren J. (ed.), The Chicago School of Political 
Economy, East Lansing 1976, pp. 79-93, 87: "Only those phenomena which 
can be represented in its laisez-faire, capitalist model merit investigation. 
For example, most members of the Chicago School have ignored the ques-
tion of monopoly, both empirically and theoretically. Theories of Imperfect 
competition have been dismissed out of hand, and no real attempt has 
been made empirically to test noncompetitive theory", citations omitted. 
8 Cf. Horwitz, Morton J., Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HofLR 
(1980), pp. 905-912, 909; Leff, Arthur A., Economic Analysis of Law: Some 
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VLR (1974), pp. 451-482, 478 f.; Rowe, The 
Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models, supra, 1547-1549, 1947: 
"(T)he efficiency model is circular, and its curves fail to fit today's 
enterprise conditions."; Samuels, Warren J., Further Limits to Chicago 
School Doctrine, in: Samuels, Warren J. (ed.), The Chicago School of Politi-
cal Economy, East Lansing 1976, pp. 397-455, 413; Wilber/ Wisman, The Chi-
cago School: Positivism or Ideal Type?, op. cit., 85-89. 
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is efficient but It never tells what conditions have to be fulfilled:9 
"Productive efficiency, like allocative efficiency, Is a normative concept 
and is defined and measured in terms of consumer welfare. Since a free 
market system assumes that consumers define their own welfare, it fol-
lows that productive efficiency consists in offering anything whether 
products or services, that consumers are willing to pay for." 
The term efficiency and the assumption that business conduct strives for 
the maximization of efficiency serve as a sort of black-box, therefore, and as 
a basis for justifying all sorts of restrictions of competition. 
The same applies to allocative efficiency as the second component of consu-
mer welfare, since firms are allocatively efficient if they prevail In the 
end.10 
The underlying assumptions lead to propositions which are not falsifiable. 
The basic assumption that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life and 
business and, therefore, is guided by self-Interest, leads to the conclusion 
that any business conduct is efficiency-enhancing and hence consumer wel-
fare increasing, since otherwise it would not have been performed by the 
9 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 104 f.; and Rowe, The Decline of 
Antitrust and the Delusions of Models, supra, 1549, stating that any solu-
tion the market generates becomes beneficial on the basis of this definiti-
on, thus arguing conclusively: "Since nothing succeeds like success, that 
truism yields neither operational criteria nor predictive norms, for Its 
circularities bless what prevails in the end." 
Cf. as well Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, op. cit., 4: "Efficiency is a 
technical term: It means exploiting economic resources in such a way that 
human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay 
for goods and services Is maximized. Value too Is defined by willingness 
to pay." 
10 Cf. Armentano, Dominick T., Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy 
Failure, New York et al. 1982, pp, 30 and 162; Bork, The Antitrust Para-
dox, op. cit., 221 f., 226 f., 248; Brozen, Yale, Mergers In Perspective, New 
York and London 1982, p. 17, who holds that "(c)oncentrated industries 
are concentrated because that Is the efficient way to organize them. 
Unconcentrated Industries are unconcentrated because that Is the effici-
ent way to organize them."; and Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the 
Delusions of Models, supra, 1549: "How can this be? Per the truisms of 
axioms and circular logic, the market ensures efficiency and cures Inef-
ficiency If meddling governments keep out." 
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economic agent. 11 This can be characterized as a sort of revealed preference 
approach from which efficiency is concluded, whatever the resulting econo-
mic performance. 
b. Price/Quantity-Interrelations as Indicators of Consumer Welfare 
Another central assumption is that social welfare in general and consumer 
welfare in particular can be exclusively and sufficiently documented by 
price/quantity-interrelations of markets, using perfect competition and 
monopoly as standards of reference. The assumption is based on the premise 
that people document everything, they assign economic value to by their 
purchase decisions in the marketplace. 12 However, in the sense of economic 
order and decentralization of economic power, public policy in the field of 
antitrust has to be viewed as a kind of public good, the beneficial outcome 
of which people cannot avoid paying for. In essence, this Is a pure free-
rider problem that is neglected in this context. 13 Whereas it is neglected In 
the context of the consideration of noneconomic goals through antitrust, It Is 
heavily emphasized by adherents of the current orientation In theory In the 
11 Cf. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, op. cit., 1; and Leff, Economic Ana-
lysis of Law ... , supra, 456 f., showing once more the circularity of the 
reasoning: "Nothing merely empirical could get In the way of such a 
structure because it is definitional. That is why the assumption can pre-
dict how people behave: In these terms there is no either way they can 
behave. If, for Instance, a society dentist raises his prices and thereby 
increases his gross volume of business, it is no violation of the principle 
of Inverse relation between price and quantity. It only proves that the 
buyers now perceive that they are buying something else which they now 
value more highly, 'society dentistry,' say, rather than 'mere' dentistry", 
italics in original. 
12 Cf., e.g., Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 50-56; and Posner, Richard 
A., Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, Chicago 1976, pp. 19 f.; and 
Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly, op. cit., 32: "Importantly, (supply and 
demand) adjustments are not limited to price and output, as In the stan-
dard model, but may encompass any aspect of exchange that consumers 
believe to be relevant.", qualifications in parentheses added; and for the 
evaluation, Bobel, Ingo, Marktmacht versus Effizienz: Ein wlrtschaftspolitl-
sches DIiemma, 14 liFo (1987/88), pp. 40-56, 50; and Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Polley After Chicago, supra, 242. 
13 Cf. Samuels, Further Limits to Chicago School Doctrine, op. cit., 400; 
Schwartz, 'Justice' and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, supra, for 
a number of statutes concerned with values not traded In the market 
place, such as small business protection; and for the conclusion, Leff, 
Economic Analysis of Law ... , supra, 467: "Remember, the issue is not, for 
every consumer/citizen, what he gets out of 'the market' or what he gets 
out of 'politics,' but what he gets out of the society which Is the product 
of both of these grand systems together." 
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context of the discussion on the pros and cons of resale price maintenance, 
however. Therefore, the assumption that price/quantity-Interrelations suffici-
ently document consumer welfare is at least open to question. 
A broader measure of consumer welfare including further aspects of life 
quality such as performance criteria can be affected by a particular Indu-
stry structure as well. The preservation of local shopping facilities, for 
example, might lead to a (hardly measureable) Increase in consumer welfare 
though there may be a (quantitatively measureable) decrease in productive 
efficiency; furthermore, undue concentration is avoided and sufficient com-
petitive pressure thereby maintained in the long run. 
The selective omission of the free-rider problem also leads to results In the 
deficiency that power considerations are not quantifiable in terms of price/ 
quantity-interrelations being more or less excluded from the observation. 
This makes for a contradiction in the underlying reasoning, since the pro-
tection of free choice is a central pilar in the current theoretical edifice. 
However, the assumption that power factors outside the market do not exist, 
or at least have no bearings on economic matters, makes the creation of 
meaningful changes In social Institutions impossible, and rules out any ex-
planation of such changes on a proper theoretical basls. 14 Closely connected 
to this Is the issue of economic order which we addressed in Part 1 of the 
thesis submitted. Weight is primarily assigned to market and market-like 
adjustments as the central mode of order, whereas the institutional setting 
and other constituting elements of markets are neglected. 15 
The same applies to the economic issue of external consumer effects. Exter-
nal effects are said to exist when an activity undertaken by an individual 
or firm benefits or imposes costs on other Individuals or firms in addition to 
the benefits or costs accruing to the acting party. These results are typi-
cally "nonexcludable" which means that the acting party is not reimbursed 
14 Cf. Wilber/ Wisman, The Chicago School: Positivism or Ideal Type?, op. 
cit., 90, who view this strictly as a "rationalized justification for social 
manipulation." 
15 Cf. Samuels, Further Limits to Chicago School Doctrine, op. cit., 400, and 
405: "It Is simply not true that scarce resources are allocated among 
alternative uses by the market. The real determinant of whatever alloca-
tion occurs in any society Is the organizational structure of that society 
- in short, its institutions. At most, the market only gives effect to pre-
vailing Institutions." 
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or charged for the external benefits or costs generated. Because of this 
characteristic, externalities are passed on outside the price system. There Is 
no inducement to take that benefit or cost into consideration when deciding 
upon the level of economic activity to undertake and hence what level of 
costs to be attained. This means that the Individual or firm chooses a level 
of activity at which the private marginal benefits from the activity Just 
equal the private marginal costs of undertaking this activity and ignores 
the marginal benefits or costs which simultaneously accrue to other parties. 
Therefore, the overall marginal costs are higher than the private marginal 
costs - in the case of negative externalities - the latter being a source of 
orientation for the acting party. Hence the level of activity lies above the 
optimal level, which leads to a misallocatlon of resources. The Pareto optimum 
is not achieved. ,e 
These external effects are dismissed although it is conceded that they do 
exist and pose an economic problem. Markets are, therefore, relied upon to 
achieve efficiency by themselves. 17 Externalities, however, can be seen as 
Inefficiencies decreasing consumer welfare. Nevertheless, It is held that 
policy instruments designed to bring about increased (allocative) efficiency 
could contribute to the increase of 'pure' consumer welfare; this, however, 
would unambiguously bring about other welfare losses for society. Since 
antitrust legislation did originally concentrate on consumer welfare In the 
sense of productive and allocative efficiency, according to the current tenet, 
it lies within the scope of legislation also to include externalities that influ-
ence other goals such as the distribution of income. 18 
16 Cf. Boadway, Robin, and David E. Wildasin, Public Sector Economics, 2nd 
ed., Boston, Toronto 1984, pp. 105-118. 
17 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 109, and 114, conceding that 
"(e)conomic activity creates social costs In the form of externalities that, 
by definition, are not taken into account through the price mechanism."; 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: 
A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HLR (1974), pp. 
1655-1681, 1671; for a survey of the basic problem of externalities of con-
sumption and production, cf. Boadway/Wlldasin, Public Sector Economics, 
op. cit., 60-62 and 105-118. 
18 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 114. In the thesis submitted, we 
have argued, however, that consumer welfare, in Chicago words that Is to 
say, increases In efficiency, are not the sole purpose of the legislator. 
Besides, external effects do affect resource allocation since either less 
than the competitive quantity is supplied or more than it. 
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Under standard economic theory, utility functions of consumers are at least 
partly Interdependent. In the case of the relative Income hypothesis19, 
quantity of demand Is also influenced by factors not directly taken Into 
account by the market. In terms of consumer welfare, this means that less 
value is placed by consumers on allocative improvements than on redistribu-
tion:20 
'"People may continue, of course, to struggle to Improve their position 
relative to others but clearly, in the limiting case In which individual 
welfare depends only on relative Income, it would no longer be possible 
to make everyone better off: only redistribution possibilities would 
remain open to society.'" 
Through the narrow selection of assumptions, the problem of externalities Is 
defined away.21 
The most essential problem of the neoclassical price theory and the model of 
perfect competition, even If only used as a standard of reference, are Its 
strict underlying assumptions which never apply in reality.22 One can draw 
the conclusion that neoclassical price theory cannot serve as a framework 
for welfare economics whose task Is to provide an answer to the remaining 
question how consumer welfare and economic efficiency are affected by acti-
ons which aim at Influencing market structure and market conduct. Mainly 
for this reason the theory of second best has been developed. It takes Into 
19 The hypothesis holds that '"the higher the level of 'real' per capita In-
come the more does a person's well-being depend, not on his absolute in-
come but on his income relative to those of others, .•• '", Mlshan, Ezra J., 
The Folklore of the Market: An Inquiry into the Economic Doctrines of the 
Chicago School, in: Samuels, Warren J. (ed.), The Chicago School of Politi-
cal Economy, East Lansing 1976, pp. 95-166, 106. For the original source 
cf. Duesenberry, James, Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Be-
havior, Cambridge, Mass. 1949; for elaborations cf., e.g., Daly, George, and 
Fred Giertz, Welfare Economics and Welfare Reform, 62 AER (1972), pp. 
131-138; and Hochman, Harold, and James Rogers, Pareto Optimal Redistri-
bution, 59 AER (1969), pp. 542-557. 
20 Cf. Mlshan, The Folklore of the Market ... , op. cit., 106. 
21 Cf. Samuels, Further Limits to Chicago School Doctrine, op. cit., 400, and 
414; Wilber/ Wisman, The Chicago School: Positivism or Ideal Type?, op. 
cit., 89. 
22 Cf. again Sullivan, Lawrence A., Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, St. 
Paul, Minn. 1977, p. 3. 
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consideration that the assumptions of the model of perfect competition are 
only partly realized.23 The core issue of the theory Is that 
given that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, 
then an optimum situation can be reached only by departing from all 
other Paretian conditions. The optimum situation finally attained may be 
termed a second best optimum because it Is achieved subject to a con-
straint which, by definition, prevents the attainment of a Paretian op-
timum".24 
The omission of the theory of second best by the Chicago School is viewed 
as a major deficiency to the use of neoclassical price theory.25 The same 
applies to the neglect of the dynamic aspects of competition which Is 
brought about through the use of a static method of analysls. 211 
Another major assumption is the auto-correction of the market In the long 
run which would lead to the maximization of consumer welfare.27 For one 
thing, it can be doubted that the disciplining function of the market works 
23 This theory "should be disregarded and antitrust should concern itself 
solely with allocative and productive efficiency.", Bork, The Antitrust Pa-
radox, op. cit., 109. 
24 Lipsey, Richard G., and Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second 
Best, 24 RESt (1956), pp. 11-20, 11. 
25 Cf. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly, op. cit., 22; Markovits, Monopolis-
tic Competition •.• , supra, 583, who regards the neglection of second best 
considerations as the main theoretical error, noting that second-best con-
siderations do not preclude an allocative efficiency rationale for antitrust, 
p. 587; Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product •.• , 
supra, 1680; and Mlshan, The Folklore of the Market ... , op. cit., 102 f.: 
"'There It was demonstrated that the extension of marginal cost pricing In 
an economy in which some sectors were constrained to realize other pri-
cing rules would not itself increase social welfare and could, indeed, re-
duce It." 
26 "'When we speak of competition, we do not Just mean competition through 
prices and product quality. Indeed, standardized staple goods are of les-
ser importance In our economies. We mean above all competition through 
innovation, through the development of new products and new processes. 
This kind of dynamic view Is the only realistic way of looking at compe-
tition"", cf. Caspari, Manfred, Joint Ventures Under EEC Law and Policy, 
unpublished paper, presented at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
New York, October 23, 1987, p. 4. This dynamic view Is almost completely 
Ignored by the underlying mode of analysis. 
27 Cf. Markovits, Richard A., A Basis Structure for Microeconomic Polley 
Analysis In our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related 
Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 67 
WiscLR (1975), pp. 950-1080, 989; Mishan, The Folklore of the Market ••. , 
op. cit., 102; Spivack, Gordon B., The Chicago School Approach to Single 
Firm Exercises of Monopoly Power: A Response, 51 ALJ (1983), pp. 651-
674, 672. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
129 
the way textbook economics suggests. At least there are reasonable doubts 
whether this function Is performed sufficiently by the market. Secondly, if 
public policy does not provide for corrective action, further damage to the 
competitive process might be done which renders any later correction impos-
sible. Thus, the corrective state may never be reached,28 
c. The General Methodology: Conclusions 
Adherents of the current tenet apply positive methodology to antitrust 
problems, i.e., the same methodology is applied to economic phenomena as is 
used in the physical sciences. The difference resides the nature of the 
empirical subject matter.29 This is a crucial difference, however. The object 
of analysis is simply not comparable to a physical phenomenon, not at least 
because it is characterized by extreme data instabllity.ao Besides this, 
economics deals with open rather than closed systems, as Is shown by the 
use of partial equilibria models that attempt to reduce the complexity of 
economic phenomena to manageable proportions. This demonstrates the limited 
range of applicability of positivist methodology as used by adherents of 
28 Cf. Scherer, Frederic M., Industrial market structure and economic per-
formance, second ed., Chicago 1980, p. 38; Spivack, The Chicago School 
Approach ... , supra, 671 f.; and Winter, s., Economic 'Natural Selection' 
and the Theory of the Firm, 4 YEE (1964), pp. 225-264, 256-264. 
The market for corporate control, assumed to be more or less perfect, is 
an often cited example in this context, cf. Lenel, Hans o., Ober die 
Mii.rkte fur Unternehmenskontrolle, In: Borchert, Manfred, et al. (eds.), 
Markt und Wettbewerb, Bern, Stuttgart 1987, pp. 143-170, 169 f.; see as 
well Mueller, Dennis C., A Cross-National Comparison of the Results, In: 
Mueller, Dennis C. (ed.), The Determinants and Effects of Mergers: An 
International Comparison, Konlgsteln/Ts., pp. 299-314, 312: " ... to the ex-
tent that It works at all, does so with considerable slippage and uncer-
tainty," 
29 Cf. Horwitz, Law and Economics ... , supra, 905: "The economic analysis of 
law Is only the most recent claimant to draw upon the prestige of the 
natural sciences in the effort to create a system of legal thought that Is 
objective, neutral, and apolitical." 
30 Cf. Chalk, Alfred F., Concepts of Change and the Role of Predictability In 
Economics, 2 HPE (1970), pp. 97-117, 109; Heilbronner, Robert L., On the 
Limits of Economic Prediction, 70 Diogenes (1970), pp. 30-38, 36. 
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current antitrust theory.31 
The same reservations apply to the use of neoclassical price theory. Propo-
nents of the Chicago School seem to use theory rather selectively, filtering 
it through pre-supposed value judgments and highly tendentious definlti-
ons.32 
2. Mergers, Efficiency, and the Model for Evaluation 
a. Consumer Welfare and Efficiency: Remarks on Interdependence 
In the context of current antitrust theory, competition is regarded as a spe-
cific state of the market in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by 
judicial decree. 33 Furthermore, the use of the efficiency criterion emerges 
from the acceptance of consumer welfare as the sole goal of current anti-
trust policy. This presupposes a close link between consumer welfare and 
the criterion of efficiency insofar as "(b)usiness efficiency necessarily bene-
fits consumers by lowering the costs of goods and services or by increasing 
the value of the product or service offered".34 
This assumes that consumers benefit from the efficiency increase automati-
cally; bit this only occurs If there is sufficient competitive pressure at any 
particular time. A crucial difficulty with regard to the terminology seems to 
be that business efficiency and economic efficiency are not properly distin-
31 Cf. Wilber/ Wisman, The Chicago School: Positivism or Ideal Type?, op. 
cit., 80-83; see as well, Buchanan, James M., Good Economics - Bad Law, 
60 VLR (1974), pp. 483-492, 485, commenting on the methodological bias: 
"At this point care must be taken to distinguish between positive econo-
mic analysis and the advancement of the efficiency norm that is often 
associated with the analysis. The latter, which involves an explicit value 
Judgment, need not accompany the former." 
32 Cf. Harris/Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines •.. , supra, 
465: "It is our view that neoclassical price theory simply does not pro-
vide a sufficient basis on which to conduct antitrust policy ... Further-
more, there is great danger when analysts or policymakers confuse the 
consequences assumed to flow from a simplified theoretical model with the 
realities of a complex economy."; cf. as well Hovenkamp, Antitrust Polley 
After Chicago, supra, 256; Schmldt/Rittaler, Die Chicago School of Anti-
trust Analysis, op. cit., 33-37; and Spivack, The Chicago School Approach 
••• , supra, 669 f.: "Despite the protestations of some of Its proponents, 
Chicago School economic theory Is just that: theory. It is not a science 
giving conclusive answers to the difficult problems that antitrust cases 
raise. 
33 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 50 f. 
34 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 7. 
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guished from each other.35 An explicit definition of when efficiency can be 
said to be achieved is not offered38, and even Bork has to concede that 
efficiency cannot be measured and that substitutes have to be used in order 
to evaluate whether increases In efficiency have occured.37 
b. The Incorporation of Current Efficiency Considerations 
We have already established that there Is no explicit consideration of effici-
ency effects where an efficiency defense in merger cases is conducted 
according to Sec. 7 Clayton Act, although the legislator has presumably in-
corporated efficiency considerations implicitly through the wording of the 
statute.38 
35 Cf. Sobel, Marktmacht versus Effizlenz ... , supra, 50 note 14; Kallfass, 
Hermann H., Die Chicago School - Eine Sklzze des "neuen" amerlkanlschen 
Ansatzes fur die Wettbewerbspolltl k, 30 WuW (1980), pp. 596-601, 599 f. 
36 Cf. Scherer, Frederic M., The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from 
Chaff, 86 YLJ (1977), pp. 974-1001, 995 f.: "Also I have been unable to 
find an explicit definition (of efficiency) ... ", There is no explicit consen-
sus, whether efficiency just means allocative efficiency or whether pro-
ductive efficiency and, therefore, productivity Increases have to be in-
cluded, cf. Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product 
... , supra, 1659-1663; and Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, op. cit., 4: 
"By a process of voluntary exchange, resources are shifted to those uses 
In which the value to the consumer, as measured by the consumer's wil-
lingness to pay, is highest. When resources are being used where their 
value is greatest, we may say that they are being employed efficiently." 
37 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 192 and 117: " ... , antitrust must 
avoid any standards that require direct measurement and quantification 
of either restriction of output or efficiency. Such tasks are impossible."; 
and Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest ... , supra, 979: "Posner appears to 
view the condition for achieving economic efficiency as the equality of 
price with long-run marginal costs under equilibrium condition," 
38 Cf. Brown Shoe v. U.S., 1962 CCH Trade Cases § 70,366, and FTC v. Proc-
ter & Gamble Co., 1967 CCH Trade Cases § 72,061, adopting this reasoning. 
Cf. Kauper, Thomas E., The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collu-
sion, Efficiency, and Failure, 71 CLR (1983), pp. 497-534, 520, who asserts 
that the unwillingness of Congress and the courts to permit proof of 
specific efficiencies does not have to be considered Inconsistent with the 
formulation of general rules accommodating efficiency concerns; cf. as 
well Schwartz, Louis B., The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmen-
tal Discretion or Propaganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CLR 
(1983), pp. 575-603, 593-595, who stresses this aspect with regard to ver-
tical integration. 
There Is also the position that there should definitely be an explicit effi-
ciency defense: "The one simple rule that is obviously needed Is that a 
merger ... should be allowed If the merging firms can demonstrate that 
the merger would substantially Increase real efficiency in production and 
distribution. (T)hat ... enforcement would be in accord with accepted 
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The current efficiency-orientation of the government, the enforcement agen-
cies, and the courts are also directed towards reorientation In the applica-
tion of Sec. 7 Clayton Act. LI ke the other antitrust statutes, Sec. 7 Clayton 
Act is regarded as a consumer welfare prescription with the Intention to 
promote economic efflclency.39 
Whereas the 1968 Merger Guidelines did not take efficiency considerations 
into account, the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines elevated minimum threshold levels 
for challenging mergers.40 At the same time, the Merger Guidelines 1984 of 
the Antitrust Division have introduced an explicit efficiency-defense and the 
falling firm defense has been extended to failing divisions of otherwise heal-
thy firms.•1 This has again revived the extensive discussion about the man-
ner in which and the method by which efficiency considerations should be 
taken Into account and thereby find an optimal solution for balancing diffe-
rent factors and effects associated with the occurrence of a merger, in ac-
cordance with the contents of the statutes.42 
The point of departure for analyzing the current orientation could be the 
possible effects of a merger on allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, 
principles of economic rationality.", Bain, Joe S., Industrial Organization, 
2nd ed., New York et al. 1968, p. 658. For the contrary position cf. 
Dewey, Donald, Mergers and Cartels: Some Reservations about Polley, 51 
AER (1961 ), pp. 255-262, 257. 
39 Cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 1979-1 CCH Trade Cases § 62,688 at p. 77, 
877; Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 57-61; Posner, Antitrust Law: 
An Economic Perspective, op. cit., 23, 99 f.; and with regard to the 1982 
Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice, making explicit govern-
ment enforcement policy, Baxter, William F., Responding to the Reaction: 
The Draftman's View, 71 CLR (1983), pp. 618-631, 619 f.: "An examination 
of the language and legislative histories of section 1 of the Sherman Act 
and section 7 of the Clayton Act strongly suggests a focus on economic 
efficiency. '(C)ompetition' and 'monopoly' in section 7 are used as short-
hand expressions for effects on consumer welfare." 
40 Cf. Merger Guidelines 1968, 1 CCH TRRer § 4510; and Bobel, Ingo, Wettbe-
werb und Industriestruktur: Industrial Organization - Forschung im 
Oberblick, Berlin et al. 1984, p. 216 for this evaluation. 
41 Cf. Merger Guidelines 1984, TRR No. 655, June 18, 1984, Part II. 
42 Cf. Fisher, Alan A., and Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations In 
Merger Enforcement, 71 CLR (1983), pp. 1580-1696, 1691 f.; and Kauper, 
The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines ... , supra, 520 and 522. 
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and the amount of wealth transfer from producers to consumers and vice 
versa. 43 
c. The Partial Equilibrium Trade-Off Model Reoonsldered 
The current considerations on the possible effects of mergers are based on 
a partial equilibrium welfare model which was origlnally Introduced by Har-
berger and which demonstrates the welfare differences between monopoly 
and competition, especially the resulting welfare loss and resource mlsalloca-
tion In individual industries due to market power.44 The model Is based on 
the concept of consumer's rent (consumer's surplus), originally Introduced 
by Dupuit and Marsha//45 and has been enlarged on by Williamson, who gave 
up the assumption of constant returns to scale Inherent in the classical 
models used for the purpose of welfare measurement. 411 
Among other purposes, the model serves to balance the efficiency effects re-
sulting from a merger. Mergers do cause market power, and, therefore, allo-
cative Inefficiency, on the one hand, by allowing the possibility of restric-
ting the output and raising the price; but on the other hand, mergers offer 
43 Cf. similarly Fox, Eleanor M., Introduction - The 1982 Merger Guidelines: 
When Economists are Kings?, 71 CLR (1983), pp. 281-302, 282 f.; Lande, 
Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust ... , 
supra, 72; Markovits, A Basis Structure for Microeconomic Polley Analysis 
... , supra, 955. 
44 Cf. Harberger, Arnold C., Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AER 
(1954), pp. 77-87; and for Germany Sobel, Ingo, Welfare Losses due to Mo-
nopoly Power: An Investigation for the West German Economy, 197 JNSt 
(1982), pp. 509-520. 
For further surveys on the model cf. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly, 
op. cit., 20-22; and Sobel, Ingo, Wettbewerb und Industrlestruktur ..• , op. 
cit., 179-185, and 202-207 for a survey on the criticism of the model; cf. 
as well Littlechlld, Steven c., Misleading Calculations of the Social Costs 
of Monopoly Power, 91 EJ (1981), pp. 348-363. 
45 "'The difference between the maximum amount that the consumer would 
pay and the amount he or she actually pays is called consumer's sur-
plus."', Mansfield, Edwin, Microeconomics: Theory and Applications, 4th ed., 
New York and London 1982, p. 95. For a survey cf. Abouchar, A., Mar-
shall, Consumer Surplus and the Marginal Utility of Money, 8 EEJ (1982), 
pp. 79-82; and Dooley, Peter C., Consumer's surplus: Marshall and his cri-
tics, 16 CJE (1983), pp. 26-38. 
46 Cf. Williamson, Oliver E., Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AER (1968), pp. 18-42; Idem, Economies as an Antitrust De-
fense: Correction and Reply, 58 AER (1968), pp. 1372-1376; idem, Econo-
mies as an Antitrust Defense: Reply, 59 AER (1969), pp. 954-959; idem, 
Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, In: Jaquemin, Alexis P., and 
Henk W. de Jong (eds.), Welfare Aspects of Industrial Markets, Leiden 
1977, pp. 237-281. 
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possible cost reductions due to an increase in productive efficiency. Accor-
ding to adherents of the model, these counteracting effects have to be 
balanced against each other In order to determine possible beneficial or 
detrimental effects of mergers and other business practlces.47 
Williamson exemplified this trade-off between the positive and negative re-
sults of horizontal mergers by a merger of duopolists: on the one hand pos-
sible cost advantages, and on the other an increase in market power which 
leads to a resource misallocation. 411 In this context, he juxtaposes a market 
situation that is characterized by competition before a merger occurs, to a 
market situation after the merger has been carried out. The effects on the 
allocation of resources and the acquiring firm's productivity due to the mer-
ger are then determined. The resulting cost advantages from the merger and 
the resulting market power demonstrated by the increase in price are hence 
presented in a partial equilibrium model:49 











Adapted fm: Schmidt, logo, and Jan B. Rittaler, Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis: 
Vettbembstheoretische und -politische Analyse eines Credos, Baden-Baden 1986, p. 51. 
47 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 91: "The whole task of antitrust can 
be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without im-
pairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or 
a net loss In consumer welfare." 
48 Cf. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 
supra. 
49 Cf. Bobel, Wettbewerb und Industriestruktur ... , op. cit., 210. 
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Within the Williamsonian model it is assumed that the long-run average costs 
of the two merging parties - approximated by the marginal cost curve - can 
be reduced from MCc to MC. by an increase in productive efficiency due to 
the merger which leads to a joint new cost function. However, the merger 
leads to a restriction of output due to the increase in market power so that 
after the merger Is carried out, the output quantity Is reduced from Qc to 
q •. 
On the basis of the model and prevalent empirical studies on welfare losses, 
It is now assumed that the cost savings documented by rectangle A2 out-
weigh by far the welfare losses due to the restriction of output documented 
by triangle A1 (so-called deadweight loss).!50 
Adherents of the model hold that economies as little as two percent in gene-
ral yield net allocative-efficiency gains to society. This means that relatively 
small efficiency gains resulting from a merger would more than offset rela-
tively large gains in the merging parties' market power. Williamson has cal-
culated the reductions in costs necessary to offset the allocative inefficiency 
resulting from a specific percentage price increase due to an increase in 
monopoly power:s1 
~ Willia•son 's Offset Calculations 
Increase 
in price Elasticity of Demand 
~ ~ ~ .!l..'.:!_ 
5 0.44 0.27 0.13 
10 2.00 1.21 0.55 
20 10.38 5.76 2.40 
~ Willimon, Oliver E., Econo•ies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 





50 The deadweight loss due to the restriction of output represents the 
amount by which the social welfare of society could be Increased If anti-
trust policy could prevent such output restrictions, cf. Armentano, Anti-
trust and Monopoly ... , op. cit., 21. 
51 Cf. Wllllamson, Oliver E., Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 
UPLR (1977), pp. 699-736, 708 f. The table presents the oost decreases 
necessary to offset the Increases In price due to increased market power, 
choosing different levels of demand elastlclty: "For example, a merger 
likely to Increase consumer prices by ten percent would have a net social 
gain if cost efficiencies exceeded two percent, for any demand elasticity 
up to three (percent).", Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations In Merger 
Enforcement, supra, 1629. 
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From a public policy point of view It does not seem useful - except In some 
extreme cases - to declare mergers illegal, since the model shows that, as a 
rule, mergers bring about net efficiency gains and, therefore, an Increase In 
consumer welfare.52 As a rule, a merger of two different firms at the same 
level of production is seen an an expression of efficiency if this merger 
does not lead to a duopoly. Even in highly concentrated markets, and taking 
this provision into account, a merger should not be the subject of judicial 
enquiry as long as there are any efficiency advantages associated with lt.53 
The validity of the Williamson welfare trade-off as an underlying model for 
the evaluation of possible effects of mergers depends on the effect of the 
qualifications necessary to transform the 'naive' Williamson model into a 
model with more realistic assumptions. These qualifications can be classified 
Into different categories: qualifications with respect to premises and assump-
tions of the model, general welfare measurement qualifications, qualifications 
associated with the effects of a merger on productive efficiency, qualificati-
ons associated with the effects of a merger on allocative efficiency, and 
qualifications associated with the consideration of possible wealth trans-
fers.54 
52 Cf. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly ... , op. cit., 22; Bobel, Marktmacht 
versus Effizienz .•. , supra, 46 f.; Hovenkamp, Herbert, Merger Actions for 
Damages, 35 HastLJ (1984), pp. 937-973, 949 f.; and Fisher/Lande, Effi-
ciency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 1624 f. 
53 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 221 f.: '"My guess is that •.. mer-
gers up to 60 or 70 percent of the market should be permitted ••• Partly 
as a tactical concession to current oligopoly phobia •.. , I am willing to 
weaken that conclusion ... making presumptively lawful all horlzontal mer-
gers up to market shares that would allow for other mergers of similar 
size In the industry and still leave three significant companies.'" 
54 We will not perform a general critique associated with the original Har-
berger model since this would be an undertaking which goes beyond the 
scope and the emphasis of the thesis submitted; besides, in any case its 
has already been done elsewhere, cf., e.g., Bergson, Abram, On Monopoly 
Welfare Losses, 63 AER (1973), 853-870; Bobel, Wettbewerb und Industrie-
struktur ••. , op. cit., 201-208; Cowling, Keith, and Dennis c. Mueller, The 
Social Costs of Monopoly Power Revisited, 91 EJ (1981 ), pp. 727-748; and 
Llttlechild, Misleading Calculations ..• , supra; we will emphasize crucial 
aspects with regard to the specific application of the WIiiiamson model, 
however. 
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d. Qualifications to the Model 
aa. Premises and Assumptions 
The main purpose of this section Is not to show primarily that the premises 
and assumptions underlying the Wil/iamsonian model and current antitrust 
theory do not correspond to reality but to show how the model would react 
to altered specification of the premises and assumptions.55 
A main assumption of the original Harberger model, which is also accepted 
by promoters of the Chicago approach, Is that the standards of reference 
are the states of perfect competition and monopoly. In the state of perfect 
competition, however, demand functions do not slope downwards, or rather 
have a price-elasticity of demand approaching a value close to infinity. In 
the case of downward-sloping demand functions, there Is a divergence of 
price from marginal costs under all selling conditions which threatens to 
make the theory of resource mlsallocation under Imperfect competition appear 
absurd. The peril here Is that the standard of reference can be lost alto-
gether, since a misallocatlon of resources is relative to a chosen standard. 58 
If one assumes demand functions with a rather low price-elasticity of de-
mand in comparison to a more elastic demand function, the deadweight loss 
associated with a merger may eventually be smaller than the one derived 
from the Wllllamsonlan model, but at the same time restrictions with regard 
to price and quantity in comparison to the more elastic demand function are 
left out of consideration. This neglects part of the harm done to the consu-
mer due to decreased output and elevated price and hence understates the 
burden put on society. 
The Identical conclusion follows from the assumption that premerger market 
structures embody some degree of market power as Is the case most probab-
55 Cf. Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 
1638, who emphasize the dramatic shift resulting from changes In the mo-
del's assumptions: "Once we relax ... these assumptions, the range of cost 
savings necessary to offset anticipated price Increases widens so sub-
stantially that a given percentage of cost savings would no longer presu-
mably offset much greater price increases from a merger." 
WIiiiamson himself showed that the valldity of his model and hence the 
net welfare effect of mergers would strongly be influenced by the shape 
of the cost curve, the elasticity of demand for the product, and the al-
leged increase in market power. How valuable the Chicago approach Is al-
together, has been treated In terms of the methodology applied supra. 
56 Cf. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly .•• , op. cit., 23 f. 
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ly In most of the real existing Industrial markets. If this is taken Into con-
sideration, the model understates the resulting burden on society by Just 
emphasizing the deadwelght loss and neglecting the price/quantity conse-
quences as well as the wealth transfers due to the merger.57 The degree of 
preexisting market power as well as the amount of price-elasticity of demand 
for the product in question therefore become crucial variables.58 
A further assumption appears to underestimate considerably the increases in 
efficiency necessary to outweigh the deadweight loss resulting from a mer-
ger. The model assumes price increases of not more than thirty percent 
above pre-merger levels. A number of studies have shown however, that 
merger-Induced price increases exceeding thirty percent are by no means a 
rarity. 59 
A further assumption closely connected to the price Increase assumption is 
that price elasticities of demand are in the range of three or below. 110 Besi-
des the fact that empirical studies show the contrary91, determining the 
value of price elasticities crucially depends on the length of the selected 
time period for measurement: as a rule price elasticities tend to be greater 
57 Cf. Bobel, Wettbewerb und Industrlestruktur ... , op. cit., 214 f.; DePrano, 
Michael E., and Jeffrey B. Nugent, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: 
Comment, 59 AER (1969), pp. 947-953; and Jackson, Raymond, The Conside-
ration of Economies in Merger Cases, 43 JB (1970), pp. 439-447. 
Williamson admits this but responds by asserting that his critics greatly 
overstate the correction factor to be applied in order to take this into 
account, cf. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Reply, supra, 
957. 
58 Cf. Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 
1641: "Regardless of the amount of correction, however, the direction is 
clear: the greater the preexisting market power, ceteris paribus, the 
greater the expected cost efficiencies should be to permit a merger likely 
to Increase monopoly power", italics In original. 
59 Cf., e.g., Gelthman, Frederick E., Howard P. Marvel and Leonard W. Weiss, 
Concentration, Price, and Critical Concentration Ratios, 63 RES (1981 ), pp. 
346-353; and Kessel, Reuben, A Study of the Effects of Competition in the 
Tax-Exempt Bond Market, 79 JPE (1971 ), pp. 706-738. 
60 Cf. Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 
1643. 
61 Cf. Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 
1643, holding that empirical studies show elasticities of demand for suc-
cessful consumer brand products between one and fifteen and the majori-
ty between two and a half to five: "Nevertheless, If demand elasticities of 
as much as five are not uncommon, the efficiencies necessary to a,mpen-
sate for possible market-power effects would Increase dramatlcally", em-
phasis added. 
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in the longer run than in the short term. 112 Since different elasticities of 
demand are connected with corresponding changes in the level of price, the 
lower the profit-maximizing price, the higher the price elasticity of demand 
for a given increase in monopoly power. This interrelatedness further in-
creases the difficulty in predicting welfare effects.93 
bb. General Welfare Measurement 
Real changes in net welfare can only be determined accurately if changes in 
productive efficiency and changes in allocative lneffciency are taken into 
account; in other words, the comparative-static nature of the model must be 
given up. Thus, the measurement must account for the timing of the trade-
off, and the discounted present values of the stream of costs and benefits 
arising from a merger. 114 An accurate prognosis of the effects on the welfare 
trade-off of extending the time period measured is rather complicated be-
cause of numerous imponderabillties. In the case of the two cost functions of 
the merging firms, this is particularly obvious. The model assumes two cost 
functions that can be unambiguously determined. It is left out of considera-
tion, however, that in a dynamic view the intensity of competitive pressure 
determines the extent of cost control that Is performed by the market, and 
hence also determines the stream of costs which arise. The trade-off there-
fore can only claim validity in the short term.95 
Comparison between welfare losses due to market power, and cost savings 
due to a shifted cost function, can only be performed If data is available 
This data, however, is generally unknown or unavailable. The Wif/iamsonian 
model Is therefore difficult to handle, difficult to operationalize, and difficult 
62 Cf. for empirical evidence, Telser, Lester G., Competition, Collusion and 
Game Theory, Chicago 1972, pp. 274-300. 
63 Cf. Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations In Merger Enforcement, supra, 
1643. 
64 Cf. Sobel, Wettbewerb und Industrlestruktur ... , op. cit., 213; on the cal-
culation of the deadwelght loss over time, cf. Schmalensee, Richard A., 
Another Look at Market Power, 95 HLR (1982), pp, 1789-1802, 1794 f. 
65 Cf. Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 
1635 f.; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 96; and 
Schmidt/Rittaier, Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 52 f. 
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to put Into practice. If additional factors are taken into consideration, the 
model loses Its analytical clarlty.118 
cc. Allocative Efficiency 
Different kinds of efficiencies can be discerned In economlcs. 117 As already 
pointed out, efficiency is seen in terms of a quantifiable amount of consumer 
welfare. In this sense, consumer welfare depends on productive efficiency on 
the one hand, and on allocative efficiency on the other:118 
"Allocative efficiency, as used here, refers to the placement of resour-
ces In the economy, a question of whether resources are employed In 
tasks where consumers value their output most." 
This characterization Is based on the Pareto definition of efficiency (Pareto 
optimality), which suggests that an allocation of resources is efficient if no 
rearrangement of resources to make one participating economic agent better 
off, can be made without rendering at least one participating economic agent 
worse off in terms of his own welfare. The neoclassical price theory is 
believed to define the circumstances under which this will occur.89 
The level of consumer welfare in the perceived market equilibrium is influ-
enced on the one hand by the preferences of all individuals which are re-
66 Even Bork concedes that "(i)t Is disastrous to draw policy conclusions 
from that diagram. Its only valid use is to indicate the general relation-
ship of loss and gain in cases in which both occur .... One simply cannot 
read appropriate merger policy off a chart.", Bork, The Antitrust Para-
dox, op. cit., 220. There is a variety of authors who reject the partial 
equilibrium trade-off model as being unable to perform its function in 
specific cases because of the lmponderabillties; for the most prominent cf. 
Adams, Walter, Economic Theory and Economic Policy, 40 RSE (1982), pp. 
1-12; Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly ... , op. cit., ch. 2; Fox, The 
Modernization of Antitrust ... , supra, 1159-1966; and Singer, Eugene, Anti-
trust Economics and Legal Analysis, Columbus, Ohio 1981. 
67 Cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 13-20: allocative 
efficiency, 302 f.: productive efficiency, 20 f. and 464-466: X-inefflciency. 
68 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 91. 
In the view of the Chicago School there is a balancing problem since 
productive and allocative efficiency, for example, may oppose each other 
in the case of a merger: "(P)roductlve efficiency Is one of the two oppo-
sing forces that determine the degree of consumer well-being (the other 
one being resource misallocation due to monopoly power) ... ", ibid., 7. 
69 Cf. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Polley After Chicago, supra, 239; Mansfield, 
Microeconomics ... , op. cit., 57 f., 440, and 459; Scherer, Industrial market 
structure ... , op. cit., 595 f. 
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vealed by total demand, and on the other hand by the costs that arise from 
the production of goods and services that fulfill the demands of society. 
Against the background of neoclassical price theory, the Chicago School con-
tends that in a market characterized by perfect competition, marginal reve-
nues of a single firm always equal market demand, thus determining market 
price.70 The market power of a single firm in a market that is characterized 
by perfect competition can only be small and is hence negllgible71, whereas 
in the case of monopoly the price is elevated and the output restricted In 
comparison to perfect competition. In this context, allocative Inefficiency in a 
monopoly Is characterized by a divergence of price from marginal costs:n 
"The distinctive feature of the monopoly situation is that the monopolist 
has created a gap between marginal costs and price, which means that 
social costs and social desires are no longer equated ... (t)he evil of 
monopoly, then, is not higher prices or smaller production (though 
these are its concomitants) but misailocated resources or allocation in-
efficiency." ' 
Because a supplier produces less than he would have produced under com-
petitive conditions, some resources will be used for other economic purposes. 
These are purposes that are valued less by the consumer, however. This 
leads to a reduction of total wealth. The measurable outcome of allocative in-
efficiency is the deadweight loss due to market power.73 
Two major qualifications have to be considered with regard to the original 
amount of deadwelght loss due to a merger measured by the Wi/1/amsonian 
model. Williamson originally assumed a non-linear iso-elastlc demand curve. 
However, if a more or less linear demand curve is assumed (as may seem ap-
propriate in some situations), the resulting deadwelght loss always exceeds 
70 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 93. 
71 Cf. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, op. cit., 9, whose 
formulation is rather Imprecise and resembles phraseology since in the 
case of perfect competition there is no problem of power. 
72 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 101; and Sobel, Wettbewerb und In-
dustriestruktur ... , op. cit., 179 ff. This definition leads the classical view 
on monopoly ad absurdum since monopoly was originally associated with 
the evils of restricted output quantities and elevated price levels. 
73 Cf. Fig. 2 of this contribution. For a formal proof that monopoly power 
leads to allocative inefficiency, cf. Mansfield, Microeconomics ... , op. cit., 
277-292; Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., ch. 2; and 
Stigler, George J., The Theory of Price, 2nd ed., New York 1966, pp. 78-
81. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
142 
the deadwelght loss calculated from a Williamson/an demand curve. 74 Hence, 
deadwelght loss seems to be tendentlally larger than WIiiiamson's model 
would have us believe: 




qm qc q 
~ Fisher, Alan A., and Robert B. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in 
Merger lnforcmnt, 71 California Lav Review (1983), pp. 1580-1696, 1639. 
A further aspect is that deadweight loss in this model Is confined to the 
Individual loss of consumer surplus, However, equally Important is social 
opportunity loss due to Inefficient use of resources and possible under-uti-
lization of these resources. This loss is largely neglected. It can be calcula-
ted by comparing the Cournot equilibrium with the competitive equilibrium. 
The latter Is attained by assuming internal growth which leads to an in-
crease in productive efficiency and, therefore, to a lower cost function 
also.75 
74 Cf. Jackson, The Consideration of Economies in Merger Cases, supra. Em-
pirical evidence provides no guidance, however, of what demand specifi-
cations to use, cf. Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations In Merger 
Enforcement, supra, 1639 f. Besides, the deadwelght loss Is further un-
dercounted since forgone profits on output no longer produced are ne-
glected, cf. DePrano/Nugent, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Comment, 
supra, 950-952. 
75 Koo, Sheu-Eng, A Note on the Social Welfare Loss Due to Monopoly, 38 
SEJ (1970), pp. 212-214. 
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dd. Productive Efficiency 
The second factor determining consumer welfare Is productive efficiency. 
Whereas allocative efficiency Is concerned with the overall placement of eco-
nomic resources, "(p)roductive efficiency refers to the effective use of re-
sources by particular firms". 78 Therefore, productive efficiency is concerned 
with the Individual firm's flow of resources to their most effective use with-
In the flrm.77 
In this context, adherent of the current tenet speak of "competitive effec-
tiveness" and apply the concept not only to mechanlstlcal or technical pro-
cesses that can be inquired Into by so-called engineering studies.n Pro-
ductive efficiency is supposed to be determined only to a certain extent by 
economies of scale and transaction-cost efficiencies. Considerably stronger 
factors of influence that determine productive efficiency are specialization, 
ability to obtain capital, management skills etc., but these are elements 
which are difficult to quantify. 
Productive efficiency Is not seen as analogous to or In any way associated 
with profitability, in contrast to the view of the Harvard School, since the 
relative efficiency of a firm is not evaluated by its profit rates, but by Its 
relative success in the market-place.79 This success is evaluated on the 
basis of the so-called "survivor test", developed by Stigler. The standard of 
reference for the underlying cost situation Is the structure of an industry 
that for a longer period has not been subject to legal barriers to entry and 
furthermore, has not changed Its market posltion. 110 The survivor technique 
76 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 91 note. 
77 For further definitions of productive efficiency cf. Mansfield, Microecono-
mics ... , op. cit., 4-6; and Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. 
cit., 13-21. 
78 Engineering studies are considered the most reliable method in determi-
ning the Impact of firm size on the costs of products, cf. Scherer, Frede-
ric M., Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in: Goldschmid, 
Harvey, et al. (eds.), Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, Boston, 
Toronto 1974, pp. 18-54; and Monopolkommlssion, Hauptgutachten VI: Ge-
samtwirtschaftliche Chancen und Rislken wachsender Unternehmensgrol3en, 
Baden-Baden 1986, pp. 232 f. 
79 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 104 f. 
80 Cf. Demsetz, Harold, Economics as a Guide to Antitrust Regulation, 19 JLE 
(1976), pp. 371-388, 375.; Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Con-
centration, op. cit., 18; and for the deficiencies, Schmidt, Wettbewerbspo-
liti k und Kartel I rec ht, op. cit., 91. 
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"proceeds to solve the problem of determining the optimum firm size as 
follows: classify the firm In an industry by size, and calculate the 
share of industry output coming from each class over time. If the share 
of a given class falls, it Is relatively inefficient, and in general is more 
Inefficient the more rapidly the share falls. "81 
As has been shown above, it is assumed that a merger will reduce the anti-
cipated Joint total average costs of an acquiring firm - approximated by its 
marginal costs - from MCc: to MC•, The effect of mergers and, therefore, 
concentration on productive efficiency is rather complex, however, and not 
as unambiguous as portrayed by the Wil/iamsonian model. 
Rising concentration can have negative effects on productive effciency as 
well. Primarily this can be subsumed under the headings of 'X-inefflciency' 
and 'dlseconomies of scale'. X-lnefflciencies can be considered a kind of 
organizational slack due to motivation and incentive problems on the part of 
of managers and workers. Such problems are likely to occur if incumbent 
competitors are protected from sufficient competitive pressure. As a result, 
these competitors will show an increased level of discretion in the market.82 
The resulting inefficiencies are considered by some economists to be at least 
as large as losses from allocative inefficiency.83 The critical reviews of 
81 Stigler, George J., The Organization of Industry, Homewood, Ill. 1968, p. 
73. The other method being engineering studies, trying to elaborate on 
the exact shape and properties of cost functions. 
82 Observed as early as 1935, cf. Hicks, John, Annual Survey of Economic 
Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 Econometrica (1935), pp. 1-20, 8; and 
for the explicit description of the phenomenon, Leibenstein, Harvey, Allo-
cative Efficiency vs. 'X-Efficiency', 35 AER (1966), pp. 392-415, 413: "In 
situations where competitive pressure Is light, many people will trade the 
dlsutility of greater effort, of search, and of the control of other peo-
ples' activities for the utility of feeling less pressure and of better in-
terpersonal relations. But in situations where competitive pressures are 
high, they will exchange less of the disutility of effort for the utility of 
freedom from pressure ... "; cf. as well DeAlessl, Louis, Property Rights, 
Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory, 73 AER 
(1983), pp. 64-81. 
83 Cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 466; whereas other 
authors deny the existence of x-inefflciencies, cf. Dilorenzo, Thomas J., 
Corporate Management, Property Rights and the X-istence of X-efflclency, 
48 SEJ (1981), pp. 116-123, 122: "The main thesis ... is that rational utili-
ty maximizing managers of private monopolistic firms will not be more lax 
In their pursuit of profit maximization than will be the managers in more 
competitive industries."; and Stigler, George J., The Xistence of X-Efflci-
ency, 66 AER (1976), pp. 213-216. 
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Leibenstein's approach were carried out mainly on theoretical and rhetoric 
grounds.84 
However, DiLorenzcl15 and De Aless;m additionally criticized the fact that 
Leibenstein had focused his studies too much on commodity markets and ne-
glected property rights, the market for corporate control, and managerial 
labour markets. 
Despite these critical views and the fragmentary evidence, empirical studies 
have unambiguously shown that the phenomenon of X-inefficiency exists in 
big firms and In firms not controlled sufficiently by competltion. 117 This kind 
of Inefficiency can either be regarded as a dead loss in the sense of some 
degree of sheer waste, or as an involuntary transfer from customers to 
input suppliers.• 
This basic Idea has been extended in order to consider that 
"lucrative transfer payments In the form of monopoly profits will at-
tract real resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize, ... The costs 
of the resources so used are costs of monopoly just as much as the 
costs resulting from the substitution of products that cost society more 
to produce than the monopolized product".89 
Competition for the right to monopolize would proceed until marginal costs of 
monopolizing would equal marginal returns from monopolizing. This action is 
84 Stigler, for example, argued that "(w)hen more of one goal is achieved at 
the cost of less of another goal, the increase in output due to (say) In-
creased effort Is not an increase in 'efficiency' It Is a change in output", 
Stigler, The X-lstence of X-Efflclency, supra, 215. 
85 Cf. Di Lorenzo, Corporate Management, •.. , supra. 
86 Cf. De Alessi, Louis, Property Rights, ... , supra. 
87 This Is emphasized by Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficlen-
cy", supra, 413: "The amount to be gained by Increasing allocative effici-
ency is trivial while the amount to be gained by Increasing X-efflclency 
is frequently significant." Evidence for this assertion was found by Pri-
meaux, Walter J., An Assessment of X-Efficiency Gained Through Competi-
tion, 59 RES (1977), pp. 105-108, who found inefficiencies as high as 11~ 
of total average costs in the field of regulated energy utilities. 
88 Cf. Shepherd, The Treatment of Market Power, op. cit., 131. 
89 Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, op. cit., 11; and idem, 
The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 JPE (1975), pp. 807-827, 
807. Posner's error, however, seems to be that he judges such activity to 
be productive, whereas the productivity of resources in securing and 
maintaining monopoly positions are clearly negative when Judged in terms 
of social productivity, cf. Buchanan, Good Economics - Bad Law, supra, 
487. 
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referred to as rent-seeking. Empirical evidence is ambiguous on the quanti-
tative significance, however.90 
The production function left unchanged, diseconomies of scale can occur. 
This Is the case if output increases by a smaller proportion than each of 
the inputs of the production process. Diseconomies typically arise if enter-
prises reach a certain size and the costs of organization overproportionately 
Increase in comparison to the organization's output. The same applies for the 
relation between input and output in research and development.91 
ee. Transfer of Wealth 
A possible increase in market power due to a merger of two parties is ac-
companied by a wealth transfer from consumers to stockholders since the 
acquiring party is able to cut output and elevate price, tendentially ap-
proaching the Cournot equilibrium.92 Neither the Harberger model nor the 
Williamsonian model take wealth transfers into account since these models 
solely allow statements about the wealth of society as a whole. They do not 
allow statements about the distribution of income and wealth changes due to 
changed economic conditions. This is also a characteristic of the original 
Chicago School approach since within the theoretical edifice the abstraction 
from distributional aspects is considered a conditio sine qua non. Consumer 
90 For a survey cf. Siegfried, John J., and Edwin H. Wheeler, Lost Efficiency 
and Monopoly Power: A Survey, 21 QREB (1981 ), pp. 25-46, including fur-
ther reference. 
91 Cf. Mansfield, Microeconomics ... , op. cit., 160 f.; and Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspollti k und Kartell rec ht, op. cit., 86 f. 
92 Cf. Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 
1625, 1631-1633, 1645, and 1693; Hovenkamp, Merger Actions for Damages, 
supra, 950; idem, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law, St. Paul, Minn. 
1985, pp. 19-24; Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust ... , supra, 74 and 146 f; as well as Leff, Economic 
Analysis of Law ... , supra, 480. 
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welfare Is equated with social welfare, which leads to an abstraction from 
distributional aspects:93 
"(I)t seems clear the income distribution effects of economic activity 
should be completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust 
legality of the activity. It may be sufficient to note that the shift In 
lnoome distribution does not lessen total wealth, ... " 
In abstracting from distributional aspects, monopolists are seen as a diffe-
rent class of consumers, which is in exact accord with the models for wel-
fare measurement. It is conceded that if wealth transfer aspects were taken 
into account, welfare calculations and the Williamson trade-off would have 
different results.!M The extent of the total welfare shift from consumers to 
93 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 111, emphasis added; Areeda, Phil-
lip, and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Prin-
ciples and Their Application, Boston and Toronto 1980, vol. 4, p. 149 note 
2; Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust ..• , supra, 144-146; Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner, Mar-
ket Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HLR (1981 ), pp. 937-996, 954, holding 
that they "ignore possible distributional objections to monopoly, as both 
controversial and difficult to quantify."; Posner, The Social Costs of Mo-
nopoly and Regulation, supra, 821; cf. as well Baxter, Responding to the 
Reaction .•. , supra, 621, with respect to the general inclusion of non-eco-
nomic considerations such as income distribution: "Direct taxes and subsi-
dies would be less costly (and politically more honest) methods for achie-
ving social and political goals." 
94 If net welfare gains arise - that is, If rectangle A2 is larger than tri-
angle A1 - distribution problems are ignored, which means that the wel-
fare gain that is represented by the two rectangles A2 and A3 (the latter 
drawn shaded) only accrues to the suppliers. The term consumer welfare 
gain can be considered rather misleading in this context because these 
gains represent more or less additional profits for suppliers. It would be 
better to speak of supplier's surplus instead of consumer welfare. 
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 110, emphasis added: "Those who 
continue to buy after a monopoly is formed pay more for the same out-
put, and that shifts income from them to the monopoly and its owners, 
who are also consumers. This is not deadweight loss due to restriction of 
output but merely a shift In Income between two classes of consumers. 
The consumer welfare model, which views consumers as a collectivity, 
does not take this income effect into account. If it did, the results of 
trade-off calculations would be slgnlflcantly altered." 
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stockholders In an economy is not quite clear, however.95 
Reasoning along these lines only makes sense, however, if this was the in-
tent of the legislator in the sense of a normative judgment, if allocational 
aspects can be separated from distributional aspects at all, and If this sepa-
ration can be performed at bearable costs. 
As has been documented, the wealth transfer assumption made by the Chica-
go School is unprovable and has to be viewed as a normative judgment con-
trary to the one made by Congress.99 The judgment by the Chicago School 
Is based on the assumption that welfare can only be measured In constant 
dollars, so that a transfer of a dollar from a consumer to a monopolist has 
no welfare Implications. This assumption has to be considered both unprov-
able and quite controversial, however, since It "rests on the ordinallst pre-
mise that no one can compare the amount of welfare, or satisfaction, that is 
created by giving a dollar to a poor person, with the amount that Is created 
95 It is assumed that the share of total personal wealth controlled by the 
wealthiest 2.4ll. of U.S. families in 1962 would have been reduced from 40% 
to somewhere between 16.6 and 32%, cf. Comanor, William S., and Robert H. 
Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth, 89 QJE (1975), pp. 177-
194, 191-193; with regard to the GNP, It is concluded that the sum trans-
fered amounts up to 2 or 3 percent of GNP, Scherer, Industrial market 
structure ... , op. cit., 471-473. 
For some more recent studies, confirming the view, cf. Friedland, Thomas 
S., The Estimation of Welfare Gains from Demonopollzatlon, 45 SEJ (1978), 
pp. 116-123; McElroy, Katherine M., John Siegfried, and George Sweeney, 
The Incidence of Price Changes in the Economy, 64 RES (1982), pp. 191-
203; and Powell, Irene, The Effect of Reductions In Concentration on In-
come Distribution, 69 RES (1987), pp. 75-82, 81. 
96 Cf. Buchanan, Good Economics - Bad Law, supra, 487, and 491, who em-
phasizes that positive economics and distributional aspects have to sepa-
rated from each other and that the latter are a matter of normative 
Judgment; cf. as well Horwitz, Law and Economics .•. , supra, 912; Hoven-
kamp, Antitrust Polley After Chicago, supra, 235-237; Lande, Wealth 
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust ... , supra, 75; 
Markovlts, A Basis Structure for Microeconomic Polley Analysis ... , supra, 
985, and 987-989. 
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by giving the same dollar to someone who is wealthy".97 Therefore, the same 
amount of welfare is assigned to any dollar spent. Following this reasoning, 
the general law of diminishing marginal utility can not be applied to money 
as an economic good.911 
Furthermore, grave doubts exist as to whether the assumption is correct 
that a strict separation of allocational from distributional aspects is possl-
ble.99 For one thing, any change towards allocative optimality has distribu-
tive effects, in the same way that any change in individuals' incomes will 
affect resource allocation. Besides, income redistribution will create external 
effects biasing allocation for nonmaterial reasons (e.g., leisure time). Unless 
the distributional effects of allocative improvements can be discovered, cau-
tiousness in recommendations should be the rationale. 100 Secondly, the redl-
97 Cf. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Polley After Chicago, supra, 236, and 237: "If 
the policy maker decided that monopoly wealth transfers do affect 
welfare and that the antitrust laws are as good a legislative mechanism 
as any to deal with this problem, he would find plenty of economic 
argument - also supported by unprovable premises - to back him up"; 
cf. Posner, Richard A., The Economics of Justice, Chicago 1981, pp. 48-
95, defending the assumption. 
The conclusions drawn from the assumption that interpersonal utility 
comparisons are unfeasible differ, however. This does not necessarily 
mean that a dollar Is worth the same to everyone, cf. Markovlts, A Basis 
Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis ... , supra, 987; recent scho-
larship has argued that Interpersonal welfare comparisons are possible 
and that the discussion between the ordlnalists and the so-called 
material welfare school about the comparability of utility was a semantic 
misunderstanding, cf., e.g., Cooter, Robert, and Peter Rappoport, Were 
the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 JEL (1984), pp. 507-
530. 
98 Mansfield, Microeconomics ... , op. cit., 52: "This law states that, as a 
person consumes more and more of a given commodity (the consumption 
of other commodities being held constant), the marginal utility of the 
commodity eventually will tend to decline.", italics In original. 
99 Cf. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly ... , op. cit., 15-17, holding that a 
resource allocation can only be Judged efficient or Inefficient given the 
distribution of Income; Horwitz, Law and Economics ... , supra, 906; 
Markovits, A Basis Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis ... , supra, 
977, 983, and 1071; Mishan, The Folklore of the Market ... , op. cit., 102; 
Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product ... , supra, 
1669, and 1677-1679. 
100 Cf. Markovits, A Basis Structure for Microeconomic Polley Analysis ... , 
supra, 977; and Mlshan, The Folklore of the Market ... , op. cit., 103 f. In 
an empirical cost-benefit study of horizontal merger enforcement it Is 
emphasized, for instance, that "(t)he number of economically efficient 
cases based on (antitrust) benefits depends upon the normative valuati-
on of a dollar redistributed. If the distributive effect is highly valuated, 
almost all of the cases represented a net economic gain", Audretsch, 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, op. cit., 79. 
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stribution of factor endowments is costly, so efficiency has to be traded for 
equity anyhow. Therefore, there can be no prediction of a policy's effect on 
allocative efficiency if its impact on the distribution of Income is dlsregar-
ded.101 
III. Impediments to New Competition 
The workability of the market mechanism under competitive pressure can be 
seen in terms of the realization of its basic functions: coordination, infor-
mation, and allocation. Not only interaction among competitors already in the 
market (Incumbents) is responsible for sufficient competitive pressure. There 
is a further conditioning factor strongly influencing the extent of competi-
tive pressure: that is, whether or not the market allows free entry and exit 
by potential oompetltors, i.e. competitors which are not in the market yet. 
Only if there is sufficient potential competition can profit and loss expec-
tations properly provide incentives and thus make for an effective level of 
competition. In other words, prevailing conditions must allow a sufficient 
number of competitors to participate in the market to perform a given set of 
predefined economic functions. 
In the following section we will therefore perform an analysis of Impediments 
to new competition paying particular attention to the following questions: 
- whether and how Impediments to new competition restrict the occurrence 
of entry (do they exist at all?); 
- how important such Impediments to new competition are (to what extent do 
they actually deter new competition?); 
- should public policy deal with Impediments to new competition (should fin-
dings be Integrated Into public policy when industry concentration is eva-
luated?). 
101 Cf. Markovits, A Basis Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis ... , 
supra, 1071, who asserts that the assumption that the effect of a policy 
on allocative efficiency will not depend on Its Impact on the distribution 
of income is only correct In a Pareto optimal world, and concludes that 
policies that tend to redistribute income may tend to increase allocative 
efficiency. 
Cf. as well Mishan, The Folklore of the Market ••• , op. cit., 108-110, hol-
ding that in situations of conflict a just distribution has a stronger 
'ethical appeal'. 
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The current theoretical discussion provides a detailed treatment of what are 
called "structural" impediments to new competition. On the other hand, stra-
tegic impediments are only treated summarically. We will attach particular 
importance to this procedure in the following. 
1. Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Potential Competition 
The impact of potential competitors on the intensity of competition within a 
market has largely been neglected by traditional microeconomic theory. 
Either totally free access was assumed or access to the market was conside-
red completely blocked. The question of access to a market was essentially 
considered Irrelevant since in atomistic industries market forces would lead 
to price adjustments, automatically determining long-run equilibrium market 
prices. An attempt to charge higher prices would lead to the attraction of 
entry which, in turn, would restore competitive performance. Therefore, in 
perfectly competitive industries an individual seller would believe the Influ-
ence of his price or output adjustments on entry to be negllglble. 1 Free 
entry in this sense would preclude the persistence of monopoly profits and 
persistent Industrial concentration would reflect nothing but efficiency. If 
impediments to new competition were negligible, even pure monopoly would 
have little market power.2 
Within the context of oligopoly analysis, impediments to potential competition 
were diagnosed that shielded supracompetitive profits from erosion. It was 
held that incumbent firms were only able to raise prices above the level of 
minimum average costs collectively if circumstances existed which would 
Cf. Areeda, Phillip, and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles and Their Application, vol. 2, Boston and Toronto 1978, 
pp. 298 f.; and Bain, Joe S., and P. David Qualls, Industrial Organization: 
A Treatise, Part A, Greenwich and London 1987, p. 236: "Theory thus 
offers no very striking hypothesis concerning the effect of the condition 
of entry on pricing in atomistic industries." 
2 Cf. Koch, James V., Industrial Organization and Prices, 2nd ed., Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., 1980, p. 95; and Shepherd, WIiiiam G., The Ecomomics of Indus-
trial Organization, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1985, p. 28. 
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deter the entry of potential competitors. 3 The underlying rationale was that 
the extent of pricing discretion exercised by incumbent firms depended on 
how easy it would be for potential competitors to enter a market. Conditions 
of entry, therefore, became a crucial structural variable in addition to the 
number of competitors, and the degree of Industry concentration, in deter-
mining market conduct. Each industry can be characterized by conditions to 
entry, these conditions being equivalent to the extent of potential competi-
tion the industry has to face from new competitors.• 
The crucial question remains, therefore, as to what extent potential competi-
tors are impeded in entering the market, since only if such impediments 
exist, can supracompetitive profits be a proxy for market power at all. 
Since there is no consensus in economic literature at all about whether im-
pediments to new competition exist and if so, what actually constitutes such 
a 'barrier to entry', as Joe S. Bain has termed the phenomenon, a closer 
look at the meaning and definition of barriers to entry seems appropriate at 
this point.5 
2. The Meaning, Definition, and Importance of Barriers to New Competition 
Current differences In evaluating barriers to new competition stem from the 
lack of consensus on the question of what actually constitutes a barrier to 
new competition. As there is no indisputable definition of the phenomenon, it 
is obvious that the concept should carry different meanings for different 
3 Cf. Asch, Peter, Industrial Organization and Antitrust Policy, rev. ed., New 
York et al. 1983, p. 160; Bain, Joe S., Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 
39 AER (1949), pp. 446-464; Mansfield, Microeconomics ... , op. cit., 351 f.; 
and Bain, Joe S., Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration, Ameri-
can Manufacturing, 1936-1940, QJE (1951 ), pp. 293-324, 294: " ... the ave-
rage profit rate of firms in oligopolistic Industries of a high concentration 
will tend to be significantly larger than that of firms in less concentrated 
oligopolies or in industries of atomistic structure." 
4 Cf. Asch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 134; and Yip, George S., 
Barriers to Entry, Lexington, Mass. 1982. For some early of the numerous 
empirical confirmations cf., e.g., Bain, Joe S., Relation of Profit Rate to 
Industry Concentration ... , supra; idem, Barriers to New Competition, Cam-
bridge, Mass. 1956; and Mann, H. Michael, Seller Concentration, Barriers to 
Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries, 1950-1960, 48 RES (1966), 
pp. 296-327. 
5 We will henceforth use the term 'impediments to new competition' to inclu-
de both barriers to entry and barriers to exit, regardless of the actual 
kind, unless we refer to other approaches explicitly. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
153 
economists. So in part, the Issue is a definitional one.8 The disagreement is 
further complicated by the fact that there is no consensus over what entry 
really is. For the purpose of our discussion, entry will be understood as 
meaning the occurrence of new capacity by a firm which did not supply 
products to the relevant market, regardless of whether this is considered a 
de novo entry or an entry by a firm already established in markets other 
than the one In question.7 
Among the economists who accept the notion of barriers to new competition, 
three distinct approaches can be discerned under which all other attempts 
to define barriers to entry can be subsumed. 
The most commonly used definition Is the one proposed by Joe S. Bain who 
introduced the concept of barriers to new competition into the economic lite-
rature. In his view a barrier to entry is any advantage held by existing 
firms over those firms that are potential producers in a market. The amount 
by which the incumbent firms can persistently raise their prices above the 
competitive level without attracting new entry into that market is viewed as 
an adequate proxy.8 This definition is also a measure for the effectiveness 
of potential competition. However, It encompasses only those circumstances 
6 Cf. Demsetz, Harold, Barriers to Entry, 72 AER (1982), pp. 47-57, 47; Koch, 
James V., Industrial Organization and Prices, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1980, pp. 95 f. ; Posner, Richard A., The Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, 127 UPLR (1979), pp. 925-952, 946: "Once 'barriers to entry' was 
redefined as a differentially higher cost borne by the new entrant, the 
plausibility of supposing that barriers to entry are common, or commonly 
substantial, diminished sharply."; Waterson, Michael, On the Definition and 
Meaning of Barriers to Entry, 26 AB (1981 ), pp. 521-539, 522. 
7 For slightly different views cf. Needham, Douglas, The Economics of Indus-
trial Structure, Conduct and Performance, London et al. 1978, p. 159; and 
Shepherd, William G., The Treatment of Market Power: Antitrust, Regulati-
on, and Public Enterprise, New York and London 1975, p. 101. 
8 Cf. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 3-5, who differentiates bet-
ween three kinds of barriers to entry: (1) economies of large scale, (2) 
product differentiation advantages, and (3) absolute cost advantages; cf as 
well Shepherd, The Ecomomlcs of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 54; and 
Bain/Qualls, Industrial Organization: A Treatise, Part A, op. cit., 22 f.: 
"The condition of entry to an Industry denotes roughly the advantages in 
terms of cost or selling price established firms have over potential ent-
rant firms. It may be measured by the degree to which established firms 
can persistently elevate their prices above minimal average or competitive 
costs without making it attractive for new firms to enter." 
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applying unlfonnly to all competltors.9 In this sense it can be viewed as an 
insider-outsider approach. 
A different approach is chosen by George J. Stigler who defines barriers to 
new competition "as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) 
which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not 
borne by firms already In the industry". 10 This approach is contrary to the 
one chosen by Bain in that it primarily refers to costs and not to prices, 
and explicitly excludes economies of scale as a barrier to new competition. 
This is because in 5tigler's view such a factor has to be faced by all 
potential entrants.11 
Yet another approach for an evaluation of barriers to new competition is 
presented by Carl-Christian von Weizsiicker, who classifies potential entry 
deterring factors according to whether or not they are socially desirable. 
Entry to a particular market is considered as "socially desirable" if it 
increases the sum of producer's surplus and consumer's surplus (so-called 
social surplus); If this kind of access to a market is blocked, a barrier to 
entry is held to obtain. For the case of a monopoly, the social surplus as a 
measure of welfare can be presented as follows: 12 
9 Cf. Koch, Industrial Organization and Prices, op. cit., 97; a similar 
approach is chosen by Ferguson, James M., Advertising and Competition: 
Theory, Measurement, Fact, Cambridge, Mass. 1974, p. 10, who defines 
barriers as "factors that make entry unprofitable while permitting estab-
lished firms to set prices above marginal cost, and to persistently earn 
monopoly return.", empasizlng marginal cost as the criterion of reference. 
10 Stigler, George J., The Organization of Industry, Homewood, Ill. 1968, p. 
67. Baumol, William J., and Robert E. Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, 
Entry Barriers, Public Goods and the Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 QJE 
(1981 ), pp. 405-432, 408, who choose a very similar definition. 
11 Cf. Koch, Industrial Organization and Prices, op. cit., 96. This is a clear 
departure from the insider-outsider concept which Bain used and which 
has been criticized for not including certain kinds of barriers; cf. Dem-
setz, Barriers to Entry, supra, 48, who mentions legal barriers to new 
competition. 
12 Fixed costs are excluded and constant returns to scale are assumed that 
are approximated by the marginal cost curve. 
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The figure shows that the social surplus is maximized If price equals margi-
nal costs (area ADE). 
In von Weizsiicker's terms, therefore, only socially undesirable limitations 
impeding the entry of resources and which are also due to the protection of 
resource owners already in the market, are considered to be real barriers to 
new competition. 13 
In the view presented in the contribution submitted, Impediments to new 
competition would be taken to encompass those factors which: 
- enable incumbent firms to shield themselves against the pressures from 
potential competition, and/or 
- reduce expectations about potential profits by forcing costs on potential 
entrants formerly not borne by the incumbents. 14 
The actual advantage of this definition can be seen in the fact that it does 
not exclude factors which, although impeding competitive pressure, are not 
generally recognized as doing so, simply because they are positively asso-
ciated with economic efficiency. In this connection it Is crucially important 
to realize that certain factors such as economies of scale, while undoubtedly 
documenting efficiency but, nonetheless act as barriers to entry in the 
13 Cf. Welzsii.cker, Carl-Christian von, Barriers to Entry: A Theoretical Treat-
ment, Berlin et al. 1980, p. 13; and idem, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to 
Entry, 11 BJE (1980), pp. 399-421. Similar reflections on barriers to new 
competition are performed by Waterson, On the Definition ..• , supra, 536-
539, who pleads for a reservation of the term barriers to entry for asym-
metries in entry conditions to which a pejorative label may be attached. 
14 Cf. similarly Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 69. 
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sense that they shield incumbent firms from potential competition. 
This view diverges considerably from the currently very influential Chicago 
School theory. Scholars of the latter theoretical approach admittedly take no 
homogeneous strand on the phenomenon. But in general it can be said that 
they either deny that barriers to new competition are an important structu-
ral factor, or they treat such barriers as being of minor importance in 
determining competitive conduct and hence disregard them. Thus factors of 
impediment focused on in the traditional approach associated with the 
Harvard School are dismissed by the supporters of the current theoretical 
tenet: 15 
"Alleged barriers to entry such as advertising, vertical integration, and 
capital requirements all fall into the class of competitive tactics more 
likely to be associated with productive rivalry than unproductive mono-
pollzatlon ... (t)he current flurry of concern over such 'barriers to 
entry' reflects the poor guidance that Is too often offered to anti-
trusters by economists." 
Different positions towards the notion of barriers to new competition can be 
highlighted if one analyzes how particular definitions affect what is to be 
considered as the source of a barrier in the first place. 
Certainly, some qualifications are necessary to the assertion that meaningful 
barriers do not exist at all. For instance, there is far-reaching consensus 
that the control of a scarce input into the production process by a compe-
titor constitutes such a barrler. 18 According to Demsetz11 a monopoly Is - in 
15 Demsetz, Harold, Economics as a Gulde to Antitrust Regulation, 19 JLE 
(1976), pp. 371-388, 382; Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly, op. cit., 36-
39, being an adherent to the Nao-Austrian School; Brozen, Yale, Barriers 
facilitate entry, AB (1969), pp. 851-854; Idem, Competition, Efficiency, and 
Antitrust, in: Brozen, Yale (ed.), The Competitive Economy: Selected Rea-
dings, Morristown, N.J. 1975, pp. 6-14, 9; Pepperell, Harold C., and Robert 
W. Turner, Barriers to Entry: Antitrust's Search for a New Look, 23 CMR 
(1981), pp. 29-40; cf. as well WIiiiamson, Oliver E., Symposium on Antitrust 
Law and Economics, 127 UPLR (1979) 918-924, 919, who points out critical-
ly that "(t)he strong version of the Chicago position asserts that mean-
ingful entry barriers do not exist." 
16 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., 299 ("control over an 
essential or superior resource, such as a raw material or entrepreneurial 
genius"); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, supra, 947; 
Demsetz, Economics as a Guide •.. , supra, 381 f. 
17 Cf. Demsetz, Economics as a Gulde ... , supra, 381 f. For some examples cf. 
Greer, Industrial Organization and Public Policy, op. cit., 161 f. 
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contrast to the way the concept is defined in neoclassical price theory - not 
characterized by the fact that it controls the whole supply in a relevant 
market, but by the dominant position it has due to its control over certain 
resources. Demsetz argues that such a position can be achieved by the con-
trol of high-grade raw materials (for instance the acquisition of 90 % of 
high-grade ore mines by U.S. Steel in the U.S.A.), of patents, of an efficient 
team of people or of an efficient method of organizing experts in a team. 
Such resources all share the characteristic that they make it difficult for 
competitors who do not have them at their disposal to Imitate those who do. 
According to Kirzner, the classic case of a monopolistic producer has no 
practical Importance; only if the monopolistic producer is also the owner of 
resources is there a real monopoly. 18 
If a monopolist is the sole owner of resources, grave consequences for pro-
duction are conceded. However, the assumption is that such a control is rare 
and in the long run the market process will take care of the elimination or 
substantial reduction of the dominating position, so that there is no need 
for antitrust policy. Besides, the creation of a resource monopoly is regar-
ded as a source of productivity. In his evaluation of the trade-off between 
productivity and market dominance, Demsetz comes to the conclusion that if 
one balances the aquisltion of a dominant position in the control of a scarce 
input with the increase in productivity, the danger of penalizing such an 
Increase In productivity is large and the Ii kell hood of reducing unproductive 
sources of market dominance is small. 19 
Bork believes that the only question for antitrust policy is whether artificial 
barriers to entry exist. Impediments of this kind are seen, for example In 
exclusionary practices and predation. They "must be barriers that are not 
forms of superior efficiency and which yet prevent the forces of the market 
... from operating to erode market positions not based on efficiency".20 How-
ever, this kind of 'blocklng' action Is regarded as very unllkely to occur 
18 Cf. Klrzner, Israel M., Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago 1973, p. 
22, although Kirzner is considered a (Neo-) Austrian scholar. 
19 Cf. Demsetz, Economics as a Guide ... , supra, 382. 
20 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox •.• , op. cit., 311 and 328 f. as well. This can 
be termed 'strategic behavior'. 
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since such unilateral action would be detrimental to the firm undertaking 
it.21 
It is also disputed that a risk premium which has to be paid by newcomers 
as an expression of a higher risk for losses constitutes a barrier to 
entry.22 
In summary, this approach holds that certain barriers to new competition do 
exist - though these are different from the ones presented by Bain. How-
ever, they are not important factors impeding potential competitors. 
Before inquiring further into the kinds of barriers and their sources, we 
will take a brief look at the methods of measuring such barriers. 
3. The Measurement of Barriers to New Competition 
Differing definitional approaches make it difficult to find a common basis for 
the measurement of barriers to new competition. Whereas a qualitative evalu-
ation might be feasible, a reduction of the obstacles Impeding the measure-
ment of barriers is considered a difficult undertaklng. 23 
The main point of departure has been the attempt to capture the effects of 
different barriers on competitive performance. Two general approaches in 
the attempt to measure barriers to new competition can be discerned. 24 On 
the one hand, there is the attempt to categorize possible individual barriers 
in each Industry by giving them labels such as high, medium, or low, and 
'"then subjectively deriving an overall barrier to the Industry as very high, 
21 In the case of such unilateral action the firm must be aware of an imme-
diate entry of newcomers because the lack of barriers would stimulate 
entry if the firm tried to abuse its monopolistic discretionary power. 
Such a conduct ""would be foolish and selfdefeatlng behavior"" and, there-
fore, unlikely, cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit, 144 f., 153, 160, 
and 309. 
22 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., 299 ("'capital market 
evaluations imposing higher capital costs on new entrants than on estab-
lished firms'"), Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, supra, 
945 f.; and Williamson, Oliver E., Book Review, 83 YLJ (1974), pp. 647-661, 
656: '"The uncertainty of the new entrant's prospects may force him to 
pay a higher risk premium to obtain capital than existing firms must 
pay."" 
23 Cf., e.g., Asch, Industrial Organization .•• , op. cit., 138. 
24 Cf. Asch, Industrial Organization .•• , op. cit., 138; Needham, The Economics 
of Industrial Structure ... , op. cit., 172-183; Shepherd, The Ecomomics of 
Industrial Organization, op. cit., 72. 
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substantial or moderate-to-low" .25 
On the other hand, there is the attempt to find measurable proxies for the 
barriers to be analyzed such as, e.g., price/cost margins. These proxies pre-
suppose a close correlation to the height of the barrier in question. The 
effect of the barriers is estimated by inserting the different proxies 
separately into a regression equation and thereby quantifying their effects 
on barriers to a market. 28 
There are different proxies to measure barriers to new competition. The most 
common ones are price and profitability proxies which measure the extent of 
deviation of elevated prices from total average costs or marginal costs In 
the situation of facing entry.27 The underlying rationale is that high bar-
riers ceterls paribus imply that incumbent firms can use the price parameter 
more freely and perform an optimal pricing policy, depending on the height 
of the barrier, by raising prices above the competitive level.28 
The most common nonprice proxies that are believed to create barriers to 
new competition are advertising expenditures and R&D expenditures.29 The 
underlying rationale for the measurement is that advertising, R&D, and 
related non production activities can affect firms' cost conditions either by 
causing scale economies or by creating absolute cost advantages for incum-
bent firms in comparison to potential entrant firms, resulting in different 
cost situations. 30 
25 Waterson, On the Definition ... , supra, 521. 
26 Cf., e.g., Comanor, William S., and Thomas A. Wilson, Advertising, Market 
Structure and Performance, 49 RES (1967), pp. 423-458; or Schwalbach, 
Joachim, Markteintrlttsverhalten industrleller Unternehmen, 56 ZfB (1986), 
pp. 713-727; cf. as well Waterson, On the Definition ... , supra, 522. 
27 Cf. Asch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 138; Koch, Industrial Organi-
zation and Prices, op. cit., 101 f.; Needham, The Economics of Industrial 
Structure ... , op. cit., 172-175; and for the most Important empirical stu-
dies, George, Kenneth D., Concentration, Barriers to Entry and Rates of 
Return, 50 RES (1968), pp. 273-275; Qualls, P. David, Concentration, Bar-
riers to Entry, and Long-Run Economic Profit Margins, 20 JIE (1972), pp. 
146-158; Mann, Seller Concentration •.. , supra; and Rhoades, Stephen A., 
The Effect of Diversification on Industry Profit Performance in 214 Manu-
facturing Industries: 1963, 55 RES (1973), pp. 146-164. 
28 Cf. Asch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 138. 
29 For a survey cf. Needham, Douglas, Entry Barriers and Non-Price Aspects 
of Firms' Behavior, 25 JIE (1976), pp. 29-43. 
30 Cf. Needham, The Economics of Industrial Structure .•• , op. cit., 175; for 
an empirical study cf., e.g., Mueller, Dennis C., and J.E. Tilton, R&D Costs 
as Barriers to Entry, CJE (1969), pp. 570-579. 
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4. Kinds of Barriers to New Competition and their Sources: Plauslblllty and 
Empirical Evidence 
The most common classification of barriers to new competition was introduced 
by the works of Joe S. Bain and differentiates between economies of large 
scale, absolute cost advantages, and product differentiation advantages. 31 
These original structural barriers can be complemented by certain factors 
that are barriers to exit from a market but, at the same time, deter entry to 
it as well. This can be the case since a potential competitor facing entry to 
a market might eventually not enter this market despite low entry barriers 
if this market has specific structural features (e.g., idiosyncratic capital) 
which make exit from the market difficult and prospects for earning ade-
quate rents not promising. 32 
These structural barriers are compounded infra by strategic barriers, that 
is, impediments raised by Incumbents through conduct, in order to deter 
entry by newcomers and maintain competitive advantages. They include stra-
tegies like limit pricing, use of excess capacity, credible threats by sunk 
costs, and the like. Strategic barriers are erected in order to reduce the 
attractiveness of the offer the incumbent has to compete against. Structural 
and strategic barriers are Interrelated, however.33 
a. Structural Barriers 
These barriers, as the term implies, are associated specifically with the 
structural dimensions of the market.34 
31 Cf. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 3-5; and Bain/Qualls, 
Industrial Organization: A Treatise, Part A, op. cit., 221. 
32 Cf. Caves, Richard E., and Michael E. Porter, Barriers to Exit, in: Masson, 
Robert T, and P. David Qualls (eds.), Essays on Industrial Organization in 
Honor of Joe S. Bain, Cambridge, Mass. 1976, pp. 39-69; Eaton, 8. Curtis, 
and Richard G. Lipsey, Exit barriers are entry barriers: The durability of 
capital, 11 BJE (1980), pp. 721-729; Franklin, Peter J., Some Observations 
on Exit from the Motor Insurance Industry, 1966-1972, 22 JIE (1974), pp. 
299-313; and Sch wal bach, Marktei ntrittsverhalten ind ustriel ler Unterneh-
men, supra, 716 f. 
33 Cf. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Polley After Chicago, supra, 260-283; Markovits, 
Richard, The Limits of Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easter-
brook, 63 TLR (1984), pp. 41-87, 44; Schwalbach, Markteintrittsverhalten 
industrleller Unternehmen, supra, 716. 
34 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 69; and Schwal-
bach, Markteintrittsverhalten industrleller Unternehmen, supra, 714. 
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aa. Economies of Large Scale 
The underlying question is whether scale economies serve as proxy variables 
for market power which allow price above average costs for lengthy periods 
and if so whether they should therefore be considered barriers to entry.35 
In this context, economies of scale present "'reductions in cost per unit of 
product manufactured and sold associated with the operation of large as 
compared to small production, distribution, and merchandising entlties"'. 311 
Scale economies are primarily encountered in production but can also be of 
importance In administration, distribution, and marketing. With regard to the 
production process, they are assumed to approximately equal to the long-run 
average cost curve. 
Real economies and pecuniary economies can be distinguished. Whereas real 
or technical economies entail fewer inputs for a distinct level of output and, 
therefore, fewer of society's scarce resources are used in the production 
and distribution process, pecuniary economies are monetary savings resul-
ting from purchasing goods at better terms. The latter include, e.g., volume 
discounts.37 
Resulting economies of the real kind can have several sources. Among these, 
the most important are:311 
- lndlvlslbllltles of machinery and labor, leading to costs independent of 
scale, or to fixed costs over certain levels of output; 
35 Cf. Waterson, On the Definition ... , supra, 531. 
36 Scherer, Frederic M., Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in: 
Goldschmld, Harvey, et al. (eds.), Industrial Concentration: The New Lear-
ning, Boston, Toronto 1974, pp. 16-54. Note that "'(t)he decline in unit 
costs with increases in the scale of plant or firm will ordinarily tend to 
be encountered over a certain limited range of increasing scales of plant 
or firm, and then cease to be encountered If the scales of plant or fl rm 
are increased still further"', Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 
53. 
37 Cf. Greer, Douglas F., Industrial Organization and Public Policy, 2nd ed., 
New York 1984, pp. 135 f., and 158; and for an extensive survey, Koutso-
ylannls, Anna, Modern Microeconomics, 2nd ed., 2nd repr., London et al. 
1981, pp. 126-139. 
38 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization and Public Policy, op. cit., 162 f., and 
167-169; Koutsoylannis, Modern Microeconomics, op. cit., 126-138; MUiier, 
Jurgen, and Rolf Hochrelter, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen der Kon-
zentration In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Gottingen 1975, pp. 143 ff.; 
and Scherer, Frederic M., Industrial market structure and economic per-
formance, second ed., Chicago 1980, pp. 82 f. 
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- specialization of machinery and labor, leading to increased productivity; 
- economies of Increased dimensions, occuring if there Is an investment In 
capital equipment such as, e.g., tanks or vessels, and the volume capacity 
becomes overproportionate in relation to the equipment's surface and, 
therefore, costs (so-called 0.6 rule). 
- economies of massed reserves, due to spare machinery and parts which 
have to be held in stock and which amount to a lower percentage of total 
costs if production is on a large scale. 
The reasoning why economies of large scale represent barriers to new com-
petition runs along the following lines.39 Assuming production with increa-
sing returns, potential entrants will have to produce close to minimum effi-
cient size and, therefore, ad hoc with relatively large capacity in industries 
In which efficient output is already relatively large in comparison to overall 
industry demand. Otherwise the product's price might - if producing at less 
than minimum efficient scale - eventually fall below the potential entrant's 
costs per unit after entry, making it impossible for him to cover his total 
costs. 40 
So the entry-deterring effect results primarily from the first-mover advan-
tage of Incumbent firms producing at minimum efficient size. Hence, a crucial 
criterion for the distinction of whether or not economies constitute a barrier 
is the question of how large the fraction constituting the minimum efficient 
size is, relative to total industry demand (so-called percentage effect).41 
If It is hence assumed that low scale entry entails significant cost disadvan-
tages per unit, then if the newcomer wants to enter at large scale this con-
stitutes the so-called absolute-capital-requirement effect, making It neces-
sary for the potential competitor to raise significant amounts of capital. If It 
is either more difficult for the newcomer to raise this capital or he can only 
39 Cf. Bain/Qualls, Industrial Organization: A Treatise, Part A, op. cit., 230-
235; Greer, Industrial Organization and Public Policy, op. cit., 156-158, 
and 162 f.; Mansfield, Microeconomics ... , op. cit., 352; Schwalbach, Markt-
eintrlttsverhalten industrieller Unternehmen, supra, 715; and Waterson, On 
the Definition ... , supra, 538 f. 
40 This is true anyway in the sense that selling price will be lowered by 
incumbents and held below the limit price in order to deter entry. This 
is additional to the possible entry deterring effect due to small scale 
production, cf. Bain/Qualls, Industrial Organization: A Treatise, Part A, 
op. cit., 230. 
41 Cf. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 55. 
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raise it at somewhat worse conditions, a barrier is constituted. 42 An additio-
nal criterion, therefore, is whether or not these disadvantages are signifi-
cant. 
The current approach emphasizes that economies of scale are a product of 
efficient industry structures and do not constitute barriers to new competi-
tion as a consequence. 43 Economies of large scale production advantages of 
incumbents over potential entrant firms are regarded as natural barriers to 
entry.44 The underlying rationale for this view mainly relies on the asser-
tion that the studies confirming a positive correlation between concentration 
and profits, which serve as a proxy for barriers due to economies, are 
based on false methodology and data, and therefore fail to deliver a theore-
tical basis for the concentration-collusion doctrine. Free access to markets 
exists and hence economies have to be interpreted as efficiencies. 45 
This point of view neglects the fact, however, that economies of scale can 
play a dual role. For one thing, they represent efficiencies and hence a 
42 Cf. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 55. 
43 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., 299 f.; Demsetz, 
Harold, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 JLE (1968), pp. 55-65; McGee, John, 
Efficiency and Economies of Size, in: Goldschmid, Harvey, et al. (eds.), 
Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, Boston, Toronto 1974, pp. 55-
97, 93, neglecting barriers to entry by holding that "the existing struc-
ture of industry is the efficient structure"; Miller, Edward M., Do econo-
mies of scale attract entry?, 25 AB (1980), pp. 583-588, 584; Stigler, The 
Organization of Industry, op. cit., 67. 
44 According to Bork natural barriers to entry exist, "(w)hen existing firms 
are efficient and possess valuable plants, equipment, knowledge, skill, 
and reputation. (Therefore,) potential entrants will find it corresponding-
ly more difficult to enter the industry, since they must acquire those 
things.", Bork, The Antitrust Paradox ... , op. cit., 310 f. For a more dis-
tinguished view on the issue, cf. Williamson, Oliver E., Antitrust Econo-
mics: Mergers, Contracting, and Strategic Behavior, Oxford and New York 
1987, p. 325. 
45 Cf. Brozen, Yale, Bain's Concentration and Rates of Return Revisited, 14 
JLE (1971 ), pp. 351-369; and Demsetz, Harold, Two Systems of Belief About 
Monopoly, in: Goldschmld, Harvey, et al. (eds.), Industrial Concentration: 
The New Learning, Boston, Toronto 1974, pp. 164-184, esp. 173: "The lack 
of a theoretical justification for identifying certain types of expenditures 
as 'barriers to entry' is even more glaring than is the lack of a theoreti-
cal basis for the market concentration doctrine ... (t)he costliness of pro-
ducing commodities does, of course, limit the amounts that will be made 
available at particular prices; in this sense cost does create a 'barrier' to 
production, but no pejorative interpretation can be given to such a 
'barrier to entry'." We will give the market concentration doctrine (con-
centration-collusion doctrine) an indepth treatment in Part 3 of this con-
tribution. 
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factor "not usually regarded as incompatible with what most economists call 
free entry", whereas, on the other hand "In a very real sense they consti-
tute a barrier to entry". 48 The question of the impact of these barriers 
becomes in fact an issue of trade-off. 
bb. Absolute Cost Advantages 
According to the traditional tenet a barrier to new competition is created if 
potential competitors have to bear costs when entering the market that are 
independent of scale and which incumbent firms did not or do not have to 
bear. This would lead to production at lower costs and optimal pricing by 
incumbent firms, setting a limit price marginally below the long-run average 
cost curve of the potential competitor, thereby deterring entry.47 
The lower costs are independent of scale In that "(a)n absolute cost advan-
tage exists if the prospective unit costs of production of potential entrant 
firms are generally, and more or less at any common scale of operations, 
higher than those of established firms". 48 
Under the current tenet this barrier to new competition is judged to be 
nonexistent or insignificant, also because this kind of natural barrier is 
considered to result from differential efflciencies.49 
The principal and most important sources of absolute cost advantages may 
be briefly categorized as follows:!50 
- access of incumbent firms to superior production techniques protected by 
patents; 
46 Dewey, Donald, Industrial Concentration and the Rate of Profit: Some Neg-
lected Theory, 19 JLE (1976), pp. 67-78, 69. 
47 Cf. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 144 and 260; Bain/Qualls, 
Industrial Organization: A Treatise, Part A, op. cit., 235 f; Greer, Indu-
strial Organization and Public Policy, op. cit., 155 f., and 161 f. for exam-
ples; Porter, Michael, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining 
Superior Performance, New York, London 1985, pp. 62-118. 
48 Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 144; cf. as well Koutsoyiannis, 
Modern Microeconomics, op. cit., 292. 
49 Cf., e.g., Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., 305 ; and Bork, 
Robert H., Vertical Integration and Competitive Processes, in: Weston, J. 
Fred, and Sam Peltzman (eds.), Public Policies Toward Mergers, Pacific 
Palisades 1969, pp. 139-149. 
50 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., 305 f; Bain, Barriers 
to New Competition, op. cit., 144 f.; cf. as well Koutsoyiannis, Modern 
Microeconomics, op. cit., 292; Schwalbach, Markteintrittsverhalten indu-
strleller Unternehmen, supra, 715. 
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- control of or lower prices for key raw materials accruing to incumbent 
firms in comparison to potential entrant firms; 
- lower 006ts of capltal for the incumbent firms due to abilities in Internal 
financing, prefered access to capital markets, or favorable terms; 
- lower prices for productive factors (as, e.g., skilled personell) accruing to 
the incumbent firms due to market imperfections. 
We will put our emphasis firstly on the absolute height of capital require-
ments as a barrier in ltself51 and, secondly, on the issue of differences in 
capital costs for potential entrant firms in comparison to incumbents, and, 
thirdly on capital market Imperfections. Patent protection, which might lead 
to cost differences, will be treated infra under the heading of legal and 
administrative barriers, and potential differences in absolute costs due to 
resource monopolization have been dealt with supra. 
There is no consensus on whether large absolute capital requirements pose 
an entry barrier to a market in themselves. On the one hand this depends 
on whether one defines a barrier as Including only conditions which have to 
be faced by all competitors. It is obvious that absolute capital requirements 
reflect a condition affecting any potential entrant firm. On the other hand, 
it depends on the definition of entry. For a large firm entering the market 
it might be possible to raise exorbitant sums of capital, whereas de novo 
entrants might not be capable of doing this. 52 Empirical evidence suggests, 
however, that there are markets, which can only be entered with the help of 
prohibitive sums of capital. In this case, entry would be totally blocked.53 
Differences in capital costs are attributable to higher risks of failure on the 
part of potential entrant firms, requmng a higher potential return on inve-
sted capital. Furthermore, they are attributable to information costs for 
51 Cf., e.g., Lenel, Hans 0., Ursachen der Konzentration, 2nd ed., Tubingen 
1968, pp. 244 f. 
52 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization and Public Polley, op. cit., 158 f. 
53 It is assumed that entry Into the German automobile market requires in-
vestment capital of roughly DM 10 billion, cf. Berg, Hartmut, Automobllin-
dustrie, in: Oberender, Peter (ed.), Marktstruktur und Wettbewerb, Mun-
chen 1984, pp. 169-215, 185. Other estimates contend that capital require-
ments in Industries like main-frame computer manufacturing are prohibi-
tive for even the largest firms, cf. Fruhan, William E., Phyrric Victories 
in Fights for Market Share, 50 HBR (1972), pp. 100-107. 
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potential Investors disadvantaging potential entrant firms since it is more 
costly for investors to verify or falsify information.54 Finally, these diffe-
rences can be attributable to capital market imperfections which mean "that 
a fully qualified borrower cannot obtain (or must pay higher prices for) the 
capital he wants".55 
However, the current approach holds that capital market imperfections are 
not existent. Williamson notes that this argument and related ones are only 
valid if costless market transactions regarding capital flows are assumed. It 
is all the necessary information on the respective borrower that makes 
investment funds more costly or less.58 Hence, a distinct tendency can be 
confirmed that "(t)he price of capital is usually lower to larger firms, espe-
cially to those that hold secure market positions. This is shown by cross-
market surveys of loan costs by size of firms, and by more precise stu-
dies'".57 
The difference between diversifying entrants and de novo entrants which we 
have stated with regard to absolute capital requirements applies similarly. 
Another argument that supports the imperfect capital market hypothesis is 
that the management of banks has a sort of self-interest in giving prefe-
rence to incumbent firms since due to experience based on history they can 
be evaluated more easily. The risk of losses on current loans would increase 
if competition was Intensified by newcomers. This leads to a sort of de facto 
cartel between incumbents and banks. 58 
54 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., 304; and Greer, 
Industrial Organization and Public Policy, op. cit., 169 f. 
55 Cf. Koch, Industrial Organization and Prices, op. cit., 137 (emphasis 
added). Cf. Bowman, Ward, Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Econo-
mic Appraisal, Chicago 1973, p. 59, who notes that "difficulties of access 
to the capital market ... (have) yet to be demonstrated." 
56 Cf. Williamson, Antitrust Economics ... , op. cit., 87 and 90. This is even 
conceded by adherents to the current tenet, cf. Demsetz, Barriers to Ent-
ry, supra, 50: "It is not large capital 'requirements', but the histories of 
successful firms, in a world in which information is costly to acquire, 
that constitute the source of such interest rate differentials." 
57 Shepherd, The Ecomomlcs of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 191. 
58 Cf. Dirrheimer, Manfred J., Marktkonzentration und Wettbewerbsverhalten 
von Unternehmungen, Frankfurt a.M., New York 1981, p. 274. 
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cc. Product Differentiation Advantages 
Products of incumbent suppliers are heterogeneous or differentiated to a 
varying degree in many markets. This means that the consumer has diffe-
rent preferences for different products, respectively, with regard to their 
actual features, the temporal aspect of their supply, or the regional availa-
bility of the product. The stronger the preferences, the stronger the sup-
plier's ability to raise prices above the competitive level without a total loss 
of sales and without inducing new entry. Such preferences do exist either 
for objective reasons because of technical and physical features or because 
of the way consumers subjectively regard the products in question. 59 
Product differentiation advantages are regarded as constituting a barrier to 
new competition in that consumers "have a preference, transitory or perma-
nent, for some or ail established products as compared to new-entrant pro-
ducts, and this may in essence erect some barriers to entry",eo The new-
comer would have to invest heavily in order to overcome the preferences 
and the consumer loyalty which are outflows of a first mover advantage 
when entering the market.51 
Product differentiation advantages result from a variety of sources:112 
59 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., 306. Product diffe-
rentiation in this sense can be seen as the "fact that different buyers 
have different product allegiances or preference patterns, so that the 
preferences in question do not result in some universally agreed-upon 
system of grading or rating for the competing products", Bain, Barriers 
to New Competition, op. cit., 114. 
60 Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 114; cf. as well Bain/Qualls, 
Industrial Organization: A Treatise, Part A, op. cit., 221. 
61 Cf. Bain, Joe S., Conditions of Entry and the Emergence of Monopoly, in: 
Chamberlin, Edward H. (ed.), Monopoly Competition and Their Regulation, 
London 1954, pp. 215-241, 224: "Product differentiation advantages of 
some or all established firms ... resulting for the potential entrant in a 
ceteris pari bus demand schedule at a lower position than those of estab-
lished firms with equivalent production and selling costs, or in higher 
costs to place its demand curve in the same position."; Comanor, William 
S., and Thomas A. Wilson, Advertising, Market Structure and Performance, 
49 RES (1967), pp. 423-440. 
62 Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 114; cf. as well Scherer, Indu-
strial market structure ... , op. cit., 375; Schwalbach, Markteintrittsver-
halten industrieller Unternehmen, supra, 715; and Yip, Barriers to Entry, 
op. cit., 18 f. 
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"Product differentiation is propagated by differences In the design or 
physical quality of competing products, by efforts of sellers to dis-
tinguish their products through packaging, branding, and the offering 
of auxiliary services to buyers, and by advertising and sales promotion 
efforts ..... 
With regard to its economic effects, product differentiation has to be consi-
dered ambiguous. It benefits consumers, on the one hand, by offering grea-
ter product variety according to Individual consumer taste. On the other 
hand, however, in the monopolistic competition market price exceeds marginal 
cost and output is produced at higher than minimum average cost which 
leads to resource misallocation and inefficiency.83 
Since the extent of product differentiation cannot be measured objectively 
along a commonly accepted scale, proxy variables are used which are suppo-
sed to be positively correlated to the extent of product differentiation. The 
most common proxies are based on ratios relating relevant quantities to the 
level of advertising expenditure.114 
There are two reasons why advertising expenditures should be regarded as 
a relevant quantity for measurement. Firstly, advertising is considered the 
main cause of product differentiation and is so used as a substitute for 
variables more difficult to measure, such as, the locational distribution of 
outlets, e.g. 
63 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., 307; and for the ori-
ginal source, Chamberlin, Edward H., The Theory of Monopolistic Competi-
tion, Cambridge, Mass. 1933. Note that if the reasoning of the current 
tenet is taken to Its logical extreme, these inefficiencies would have to be 
competed away. 
64 Cf. Comanor/Wilson, Advertising, ... , supra; Ferguson, Advertising and 
Competition ... , op. cit.; Needham, The Economics of Industrial Structure 
... , op. cit., 177; Shepherd, The Ecomomics of Industrial Organization, op. 
cit., 314-320, esp. 318; and Waterson, On the Definition ... , supra, 521 f. 
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Secondly, the size of advertising expenditures creates economies of scale or 
other advantages, serving in turn as barriers to new competition.e5 
Current theory Is shifting away from the view that product differentiation 
and, therefore, advertising expenditures should necessarily be thought of as 
a means for erecting barriers to new competition. Advertising is more or 
less seen as a means of entry due to its informational function, and is re-
garded as desirable, therefore.88 For adherents to current theory the real 
barrier to entry is high information costs for consumers and It Is precisely 
through advertising that such a barrier is surmounted. Information 
increases the consumer's willingness to substitute products for other ones, 
makes demand curves more elastic, and hence markets more competitive.87 
65 Cf. Needham, The Economics of Industrial Structure ... , op. cit., 177; 
Schmalensee, Richard, Advertising and Profitability: Further Implications 
of the Null Hypothesis, 25 JIE (1976), pp. 45-54; Shepherd, The Ecomomics 
of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 314-317. 
A variety of empirical studies have used this proceeding, cf. Berg, Hart-
mut, Produktdifferenzierung, Werbung und Wettbewerb: Der Zlgaretten-
markt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Bernbach, Gottfried, et al. 
(eds.), lndustrieokonomik: Theorie und Empirie, TUblngen 1985, pp. 283-
295; Comanor/Wilson, Advertising, ... , supra; Mongoven, James J., Adver-
tising as a Barrier to Entry: Structure and Performance In the Soft-Drink 
Industry, 8 ALER (1976), pp. 93-101; Porter, Michael E., Consumer Behavi-
or, Retailer Power and Market Performance in Consumer Goods Industries, 
56 RES (1974), pp. 419-435. 
66 Cf. Brozen, Competition, Efficiency, and Antitrust, op. cit., 9: "A new 
entrant can usually insinuate itself more easily into the market if its 
product Is not identical with those offered by established firms." 
Cf. for an analageous controversy on the function of advertising in com-
petition, cf. Hoppmann, Erich, Wettbewerb und Werbung, 33 WuW, (1983), 
pp. 776-779, and the rejoinder by Kantzenbach, Erhard, Zur wirtschaftli-
chen Beurteilung der Werbung, 34 WuW (1984), pp. 297-301, 298 f. For the 
differentiation between informative and persuasive advertisement, cf. 
Greer, Industrial Organization and Public Polley, op. cit., 71 ff.; and 
Shepherd, The Ecomomics of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 320 f. 
67 Brozen, Yale, Entry Barriers, Advertising, and Product Differentiation, in: 
Goldschmld, Harvey, et al. (eds.), Industrial Concentration: The New Lear-
ning, Boston, Toronto 1974, pp. 115-161, 115: "To any casual observer, it 
would seem that advertising Is a means of competing. Most importantly, 
advertising is much more means of entry than a barrier to entry." But 
see Nelson, however, who poses the question "what kind of Information 
'great balls of comfort' is meant to convey. Is It really information for me 
to know that 'If I'm out of Schlitz, I'm out of beer'?", Nelson, Richard L., 
Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 UPLR (1979), pp. 949-952, 950. 
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According to Posner, the rational consumer will pay for advertising only to 
the extent that his search costs in selecting products are diminished. On 
these grounds Posner characterizes advertising as a service to customers. 
In any case, this service cannot be separated from the features that are 
part of the product itself.98 
Empirical evidence for this view was supplied by a study comparing the 
price of eyeglasses in different U.S. states. It was discovered that in states 
which allowed advertising for eyeglasses, prices tended to be lower than in 
states where advertising was regulated.e!I 
Differences in theoretical positions on the Issue thus have to do with diffe-
rent views on whether participants in the economic process (suppliers and 
consumers) act rationally. The traditional approach associated with the Har-
vard School allegedly presupposses "that consumers are irrational and mani-
pulable". Contrary to this assumption, it Is pointed out that "the Chicago 
theorist rejects this assumption as inconsistent with the premises of price 
theory".70 This amounts to an acceptance of the neoclassical premise that 
market participants behave rationally. The empirical basis for this assump-
tion, however, has not been unambiguously defined. 
One aspect which requires close and critical scrutiny, for instance, is the 
assumption of autonomous behavior on the part of the consumer, i.e. the 
postulate that consumers freely decide which goods and services to pur-
chase within the context of their budget constraints and their preferences 
(consumer sovereignty).71 
The representatives of other approaches to antitrust theory and policy also 
assume a certain rationality in the behavior of economic agents; it is true, 
68 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, supra, 930 f. and 
938: "Advertising can make an advertised brand cheaper by reducing the 
consumer's search costs by an amount greater than the difference in no-
minal price between that brand and non-advertised brands of the same 
product." Posner also admits that the fundamental Chicago assumption 
applies, that the consumer is an absolutely rational human being, cf. 
ibid., 938 note 38. 
69 Cf. Benham, Lee, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 
JLE (1972) pp. 337-352. 
70 Posner, The Chicago School .. , supra, 930. 
71 Cf. Henderson, James M., and Richard E. Quandt, Microoeconomic Theory: 
A Mathematical Approach, 3rd ed., Auckland et al. 1985, p. 6 f. On the 
consumer sovereignty issue in welfare economics, see Scitovsky, Tibor, On 
the Principle of Consumer's Sovereignty, 52 AER (1962), pp. 262-268; and 
idem, The Joyless Economy, New York 1976. 
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certainly, that as a rule, however, the concept of bounded rationality em-
ployed by the behavioral sciences is used.n In the words of Herbert Simon 
this bounded rationality can be characterized in that 
"(t)he capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose 
solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real 
world".73 
By contrast, current theory assumes totally rational behavior in the sense 
that consumers and suppliers maximize utilities and profits, respectively.74 
However, there is evidence against this assumption of autonomous behavior. 
Consumer preferences are clearly influenced at least to a certain extent by 
external factors. Two arguments seem especially relevant in this context:75 
- consumers' preferences and, therefore, the demand of goods and services, 
is influenced by the decisions of other consumers (external consumer 
effects); 
- consumers' decisions are not totally rational because they are influenced 
by producers through advertising. This is of particular importance since 
there are two types of advertising: informative and persuasive adverti-
sing. 
Although a neat separation between these two components is difficult, it is 
an undeniable fact that human beings - also in their roles as consumers -
are not totally rational beings and, therefore, are susceptible to persuasive 
advertising and even to open manipulation. 
It is often pointed out by adherents to this view that only persuasive and 
informative advertising together can stimulate consumers' interest because 
the role of the persuasive component is to break down the barrier of selec-
72 Cf. Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications, New York 1975, p. 21 f., and Ouchi, William G., Markets, 
Bureaucracies and Clans, 25 ASQ (1980), pp. 129-141. 
73 Simon, Herbert A., Models of Man, New York 1957, p. 198. 
74 An approach that tries to use the behavioral concept of rationality for 
antitrust theory is found in Zohlnhofer, Werner, and Horst Greiffenberg, 
Neuere Entwicklungen in der Wettbewerbstheorie: Die Ber0ckslchtigung 
organisatlonsstruktureller Aspekte, in: Cox, Helmut, Uwe Jens, and Kurt 
Markert (eds.), Handbuch des Wettbewerbs, M0nchen 1981, pp. 79-101. 
75 Cf. Schmidt/Rittaler, Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 18. 
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tlve perception. However, this argument does not reflect the core problem 
since it is basically business-oriented and regards advertising from the 
standpoint of marketing techniques. This latter argument cannot remove 
suspicion in the econ_omic sense that advertising restricts sovereignty in a 
free enterprise system. 7e 
Even the representatives of the traditional tenet concede that advertising 
contains information in many cases, but in so doing they do not understate 
the manipulative effect. Nelson, for instance, argues that advertising often 
tends rather to set signals In a persuasive sense than to provide informa-
tion when the industry concerned is conscious that consumers are uncertain 
about selecting products. 77 The informative component of advertising may 
play an Important role with regard to non-convenience and/or specialty 
goods. However, as far as convenience goods for daily use are concerned, 
advertising undoubtedly shifts its accent from information to persuasion. 
And as the latter kind of goods are encountered more frequently in an eco-
nomy, it follows logically that persuasive advertising Is more widespread. 
In summary of what has been argued, then, the dual character of product 
differentiation should be emphasized. Whether the barrier effect which 
deters potential competition prevails or the informational effect which is 
bound to intensify competition, is heavily disputed in current economic lite-
rature.78 The economic effects of advertising and product differentiation 
have therefore to be seen in a twofold manner:79 
76 Cf. Schmidt/Rittaler, Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 19; 
and Waterson, On the Definition ... , supra, 526 f., on the state of the art: 
"(A)dvertising could potentially, or actually, be a barrier to entry, but 
on the other hand it may assist entry by allowing new firms convenient 
access to potential customers ... (t)he outcome, a net effect of several 
factors, is potentially an empirically discernible one, yet tests within the 
structure-profit framework to date do not appear particularly helpful In 
evaluating it." 
77 Cf. Nelson, The Chicago School ... , supra, 950. 
78 Cf. Albion, Mark S., and Paul W. Farris, The Advertising Controversy: 
Evidence on the Economic Effects of Advertising, Boston, Mass. 1981, p. 
38: "A major point of divergence between the two main streams of re-
search into the economic impacts of advertising is whether advertising 
should be regarded as persuasive or informative in nature."; cf. as well 
Shepherd, The Ecomomlcs of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 318 f. 
79 Butters, Gerard R., A Survey of Advertising and Market Structure, 66 
AER (1976), pp. 392-397, 395. 
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"There is no contradiction in believing both that advertising is crucial 
in facilitating firms' entry into new markets and that the entry costs 
might be steep enough to discourage entry. It is not Inconsistent to 
hold that Indivisibilities associated with advertising on nationwide tele-
vision create market power in certain industries, but that a government 
policy to severely curtail advertising in these Industries would cause 
prices to become even higher." 
This dual role of advertising and, therefore, product differentiation has 
been confirmed by empirical evidence as weil. 80 
b. Strategic Barriers 
So far, barriers to new competition have been considered an exogeneously 
given determinant of market structure, which are able to influence the rate 
and extent of entry to a market and, therefore, constrain incumbent firms' 
conduct. We strongly emphasized in Part 1 of this contribution, however, 
that structure, conduct, and performance show a circular interdependence in 
that specific conduct is able to alter market structure. Hence, elements of 
market structure such as barriers to entry can become the competition 
parameters of incumbent flrms. 91 This aspect of barriers is associated with 
strategic behavior, being either predatory conduct aimed at disciplining or 
driving incumbents out of the market, or raising particular barriers to the 
market aimed at deterring potential entrant firms.112 
The primary purpose of strategic behavior of the latter kind is to communi-
cate to potential entrant firms verbal threats of retaliation, or actions that 
enable or might even require retaliation in case of entry. Unlike structural 
barriers, which occur more or less unintentionally as a side effect of profit 
maximization, these barriers are purposely erected in order to reduce the 
80 Cf., e.g., Dorfmann, Robert, and Peter O. Steiner, Optimal Advertising and 
Optimal Quality, 44 AER (1954), pp. 826-836; Hart, Peter E., and E.V. Mor-
gan, Market Structure and Economic Performance In the United Kingdom, 
25 JIE (1977), pp. 177-193, for some U.K. studies; and Schmalensee, 
Richard, The Economics of Advertising, Amsterdam 1972. 
81 Cf. Dirrhelmer, Marktkonzentration ... , op. cit., 35 ff. 
82 Cf. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra, 262 f.; Williamson, 
Antitrust Economics ... , op. cit., 328, who views strategic behavior as 
"efforts by established firms to take up advance positions or respond 
contingently to rivalry in ways that discipline actual and discourage po-
tential competition." 
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attractiveness of the offer the incumbent has to compete against and, there-
fore, to reduce the probability of entry. 113 
The occurrence of strategic barriers is closely related to the existence of 
structural barriers to a market which means that "severe structural precon-
ditions in both concentration and entry barrier respects need to be satisfied 
before an incentive to behave strategically can be claimed to exlst".84 
The kinds of strategic barriers can be categorized according to the competi-
tive parameters actually used:89 
limit price strategy, setting price somewhere between the monopoly price 
and the competitive price, respectively; 
- excess capacity strategy, expanding output and investment in the pre-
entry period or shortly after entry, aimed at discouraging Incentives to 
enter or driving newcomers out of the market; 
product differentiation strategy, offering more product variations than in 
the case of structural barriers; and 
- excess cost strategy, imposing cost disadvantages on the potential entrant 
which the Incumbent firms did not themselves have to bear when they en-
tered the market. 
The adherents of the current theory regard this kind of action as an artifi-
cial barrier to new competition. But they maintain that such unilateral action 
would be detrimental to the firm undertaking it because In the case of such 
unilateral action and in the absence of structural barriers, the incumbent 
firm must be aware that if It tried to abuse its discretionary monopolistic 
power an influx of potential entrants Into the market would be immediate. 
83 Cf. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra, 260-283; Markovits, 
The Limits of Simplifying Antitrust ••. , supra, 44; Salop, Steven C., Strate-
gic Entry Deterrence, 69 AER (1979), pp. 335-338; Schwalbach, Marktein-
trittsverhalten industrieller Unternehmen, supra, 716. 
84 Williamson, Antitrust Economics ... , op. cit., 342; cf. as well Esposito, 
Frances Ferguson, and Louis Esposito, Excess Capacity and Market Struc-
ture, 56 RES (1974), pp. 188-200, 188; Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After 
Chicago, supra, 278; Schwalbach, Markteintrittsverhalten industrieller 
Unternehmen, supra, 716; and v. Weizsacker, Barriers to Entry ... , op. 
cit.,- 13-15. 
85 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitl k und Kartell recht, op. cit., 69 f.; Scherer, 
Industrial market structure ••. , op. cit., 232-260; Schwalbach, Markteln-
trlttsverhalten industrieller Unternehmen, supra, 716; and Williamson, 
Antitrust Economics .•. , op. cit., 332. 
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Such conduct "would be foolish and selfdefeating behavior" 1111 and, therefore, 
unlikely. 
Even if the existence of at least some kind of structural barriers is accep-
ted, the crucial question still has to be answered as to whether on this 
basis such strategic barriers to entry exist and whether thel r erection con-
stitutes a meaningful strategy for the deterrence of entry. In examining this 
issue, we will refrain from dealing with single kinds of strategic barriers87, 
rather we will adress ourselves to the crucial issues of excess capacity, 
sunks costs, and credible threats that underlie the respective hypotheses on 
these kinds of barriers and determine their validity. The purpose of this is 
to demonstrate - pars pro toto - that incumbent firms are able to deter 
entry by strategic conduct. 
The primary argument of the hypothesis is that incumbent firms regulate 
their capacity which they are going to invest before entry of newcomers in 
such a way as to equal the presumed post-entry output expected after a 
potential competitor enters the market. In this case the actual output before 
newcomers enter is deliberately chosen smaller than overall pre-entry capa-
city. The resulting excess capacity is used to threaten to expand output, cut 
prices and, therefore, to make entry unprofitable.88 Thus the entry deter-
ring effect is achieved by intensifying presumed post-entry competition by 
86 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox ... , op. cit., 309, and as well, 144 f., 153 and 
160; for a similar view on the existence of strategic behavior, cf. McGee, 
John, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 JLE (1980), pp. 289-330; and Baxter, 
William F., Reflections Upon Professor Williamson's Comments, 27 StLouis-
ULJ (1983), pp. 315-320, acknowledging that strategic behavior exists but 
holding that the courts are unable to deal with it. 
87 In fact, this has been done abundantly elsewhere, cf., e.g., Baron, D. P., 
Limit Pricing, Potential Entry, and Barriers to Entry, 63 AER (1973), pp. 
666-674; Dlxlt, Avinash K., Recent Developments in Oligopoly Theory, 72 
AER (1982), pp. 12-17; Salop, Steven C., and David T. Scheffman, Raising 
Rivals' Costs, 73 AER (1983), pp. 267-271. 
88 Cf., e. g., Dixlt, Avlnash K., The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence, 
90 EJ (1980), pp. 95-106; Lieberman, Marvin B., Excess Capacity as a Bar-
rier to Entry: An Empirical Appraisal, 35 JIE (1987), pp. 607-627; Salop, 
Strategic Entry Deterrence, supra; Spence, A. Michael, Entry, Capacity, 
Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BJE (1977), pp. 534-544, 534 f.; for 
the basic reasoning, cf. Pashigian, B. Peter, Limit Price and the Market 
Share of the Leading Firm, 16 JIE (1968), pp. 165-177; and Wenders, John 
T., Excess Capacity as a Barrier to Entry, 20 JIE (1971 ), pp. 14-19. 
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additional output, a course of action which invalidates the Sylos' postulate.• 
It has been shown that there is an incentive to hold excess capacity at some 
cost because the anticipated reduction in the profit margin due to eventual 
entry Is perceived to offset these costs.90 
In our view, the likelihood of occurrence has to be connected to three pre-
conditions, however. First, the occurrence varies with the extent of struc-
tural barriers.91 Secondly, the kind of capital invested and the structure of 
resulting costs determine the likelihood of occurrence, and thirdly, the like-
lihood of deterrence is also dependent on the extent of credibility that is 
assigned to the threat by potential entrants. 
The issue of structural barriers has been dealt with supra and has to be 
considered implicitly. 
The potential for entry deterrence increases with the extent to which assets 
are limited in their transferability to alternative economic uses because of 
specificity in use. This limited degree of mobility of specific assets poses an 
additional risk to the potential entrant because in case of failure after entry 
the salvage value cannot fully be recovered. The residual part of the fixed 
costs which is not recoverable in the case of exit is referred to as 'sunk 
costs' and is calculated by subtracting the salvage value from the unamorti-
zed costs of the asset. The impact of sunk costs has to be taken into consi-
deration by a potential entrant when calculating entry costs because an 
irrevocable choice of investment can alter the pre-entry conditions or those 
prevailing after entry has occurred. Such an occurrence is to the incum-
bents' advantage, because additional costs are imposed on the entrant that 
89 Cf. Sylos-Labini, Paolo, Oligopoly and Technical Progress, Cambridge, 
Mass. 1962. The postulate holds that incumbents will keep the pre-entry 
price on limit level and threaten to keep output constant after entry 
which would result in an unprofitable post-entry situation; cf as well, 
Wenders, Excess Capacity as a Barrier to Entry, supra, 15. 
90 Cf. Spence, A. Michael, Entry, Capacity, ... , supra, 534. 
91 With regard to the reasoning along the above lines, the strategy can only 
be used profitably in an oligopoly, cf., e.g., Esposito/Esposito, Excess 
Capacity and Market Structure, supra, 188. This is consistent with the 
empirical findings in economic literature, cf., e.g., Lieberman, Excess Ca-
pacity as a Barrier to Entry ..• , supra, 607. 
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were not borne by the incumbent. Hence, sunk costs serve as a barrier to 
entry because they allow exploitation of a first-mover advantage.92 
The threat of the incumbent firms to use excess capacity after successful 
entry and hence make entry unprofitable is dependent on the credibility of 
the threat.93 Potential entrants will not be deterred from entering the mar-
ket unless the "established firm unambiguously commit<.s) itself to a course 
of action which will deter entry".94 The irreversibility of an investment is 
an Instrument to document the credibilitiy of the threat. Again, this leads to 
the condition that the incumbent firms must invest in durable, specialized 
assets in order to raise the probability of entry deterrence.95 
c. Legal and Administrative Barriers 
In addition to the control of an essential input of the production process, 
the government protection for some industries is regarded by current 
theory as the second substantial cause of barriers to new competition and, 
therefore, monopoly power.98 This is considered so, because governmentally 
sanctioned barriers to new competition do not allow monopoly positions to be 
92 Cf. Dixit, The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence, supra, 95 f.; Eaton/ 
Lipsey, Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers •.. , supra, 721; Hovenkamp, Anti-
trust Policy After Chicago, supra, 264-266; and Balley, Elizabeth E., Con-
testability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AER 
(1981 ), pp. 178-183, 178 f.: "It is primarily the risk involved in expending 
large sums of money in order to acquire sunk-cost facilities that deters 
new entry when an otherwise profitable entry opportunity arrises. Poten-
tial competition becomes an ever more effective force as the extent of 
large Irretrievable entry CX>Sts decline", emphasis added. 
93 Cf., e.g., Wenders, Excess Capacity as a Barrier to Entry, supra, 18. 
94 Eaton, B. Curtis, and Richard G. Lipsey, Capital, commitment, and entry 
equilibrium, 12 BJE (1981 ), pp. 593-604, 594, italics in original; and 
Spence, A. Michael, Entry, Capacity, ... , supra, 544. The assumption is 
based on Schelling's distinction between threats and commitments. If an 
actor has made commitments in a strategic game, it is in his self-interest 
to take counteraction if the action at which the commitment was aimed, 
occurs, cf. Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, 
Mass. 1960, ch. 2. 
95 Cf. Eaton/Lipsey, Exit barriers are entry barriers ... , supra, 721; William-
son, Antitrust Economics •.. , op. cit., 333. The price as a flexible instru-
ment for reaction can still be used in the actual case. Note that the price 
is now decreased in order to deter entry, whereas before there was a 
potential for its elevation. 
96 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, supra, 947 note 65: 
"Legal barriers to entry such as patents are quite properly ignored as 
beyond the reach of antitrust policy." 
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challenged.97 Barriers to entry erected by government, such as patents, 
legal restrictions of admission to certain occupations or professions, and 
similar regulations, have been deliberately established by government and 
authorities; they are therefore durable and cannot be removed by market 
forces. This kind of protection is provided by legal and administrative 
barriers.911 
According to the current approach, those areas that are exempt for political 
reasons cannot be defended by economic arguments. At the same time, how-
ever, it is very difficult to attack them politically. The protection of these 
Industries against competition should be reduced step by step because, 
according to present evidence it seems to offer no advantages at all. 99 For 
instance, the German Monopolies Commission believes that the losses in 
efficiency In the economy flowing from governmental and public restraints 
are greater than the ones from market power. 100 
Current government policy aims at abolishing legal and administrative 
barriers by deregulating those exempted areas. This has also become the 
official policy of the Reagan Administration. Deregulation has already gone 
far In the airline industry and in transportation. However, proponents of the 
current approach admit that It is very difficult to make policy conclusions 
97 Cf. Koch, Industrial Organization and Prices, op. cit., 104 f.; and Dem-
setz, Economics as a Guide ... , supra, 381: "Monopolization has two plau-
sible routes. One follows a circuitous path through fifty state capitals 
and Washington, D.C. The other is to obtain very dominant control over 
resources 'essential' to the production of a good." 
98 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., 300 f.; Koch, Indus-
trial Organization and Prices, op. cit., 104; and Mansfield, Microeconomics 
••• , op. cit., 353. For an empirical investigation cf., e.g., Kuhlmann, John 
M., and Terry D. Davis, The Automobile Rental Industry: An Economic 
Analysis of the Airport Concessionaire Agreement, 5 ALER (1971 ), pp. 59-
70. 
99 Cf. Demsetz, Economics as a Guide ... , supra, 383: "In addition ... it is 
difficult to see great gains flowing from government protection of indus-
tries from competition, although in some case, as with patent protection, 
such a case can be made." 
100 Cf. the comments on the Sixth Main Report of the German Monopolies 
Commission by the Federal Government, Stellungnahme der Bundesregie-
rung zum Hauptgutachten VI, BTDr. 11 /555, p. 2. This is furthermore 
emphasized by Caspari, Joint Ventures Under EEC Law and Policy, sup-
ra, 12: "Also in Europe, established traditions or social constraints play 
a major role, and lobbyists as well are all too able to find politicians 
and bureaucrats who, for reasons of economic ignorance or lack of re-
sponsibility, are prepared to protect particular interests." 
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in fields which have not yet been thoroughly analyzed. 101 This view is 
criticized by the traditional industrial organization approach, especially with 
regard to the problems of natural monopoly. In markets in which economies 
of scale prevent a competitive market structure, monopoly profits should be 
avoided by regulation; in such a case, a policy of deregulation would allow 
monopolists to skim off monopoly profits. 
If the policy of deregulation is not to become an ideology, however, the 
essential question remains as to how regulation should be handled in order 
to avoid the costs of regulation which have been pointed out by Stigler and 
others. 102 This however, is an Issue that is beyond the scope of this contri-
bution.103 
d. Barriers to Exit 
The extent of potential competition that a market faces is determined not 
only by barriers to entry but also by barriers to exit from that market. If a 
potential entrant anticipates high barriers to exit from a market he might 
eventually decide not to enter this market even if the entry barriers them-
selves are low. This situation may arise if subnormal profitability because of 
cutthroat competition has to be expected. 104 Hence, barriers to exit influence 
performance, profits and industrial structure In the same way as barriers to 
101 Cf. Demsetz, Economics as a Guide •.. , supra, 383. 
102 Rosenbluth, Gideon, Comment on a Paper by Demsetz, 19 JLE (1976), pp. 
389-391, 391: "The question that naturally follows from Demsetz's analy-
sis Is: Can we regulate Insufficiently competitive industries without in-
curring all the evils of regulation to which Stigler and others have 
drawn our attention?". 
103 For recent thorough treatments of the issue, cf. Pascher, Heinrich, Die 
U.S.-amerikanische Deregulation Policy im Luftverkehrs- und Bankenbe-
reich, Frankfurt a.M. et al. 1987; and Soltwedel, ROdiger, et al., Deregu-
lierungspotentiale In der Bundesrepublik, TObingen 1986. 
104 Cf., e.g., Caves/Porter, Barriers to Exit, op. cit.; Porter, Michael E., Com-
petitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors, 
New York, London 1980, p. 186; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspoliti k und Kartell-
recht, op. cit., 70; and Schwalbach, Markteintrlttsverhalten industrieller 
Unternehmen, supra, 716 f. 
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entry do, since they show a structural complementarity. Recent work has 
emphasized that this aspect has been neglected.105 
These two types of structural barriers are related In that factors that im-
pede entry are likely to impede exit as well and actions that Incumbent 
firms can take to deter entry also determine the conditions for their own 
departure from the market. Absolute cost advantages, product differentiation 
advantages, as well as economies of large scale can also erect a barrier to 
exit affecting incumbent firms as well as potential entrant fl rms. 11ie 
Barriers to exit from a market may deter exit because of the following kinds 
which can be considered fundamental sources of such exit barrlers:107 
durable and hlgly speclallzed assets (idiosyncratic capital) creating irre-
trievable costs due to diminished liquidation value of the Investment; 
- fixed <Xl61:s of exit due to pension plans, labor settlements, contract can-
cellation penalties, and the Ii ke; 
- strategic exit barriers due to overall business relatedness of the existing 
business unit, access to financial markets, or vertical integration; 
- lnfonnatlonal barriers due to false evaluation or concealment of business 
performance; 
- government and soclal barriers due to the legal system or political pres-
sure; and 
- managerlal and emotional barriers due to emotional attachment and commit-
ment to a business. 
105 Cf. Eaton/Lipsey, Exit barriers are entry barriers ... , supra; and Frank-
lin, Some Observations on Exit •.• , supra, 299; Koch, Industrial Organi-
zation and Prices, op. cit., 103: "The conditions of exit may subtly Influ-
ence the conditions of entry"; cf., however, Hensley, Roy J., Competition, 
Regulation and the Public Interest in Nonllfe Insurance, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles 1962, p. 66: "Conditions of exit in an industry are not likely 
to be as important an Influence on industry conduct and performance as 
are conditions of entry." 
106 Cf. Caves/Porter, Barriers to Exit, op. cit., 44. This is strongly suppor-
ted by recent empirical investigations that confirm a symmetry between 
entry and exit barriers in terms of an ex-ante symmetry in that bar-
riers to exit serve as barriers to entry, cf. Shapiro, Daniel, and R.S. 
Khemani, The Determinants of Entry and Exit Reconsidered, 5 IJIO (1987), 
pp. 15-26, 16 and 25. 
107 Cf. Caves/Porter, Barriers to Exit, op. cit., 40-44; Porter, Competitive 
Strategy ... , op. cit., 259-266; and Schwalbach, Markteintrittsverhalten 
industrieller Unternehmen, supra, 717. 
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Empirical results confirm the significance of barriers to exit not only with 
regard to their Importance but also with regard to their function in deter-
ring potential entries to a market. a 
The different kinds of Impediments to competition may be presented in the 
following synopsis: 















durable and highly 
specialized assets; 





cealed or biased 








overall industrial policy: 
- merger policy (e.g., in case 
of diversification) 
- commercial law 
- corporate law 
- patent and license system 
special industrial policies 
- individual subsidies 
- regulation policy 
- patent and license system 
- occupational access 
- merger policy (e.g., prohi-
biting undesirable mergers) 
barriers due to the legal 
system (e.g., legal pension 
plans) 
political pressure and 
moral suasion (e.g., in case 
of firm failure and resulting 
unemployment) 
108 Cf. Caves/Porter, Barriers to Exit, op. cit., 67-69; Eaton/Lipsey, Exit 
barriers are entry barriers ••• , supra; and Schwalbach, Marktelntrltts-
verhalten lndustrieller Unternehmen, supra, 723 f. 
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5. An Evaluation of Impediments to New Competition 
Even If Bork's separation into natural barriers - which reflect efficiency 
differences - and artificial entry barriers - which are not based on effi-
ciency but prevent market forces from eroding positions based on power -
Is accepted 109, there are doubts about the validity of policy conclusions 
drawn by adherents of current theory. Of course it is possible to regard 
natural barriers to entry as an expression of superior efficiency. However, 
under such a view only short-term aspects of efficiency are taken into 
account; the long-run aspect of maintaining competition as an anonymous 
control mechanism which forces firms to produce In an efficient way and at 
the same time to pass on the efficiency gains to consumers Is totally disre-
garded, even if barriers to entry are only understood as a manifestation of 
efficiency. The possible conflict between the realization of short-term effi-
ciency gains and the long-run elimination of competition as an anonymous 
control mechanism Is denied by the current tenet, since it relies on the 
force of potential competition. The different view of the traditional theory 
associated with the Harvard School tries to resolve this conflict and views 
natural barriers to entry in a different way. It emphasizes the workability 
of competition as a control mechanism and starts from the assumption that 
the coordination, information, and allocation function of competition is les-
sened by high barriers to entry, whether they actually reflect efficiencies 
or not. 
Entry into a market presupposes that barriers to entry, as well as the exis-
ting profit opportunities in a relevant market, are well-known and that 
there are enough competitors possessing spirit of competition to allow these 
profit chances to be exploited by entering the market. If there Is too little 
information on profit opportunities and/or too little spirit of competition, 
there will be no market entry even In the case of low barriers to entry. Be-
sides this, the product life cycle plays an important role in deciding 
whether to enter a market or not. 
109 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 311. 
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Therefore, the traditional tenets associated with Harvard School hold that 
barriers to entry hinder the long-term erosion of powerful positions. 110 
Consequently, barriers to entry form a kind of protective shield against 
competition and keep dominant firms from passing on efficiency gains to the 
purchasers or to consumers, which leads to increased profits for the domi-
nant firms. 
Hence, the conclusion can be drawn that structural barriers to entry to a 
particular market, and also strategic barriers to entry, which have been 
erected by established firms in order to keep potential competitors out of 
the market, are an obstacle for the interlndustrial mobility of diversifying 
firms and de novo competition. Such barriers to entry cause extra costs of 
entry to arise; and these are extra costs that established competitors were 
not or are not burdened with. 
Recent empirical studies show that market entrance and exit is negatively 
influenced by these kinds of barriers. 111 
Shepherd1 12 provides evidence from results of a study on erosion or change 
In the position of dominant firms during the period 1910 - 1973 in the USA 
and in the United Kingdom. An important result of his investigation is that 
"(t)he 'natural' decline of dominant firms was much more in 1910 - 1935 than 
in 1948 - 1973". 1:3 
In addition, increasing concentration in most industries underlines the exis-
tence of barriers to entry, especially since market entrance in the sense of 
"net new capacity added by a new firm" 114 has little significance. The figu-
res of the Sixth Main Report of the German Monopolies Commission show that 
between 1983 and 1985, a period of moderate economic activity, concentration 
in 93 commodity groups (35,9 ,-;) increased, in 64 commodity groups (24,7 ,-;) 
110 Cf. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 71-75. 
111 Cf. Masson, Robert T., and Joseph Shaanan, Stochastic-Dynamic Limit 
Pricing: An Empirical Test, 64 RES (1982), pp. 413-422; Neumann, Man-
fred, Ingo Babel, and Alfred Hald, Innovations and Market Structure in 
West German Industries, 3 MDE (1982), pp. 131-139; Schwalbach, Joachim, 
Strategisches Wettbewerbsverhalten in der Titandioxidindustrie, 54 ZfB 
(1984), pp. 388-399; Yip, Barriers to Entry, op. cit. 
112 Cf. Shepherd, The Treatment of Market Power ... , 113 f. 
113 Shepherd, The Treatment of Market Power ... , op. cit., 115. 
114 Shepherd, The Treatment of Market Power ... , op. cit., 101. 
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decreased, and in 102 commodity groups (39,4 %) fluctuated or remained con-
stant. m In essence, this means that in 75 % percent of the commodity 
groups concentration did not decrease. This can be interpreted as strong 
evidence for the importance of impediments to new competition. 
IV. Conclydlng Remarks 
In Part 2 of this contribution we analyzed the central elements of the cur-
rent theoretical edifice. With regard to the importance of efficiency con-
siderations in the United States' antitrust laws and the current antitrust 
policy, we can largely adopt the view put forward by the critics of the cur-
rent theory. This is that the legislative history of the statutes, the ratio 
legis, the Judicial Interpretation of the laws by the Federal Supreme Court, 
and further plausibility considerations, all provide strong evidence that U.S. 
antitrust legislation was never passed with the intention of upholding and 
promoting only a single goal or of pursuing one Individual goal like, for 
Instance, economic efficiency. The 'imprecise wording' of the statutes has 
rather led, in fact, to the conclusion that the legislators did not feel in a 
position to define and quantify additional social and political objectives and 
therefore left the solution of possible goal conflicts to the judiciary. On the 
basis of the aforementioned we must thus assume that the antitrust laws of 
the United States comprise several goals, all of which are Interrelated 
(multlple-goal approach). This Interpretation has been confirmed by Con-
gress' unwillingness to initiate any change in the legal statutes to conform 
to the direction of current theory. 
Sociopolitical as well as economic considerations underlay the original draft 
of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition. The sociopolltical con-
siderations encompass, firstly, the protection of the freedom to compete for 
its own sake, secondly and as a result of this, the preservation of an im-
portant mechanism regulating and controlling economic power in the market, 
and thirdly, the idea that only such protection and control may serve as an 
appropriate economic equivalent of the political principles of democracy. 
115 Cf. Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommlssion VI: Gesamtwirtschaftliche 
Chancen und Risi ken wachsender UnternehmensgroBen, Baden-Baden 
1986, para. 40. 
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All-encompassing optimization of economic welfare by the best possible sup-
ply of consumers Is the actual intended result of these economic considerati-
ons. The same applies to European law. In German and EEC antitrust philo-
sophy, competition is regarded as an anonymous control and steering mecha-
nism which forces competitors not only to gain efficiency advantages but 
also to pass them on to consumers. 1 In this view the freedom to compete Is 
an advantage secured for competitors and consumers alike - a view under-
lined by the European Commission in Its Fifteenth Report on Competition 
Polley In 1986.2 This, however, Is an aspect which is of no importance for 
the current U.S. approach. 
In evaluating the adequacy and usefulness of neoclassical price theory and 
the static partial equilibrium model used by current theory for antitrust 
analysis, we found caveats with regard to the use of neoclassical price 
theory. Neoclassical price theory seems to be used rather selectively by the 
current tenet, in order to accord with certain a priori premises and pre-exi-
sting value judgments. The use of neoclassical price theory as the allegedly 
appropriate instrument of analysis has led to the omission of developments 
in price theory starting in the 1930s (Chamberlin, Robinson, J.M. Clark et 
al.). For the sake of analytical ciarity, real world market conceptions have 
been surrendered or Ignored. Total rationality of economic agents, autono-
mous behavior on the part of consumers, perfectly competitive market 
structures, perfect Information available to economic agents, absence of con-
sumer preferences, and divisibility and mobility of economic resources are 
the basic assumptions underlying the approach. In the real world, however, 
these assumptions cannot be met. They must therefore be rejected entirely, 
or restricted to special cases. 
The main objection can be stated with regard to the selective use of price 
theory. Definitions, premises, and assumptions formulated by current tenet 
Cf. the wording of Act. 85 para. 3 Treaty of Rome about the passing-on of 
efficiency gal ns. 
2 Cf. Arts. 85 and 86 Treaty of Rome; and Commission of the European Com-
munities, Fifteenth Report on Competition Polley, Brussels, Luxembourg 
1986, p. 11, holding that "(e)ffectlve competition provides a set of .•. 
checks and balances in the market economy system. It preserves the free-
dom and right of Initiative of the individual economic operator and It 
fosters the spirit of enterprise. It creates an environment within which 
European Industry can grow and at the same time take account of social 
goals." 
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tend to make the underlying model immune from falsification. 
Positive methodology - such as that applied in the physical sciences - Is 
used for the purpose of analysis. The only distinction is the empirical sub-
ject matter. The subject matter of antitrust is not of a comparable nature, 
however. It Is characterized by extreme data Instability, and for this reason 
alone does not permit valid application of positive methodological principles. 
Besides this, economics deals with open rather than closed systems, as is 
shown by the use of partial equilibria models that attempt to reduce the 
complexity of economic phenomena to manageable proportions. This is a fur-
ther factor demonstrating the limited range of applicability of positivist 
methodology to antitrust as used by adherents of the current tenet. 
The welfare approach of the Chicago School that Is based on price theory 
relies on the assumption of effective competition, and hence on the existence 
of competitive prices. If the welfare implications of different policy recom-
mendations are simply considered without concern for the effects on the 
workability of the market mechanism however, such markets will tend to-
wards self-destruction. By assuming a per se-workabillty of the market me-
chanism and neglecting any long-run effects on the workability of the com-
petitive mechanism, advocates of current theory effectively "'define conflicts 
away"". The term 'efficiency' tends to become a sort of black box In this 
context which may be used to justify all kinds of restraints of trade. 
In addition to application problems Inherent to the model, the partial equili-
brium trade-off model used as a basis for policy inferences tends to over-
estimate possible cost reductions due to industrial concentration, tends to 
underestimate resulting allocative inefficiencies after a merger, and neglects 
possible wealth transfers from producers to consumers. The necessary quali-
fications to the model lead to a loss of analytical clarity and Increase the 
difficulties In drawing unambiguous policy implications. Furthermore, the 
model performs the trade-off between allocative Inefficiency and productive 
efficiency by means of comparative-static analysis which lacks a dynamic 
character, although competition Is nonetheless perceived as a dynamic pro-
cess. 
The measurement of efficiency is not necessarily confined to the use of a 
partial equilibrium model which we presented. A different method Is the con-
struction of an empirically observable relationship between factors that 
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determine the structure of an industry and the resulting performance. In 
addition to profits, the degree of technological innovation or technological 
efficiency could be used as criterion for the measurement of efficiency. A 
narrowing-down of the analysis on price/quantity relationships Invalidates 
the resulting conclusions. 
The assumption of perfectly competitive markets leads to a denial or playing 
down of the existence of barriers to new competition. Therefore, numerous 
competitors are assumed to be a factor guaranteeing a constant and perma-
nent source of sufficient (potential) competitive pressure. Hence, the current 
tenet is based on the view that competition is a "self-maintaining" mecha-
nism which would only be disturbed by public Intervention. Therefore, mar-
ket power Is assumed to be only temporary - if It exists at all. 
We have documented that this view primarily depends on the definition of 
the term 'barrier'. Structural and strategic Impediments may be simultane-
ously both an outcome of efficiency on the one hand, and an obstacle to new 
competition on the other hand. Hence the pros and cons of Impediments to 
new competition have to be evaluated very carefully in judging specific 
cases of industry concentration. That is, they are essentially of an ambiva-
lent character, as far as economic welfare is concerned. Structural and 
strategic Impediments are interrelated In that the extent of structural bar-
riers is responsible for the range of discretion incumbents possess In the 
potential or actual erecting of strategic impediments. 
The protection of the workability of competition as an anonymous instrument 
for controlling and steering economic processes is not a topic of fundamental 
importance for the current tenet. Because of the presumed absence of bar-
riers to entry, sufficient potential competition is always presupposed to be 
present to force actual competitors to pass on supra-competitive profits to 
consumers. Economic power considerations are, therefore, restricted to 
price/quantity-interrelations and the interdependence of a free and decen-
tralized economic order with a free and democratic polltical system Is igno-
red. 
On the basis of these conclusions, Part 3 of our contribution will be devoted 
to an anlysls of the role of the number of competitors, the degree of Indu-
stry concentration, and the Individual market share as crucial structural 
factors in determining Industry performance, and especially lnterfirm effi-
ciency differences. 
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.e.r:t.....a: Industrial Concentration through Horizontal Mergers: Effects 
on Performance 
In order to justify an activist competition policy towards mergers it is not 
sufficient Just to be aware of the construction-default inherent in free 
enterprise systems, as described above. More than this, the economic case 
for an activist antlmerger policy has to be based on an economic model or 
paradigm which can serve as a framework for public policy. The weaker the 
empirical evidence for such a paradigm, the weaker the case for distinct 
antimerger policy.1 
In evaluating the theoretical basis for an antitrust policy towards horizontal 
mergers, we will proceed as follows: 
- We will present the concentration-collusion doctrine as the theoretical 
foundation underlying the past enforcement policy towards horizontal mer-
gers, evaluate empirical attempts at verification and critically evaluate the 
Insufficiencies associated with the traditional approach. 
- We will then present the rival theory underlying the current approach 
towards horizontal mergers, the so-called new learning hypothesis. The 
theoretical basis as well as empirical attempts at verification will be eva-
luated critically and its public policy implications will be discussed. 
- Furthermore, we will try to separate efficiency effects from market power 
effects by answering the question as to what extent horizontal industry 
concentration is justified by technical economies and additional non-tech-
nical efficiencies. Our emphasis will be on the role of market share and 
the distribution of firm shares in a particular market, according to recent 
empirical findings. 
1. The Eoonanlc Rationale underMns the Traditional Merger poflcy 
The economic case for traditional horizontal merger policy Is based on the 
so-called concentration-collusion doctrine, which can be considered a special 
Cf. Green, Chris, Industrial Organization Paradigms, Empirical Evidence, 
and the Economic Case for Competition Policy, 20 CJE (1987), pp. 482-505, 
483 f., who states that empirical evidence has to be considered more im-
portant than analytical rigor; cf. as well, Pautler, Paul A., A Review of the 
Economic Basis for Broad-Based Horizontal-Merger Policy, 28 AB (1983), pp. 
571-651, 624. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
190 
variant of the structure-, conduct-, performance-paradigm that was treated 
in Part 1 of the contrl butlon su bmltted.2 
1. The Content of the Concentration-Collusion Doctrine 
The economic principle of the concentration-collusion doctrine was first em-
phasized implicitly by Adam Smith, who noted that competitors would re-
strain competition by harmonizing (colluding) their economic activities and 
agreeing upon matters of joint lnterest.3 With regard to antimerger policy, 
this economic impetus for public policy was elaborated on first by Augustin 
Cournot. His theoretical work showed that a decrease in the number of com-
petitors would have deleterious effects on market performance in that the 
equilibrium price achieved would be above the one obtained by competitlon. 4 
Hence, a tendential increase in the number of competitors seemed to be ne-
cessary in order to obtain the competitive equilibrium price and, therefore, 
good market performance.5 
Actually, this can be considered the starting-point of and the economic basis 
for the concentration-collusion doctrine.8 The doctrine can be traced back to 
Edward H. Chamberlin who can probably be credited for having been the 
first to argue explicitly that the probability of the recognition of mutual 
interdependence among competitors would rise as the number of competitors 
decreased and that eventually a critical level of concentration would be 
2 Cf. Green, Industrial Organization Paradigms ... , supra, 484; and Pautler, A 
Review ... , supra, 587. 
3 Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, New York 1937, p. 128: "People of the 
same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends In conspiracy against the public, or in some contri-
vance to raise prices." 
4 Cf. Cournot, Augustin, Researches Into the Mathematical Principles of the 
Theory of Wealth, translated by N. Bacon, New York 1960. 
5 Again, it becomes obvious that good economic performance and not just 
freedom to compete must be a valuable criterion for the policymaker In 
order to accept the tenet submitted. 
6 On the meaning and essence cf. further Greer, Douglas F., Industrial Or-
ganization and Public Policy, 2nd ed., New York 1984, p. 295; Mueller, Den-
nis C., Profits in the Long Run, Cambridge, Mass. 1986, p. 51; and Schma-
lensee, Richard L., Collusion Versus Differential Efficiency: Testing Alter-
native Hypotheses, 35 JIE (1987), pp. 399-425, 399. 
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reached which would allow for collusive action and non-competitive pricing.7 
The increased awareness of mutual interdependence stems from the fact that 
competitors gradually approach perfect information on relevant market cha-
racteristics and, simultaneously, the probability of detecting violations of 
interdependence, i.e. of collusive conduct, increases. Hence, the essence of 
the doctrine is to show "that successful (tacit or explicit) collusion would 
approach joint maximization and that the ability to collude increases with 
concentration". 8 
The crucial yardstick for the evaluation of the economic evils of collusion 
are various performance criteria. According to basic monopoly and oligopoly 
theory, collusion due to Increased Industry concentration will lead to output 
restrictions and as market prices are raised and exceed marginal costs, allo-
cational inefficiencies will occur as concomitants. Hence, price-cost margins 
might be seen as a proof of the quality of performance. Power to raise pri-
ces by any form of collusion might result not only in allocatlonal inefficien-
cies but also in Increased costs of production as competitive pressures to 
minimize costs are reduced.9 
7 Cf. Chamberlin, Edward H., The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 8th ed., 
Cambridge, Mass. 1962, pp. 46 f.: "The assumption of independence cannot 
be construed as requiring the sellers to compete as though their fortunes 
were independent, for this is to belie the very problem of duopoly itself." 
On the aspect of mutual interdependence, cf. as well Greer, Industrial Or-
ganization ••• , op. cit., 11 f.; Green, Industrial Organization Paradigms ... , 
supra, 575; and Areeda, Phillip, and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, vol. 4, Boston and 
Toronto 1980, p. 55: "There is a general agreement that beyond some point 
the smaller the number of firms and the larger the share of the market 
occupied by one or relatively few firms, the greater the likelihood of sub-
stantial departures from competitive performance, particularly with regard 
to price." 
8 Weiss, Leonard, Quantitive Studies of Industrial Organization, in: Intrl-
llgator, Michael D. (ed.), Frontiers of Quantitative Economics, Amsterdam, 
Oxford 1971, pp. 362-408, 363. 
9 Cf. Koch, James V., Industrial Organization and Prices, 2nd ed., Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., 1980, p. 190; and Singleton, Ross c., Industrial Organization 
and Antitrust: A Survey of Alternative Perspectives, Columbus, Ohio 1986, 
p. 10. The ambiguity of performance measures in determining market 
power is emphasized by the latest Report of the Council of Experts for 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, cf. Bericht des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats 
beim Bundesministerium fur Wlrtschaft, Wettbewerbspolitik, Bonn 1986, p. 
11. 
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The conclusions issuing from this line of theorizing provide the welfare-
theoretic basis for policies that attach to collusion, the exercise of market 
power as well as to substantial accretions to such power eventually added 
by mergers. 10 
2. Economic Returns as a Standard of Measurement 
In order to measure market power, the representatives of the former theo-
retical edifice associated with the Harvard School used different performance 
measures. These performance measures indicate the degree of attainment of 
the performance variables allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency 
(technological progress). 11 They encompass output restriction, price eleva-
tion, profit rates of return, price-cost margins, and the extent of overcapa-
city, etc. and relate these factors to structural variables such as, e.g., the 
degree of industry concentration, the market shares of the competing firms, 
or the height of the barriers to entry. 12 
Economic returns, price-cost margins and profit rates have received parti-
cular attention In this context. Crudely stated, the profitability of an enter-
prise can be viewed as its basic motivation. This leads to the hypothesis 
widely agreed upon that economic returns serve as an adequate yardstick 
for a company's performance. At the same time, profitability serves as an 
indicator of whether the company actually faces sufficient competition. If it 
faces sufficient competition, excess returns on capital invested and, there-
fore, undue market power are supposed to be transitory and will be eroded 
10 Cf. Green, Industrial Organization Paradigms ... , supra, 484; Greer, Indu-
strial Organization ••• , op. cit., 404 f.; and Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 
575 f., who note that the antitrust authorities in the U.S. felt secure 
enough in their knowledge of the relationship between concentration and 
performance to base their general guidelines for horizontal mergers on 
the concentration-collusion doctrine; cf. as well, Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines 1968, Issued by the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11 Cf. Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 190; and Singleton, Indu-
strial Organization ••. , op. cit., 4 f. 
12 Cf. Schmalensee, Richard A., Another Look at Market Power, 95 HLR 
(1982), pp. 1789-1808, 1804-1808, and Landes, WIiiiam M., and Richard A. 
Posner, Market Power In Antitrust Cases, 94 HLR (1981 ), pp. 937-996, 938. 
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- at least over a longer period of time. 13 The importance of Individual 
structural factors then depends on how much they add to profltablllty In 
the Individual case,14 
In addition to a number of statistical problems there are three crucial pro-
blems In measuring performance, I.e., in measuring market power by means 
of profltability:1s 
- Severe operationallty problems exist in measuring profitability; 
- market power may exist even at low "excess profits"; 
- "excess profits" may exist in competitive markets In the short-run (as an 
Incentive to imitative competition). 
In addition to the notion that excess returns must be non-transitory in 
order to Indicate market power, another qualification has to be made. Eco-
nomic returns might also reflect an enterprise's higher efficiency or higher 
innovativeness. It will be the main task of this part of our contribution to 
find some evidence on the causes of excess returns: to what extent are such 
returns attributable to higher effclency and to what extent can they be put 
down to market power? 
The underlying technique of performance measurement seems to be the main 
point of dispute for the present. For the purpose of measuring monopoly or 
13 On this position cf. Shepherd, William G., The Ecomomics of Industrial Or-
ganization, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1985, p. 65, who emphasizes 
profitability in the sense of accounting returns only. For a profound dis-
cussion on the difference between economic returns and accounting re-
turns, cf. Areeda, Phillip, and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analy-
sis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, vol. 2, Boston and 
Toronto 1978, §§ 508-510, 512c, and § 508: "Substantial market power 
usually brings higher returns than needed to attract capital Into the bu-
siness ... , we will show that persistent excess returns are convincing 
proof of durable, Individually held market power for a firm that Is the 
only producer of a physically distinguishable product, or that has pro-
duced a very high and relatively stable proportion of the output of that 
product." 
14 For a detailed survey on the significance of various structural elements 
in determining variations in profitability, cf. Abell, Derek F., and John S. 
Hammond, Strategic Market Planning: Problems and Analytical Approaches, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1979, pp. 271-286; and more recently, Buzzell, 
Robert D., and Bradley T. Gale, The PIMS Principles: Linking Strategy to 
Performance, New York 1987. 
15 Cf. Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, supra 1805; and also 
again, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesmlnisterium for Wirtschaft, 
op. cit., 11 f. 
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market power, the current theory associated with the Chicago School tends 
towards a theoretical case-by-case analysis and uses perfect competition as 
a standard of reference: 
"The term 'market power' refers to the ability of a firm (or a group of 
firms, acting jointly) to raise price above a competitive level without 
losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable 
and must be rescinded." 18 
This evaluation of market power follows logically from the price/quantity-
definition of monopoly. The existence of market power as such is of less im-
portance; with regard to antitrust theory and policy the extent of market 
power is of much greater concern. The theoretically correct Index for the 
measurement of this power Is the Lerner Index which relates price-cost mar-
gins to price and indicates deviation from an efficient resource allocation. 17 
The Lerner index must equal zero if perfect competition is prevalent, and 
Increases up to one with the extent of market power Individually held. Some 
critics of the current tenet, however, doubt that measures such as the Ler-
ner index are suitable for the general case and reject them for this rea-
son:18 
"Concepts such as the Lerner index of monopoly, relating price to mar-
ginal cost, reflect the adoption of these criteria," (i.e., performance 
criteria) "criteria which have become widely adopted principles of anti-
trust economics. Nonetheless these are incorrect criteria upon which to 
construct standards of antitrust pol icy." 
While other adherents of current theory accept such measures of market 
power in principle, they stress the problems of using these measures. For 
instance, Landes and Posner emphasize the difficulty of extricating the ne-
cessary data and especially of measuring the elasticity of demand which is 
used In the Lerner index:19 
16 Landes/Posner, Market Power In Antitrust Cases, supra, 937. 
17 Cf. Koch, Industrial Organization .•• , op. cit., 62; and Scherer, Frederic 
M., Industrial market structure and economic performance, second ed., 
Chicago 1980, p. 268. 
18 Demsetz, Harold, Economics as a Guide to Antitrust Regulation, 19 JLE 
(1976), pp. 371-388, 373. 
19 Landes/Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, supra, 943. 
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"More important is the difficulty that would face a court or an enforce-
ment agency in estimating elasticities of demand for purposes of using 
(the) approach in antitrust enforcement and adjudication." 
The dead-weight loss, which has already been discussed, seems to be the 
only concept that is accepted by all representatives of current theory. As 
has been emphasized above, this measure presents the monetary loss which 
results in an economy by virtue of the fact that a monopoly offers a smaller 
quantity than would be offered under competitive conditions.20 We have 
pointed out the practical difficulties of the model and the qualifications ne-
cessary to make use of the approach. Furthermore, the dead-weight loss is 
severely handicapped by the fact that as a rule it is static and strictly 
efficiency-orientated (in contrast to a multiple-goal approach advocated by 
us in this contribution); it therefore does not serve as a broadly enough 
based concept for the purpose of empirical proof. 
In order to find empirical evidence of supracompetitlve profits, an empiri-
cally observable relationship between factors that determine the structure of 
an industry and the resulting profits has to be constructed. In addition to 
profits, the degree of technological innovation or technological efficiency can 
be used as a criterion for measuring performance.21 Additional measures can 
only be determined vaguely.22 We have to return to so-called proxy 
variables, which will be treated further below. Our considerations will be 
based on the commonly used structure-performance studies employing such 
proxy variables. Furthermore, we will return to the problems of performance 
studies as used by traditional, after having evaluated the empirical evidence 
on the concentration-col I us Ion doctrine. 
3. Empirical Attempts to Verify the Concentratlon-colluslon Doctrine 
Empirical studies aiming to verify the concentration-collusion doctrine have 
commonly attempted to determine the role of various structural factors in 
20 Cf. the criticism of this measurement concept by Schmalensee, Another 
Look at Market Power, supra, 1793. 
21 Cf. Bain, Joe s., Industrial Organization, 2nd ed., New York et al. 19158, 
pp. 434 ff. 
22 Cf. Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 458 ff. 
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facilitating collusion. In this context, collusive behavior has been seen as an 
attempt to restrain competition, which leads to poor performance. 23 
Commonly, underlying these studies, were four different independent struc-
tural variables, used either separately or simultaneously. Competitive per-
formance was seen to be influenced primarily by the degree of market con-
centration, the size distribution of the firms (market shares), barriers to 
market entry, and the degree of product differentiation. Since the emphasis 
of the traditional studies was on the degree of market concentration as 
measured by concentration ratios or the Hirschman-Herfindahl index as pre-
sented above, we will proceed along the same lines.24 
Underlying the traditional studies are two different sets of data. Both are 
based on the Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC), which regards 
markets in terms of industries and "'delineates market breadth with a system 
of numerical codes"'. 25 The breadth of delineation runs from two-digit major 
industry groups (e.g., electrical equipment and supplies) which are broken 
down into narrower industries (e.g., five digits: electrical integrating 
Instruments) and then finally into seven-digit single product categories. 
One set of data is collected by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The 
data provided comprises the two-, three-, and four-digit levels of Industry 
aggregation in terms of the census classification scheme. This sort of 
23 Cf. Green, Industrial Organization Paradigms ••• , supra, 489; Pautler, A 
Review ... , supra, 587-591 for the original tenet presented by these stu-
dies; Singleton, Industrial Organization ••. , op. cit., 10 f.; and Weiss, 
Leonard W., The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, In: 
Goldschmid, Harvey, et al. (eds.), Industrial Concentration: The New Lear-
ning, Boston, Toronto 1974, pp. 184-233, for a survey and evaluation of 
the basic studies up to 1974. 
24 Cf. Green, Industrial Organization Paradigms .•. , supra, 484; Singleton, 
Industrial Organization ••• , op. cit., 11. 
25 Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 103; and cf. as well Koch, In-
dustrial Organization .•• , op. cit., 173-175. 
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classification is contaminated, however, since whole companies are assigned 
to their primary industry category.28 
The second set of data used Is provided by the U.S. Bureau of Census that 
collects statistics on manufacturing activity at the level of Individual plants, 
and condenses the figures to concentration ratios of the four, eight, twenty, 
and fifty largest fl rms.27 
We will infra recur to the question of general data insufficiencies being pos-
sibly responsible for spurious results in the studies presented. 
a. Empirical Evidence 
The most commonly used performance variables in the traditional studies are 
prices, profits, and price-cost margins, the latter being considered a correct 
substitute proxy for economic returns. 
aa. Concentration and Prices 
The primary proof of the concentration-collusion doctrine should come from 
a link between the degree of concentration and the level of price. If an in-
crease In concentration raises the probability of mutual interdependence, the 
actual result would be an Inelastic demand situation. This would encourage 
incumbent competitors to raise prices. Hence, an Increase In concentration Is 
associated with a rise In price. This reasoning only holds ceteris paribus, 
however, since the height of entry barriers to the market In question as 
well as the intensity of potential competition have to be considered at the 
26 Cf. Intrlligator, Michael D., et al., Conceptual Framework of an Econo-
metric Model of Industrial Organization, in: Weston, J. Fred., and Stanley 
J. Ornstein (eds.), The Impact of Large Firms on the U.S. Economy, Lex-
ington et al. 1973, pp. 23-55, 35; and Scherer, Industrial market structure 
••• , op. cit., 270: "(F)or diversified corporations, this means that vast 
amounts of irrelevant or 'contaminating' activity are loaded Into the pri-
mary Industry totals along with correctly classified primary Industry, 
profits, sales, and assets." 
27 Cf. Koch, Industrial Organization •.. , op. cit., 173-175; Shepherd, The Eco-
nomics ..• , 67-69; Scherer, Industrial market structure ..• , op. cit., 271; 
and Singleton, Industrial Organization •.. , op. cit., 16 note 21, who notes 
that Industries are defined on the basis of similarity of production pro-
cesses: ""As a result firms which do not compete with each other are 
sometimes Included in the same Industry while firms which do compete 
are sometimes not included In the same industry." 
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same time. Low barriers and strong potential competition would make the 
demand situation more elastic. 28 
Empirical studies have been performed mainly with regard to industries 
where data is available relatively easily, such as commercial loan terms in 
banking29, mortgage rates of mortgage-lending institutions30, Interest rates 
of savings bonds31, food retailing 32, and newspaper publishing.33 All of 
these studies have indicated that the net effect of increased concentration 
is a significant tendency to raise prices:31 
"Although one can, as always, quarrel with the particular samples, con-
trols, and methods employed in theses studies, their overall thrust Is 
unambiguous. Prices do tend to be higher when markets are highly 
concentrated than when they are not." 
For several reasons, however, these studies are of restricted usefulness in 
their attempts to verify the concentration-collusion doctri ne:35 
- Structural factors other than industry concentration such as, e.g., bar-
riers to entry or the extent of buying power might affect the level of 
prices in actual markets in cases where the ceteris paribus-condition no 
28 Cf. Shepherd, The Economics .•• , 126 f. for specific examples and the un-
derlying reasoning; and Pautler, A Review ..• , supra, 615-624 for a sur-
vey. 
29 Cf. Heggestad, A. and J. Mingo, Prices, Nonprices, and Concentration in 
Banking, 8 JMCB (1976), pp. 107-117; and Hester, D., Customer Relation-
ships and Terms of Loans: Evidence from a Pilot Survey, 11 JMCB (1979), 
pp. 349-357. 
30 Cf. Aspinwall, R.C., Market Structure and Commercial Bank Mortgage Inte-
rest Rates, 36 SEJ (1970), pp. 376-384. 
31 Cf. Kessel, Reuben, A Study of the Effects of Competition in the Tax-Ex-
empt Bond Market, 79 JPE (1971 ), pp. 706-738. 
32 Cf. Lamm, Richard, Prices and Concentration in the Food Retailing Indu-
stry, 30 JIE (1981 ), pp. 67-78; and Marion, Bruce W., et al., The Price and 
Profit Performance of Leading Food Chains, 61 AJAE (1979), pp. 420-433. 
33 Cf. Landon John H., The Relation of Market Concentration to Advertising 
Rates: The Newspaper Industry, 16 AB (1971), pp. 53-100. 
34 Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 288; cf. for one of the 
latest case studies, Barton, D., and R. Sherman, The Price and Profit Ef-
fects of Horizontal Merger: A Case Study, 32 JIE (1984), pp. 165-178; and 
Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 615; Greer, Industrial Organization ••• , op. 
cit., 295 f. note 1 for a largely complete survey on the studies. 
35 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 295; Pautler, A Review ..• , 
supra, 615; Smith, James L., Risk Aversion and Bidding Behavior for Off-
shore Petroleum Leases, 30 JIE (1982), pp. 251-269; Scherer, Industrial 
market structure .•. , op. cit., 287; Walker, H.D., Market Power and Price 
Levels in the Ethical Drug Industry, Bloomington, Ind. 1971, chs. 6 and 7. 
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longer obtains. The extent to which these factors add to or subtract from 
the pricing effect is difficult to deteremine correctly. 
Prices cannot - as a rule - be compared across different markets, since 
there is no way of standardizing what constitutes a 'competitive price'. 
- There is a paucity of useful data on prices, which restricts empirical 
attempts to verify the doctrine in respect of certain industries particu-
larly those which might show irregular structural or legal features.311 
In essence, the results of the price studies can be considered crucial for a 
proper Interpretation of the profit studies to be presented because they 
might add information necessary to distinguish price-raising effects from 
cost-depressing effects that are due to scale economies:37 
"Without these price studies we could never be certain that the obser-
ved positive association between profits and concentration (or profits 
and market share) was indeed due to 'market power'. A skeptic would 
argue that the cause of the positive profit association was not market 
power pushing up prices, but rather some non-price profit-enhancing 
variable like productivity or efficiency, which would be positively but 
unmeasurably associated with concentration." 
A complex interplay of price increasing and cost decreasing-effects seems to 
be at work, the latter of which we will deal with Infra; there seems to be a 
tendency for suppliers to refrain from lowering their prices to such an 
extent as gained cost advantages would allow them to do. A study by Kel-
tofi38, who inquired into the correlation between concentration and prices in 
the field of food and tobacco products shows a durable positive and signifi-
cant correlation between the two variables In periods without inflation 
(change of the price level of 8 % when the level of concentration increased 
by 10 %).39 
36 For example, much of the banking business in the United States Is regu-
lated. This affects the results of banking studies severely, cf. Pascher, 
op. cit. 
37 Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 299, italics original; and cf. 
Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 287. 
38 Quoted from Weiss, Leonard W., Concentration and Price - A Possible Way 
out of the Box, Discussion Paper of the International Management Insti-
tute Berlin, Berlin 1984, pp. 7 ff. 
39 Cf. Weiss, Concentration and Price .•. , supra, 8. 
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bb. Concentration, Profit Rates, and Price-Cost Margins 
The concentration-profitability relationship is considered to be the probably 
most thoroughly tested hypothesis in economics.40 The pioneering study 
within the field was performed by Joe S. Bain in 1951. He tested the hypo-
thesis "that the average profit rate of firms In oligopolistic industries of a 
high concentration will tend to be significantly larger than that of firms In 
less concentrated oligopolies or In industries of atomistic structure".41 He 
collected data from 335 firms in 42 industries for the period of 1936-1940 on 
the rate of return on equity after tax (the underlying performance measure) 
and correlated this data with the eight-firm concentration ratio (the measure 
for market structure). Bain did not find a linear relationship between con-
centration and profitability as measured by rate of return on equity. Never-
theless, he found profits to be significantly above average for an eight-firm 
concentration ratio above 70%,42 
A whole spate of empirical studies followed the one performed by Bain. The 
majority of theses studies showed a significant positive correlation between 
40 Cf. Weiss, The Concentration Profits Relationship and Antitrust, op. cit., 
193. 
41 Bain, Joe S., Relation of Profit Rates to Industry Concentration: American 
Manufacturing 1936-40, 65 QJE (1951 ), pp. 293-324, 294. 
42 Cf. Bain, Relation of Profit Rates ..• , supra, 313. Probably the most recent 
of these studies are Salinger, M., Tobin's q, Unionization, and the Con-
centration Profits Relationship, RandJE (1984), pp. 159-170; and Schmalen-
see, Richard L., Do Markets Differ Much?, 75 AER (1985), pp. 341-351. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
201 
concentration or further independent structural variables and profits as the 
dependent variable across various industries:43 
"Almost all of the 32 concentration-profits studies except Stigler's have 
yielded significant positive relationships for years of prosperity or re-
cession, though they have depended on a wide variety of data and me-
thods," 
During the period of traditional studies Stigler was the only scholar to pre-
sent a deviant study. However, his different results can be traced to the 
fact that high inflation or price controls occured in the period of inquiry 
and/or to false assumptions.44 It has to be noted, however, that the concen-
tration-profitability relationship has not been statistically significant In the 
vast majority of the cases. It is disputable whether this is a consequence of 
a weak correlation or of insufficiencies of the data base. 
There was strong evidence that the contention of a strong correlation would 
hold even If different time periods were examined, different countries com-
43 Weiss, Quantitive Studies of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 371. Cf. So-
bel, Ingo, Wettbewerb und Industriestruktur: Industrial Organization -
Forschung im 0berblick, Berlin et al. 1984, 25; Greer, Industrial Organi-
zation ... , op. cit., 407; Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 195; and 
for a deviant opinion, cf. Shepherd, The Economics ... , op. cit., 128 f., 
who states that there Is actually no close correlation, essentially because 
of data problems: "(T)he correlation accounts statistically for only about 
10 percent of the variation In margins. Such a weak correlation could re-
flect errors in the data, and therefore be meaningless." Among the most 
important of these studies are Bain, Relation of Profit Rates ... , supra; 
Bain, Joe s., Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Conditions of 
Entry In Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AER (1954), pp. 15-39; Bain, 
Joe S., Barriers to New Competition, Cambridge, Mass. 1956; Collins, Nor-
man R., and Lee E. Preston, Price-Cost Margins and Industry Structure, 
51 RES (1969), pp. 271-286; Comanor, William S., and Thomas A. Wilson, 
Advertising, Market Structure and Performance, 49 RES (1967), pp. 423-
458; Mann, H. Michael, Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates 
of Return in Thirty Industries, 1950-1960, 48 RES (1966), pp. 296-327; 
Rhoades, Stephen A., and J.M. Cleaver, The Nature of Concentration-Price/ 
Cost Margin Relationship for 353 Manufacturing Industries: 1967, 40 SEJ 
(1973), pp. 90-102; and Shepherd, William G., The Elements of Market 
Structure, 54 RES (1972), pp. 25-37. 
44 Cf., e.g., Kilpatrick, Robert W., Stigler on the Relationship Between Indu-
stry Profit Rates and Market Concentration, 76 JPE (1968), pp. 479-488; 
and for the study, Stigler, George J., Capita! and Rates of Return in Ma-
nufacturing Industries, Princeton, N.J. 1963. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
202 
pared, and varying profitability definitions chosen. 45 
Most of the traditional empirical tests of the concentration-performance rela-
tionship chose average after-tax profit-rates ("rate of return on equity 
after tax") for leading firms whose primary product was assigned to the in-
dustry according to the SIC. The use of rather simple profit rates has dis-
appeared over time, current emphasis being placed on the following measu-
res of profitability as substitute proxy variables:4ll 
- rate of return on equity as an indication of the profitability of the firm's 
invested capital, and therefore of misaliocatlon of resources and ineffi-
ciency; at the same time, this is the actual variable to be maximized by 
the shareholder; 
- rate of return on assets; 
rate of return on sales; it remains ambiguous whether or not allocative In-
efficiency can be measured by means of this variable; 47 
price cost margins, which have been used with increasing frequency in 
recent studies as a substitute proxy for the Lerner index; and 
- Tobin's q, which tries to avoid the problems associated with the differen-
ces In profitability definitions . .ce 
The rate of return on equity and price cost-margins have received the most 
attention in recent studies. Their advantages and disadvantages will be dealt 
with infra. 
45 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 407 f.: "Given this wide va-
riety of tests, the general consistency of a positive concentration-profit 
relationship is impressive"; Kilpatrick, Robert W., The Validity of the Ave-
rage Concentration Ratio as a Measure of Industrial Structure, SEJ (1976), 
pp. 711-715; Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 278 f.; and 
Singleton, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 11. 
46 For an In depth discussion of the performance variables used, cf. Sche-
rer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 276-280; and Weiss, The 
Concentration Profits Relationship and Antitrust, op. cit., 198-200. 
47 For the contrary positions cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 
407, and Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 191. 
48 The advantage of this variable is to be seen in the fact that the "capital 
market valuation of rents appropriately incorporates firm risk, corres-
ponds to an equilibrium valuation of rents and minimizes any distortions 
introduced by tax laws and accounting conventions", Smirlock, Michael, 
Thomas Gilligan and William Marshall, Tobin's q and Structure-Performance 
Relationship, 74 AER (1984), pp. 1051-1060, 1054. 
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b. Collusion and "Crltlcal Levels" of Concentration 
In concentration profitability studies there Is a strong tendency to deter-
mine whether there exists a continuous or discontinuous· relationship bet-
ween concentration and profitability, i.e. whether or not a steady upward 
progression of profitability may be found as industry concentration increa-
ses.•9 Such a break in the concentration-profitability relationship could be 
of Importance as a sound theoretical basis for antimerger policy because 
"(i)f such a break existed, and it could be attributed to market power, 
and if the breakpoint was relatively stable over a large class of mar-
kets, then one might be able to devise an antlmerger policy that would 
slow the movement of concentration above the critical level" .!10 
For studies performed on the basis of U.S. samples the results have been 
unambiguous, even if we consider the variety of performance measures used. 
The four-firm concentration ratio CR• was detected to be between 45 and 
60% of the market in question and betwe1:;:-1 60 and 70% for the eight firm 
concentration ratio CRa. 51 Areeda and Turner assert that this does not imply 
enough consensus on what the critical levels are, actually, because a span 
of discretion is left. This follows from the contention that four-firm concen-
49 Cf., e.g., Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 280. For a sur-
vey on the studies cf. Bradburd, Ralph M., and A. Mead Over, Organiza-
tional Costs, "Sticky Equilibria", and Critical Levels of Concentration, 64 
RES (1982), pp. 50-58, 50 f. 
50 Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 637. Furthermore, such a critical concentra-
tion ratio would be consistent with the approach of the contribution sub-
mitted since we prefer a combination of structure-conduct approach. A 
continuous relationship among the variables is found by Collins/Preston, 
Price-Cost Margins and Industry Structure, supra; Kamerschen, David, 
The Determination of Profit Rates in "Oligopolistic" Industries, 42 JB 
(1969), pp. 293-301. 
51 Cf. Bain, Relation of Profit Rates ... , supra; Dalton, James E., and David W. 
Penn, The Concentration/Profitability Relationship: Is There a Critical 
Concentration Ratio?, 25 JIE (1976), pp. 133-142; Meehan, James W. and 
Thomas Duchesneau, The Critical Level of Concentration: An Empirical 
Analysis, 22 JIE (1973), pp. 21-30; Rhoades/Cleaver, The Nature of Con-
centration-Price/Cost Margin Relationship ... , supra; and White, Lawrence 
J., Searching for the Critical Industrial Concentration Ratio, in: Goldfeld, 
Stephen; and Richard E. Quandt (eds.), Studies In Non-Linear Estimation, 
Cambridge, Mass. 1976, pp. 61-75. 
Deviating from this span Is Stigler, George J., The Organization of Indu-
stry, Homewood, Ill. 1968, p. 59, who asserts a critical CR• of 80%. 
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tration levels CR4 below 55-60% are not likely to foster collusion, whereas, if 
these CR4 ratios are higher than 75-80% collusive conduct is rather llkely.s2 
Additionally, a variety of abstrusnesses justifies a closer look at the ambi-
guous results. To begin with, there seems to be a significant difference 
between high and low concentration industries in that no such break point 
of profitability presumably exists in low concentration industries.!13 The poo-
ling of low and high concentration industries in samples might be biasing 
the relationship, and hence may be inappropriate for the determination of a 
critical level of concentration.54 
Furthermore, Kwoka found out that especially the four-firm concentration 
ratio has the tendency to mask the possible asymmetry and Importance of 
individual firm shares of the market. When introducing the market shares of 
the top four firms it was seen that the shares of the top two firms were 
consistently positive and at the same time significant, whereas the coeffici-
ents of the third and fourth largest firms were negative and often insignifi-
cant.5S This has shattered the whole traditional field of concentration-profi-
tability studies and has led to the contention that the two-firm concen-
tration ratio is the correct structural variable. There has been found to be 
a profitability break at a CR2 of 35%. This seems to indicate that four-firm 
concentration ratios carry a rather strong bias due to data aggregation and 
hence it can be contended that "concentration by itself may not be detri-
mental, but that dominance may be a more important problem".se As a result, 
firm dominance as documented by CR, and CR2 may be considered the real 
source of market power rather than collusion via simple four firm industry 
concentration If the tenet held. A critical concentration ratio would simply 
52 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ..• , vol. 4, op. cit., § 910d. 
53 Cf. Rhoades/Cleaver, The Nature ..• , supra. 
54 Cf. Dalton/Penn, The Concentration/Profitability Relationship •. ,, supra. 
55 Cf. Kwoka, John E., Large-Firm Dominance and Price/Cost Margins in 
Manufacturing Industries, 44 SEJ (1977), pp. 183-189; and Kwoka, John E., 
The Effects of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance, 61 
RES (1979), pp. 101-109. 
56 Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 645. This has been assumed implicitly already 
by Mann, H. Michael, Asymmetry, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return 
in Twenty-Six Concentrated Industries, 8 WEJ (1970), pp. 86-89; and do-
cumented by Shepherd, The Elements of Market Structure, supra. 
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be the outcome of a bias due to data aggregation. This has been confirmed 
by later studies,57 
c. The Sultablllty of Different Performance Criteria 
The suitability of a performance measure has to be determined by its ability 
to indicate the existence of nontransitory market power, hence to Indicate 
the ability to raise price above the competitive level for an extended period 
of time. For the time being, it is "difficult to reach confident judgments 
except where excess returns are indicated by all or most of the plausible 
techniques of measurement". 511 At the heart of the discussion lies the ques-
tion of which performance variable serves the purpose of indicating market 
power best, which variable can be used to proxy a theoretically correct in-
dex if this is found to be inoperational, and which measurement technique Is 
finally to be applied in actual empirical studies. 59 
It is often contended that the economic rate of return is the sole superior 
indicator of monopoly or market power and that the validity of performance 
measures is judged by whether they are able to serve as a proxy for eco-
nomic rates of return. 110 This does not seem to be correct, however, since 
the choice among different performance measures rather depends on the un-
derlying purpose of the study within which the measure is used. Conclu-
57 Cf. Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 649: "Since at least 1977, the emphasis 
has shifted toward the market-dominance problem, and the large market 
shares held by leading firms have become the focus of attention." Cf. as 
well, e.g., Kwoka, John E., and David J. Ravenscraft, Collusion, Rivalry, 
Scale Economies, and Line of Business Profitability, Washington, D.C. 1982. 
58 Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., § 512a. 
59 For an extensive pros and cons survey on different performance measu-
res cf. Long, William F., and David J. Ravenscraft, The Misuse of Accoun-
ting Rates of Return: A Comment, 74 AER (1984), pp. 494-500, 495 f.; and 
Weiss, The Concentration Profits Relationship and Antitrust, op. cit., 198 
f. 
60 Cf., e.g., Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., § 512c; Fisher, 
Franklin M., and John J. McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of 
Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AER (1983), pp. 82-97, 82: "Thus, the 
economic rate of return Is the only correct measure of the profit rate for 
the purpose of economic analysis. Accounting rates of return are useful 
Insofar as they yield information as to economic rates of return." 
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sively, strong doubt can be cast on the hypothesis that economic returns 
are the sole valid basis.81 
Because of inoperationality, the theoretically correct variable has to be 
proxied by a substitute in every case. The crucial question that has been 
discussed In this context is whether or not accounting profit data is able to 
reflect economic returns due to monopoly power.82 It was concluded that 
"the accounting rate of return ... is a misleading measure of the economic 
rate of return ... (t)hus comparisons of accounting rates of return to make 
inferences about monopoly profits is a baseless procedure".83 
Although this reproach has to be rejected since it is based on a variety of 
false calculations and is tested on the basis of performance criteria other 
than profitability-on-sales which substitutes for the Lerner index quite cor-
rectly, cautiousness is recommended in making a choice about the correct 
61 Cf. Long/Ravenscraft, The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return: A Com-
ment, supra, 495: "The correct definition of profit depends on the context 
in which it is employed ... Existing evidence suggests that the Lerner in-
dex, which can be approximated by profit/sales, better reflects the de-
gree of monopoly power." For a reasoning along the same line, cf. Koch, 
Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 191 f. 
62 Cf. Brozen, Yale, The Persistence of "High Rates of Return" in High 
Stable Concentration Industries, 14 J LE (1971 ), pp. 501-512, 512; Pautler, 
A Review ... , supra, 580 note 22; Fisher/ McGowan, On the Misuse of Ac-
counting Rates of Return ... , supra, 82: "Such a procedure is valid only 
to the extent that profits are Indeed monopoly profits, accounting profits 
are in fact economic profits, and the accounting rate of return equals the 
economic rate of return." 
63 Fisher/McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return ... , supra, 
89; and cf. as well Brozen, Yale, The Significance of Profit Data for Anti-
trust Policy, in: Weston, J. Fred, and Sam Peltzman (eds.), Public Policies 
Toward Mergers, Pacific Palisades 1969, pp. 110-127; but cf. Scherer, Fre-
deric M., On the Current State of Knowledge in Industrlal Organization, 
In: de Jong, Henk W., and William G. Shepherd (eds.), Mainstreams in In-
dustrial Organization - Book 2, Dordrecht et al. 1986, pp. 5-22, 9, who 
notes that data problems are always difficult to deal with: "(E)veryone 
admits that accounting data are Imperfect, and It is virtually impossible 
to prove the negative proposition that the problems are not so serious as 
to preclude valid inferences. Much seems to hinge on basic matters of 
faith ... Attempts to test the robustness of structure-performance regres-
sion results to variations In accounting conventions have shown no signi-
ficant sensitivity", citation omitted. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
207 
accounting rate of return,84 Nevertheless, a survey of empirical studies 
relating accounting earning changes to stock market price changes, the lat-
ter being an indicator for economic returns, finds strong evidence of a 
significant correlation between the two and no evidence that large deviations 
are common.s5 
The most suitable proxy variable for the Lerner index are price-cost mar-
gins which have been introduced by Collins and Preston. They are calcula-
ted by subtracting the marginal cost approximated by variable costs from 
the price and relating this difference to the price. Return on sales is pro-
perly used as a proxy for the price-cost margin.88 If we assume average 
costs not to be constant, the price-cost margin is a function of the Lerner 
index and the elasticity of the average cost curve, and is considered to 
have "both sound theoretical roots and the considerable practical advantages 
of availability and reliability"87 because of the interrelatedness with the 
theoretically correct performance measure. 
Although It does not Indicate resource misallocation as, e.g., return on the 
firm's equity does, it serves as an indicator of the firms' ability to raise 
prices above the competitive level. This is of importance for the contribution 
submitted in that "an excess of price over average variable cost is likely to 
provide a reasonably accurate measure of the degree of market power".88 
64 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., § 512c; Long/Ravens-
craft, The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return: A Comment, supra, 494; 
and Stauffer, Thomas, The Measurement of Corporate Rates of Return: A 
Generalized Formulation, 2 BJE (1971 ), pp. 434-469, 467 f.: "Most firms or 
industries are little affected by the corrections, which partly vindicates 
the accounting rate of return as a practical tool. There are certain egre-
gious counter-examples, however." 
65 Cf. Beaver, William H., Financial Reporting: An Accounting Revolution, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1981, p. 118. 
66 Cf. Collins/Preston, Price-Cost Margins and Industry Structure, supra, 
and Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 591; and Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law 
... , vol. 2, op. cit., § 513a: "(P)ersistent and substantial differences bet-
ween price and marginal cost strongly suggest either that excess returns 
have in fact been earned or that they could have been even though the 
books show otherwise. Accounting profits might understate the firm's 
true profits or reflect non-competitive policy choices." 
67 Kwoka, John E., The Effects of Market Share Distribution ... , supra, 101. 
68 Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 2, op. cit., § 513b; and Koch, Indu-
strial Organization ... , op. cit., 191; but cf. Liebowitz, S. J., What Do Cen-
sus Price-Cost Margins Measure?, 25 JLE (1982), pp. 231-246, 246: "I have 
found that the census-price-cost margin does not measure the variable it 
was purported to measure, nor is It much of a proxy for more traditional 
profit measures." 
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d. Insufficiencies of the Traditional Studies 
We have concluded that most of the traditional empirical studies on the con-
centration-profit relationship find a strong correlation among the variables. 
However, a number of restrictions have to be mentioned with regard to the 
studies especially with regard to the ones using aggregated industry data 
and leading to a somewhat weaker correlation between concentration and 
profits: 
- Often limited samples of data for too short a period of time were used; 
thus a certain source of bias was assumed due to the fact that time peri-
ods were picked randomly, The positive correlation would be assumed to 
disappear if other periods of time were chosen for the inquiry.89 
- In essence, the first point is closely associated with the contention that 
excess profits are only a temporary problem and will be eroded over time 
in every case.7° The logical conclusion to be drawn from the observation 
that competitors' profitability In various industries remains above average 
over time, is considered to be proof of some kind of (efficiency) superio-
rity of Incumbents versus potential competitors. 
- As we have already mentioned supra, the level of profit is not solely in-
fluenced by the degree of concentration. Other structural variables such 
as barriers to entry, market share, firm size, capital requirements, and 
the stage of market evolution influence the level of profits as well and 
must therefore be analyzed individually and be carefully distinguished 
from one another. The attempt to determine their influence by means of 
multiple regression analysis may lead to multicolinearity, possibly overem-
phasizing the role of the degree of industry concentration,71 
- Another source of uncertainty is that economic rents differ from book-
keeping profit rates. To what extent these differ from each other and may 
become arbitrary, therefore, would have to be evaluated in each individual 
case, as to the extent to which such a difference would affect the empiri-
69 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 410; and Scherer, Industrial 
market structure ... , op. cit., 277 f. 
70 Cf., e.g., Brozen, Yale, Concentration and Structural and Market 0lsequl-
llbrla, 16 AB (1971 ), pp. 241-248; and Brozen, The Persistence of "High 
Rates of Return" ... , supra. 
71 Cf. Bobel, Wettbewerb und Industriestruktur ... , op. cit., 26 and 55; Koch, 
Industrial Organization •.. , op. cit., 195; and Scherer, Industrial market 
structure, 279. 
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cal study in question.72 The longer the time period over which economic 
rents and book-keeping profit rates are compared, the less should be the 
difference between the two If average values are juxtaposed. 
- The main criticism of the traditional studies is the use of data which is 
aggregated on an industry level. By aggregating the data, potential expla-
natory variables may lose their importance in explaining profitability 
differentials among competitors, since the profitability of market leaders 
may be exaggerated. 
This contention is supposed to be backed up by the finding that the si-
multaneous introduction of additional structural variables leads to a some-
what weaker concentration-profitability relationship. This might either be 
a reason for the weak correlation due to an averaging of the profit rates 
or a reason for the correlation to be spurious.73 In essence, this seems to 
be the main cause of the uncertainty that remains in the attempt to sepa-
rate efficiency from market power effects with regard to the causal relati-
onship between concentration and efficiency. 74 This implies a strong need 
for data on a firm or commodity group level. 
The use of cross-sectional data is a final point that is put forward against 
traditional concentration-profitability data and leads to to the contention 
that "interindustry or intermarket comparisons of profits are irrelevant 
72 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 406; Hagerman, Robert L., 
and Lemma W. Senbet, A Test of Accounting Bias and Market Structure, 
49 JB (1976), pp. 509-514; Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 195 f.; 
Brozen, The Significance of Profit Data for Antitrust Policy, op. cit.; and 
Weiss, The Concentration Profits Relationship and Antitrust, op. cit., 196, 
state the opposite case that the relationship Is rather underestimated due 
to the data problems: "The reported rates of return can vary a great 
deal depending on which of many accounting conventions are used. Even 
if the choice of accounting conventions were randomly distributed among 
firms, such variations would introduce errors that would reduce the cor-
relation between concentration and profits." This seems to be in accor-
dance with the findings on the robustness of such studies with regard to 
changes in the performance measure. 
73 Cf. Schmidt, Inge, and Jan B. Rittaler, Die Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis: Wettbewerbstheoretische und -politische Analyse elnes Credos, 
Baden-Baden 1986, p. 60; and Scherer, On the Current State of Knowledge 
in Industrial Organization, op. cit., 8: "Let me make the point more 
strongly: At least for the United States, the many studies that found a 
positive association between aggregated industry profits and concentrati-
on were almost surely spurious, the victims of aggregation biases." 
74 Cf. Greer, Industrial Organization ..• , op. cit., 412 f.; Koch, Industrial Or-
ganization .•. , op. cit., 191 and 195; and Shepherd, The Economics ... , op. 
cit., 128. 
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because they Indicate nothing about what would happen to profits if con-
centration within an industry or market changed".75 
Furthermore, the alleged relationship seems to be evidently stronger in con-
sumer goods industries than in producer goods Industries because of 
knowledgeable Industrial buyers who may hold a certain amount of buyer 
power as well.78 
II. Jhe Yolldltv of the Halolloe Paradigm and the New Learnlos-Hvoothesls 
Since the 1970s, the validity of the mainline paradigm underlying the tradi-
tional approach to industry concentration and mergers was attacked on the 
grounds of two propositions. The explicit so-called new learning hypothesis 
held that industry concentration trends occur because of interfirm efficiency 
differences. 1 This was accompanied by the more implicit suggestion that the 
new learning hypothesis makes the concentration-collusion doctrine loose its 
theoretical foundation because it was concluded that concentration and collu-
sion are not as a rule necessarily associated with each other.2 
1. Efficiency as a Cause of Concentration 
With regard to the first proposition, the traditional industrial organization 
approach assumed that it was necessary for firms in an industry to achieve 
a certain size in order to be efficient in the sense of having lower average 
costs, assuming access of competitors to almost identical common technology 
and the presence of economies of scale.3 This led to the chain of causation, 
which asserted that size as a result of an expansion of output would cause 
lower costs and, therefore, increase (productive) efficiency. 
75 Greer, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 412 italics original. 
76 Cf., e.g., Collins/Preston, Price-Cost Margins and Industry Structure, su-
pra. 
Cf., e.g., Demsetz, Harold, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public 
Policy, 16 JLE (1973), pp. 1-9. 
2 Cf., for Instance, Brozen, Yale, The Concentration-Collusion Doctrine, 46 
ALJ (1977), pp. 826-856. 
3 Cf. Bain, Joe S., Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of 
Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AER (1954), pp. 15-39. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
211 
However, within the current context, the relation between concentration and 
profits has undergone reinterpretation. Accordingly, concentration has to be 
perceived as an expression of efficiency (the actual so-called new learning) 
and therefore higher profits are an expression of efficiency as well. Compe-
titors that have attained a large market share allegedly satisfy the wants of 
consumers better than smaller firms, regard less of the degree of industry 
concentration. Hence an increasing degree of concentration means aggressive 
competitive behavior primarily due to efficiency differences with prices close 
to long-run costs. 4 Declining concentration would be an indicator of carteli-
zation or monopolistic price behavior, however, because entry of newcomers 
due to supracompetitive profits would be stimulated and this in turn would 
lead to the erosion of excess profits. 5 Newcomers would immediately erode 
monopoly power that is not based on efficiency. For instance, what may look 
like a resource monopoly in the short run is actually an expression of com-
petition in the long run; therefore, such monopoly positions cannot be main-
tained.e As a result, it could be concluded that profits which have not been 
eroded over a long time show that a firm operates efficiently in the market. 
In this line of reasoning, concentration is considered to be absolutely neces-
sary in some markets in order to achieve economic efficiency. According to 
the view of this tenet, different levels of efficiency lead to an elimination of 
weaker competitors and thereby to concentration (efficiency causes concen-
tration). Therefore, the size of the firm that is realized through internal 
growth, for instance, is also the most efficient size for the firm.7 Whereas 
the traditional mainline paradigm ascribed supracompetitive profits in mar-
kets to increased concentration and barriers to entry, barriers to entry are 
regarded here as a reward for high risk and superior efficiency, or as 
being the result of a natural monopoly which would not allow for further 
competitors.8 For the mainline paradigm, profits that have not been eroded 
4 Cf. Kallfass, Hermann H., Die Chicago School - Eine Skizze des "neuen" 
amerikanischen Ansatzes fUr die Wettbewerbspolltik, 30 wuw (1980), pp. 
596-601, 597. 
5 Cf. Brozen, The Concentration-Collusion Doctrine, supra, 830. 
6 Cf. Klrzner, Israel M., Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago 1973, pp. 
205 ff., for the similar Neo-Austrian point of view. 
7 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 192. 
8 Cf. Scherer, Frederic M., The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from 
Chaff, 86 YLJ (1977), pp. 974-1001, 995 ff., and Posner, Richard A., The 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 UPLR (1979), pp. 925-952, 945. 
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by competition in the long run indicate market power in that "they show 
clearly that there is some impediment to effective imitation of the firm in 
question".9 
2. Concentration May Possibly Cause Collusion 
A far-reaching consensus with the mainline paradigm remained on the view 
that the likelihood of collusion would increase with growing concentration 
because of the perception of Increased mutual interdependence among firms. 
Here the idea of mutual interdependence is accepted - In contradiction of 
the general reasoning (!). However, a possible abuse through an exertion of 
monopoly power would become well-known to potential competitors and this 
would Induce new entry. Moreover, collusion could be recognized easily by 
the antitrust authorities and therefore be dealt with at once. As a result, 
the proposition of the mainline paradigm that market concentration serves as 
a substitute proxy for and an indication of collusion and should therefore 
be of antitrust concern, became subject to criticism on the grounds that 
public policy intervention may discourage competitive conduct that would 
otherwise promote efficiency. 10 
According to the current reasoning, explicit collusion, i.e., conspiracy or 
concerted action (cf. Sec. Sherman Act), and Implicit collusion or spon-
taneous coordination (cf. the control of market dominating groups under Art. 
86 Treaty of Rome and under Sec. 22 para. 2 ARC in Germany), which is not 
covered by U.S. antitrust law, are judged in a different manner. 11 
(1) In order not to reject American antitrust policy in toto, the current te-
net expresses the opinion12 that horizontal price conspiracies should be 
prohibited, since collective monopolies have the same effect on price and 
output as an individual monopoly. The tendency towards conspiracy in-
creases when concentration increases and the number of competitors de-
9 Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, supra, 1806. 
10 Cf. Demsetz, Economics as a Gulde to Antitrust Regulation, supra, 383, and 
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 193: ""(T)o explain industrial concen-
tration on grounds other than efficiency, ... will prove difficult or im-
possible to do •.. ". 
11 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School ••• , supra, 932 f. and 944 - 946. 
12 Posner, The Chicago School ..• , supra, 932: ""Partly, perhaps, for tactical 
reasons (not to seem to reject antitrust policy in its entirety), the mem-
bers of the Chicago School would sometimes denounce price fixing." 
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creases. The necessity of public policy and legislation is accepted at least 
to this extent.13 
(2) Neglecting the position of Stigler who regards tacit or implicit collusion, 
i.e., spontaneous coordination as a problem in markets with high interde-
pendence due to a high degree of concentration, the other representa-
tives of the current tenet deny that implicit collusion actually restrains 
competition (i.e., favoring conscious parallelism). 14 It is not denied that 
concentration Is an important factor in facilitating collusion. However, the 
question of how excessive profits can exist without attracting newcomers 
in the long run is seen to be the core issue since it is assumed that the 
entry of newcomers would cause an immediate or gradual price decline.15 
This would necessarily lead to the suggestion that supracompetitive profits 
that have not been caused by efficiency, but rather by implicit collusion, 
would have the effect of lowering concentration because of entry by new-
comers or It would force firms to lower their prices in order to prevent 
newcomers from entering the market (e.g, by means of limit pricing). This 
reasoning takes for granted, however, that Ideal markets without any bar-
13 Cf. e.g. Demsetz, Economics as a Guide, supra, 383, and Bork, The Anti-
trust Paradox, op. cit., 406. Vertical arrangements, however, have to be 
judged in an unrestricted and completely different way, according to 
Bork because they do not have any output consequences: "Vertical price 
fixing (resale price maintenance), vertical market division (closed dealer 
territories), and, indeed, all vertical restraints are beneficial to con-
sumers and should for that reason be completely lawful", Bork, The Anti-
trust Paradox, op. cit., 297. 
14 Cf. the omnibus volume on the economic and legal problems of conscious 
parallelism, 13 The Journal for Reprints of Antitrust Law and Economics 
(1982), pp. 581 ff. 
15 It Is assumed that due to changing conditions with regard to demand, 
technology, and different cost situations, collusion that is favored by oli-
gopolistic interdependence between the firms is In practice very difficult 
to deal with, Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 92: "Conventional oli-
gopoly theory, however, is little more than a guess about the ways In 
which firms might be able to behave in a market composed of a few sel-
lers." This cannot be considered new knowledge, however, since the de-
terminants of cartelizatlon have been known for some time, cf. Koch, 
James V., Industrial Organization and Prices, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1980, pp. 424-428; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspollti k und Kartellrecht: 
Eine EinfOhrung, 2nd ed. Stuttgart 1987, pp. 112 f. 
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riers to entry are the rule rather than the exception - an assumption which 
we have already dealt with critically in one of the preceding sections. 16 
3. The Theoretical Basis and the Empirical Evidence of the New Learning 
The main contention of the new-learning hypothesis is that a strict merger 
control carries with it the peril of sacrificing efficiencies due to scale eco-
nomies and related nontechnical efficiencies. 17 Consequently, the industry's 
structure is the result of differing efficiencies of firms over time. However, 
the unwarranted assumption underlying this assertion is that the improve-
ment of efficiency is the only motivation for concentration. 18 A high degree 
of concentration is regarded as the result of superior abilities on the part 
of entrepreneurs. According to this line of thinking, it is important whether 
the firm has reached its efficient size by internal or external horizontal 
growth. 1' 
In this context, representatives of the Chicago School speak of "competitive 
effectiveness", emphasizing that the approach does not only apply to mecha-
nistic or technical processes. Productive efficiency is not only determined 
by economies of scale and transaction-cost efficiencies but also by speciali-
zation advantages, ability to obtain capital, management skills, etc. 
A positive correlation between concentration and profits is acknowledged by 
economists adhering to the current tenet. However, they would consider the 
relationship to be spurious, misinterpreted, or overstated for a number of 
16 Accordingly, the sustainability of profits has to be viewed in the context 
of market barriers. If the latter are not substantial, persistent profits 
really have to be considered an outcome of superior efficiency. 
17 Cf. Brozen, Yale, Concentration, Mergers, and Public Policy, New York 
1982, p. 11; McGee, John S., Efficiency and Economies of Size, in: Gold-
schmid, Harvey, et al. (eds.), Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, 
Boston, Toronto 1974, pp. 55-97; and Posner, Richard A., The Chicago 
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 UPLR (1979), pp. 925-952, 940. But cf. 
Stigler, George J., The Economies of Scale, 1 JLE (1958), pp. 54-71, who 
regards economies of scale as such as being negligible beyond rather 
small scales. 
18 Cf. Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission IV: Fortschritte bei der Kon-
zentrationserfassung, Baden-Baden 1982, ch. VI: "Motives of concentra-
tion", in which the German Monopolies Commission deals with the different 
underlying causes of concentration (for instance, legal framework, 
imperfect capital markets, patents, striving for market power, etc.). 
19 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox ..• , op. cit., 164. 
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reasons. Productive efficiency should not be seen as analogous to or even 
confused with profitability, since the relative efficiency of a firm is not 
evaluated by its profit rates but by its relative success in the market-
place:20 
"Productive efficiency, like allocative efficiency, is a normative concept 
and is defined and measured in terms of consumer welfare. Since a free 
market system assumes that consumers define their own welfare, it fol-
lows that productive efficiency consists in offering anything whether 
products or services, that consumers are willing to pay for." 
Again, this argument presupposes that (overproportlonate) internal and ex-
ternal growth only occurs because of superior efficiency. According to empi-
rical estimates trying to find evidence for this view, a divestiture of con-
centrated industries with CR• more than 50 % would result in cost increases 
of about 20 % and price increases of about 15 %. 21 Since the market struc-
tures resulting from unfettered competition are considered to be an outflow 
of superior efficiency and since efficiency is the goal of antitrust policy, no 
reason for interference emerges. An abuse of power in concentrated indu-
stries would result in a natural deconcentration of the industry since effi-
cient newcomers would enter the market by virtue of the non-existence of 
barriers to entry.22 Even leaving aside the issue of efficiency, the dives-
titure of industries does not seem to be practicable.23 
20 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 104 f. This deprives the antitrust 
analyst of an operational criterion for the determination of market power 
since 'success in the market' embodies a tautology: Everything that pre-
vails in the end is successful, regardless of the conditions and circum-
stances present, cf., e.g., McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, op. 
cit., 88 f. 
21 Cf. Peltzman, Sam, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentation, 20 
JLE ( 1977), pp. 229-263. But see Scherer, Frederic M., The Causes and 
Consequences of Rising Industrial Concentration, 22 JLE (1979), pp. 191-
208, 208: "(T)here is no reason to suppose that deconcentration need Im-
pose efficiency sacrifices as long as government enforcement agencies 
and courts do not behave like bulls in (vitreous) china shops." 
22 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School ..• , supra, 946. 
23 Posner, The Chicago School ... , op. cit., 79: "Any proceeding to deconcen-
trate an industry by reorganizing the major firms into smaller units 
would probably be cumbersome, protracted and indeed unmanageable." Cf. 
also Schmidt, Ingo, Different Approaches and Problems In Dealing with 
Control of Market Power: A Comparison of German, European, and U.S. 
Antitrust Policy Towards Market Dominating Enterprises, 28 AB (1983), pp. 
417-460, who reviews the prohibitive difficulties in divesting firms. 
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Effective divestiture would presuppose a knowledge of the optimal market 
stucture, which does not exist on account of the complexity of market for-
ces. Therefore, divestiture could not be carried out in a constitutional way. 
The aforementioned shortcomings of the traditional studies have been empha-
sized in a number of empirical studies, which try to lend support to the 
new learning hypothesis:24 
- The most Important reason is the existence of aggregation biases which 
would make results spurious. This is one of the results issuing from Dem-
setz' work. It Is concluded that the positive correlation between concen-
tration and profits is only valid for firms with a large market share in an 
oligopoly (core of the oligopoly), but not for the fringe of small firms in a 
(partial) oligopoly because "'the differential profitability of large firms did 
not fall as concentration (and the probability of collusion) increased".25 If 
collusion caused the profits-concentration relationship all competitors and 
not just the ones owning large market shares in a market would attain 
supracompetitlve proflts. 211 This need not necessarily be the case, how-
ever, since collusion might only be an advantage to the core of the oligo-
poly, whereas fringe firms - more or less - have to act as price takers. 
In addition to economies of scale, experience-effects from cumulated pro-
24 Among the most important are, Brozen, Yale, Bain's Concentration and 
Rates of Return Revisited, 14 JLE (1971 ), pp. 351-369; Brozen, Concentra-
tion and Structural and Market Disequili bria, supra; Brozen, The Persis-
tence of "High Rates of Return" ... , supra; Carter, John R., Collusion, 
Efficiency and Antitrust, 21 JLE (1978), pp. 435-444; Demsetz, Industry 
Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, supra; Demsetz, Harold, Two 
Systems of Belief about Monopoly, in: Goldschmid, Harvey J., et al. (eds.), 
Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, Boston 1974, pp. 164-184; 
Gale, Bradley T., and Ben S. Branch, Concentration versus Market Share: 
Which Determines Performance and Why Does it Matter?, 27 AB (1982), pp. 
83-106; Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentatlon, sup-
ra; Smirlock/Gilligan/ Marshall, Tobin's q ... , supra. 
25 Singleton, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 47; and for the study, Dem-
setz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, supra, 7 f.; 
although empirical efforts to verify the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm and, therefore, implicitly the concentration-collusion doctrine 
are rejected, the scholars associated with current theory now heavily 
draw on such studies to prove their hypotheses. 
26 The essence of the findings holds that "(c)oncentrated Industries, then, 
will typically consist of several large, relatively efficient firms sharing 
the majority of the market and a fringe of many smaller, less profitable 
firms. The industry profit rate in such concentrated industries will be 
above average precisely because the large profitable firms share the ma-
jority of the market. The above-average profit rate In such Industries 
wlll emphatically not be the result of collusive output restriction", 
Singleton, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 47, italics original. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
217 
duction (learning by doing), goodwill, and the difference in the quality of 
management are used in order to explain superior performance and hence 
concentration tendencies27; the latter factors Imply the realization of a 
more favorable production and cost function, the actual realization of 
which seems at least disputable. Demsetz draws the conclusion that the 
absolute cost advantages, economies of scale or other efficiencies which 
are due to Individual firm superiority, are the reason for the higher pro-
fits.28 The underlying reasoning results from an Industry profile (firms 
A-L), a market price, and different total costs such as the ones depicted: 
lJ.i:...t. Industry Profile 
$ 
C D E 
-- --~ 




~ Singleton, Ross C., Industrial Organization and Antitrust: A Survey of Alternative Perspectives, 
Coluabus, Ohio 1986, p. 48. 
- Persistent profits are concluded to be an Indicator of efficiency as a re-
sult of the underlying potential competition doctrlne.29 This doctrine holds 
27 Cf. Alchian, Armen, and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, 
and Economic Organization, 62 AER (1972), pp. 777-795, 777; Green, Indu-
strial Organization ... , supra, 484; and Kallfass, Die Chicago School .•• , 
supra, 598. 
28 Cf. as well Brozen, Bain's Concentration .•. , supra, 367: "(I)t seems that 
the less concentrated industries were less concentrated because that was 
the efficient pattern of organization just as the more concentrated be-
came so because that was the efficient way to organize them. The market 
selected the appropriate structure for each industry." This makes the 
disaggregation of data a primary task for subsequent empirical research. 
29 Cf., e.g., Clark, John Bates, The Control of Trusts, New York 1901. 
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that "(n)o matter how concentrated an industry, external competition will 
constrain the collusive behavior of entered flrms".30 
- Criticism on the underlying empirical test to verify the traditional tenet 
rests on the alleged insufficiency of the kind of data (accounting data) 
and the data base used ( FTC, IRS, PIMS, or SIC data). The results of for-
mer empirical studies are furthermore considered to be spurious because 
problems in the sampling techniques result from the general use of a 
small number of industries and profit rates for few firms at a point in 
time rather than at several points.31 Hence, the choice of the underlying 
sampling techniques has to be considered in interpreting the results. 
- Concentrated Industries were found to have profits below equilibrium and 
unconcentrated industries to show profits above equilibrium. This sug-
gests that industries earning low profits are therefore held to be collu-
sive more likely than concentrated and high profitability industries.32 
- Excess profits - if they appeared - are seen primarily as a problem of 
temporary disequilibrium in Individual markets; it is therefore held that 
they tend to disappear in later years. 33 There is an encompassing consen-
sus that the elimination of excess profits is to be considered an indicator 
of sufficient competitive pressure, and is hence empirically relevant. 
30 Singleton, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 44. This is an equivalent to 
the assumption that meaningful market barriers do not exist; and Dem-
setz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, supra, 1: 
"(I)n the absence of effective barriers to entry it would seem that the 
concentration of an industry's output on a few firms could only derive 
from their superiority In producing and marketing products or in the 
superiority of a structure of industry in which there are only a few 
firms", italics supplied. 
31 Cf. Benston, George J., The Validity of Profits-Structure Studies with 
Particular References to the FTC's Line of Business Data, 75 AER (1985), 
pp. 37-67; Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 597; Scherer, On the Current 
State .•• , op. cit., 7 f.; and Singleton, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 
47 f. and 51; and Brozen, Yale, Deconcentration Reconsidered: Comment, 14 
JLE (1971), pp. 489-491, 491: "We need not, however, be concerned that 
above-normal profits are more prevalent in concentrated industries. It 
appears that findings to this effect are the consequence of the use of 
small samples. Larger samples do not show any relationship between con-
centration and rates of return." 
32 Cf. Asch, Peter, and John Seneca, Is Collusion Profitable? RES (1976), pp. 
1-12, 6; Brozen, Yale, No ••• The Concentration Collusion Doctrine, in: Ameri-
can Bar Association (ed.), Industrial Concentration and the Market Sys-
tem, pp. 106-117, 106; Pautler, A Review .•• , supra, 597. 
33 Cf. implicitly admitted by Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, 
and Public Policy, supra, 3; and Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 597 note 66: 
"Brozen did not show that the relationship •.. was spurious, but only that 
it was not persistent In any Individual Industry." 
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- The final argument holds that no causal relationship exists between con-
centration and profitability, although a correlation may be found. It is 
argued that a verified correlation could not serve as evidence for the exi-
stence of an underlying chain of causation. 34 This argument seems of the 
utmost importance since it deals with the separability of efficiency gains 
from market power effects. 
4. Revised Polley Conclusions for Horizontal Mergers 
As a result of this reasoning on the relationship between concentration and 
collusion, Bork raises doubts as to whether mergers would lead to substan-
tial restraints of output and believes that "the effect would usually be out-
weighed by cost savings". 35 However, he admits that with monopolistic 
structures, the restraints of output may outweigh the efficiency gains so 
that "we are in an area of uncertainty". 36 Bork therefore comes to the pre-
liminary conclusion that mergers up to 60 or 70 % market share should be 
legal per se. However, "(p)artly as a tactical concession to current oligopoly 
phobia and partly in recognition of section 7's intended function of tighte-
ning the Sherman Act rule, I am willing to weaken that conclusion". 37 
Posner explicitly refers to Bork on the subject of the limits of horizontal 
concentration. 38 He expresses in a rather unspecified way that antitrust po-
34 Cf., Green, Industrial Organization ... , supra, 489; Singleton, Industrial 
Organization ... , op. cit., 50; and, e.g., the separate statement of Bork, 
Robert H., White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, Report 1, CCH 
TRRer No. 415, May 26, 1969, Supplementary, at 1-B to 2-B: "My objection 
to the proposed statute is that the studies relied upon are shaky and 
open to question and that the correlation, if it were shown to exist, 
would prove nothing." 
35 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 221. The welfare trade-off as the 
underlying methodology has been treated with regard to its shortcomings 
in Part 2 of the contributon submitted. 
36 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 221. 
37 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 221. But cf. Stigler, The Organiza-
tion of Industry, op. cit., p. 265 and 270, who figures out a substantial 
decline of horizontal mergers according to FTC statistics on the merger 
activities of the 200 leading firms in the U.S.A. from 1948-1953, 1954-1959, 
and 1960-1964. He traces this decline to the effect of the amendment of 
Sec. 7 Clayton Act in 1950. In the summary of the chapter on the econo-
mic impacts of the antitrust laws he stresses this fact once more without 
any comment. Thus, it seems that he is in favour of this effect of the 
amendment of Sec. 7 Clayton Act. 
38 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, supra, 933. 
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licy should deal mainly with horizontal mergers that lead directly to mono-
polies or which contribute to cartelization by a large reduction of the num-
ber of firms in a market. 39 
In the case of horizontal mergers, the effects of output restriction outweigh 
the efficiency gains only if the merger results in a very high degree of 
concentration. Consequently, Bork regards as "presumptively lawful all 
horizontal mergers up to the market shares that would allow for other mer-
gers of similar size in the industry and still leave three significant com-
panies".<10 
He takes the view that the maximum market share realized by a merger 
should be about 40 %. 41 Although, he objects that "even at these levels the 
law would certainly be preventing the realization of some efficiencies" 42, he 
supports this proposal for horizontal mergers in his recommendations. 43 
As competition is regarded a free play of market forces, interference in 
market structures is generally rejected. How divestiture in cases of over-
proportionate internal or external growth is accordingly evaluated in this 
view, seems to be apparent. In general, remedies through market structure 
interference are rejected on the argument that the organization of an indu-
stry which has developed over time without any legal restrictions can be 
viewed as an outcome of the underlying cost situation ('"survival of the flt-
test").44 As a result, divestiture would harm consumers by forcing subop-
timal sizes and market shares upon the firms and depriving the firms of in-
centives to grow by means of efficiency-enhancing conduct.45 The underly-
ing reasoning, upon which the hypothesis is based, holds 
39 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, supra, 928; taken to 
its logical extreme, the notion that no meaningful barriers to entry exist, 
and the assertion that there will not be any form of collusion, no matter 
how concentrated the industry is, effectively means the minimum number 
of firms in an industry necessary to insure competition and, therefore, 
competitive performance, is one, cf. Singleton, Industrial Organization and 
Antitrust, op. cit., 44. 
40 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 221 f. 
41 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 222. 
42 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 222. 
43 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., p. 406 (3) (b). 
44 Cf. Demsetz, Economics as a Guide ... , supra 375. 
45 Cf. Demsetz, Economics as a Guide, supra, 375. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
221 
"that any size achieved by internal growth without predation is the 
most efficient size for that firm. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion 
that the dissolution of any such firm will always create an efficiency 
loss". (Therefore) "the law should never attack such structures since 
they embody the proper balance of forces for consumer welfare. " 441 
After the Reagan Administration received responsibility for antitrust policy, 
the enforcement agencies have rarely attacked mergers. Even in the case of 
horizontal mergers there is a very generous interpretation of the antitrust 
law - especially in the oil industry; as a result, the concentration in this 
industry has been strengthened. The four biggest firms: Exxon, Mobil Oil, 
Standard Oil of California, and Texaco have become much bigger than all the 
other firms, so that the oligopolistic nucleus in this industry has become 
still stronger. The break-up of Standard Oil in 1911 into different competing 
firms has been offset as a result. 47 
5. Critical Evaluation of the New Learning-Hypotheses, the Underlying 
Premises, and their Empirical Evidence 
The policy conclusions just presented rest on the new learning hypotheses 
and underlying premises, as well as on empirical evidence. Most of the empi-
rical evidence, however, is ambiguous enough to leave room for divergent 
Interpretation; hence, some of the new learning hypotheses are still disputed 
and so are the resulting policy conclusions. This is mainly due to the fol-
lowing aspects. 
L Impediments to Competition 
Although former empirical (mostly qualitative) results on the importance of 
impediments to competition did not justify the emphasis which was put on 
this element of market structure, impediments to competition do exist and 
their importance in detering sufficient pressure due to potential competition 
is underestimated by current Chicago theory. The original potential competi-
tion doctrine supplied by John Bates Clark does not hold in a real economy 
characterized by numerous frictions which partly invalidate the functioning 
46 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 194 and 164. 
47 Cf. as well Schmldt/Rittaler, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. 
cit., 77 f. 
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of the competitive mechanism and have therefore to be seen as impediments 
to new competition. 4e 
Such barriers are able to distort the proper working of competition and, 
therefore, also distort the efficient allocation of economic resources. This 
does not necessari I y mean that they are to be condemned per se, si nee their 
impact may be competition-enhancing from time to time which makes a trade-
off necessary in an actual case. 49 Collusion thus can be seen as a policy 
problem primarily in industries that are accompanied by persistent impedi-
ments to competition of any kind in the sense of the insider-outsider con-
cept which we have presented. Although some of these barriers can be 
viewed as being a form of efficiency, they can represent an impediment to 
new competition at the same time. 50 This makes necessary the trade-off just 
mentioned. 
This view is consistent with the notion of the role of mobility barriers as an 
extended explanatory approach. Mobility barriers can be considered in the 
heritage of barriers to competition :51 
"The theory of entry barriers, concentrating on the movement of a firm 
from zero output to some positive output, has missed a great opportu-
nity for generality. Entrants into an industry can be entirely new firms 
or firms already established elsewhere. Firms may enter one or another 
segment of a given industry, and firms already operating in one seg-
ment may shift to another." 
According to this approach, interfirm variations in profitability cannot only 
be explained by interfirm efficiency differences but also by the concept of 
mobility barriers within an industry, a concept developed primarily by Caves 
48 Demsetz speaks of "natural frictions and ignorance that characterize any 
real economy", Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public 
Policy, supra, 3. The question remains, however, how one is to separate 
these natural frictions from impediments to competition. This seems to be 
a definitional issue primarily and from an antitrust policy point of view it 
has to be decided on a case by case basis. Cf. as well Pautler, A Review 
... , supra, 605: "It seems that much of the debate boils down to whether 
barriers to entry and immobility among firms are really serious enough to 
be concerned with and, if they are, whether they can be reduced effici-
ent! y through antitrust measures." 
49 Cf. Otremba, Walter, Die empi rische Relevanz von Marktzutrittsbarrieren, 
28 Konjunkturpolitik (1982), pp. 190-198, 197. 
50 Cf. Qualls, P. David., Stability and Persistence of Economic Profit Margins 
in Highly Concentrated Industries, 40 SEJ (1974), pp. 604-612. 
51 Caves, Richard E., and Michael E. Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility 
Barriers: Conjectural Decisions and Continued Deterrence to New Competi-
tion, 91 QJE (1977), pp. 241-261, 249. 
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and Porter. 52 The market entry approach is enlarged to a mobility approach. 
It holds that industries contain strategic groups and that there are mobility 
barriers into and out of these strategic groups that account for a major 
proportion of interfirm profitability differences. Whereas the traditional 
approach departed from homogeneous industries with identical firms, it is 
now assumed that firms can be separated from each other by means of eco-
nomically relevant features which account for the mobility barriers. This is 
concluded from the fact that structural determinants of profitability differ 
between strategic groups, "depending on their status in their particular 
industry". 53 This makes it difficult for a firm belonging to one strategic 
group to change to another. These kinds of barriers are apt to protect in a 
twofold manner. They protect from newcomers and they protect from incum-
bents of other strategic groups. Entry could possibly be made easier since 
entry can follow successively from strategic groups with low mobility bar-
riers and low risk to strategic groups with rather high mobility barriers 
and high risk. 54 
b. Accounting Data and the Data Base 
Although data problems are always difficult to deal with, attempts to test 
the robustness of structure-performance regression results for variations in 
accounting conventions have shown no significant sensitivity. 55 The biases 
due to data aggregation have led to attempts to compile firm and business 
unit level data. This has been done primarily by the PIMS (profit impact of 
marketing strategies) data base and the FTC Line of Business Program, the 
latter containing data on revenues, sales, and equity of 3,007 businesses in 
52 Cf. Caves/Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers, supra; and 
Porter, Michael E., The Structure within Industries and Companies' Per-
formance, 61 RES (1979), pp. 214-238. 
53 Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 610. Although the studies are based on 
crude sets of data, the empirical evidence is as strong as it is for the 
differential efficiency approach proposed by the current tenet. 
54 An excellent example is the European motorcycle industry. Japanese 
producers entered segment for segment, starting with the 50 ccm class 
and ending at 1100 ccm, cf. Purkayastha, Dev, Note on the Motorcycle In-
dustry in 1975, Harvard Business School, Case 9-578-210 Rev. 9/78, Inter-
collegiate Case Clearing House, Boston 1978. 
55 For a survey cf. again Leamer, Edward E., Sensitivity Analysis Would 
Help, 75 AER (1985), pp. 308-313. 
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':57 industries on a legal basis. 55 The former is intended to isolate the long-
run determinants of firm profitability among 37 variables and contains data 
obtained from large firms, voluntarily contributing line of business data 
which Is compiled by the Strategic Planning Institute. The firms are free to 
define their businesses and since the lines of business are picked by the 
firms on an arbitrary basis they are not randomly distributed. Although a 
number of interpretation problems remain 57, the studies based on the new 
sets of data confirm earlier results on the predominance of the market share 
value over simple concentration variables in the sense that if market share 
is introduced simultaneously into a regression equation containing concen-
tration ratios, concentration as an explaining variable loses its signifi-
cance.58 
This has not silenced critics on the use of accounting data, however. It is 
repeatedly argued that "the numbers reported, which are derived from the 
companies' accounting system, do not reflect economic market values well'". 59 
56 Cf. Bobel, Wettbewerb und Industriestruktur, op. cit., 129; Pautler, A Re-
view ... , supra, 625-633 for an extensive survey. Furthermore, cf. Buzzell, 
Robert D., Bradley T. Gale, and Richard Sultan, Market Share - A Key to 
Profitability, 52 HBR (1975), pp. 97-106; and Ravenscraft, David J., 
Structure-Profit Relationships at the Line of Business and Industry Le-
vel, 65 RES (1983), pp. 22-31. 
Under the pressure of the Reagan officials, the program has been stop-
ped, however, by a 4 to 1 vote among the FTC Commissioners, cf. CCH 
TRR No. 645, April 17, 1984, p. 1. 
57 Cf. Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 629 note 162, who mentions the lack of 
correspondence to relevant markets; and Scherer, Industrial market 
structure ... , op. cit., 270, who empasizes that due to data secrecies it is 
impossible to say "what companies and industries are being studied or 
what the absolute size of any business is." 
58 Cf. Gale/Branch, Concentration versus Market Share ... , supra; Martin, Ste-
ven, Market, Firm and Economic Performance, New York 1983; and for an 
early work, Shepherd, The Elements of Market Structure, supra. This 
"'supports the hypothesis that concentration acts as a proxy for market 
share in industry regressions", Ravenscraft, David J., The Relationship 
Between Structure and Performance at the Line of Business and Industry 
Level, Washington, D.C. 1981, p. 19. For a recent affirmation, cf. Schwal-
bach, Joachim, Marktanteil und Unternehmensgewinn, unpublished inaugu-
ral lecture at the University of Koblenz, December 18, 1987. 
59 Benston, The Validity of Profits-Structure Studies, supra, 64; and the re-
joinder, Scherer, Frederic M., et al., The Validity of Studies with Line of 
Business Data: Comment, 75 AER (1987), pp. 205-217, 209: "(C)ontrary to 
the impllcatlons drawn by Benston, the basic structural relationship esti-
mated using LB data turn out to be robust across a wide range of vari-
able definitions, sampling frames, and controls for accounting method va-
riations." 
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Aside from the arguments already listed in rejection of this reproach, severe 
analytical carelessness can be documented in empirical studies that empha-
size a sort of worst-case analysis (reproach of selective emplrlclsm). 110 
The selective empi rism of the current tenet becomes especially evident with 
regard to the debate on the concentration-profitability relationship refered 
to supra. Demsetz, for instance, reinterpreted all studies which supported 
the traditional findings - a positive correlation between market concentration 
and supra-competitive profits of the large firms as indicating market power 
- in the sense that they had unintendedly discovered a concentration-effici-
ency nexus. 51 In 1977 Peltzman tried to support the Demsetz hypothesis by 
holding that "the main result ... is that long period changes in market 
structure are accompanied by increased efficiency. This efficiency gain is 
most pronounced where concentration is growing".52 
But a closer look at the data of the Peltzman study reveals a further aspect 
of selective empirism. All of the industries in the study with rather fast in-
creases in concentration were consumer goods industries with important pro-
duct innovations and large-scale advertising campaigns.83 The criticism that 
the Peltzman study - which most of the Chicago adherents rely on - was 
biased by the consumer goods industries was confirmed by further studies 
In which data of consumer goods and producer goods industries were used. 
These studies showed that Peltzman's findings do not hold for producer 
goods industries.54 
60 Cf. Schmidt/Rittaler, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 97; 
and Scherer, Frederic M., et al., The Validity of Studies with Line of Bu-
siness Data: Comment, 215: "Data are fallible. So are scholars. Yet when 
an article is as consistently negative as Benston's, one suspects bias, and 
when it contains as many demonstrable errors as Benston's, one suspects 
a degree of carelessness incompatible with the burden a scholar must 
bear when he singles others' work out for criticism"; and Benston, Geor-
ge J., The Validity of Studies with Line of Business Data: Reply, 75 AER 
(1987), pp. 218-223, 221 f., who partly admits this. 
61 Cf. Mueller, Willard F., A New Attack on Antitrust: The Chicago Case, 18 
ALER (1986), pp. 29-66, 40. 
62 Peltzman, The Gains and Losses ... , supra, 251. 
63 Cf. Scherer, The Causes and Consequences of Rising Industrial Concen-
tration, supra, 289. 
64 Cf. Mueller, A New Attack on Antitrust ... , supra, 41 f. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
226 
Although a number of interpretation problems remain 65, the studies based on 
the new sets of data confirm earlier results on the predominance of the 
market share value over simple concentration variables.86 These findings 
have been confirmed in a variety of studies, essentially leading to a conver-
ging emphasis. 
A study performed by Martin for 1975 was based on the FTC Line of Busi-
ness, using 4.527 LBs of 475 firms and 275 industries. 67 Inquiring into the 
relationships between profitability, market share, corporate structure, econo-
mies of scale, demand characteristics, advertising activities, R&D activities, 
capital intensity and internal organizational firm structure, he drew the fol-
lowing conclusions: 
- Lines of business with a high market share do have a positive effect on 
profitability. This is based on an increase in market power as well as on 
economies of scale; the relative importance of the two factors varies from 
industry to industry. 
- Lines of business in concentrated industries have lower rates of return -
on average - than other lines of business. The most likely underlying 
reason for this is that oligopolists had problems maintaining and enforcing 
collusive agreements in times of recession. 
- The absolute size of a line of business seems to be rather significant. 
Larger lines of business have larger profits than smaller lines. Lines of 
business that are part of a diversified enterprise show higher profits as 
well. As a rule, these lines show higher market shares. This seems to be 
in accordance with the market share hypothesis. 
If price is primarily used as a competition parameter in a line of business 
this tends to induce a search for non-price competition, such as product 
differentiation through advertising. 
65 Cf. Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 629 note 162, who mentions the lack of 
correspondence to relevant markets; and Scherer, Industrial market 
structure ... , op. cit., 270, who empasizes that due to data secrecies it is 
impossible to say "what companies and industries are being studied or 
what the absolute size of any business is." 
66 Cf. Buzzell, Robert D., et al., Market Share ... , supra; Gale/Branch, Con-
centration versus Market Share ... , supra; Martin, Stephen, Market, Fi rm 
and Economic Performance, New York 1983; and for an early work, Shep-
herd, The Elements of Market Structure, supra. 
67 On the following study, cf. Martin, Market, Firm and Economic Perfor-
mance, op. cit. 
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The concurring efficiency differential- and concentration collusion-hypothe-
ses were tested by Clarke, Davis and Waterson on the basis of price-cost 
margins in the U.K., using a model to separate market power effects from 
efficiency effects.es The study is based on 147 and 155 manufacturing indu-
stries on a three digit level for the period from 1971 to 1977 respectively, 
using the ratio of gross profits to sales as the dependent variable. 
If the efficiency-differential hypothesis by Demsetz holds, relatively small 
firms should be of lower profitability than relatively large firms, regardless 
of the level of industry concentration; and the profitability differences 
should be larger, the higher the level of concentration. However, Demsetz' 
hypothesis is not confirmed by this study. The authors conclude that "both 
efficiency and market power effects are at work".59 
Amato and Wilder emphasized the relation between profitability, firm size and 
further structural variables for the years 1966 to 1975, including 40 manu-
facturing industries, classified by IRS data.7° The basic hypothesis to be 
tested is that, because of the separation of owne1· and management, utility 
maximization by managers in accordance with firm size is the correct vari-
able. It was also tested whether profitability is a non-linear function of firm 
size. The result that there is no relationship between firm size and profit 
rate - which contradicts most of the previous studies - is supposed to be 
due to an improved data base. Demsetz' differential efficiency hypothesis is 
rejected and it is stated that the results of market share/profitabi I ity stu-
dies cannot be applied to firm size/profitability studies. 
c. The Core of the Oligopoly and other Omissions 
Although it is conceded by the current tenet that concentration facilitates 
collusion and that real markets are characterized by oligopolistic struc-
tures71, concentration is in fact of little importance for antitrust policy 
because it is argued that there is no clear theoretical basis for a general 
68 Cf. Clarke, Roger, Stephen Davies and Michael Waterson, The Profitability-
Concentration Relation: Market Power or Efficiency?, 32 JIE (1984), pp. 
435-450. 
69 Clarke/Davies/Waterson, The Profitability-Concentration Relation ... , supra, 
448. 
70 Cf. Amato, Louis, and Ronald P. Wilder, The Effects of Firm Size on Profit 
Rates in U.S. Manufacturing, 52 SEJ (1985), pp. 181-190. 
71 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 101 f. 
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oligopoly theory. 72 Due to changing conditions with regard to demand, tech-
nology, and different cost situations, collusion that is favored by oligopoli-
stic interdependence between the firms is in practice very difficult to deal 
with. 73 
According to this view, the fact that monopolies neither act as a collective 
monopoly, nor act purely competitively does not permit the conclusion that 
oligopolists behave uncompetitively.74 
There is an exception, however, in the case of Stigler who was among the 
first to deal with problems of competition in an oligopoly.75 Though Stigler 
is in favour of an oligopoly theory, he has not succeeded in developing a 
coherent economic and legal approach to oligopoly.76 
However, if we start from the more realistic assumption of market imperfecti-
ons and if we assume furthermore that with increasing concentration and a 
decreasing number of competitors the interdependence between the firms in-
creases, i.e., that every supplier has to take account of the behavior of his 
competitors as a reaction to his own behavior, then a single supplier has 
monopolistic discretion, which he has neither under the conditions of perfect 
competition (price being given) nor in a (partial) monopoly (where the fringe 
of the small competitors has no influence on the market activities). 
However, accepting the correlation between concentration and the interde-
pendence of firms is not enough to settle the question of whether oligopo-
lists must behave in a competitive way or not. In order to answer this 
question, the existing structural conditions of the market have to be looked 
72 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School ... , supra, 932. 
73 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 92: "Conventional oligopoly theory, 
however, is little more than a guess about the ways in which firms might 
be able to behave in a market composed of a few sellers." A different 
view is offered by Stigler. He accepts the existence of an authority that 
takes legal action against collusion, thus accepting the phenomenon as a 
real one. Thus he comes to the conclusion that "(t)he Sherman Act has 
reduced the availability of the most efficient methods of collusion and 
thereby reduced the amount and effects of collusion", Stigler, The 
Organization of Industry, op. cit., 271. 
74 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 102 and 104. 
75 Cf. esp. Stigler, The Organization of Industry, op. cit., 39 ff. 
76 For this evaluation, cf. Kirchner, Christian, "Okonomische Analyse des 
Rechts" und Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrii.nkungen (antitrust law and 
economics), 140 ZHR ( 1980), pp. 563-588, 565. 
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into as well (for instance, the stage in market evolution, product homogene-
ity or heterogeneity, degree of information - these being factors which qua-
lify the importance of the number of the firms). Structural conditions which 
lead to oligopolistic behavior cannot be established for the general case. 
Significant and empirically meaningful statements can be made only by 
showing a correlation between specific market structures and the likelihood 
of oligopolistic behavior. Consequently, a classification of specific oligopoli-
stic forms of behavior restraining competition becomes necessary.77 
The assertion that concentration does not necessarily lead to collusion since 
oligopolies are rather fragile in nature does not take into account sufficient-
ly the fact that there is often a distinct symmetry of interest within a small 
group of competitors substituting for legal sanctions (e.g., penalties for 
breach of contract).78 
This distinct symmetry of interest may be the answer to the question why 
firms of the oligopoly core do not seem to compete among each other on a 
price basis. Under the circumstances presented, positive price-cost margins 
should pose an incentive to expand output until competitive returns are rea-
lized and prices equal marginal costs. This would have the effect that most 
of the smaller and allegedly inefficient firms would have to leave the market. 
The fact that in reality this often does not happen, presents some evidence 
that superior efficiency and collusive behavior may go hand in hand.79 This 
makes the original reasoning become more or less tautological with regard to 
the efficiency-differential hypothesis of large firms because "comparing pro-
fitability amongst large and small firm profits is defective, in that their effi-
ciency would Imply higher profits, but their higher profits do not necessa-
rily imply their efficiency",l!O This seems to be apparent to some of the ad 
77 Cf. Zohlnhofer, Werner, Wettbewerbspolitik im Oligopol: Erfahrungen der 
amerikanischen Antitrustpolitik, Basel and TUbingen 1968, pp. 26 ff. 
78 Cf. Schmidt/Rittaler, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, op. cit., 97. 
79 Cf. Green, Industrial Organization Paradigms ... , supra, 493; and Greer, 
Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 412 f.: "Collusion can reward an indu-
stry's big firms with excess profits and simultaneously reward its small 
firms with only normal profits even if the concentration fostering the 
collusion is not grounded on big firm efficiencies." 
80 Clarke/Davies/Waterson, The Profitability-Concentration Relation ... , supra, 
438. 
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herents of current theory, although this is not acknowledged or even ac-
cepted.81 
d. The Persistence of Profits In the Long Run 
The workability of the market mechanism is seen by the Chicago School in 
terms of a long-run realization of its basic functions: coordination, informa-
tion, and allocation. However, market processes are perceived to take a cer-
tain amount of time to adjust to changing economic conditions because the 
relevant information has to be processed. According to this view, it is this 
which is responsible for temporary market frictions. However, this ought not 
to be mistaken for impediments to competition. Since the whole concept 
stands or fails with the assumption of the non-existence of impediments to 
competition and a long-run view of market processes (time horizon), both 
premises are of crucial importance. 82 We will try to find evidence for the 
validity of the assumption of the long-run effectiveness of the market 
mechanism by observing as to whether above average profitability is re-
duced to average competitive rates of return over time. 
There is a general consensus that high profits can persist over a longer 
period of time when the observed enterprise has cost or related efficiency 
advantages, offers a superior good or holds market power in comparison to 
actual or potential competitors. 83 Nevertheless, sufficient competitive pres-
sure is supposed to exercise persistent downward pressure on prices and 
profitability so that the ideal norm would seem to be that only costs plus a 
normal return on capital ought to be earned in unconcentrated industries.B-4 
There is no consensus on two issues, however. First, the question remains 
as to whether above-average profitability is just a result of a disequilibrium 
81 Cf. Demsetz, Harold, Two Systems of Belief about Monopoly, op. cit., 178; 
and Carter, Collusion, Efficiency and Antitrust, supra, 438 and 441, who 
seems to acknowledge that these results are consistent with collusion 
among the large firms and efficiency differentials vis-a-vis smaller firms 
at the same time. 
82 Impediments to competition have been treated supra, showing the limited 
use of the assumption of ultra-free entry. 
83 Cf. Mueller, Dennis C., United States' Antitrust: At the Crossroads, in: de 
Jong, Henk W., and William G. Shepherd (eds.), Mainstreams in Industrial 
Organization - Book 2, Dordrecht et al. 1986, pp. 215-241, 232. 
84 Cf., e.g., Mueller, Dennis C., Profits in the Long Run, Cambridge, Mass. 
1986. p. 31. 
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state of the market or whether there actually is a movement of above-aver-
age rates of return toward that norm and whether or not this movement oc-
curs less quickly in more concentrated industries in comparison to less con-
centrated ones.85 Second, if profits are not eroded quickly in some indu-
stries this does not necessarily mean that these profits are persistent as a 
result of market power. They can also be persistent as a result of efficiency 
differences, product preferences, or as a result of a mixture of power, pro-
duct preferences, and efficiency. 
With regard to the first question, empirical evidence suggests that the ero-
sion of profitability divergences in concentrated industries - if it occurs at 
all - takes a much longer time than it does in less concentrated indu-
stries815, regardless of whether profit margins of high and low concentration 
with either high or low barriers are examined 87, or results of concentrated 
industries are treated as if they were competitive. 88 
Contrary to the assertion of the current tenet, under certain circumstances 
profits may be an index of market power in cases in which profits are not 
eroded in the long-run. This is the case when profitability differences can-
not be justified by persistent interfirm-efficiency differences as expressed 
by cost differences and when in addition the market in question may be 
facing impediments to competition. In this case profits can be considered an 
expression of market power arising from a restraint on competition. This 
makes it necessary to distinguish efficiency effects carefully from market 
power effects.89 
85 Cf., e.g., Liebowitz, S.J., Measuring Industrial Disequilibria, 48 SEJ (1982), 
pp. 119-136. 
86 Cf. MacAvoy, Paul W., John W. McKie and Lee E. Preston, High and Stable 
Concentration Levels, Profitability, and Public Policy: A Response, 14 JLE 
(1971 ), pp. 493-499; Mueller, Dennis C., The Persistence of Profits Above 
the Norm, 44 Economica (1977), pp. 369-380; Mueller, Profits in the Long 
Run, op, cit.; and Weiss, Leonard W., and George Pascoe, The Extent and 
Permanence of Market Dominance, Paper presented at the Annual EARIE 
Conference 1983 at Fontainebleau. 
87 Cf., e.g., Qualls, P. David, Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Long-Run 
Economic Profit Margins, 20 JIE (1972), pp. 146-158. 
88 Cf. Marvel, Howard P., Collusion and the Pattern of Rates of Return, 47 
SEJ (1980), pp. 375-387. 
89 Cf. Mueller, United States' Antitrust: At the Crossroads, op. cit., 226 who 
emphasizes with regard to the U.S. American Fortune 500 that "'an exami-
nation of the list of persistently most profitable firms suggests that this 
image of efficiency does not characterize these firms." 
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m. firm Market Share as the Essential Determinant Qf Interflrro PrQfitabmty 
Differences 
In the following, the aforementioned line of reasoning leads us to the at-
tempt to determine the extent to which concentration is actually justified by 
technical and non-technical efficiencies. The result can be considered a 
prima facie assumption on the threshold beyond which undue market power 
may be assumed to emerge. 1 
1. Interflrm Profitability Differences: Efficiency or Market Power? 
The former tenet associated with the Harvard School does not necessarily 
seem to be in conflict with the new learning hypothesis, even if It seems 
that this former tenet as the underlying rationale for antimerger policy is in 
actual need of a few refinements. There is no reason why economies of scale 
could not be responsible for generating the intra-industry results which 
Demsetz and others offer as support for the efficiency-causes-concentration 
hypothesis.2 
The roots of a possible complementarity lie within the role that market share 
as an element of market structure plays. Both the adherents to the former 
and the current tenet take the view that the correlation between market 
share and profit is much more central - even analytically more precise -
than the correlation between concentration and profits.3 This seems to be 
largely in accordance and consistent with findings on the role of market 
shares. According to the view of the former tenet, however, higher profits 
of firms with large market shares are the result of better opportunities of 
making use of advantages in product differentiation and price differentia-
tion, i.e. better opportunities of exerting Individual monopoly power and rai-
sing prices beyond the competitive level, as well as of making use of econo-
Necessari I y, the ceteris pari bus clause applies. Additional structural and 
behavioral aspects have to be considered depending on the individual 
case. 
2 Cf. Scherer, The Causes and Consequences of Rising Industrial Concentra-
tion, supra; and Clarke/Davies/Waterson, The Profitability-Concentration 
Relation: Market Power or Efficiency?, supra, 437, who note that in the 
case of firms producing along a production function exhibiting scale eco-
nomies "there would be a natural tendency over time for the larger firms 
to be more successful and for the Industry to become more concentrated", 
3 Cf. Scherer, On the Current State ... , op. cit., 6; and recently, Buzzell/ 
Gale, The PIMS Principles ... , op. cit. 
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mies of scale or other cost advantages. Whereas the use of industry-wide 
data in former empirical studies led to spurious results due to data aggre-
gation and thereby to a positive correlation between concentration and pro-
fit, as has been demonstrated supra (exaggeration of profits of market lea-
ders)4, recent empirical inquiries show that the profits of the firms have to 
be seen primarily as a function not only of (relative) market share, but also 
of invested capital, market growth, life cycle stage, and product diffe-
rentiation advantages:5 




0 16 30 45 80 
Relalln M• rlc.c Bhan 
~ Abell, Derek F., and John s. Ha •• ond, Strategic Market Planning: Problems and Analytical Approaches, 
Englewood Cliffs, U., 1979, p. 279. 
These studies are based on the above mentioned PIMS-Data Base and FTC 
Line of Business Program, which refer to firm Information instead of indu-
stry data. They offer significant solutions to data problems due to Industry 
aggregation, and tend to throw quite a different light on the new learning-
4 Cf. Scherer, On the Current State ••• , op. cit., 6. The structural Importance 
of market shares was emphasized as early as 1972, cf. primarily Buzzell/ 
Gale/Sultan, Market Share - A Key to Profitability, supra; and Shepherd, 
The Elements of Market Structure, supra, but an extreme data Insufficien-
cy problem remained that made It difficult If not Impossible to test the 
Importance of market shares. 
5 Cf. esp. Ravenscraft, Structure-Profit Relationships at the Line of Business 
and Industry Level, supra, where product differentiation Is measured by 
the amount of advertising and a patents-to-sales ratio; and Abell/ Ham-
mond, Strategic Market Planning .•• , op. cit., 289: "PIMS-flndlngs Indicate 
that Investment Intensity, market share, industry growth rate, life cycle 
position, and marketing expense/sales ratios are among the most Important 
factors affecting ROI and cash flows", which emphasizes market share 
overproportlonatel y. 
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hypothesis of the Chicago School (efficiency causes concentration) than was 
originally thought:6 
"The typical firm earning persistently high profits has a large market 
share in a differentiated product industry. If it is more efficient than 
its competitors, it is not because it produces the same product as they 
at lower costs, and sells it at lower prices. If anything, the price it 
charges probably exceeds that of its competitors for a product that is 
perceived to be superior along one or more product characteristic di-
mensions . ... The successful firm is more efficient than its competitors 
in using nonprice modes of competition." 
Due to a high market share, the supplier can take advantage of his monopo-
listic discretion to charge higher prices; however, due to the lack of compe-
titive pressure, it is not guaranteed that the effic:c~r.v gains will also be 
passed on to consumers. In this case, the hypothesis that an increase in the 
efficiency of a business due to cost reductions - be it actual or potential -
leads self-evidently to higher growth and greater welfare has not been 
established empirically. It has not been shown that a potential efficiency 
increase resulting from a merger would be synonymous with an increase in 
overall efficiency. 7 Hence the role of market share not only serves as a 
basis for an efficiency explanation but also as a basis for a possible market 
power explanation.8 As size of firm, level of market concentration, and expli-
cit product differentiation are essentially all held constant, recent investi-
gation has suggested that market share per se has to be considered a 
source of market power regardless of the level of concentration and that 
this kind of market power is distinct form the one usually associated with 
6 Mueller, Dennis C., Profits in the Long Run, op. cit., 229, italics supplied; 
and cf. idem, United States' Antitrust: At the Crossroads, op. cit., 225, 
which emphasizes that "(f)irms with large market shares in differentiated 
product industries are more profitable presumably because they have hig-
her quality products or products which are perceived to be of higher 
quality ... If one wants to describe the most profitable firm as being more 
efficient, they appear to be more efficient at differentiating their products 
through advertising or patentable product improvements.", italics supplied. 
7 As a result, "Increased efficiency cannot necessarily be inferred from a 
presumed increase in profitability in the case of large firms. In such 
cases, profits may also be caused by market power. Such market power 
can in turn be regarded as almost a guarantee that the potential for effi-
ciency and in particular innovation is not being exploited to the fullest 
and the the maximum welfare possible is not being achieved", Caspari, 
Manfred, Joint Ventures Under EEC Law and Policy, unpublished paper, 
presented at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York, October 23, 
1987, p. 8. 
8 Cf., e.g., Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 611. 
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oligopolistic market structures.9 The implications that can be drawn from 
these findings are that market share can be considered at least as important 
for the existence and exercise of market power as is the case with all the 
other elements of market structure and that Industries that may show com-
petitive overall structure "may actually have a market power problem that is 
not apparent from overall industry performance". 10 The results of these 
studies falsify the Demsetz hypothesis that profitability differences are an 
outflow of efficiency differentials, but do clearly Indicate that a unique kind 
of market power associated with market share is responsible for persistent 
above average profltability. 11 
As has been empasized above, however, the monopoly problem or the problem 
of welfare losses due to monopoly and market power are assumed to play 
only a minor role in the U.S. 12 
This seems to support the view that the supplier with a high market share 
Is profiting from lower costs as well as from higher prices; however, the 
customers do not gain necessarily from these increases in efficiency, and 
this contradicts the explicit goal of consumer welfare. 13 This makes It 
9 This aspect of large market shares has strongly been emphasized parti-
cularly by Rhoades, Stephen A., Market Share as a Source of Market Pow-
er: Implications and Some Evidence, 37 JEB (1985), pp. 343-363, esp. 359; 
and Ibid., 347 and 350, which characterizes the underlying reasoning by 
asserting that there may be "product differentiation that Is unique to 
market leaders (in the buyer's perceptions) irrespective of specific pro-
duct differentiation policies ... - giving market leaders an opportunity to 
sell their products at premium prices even if the quality of their pro-
ducts is identical to that of their competitors". 
10 Rhoades, Market Share as a Source of Market Power ... , supra, 346. 
11 Cf. again Rhoades, Market Share as a Source of Market Power ... , supra, 
359 f., who concludes that "these findings, along with the work on stra-
tegic groups, raise the possibility that markets may generally be defined 
too broadly" and that "the antitrust authorities ... should devote atten-
tion to the market share of firms to be acquired, regardless of market 
concentration." 
12 This view is based on the study of Harberger, Arnold C., Monopoly and 
Resource Allocation, 44 AER (1954), pp. 77-87. Losses of allocation would 
be more than compensated for by profits due to productive efficiency 
and, hence, would Increase 'consumer welfare'. This position has to be 
criticized since later studies have found higher welfare losses, as has 
been demonstrated supra; besides, the Harberger study on which the 
Chicago view is based has been criticized on many aspects, cf. Bobel, 
Wettbewerb und Industrlestruktur ... , op. cit., 179 ff. and 201 ff. 
13 Cf. the legal wording of Art. 85 para. 3 Treaty of Rome where In the case 
of a rationalization cartel a fair share of the resulting benefits has to be 
passed on to consumers. 
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obvious that the efficiency differential explanation offered by Demsetz and 
others does not provide convincing evidence on "how one Is to distinguish 
those situations where scale economies only have efficiency effects, from 
those where the firms enjoying such economies realise entry into the Indu-
stry is difficult (for whatever reason) and thus set high prices". 14 A major 
hint could be the extent to which market shares are necessary to exploit 
economies of scale. If it is assumed that beyond this point on a scale, addi-
tional efficiency gains, regardless of source, are non-existent or play a mar-
ginal role only, the corresponding market share could serve as a sort of 
borderline, indicating as it were the limits of a technical imperative. Beyond 
this point, undue market power could be assumed to exist. 
The view that concentration is only caused by efficiency-differentials is 
consistent with the hypothesis that if the general conditions of production 
were characterized by economies of size and Increased Industry concentra-
tion with related efficiencies in an unlimited manner, welfare maximization 
resulting from the attainment of these economies, from the rate of technolo-
gical progress, and from the availability of a superior management would 
require unlimited growth of slze. 15 A typical goal conflict as described 
above would arise since the attainment of all possible cost savings would re-
sult in a loss of effective competitive pressure within the particular market, 
which would otherwise tendentially hold down prices close to marginal costs. 
A trade-off between attainable efficiencies in the short-run and sufficient 
competitive pressure In the long-run would become necessary.18 
In order to measure efficiency, an empirically observable relationship has to 
be established between factors that determine the structure of an Industry 
14 Cf. Clarke/Davies/Waterson, The Profitability-Concentration Relation: Mar-
ket Power or Efficiency?, supra, 437; Herdzina, Klaus, Wettbewerbspolltlk, 
2nd ed., Stuttgart 1987, p. 41. Fisher, Alan A., and Robert H. Lande, Effi-
ciency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CLR (1983), pp. 1580-
1696, 1608: "After more than a decade of debate, neither side has proven 
its case, but the evidence tentatively suggests that both market-power 
and efficiency effects contribute to the overall relationship between con-
centration and profitability." 
15 This postulate is the so-called traditional defense hypothesis and was 
first put forward by Schumpeter, Joseph H., Capitalism, Soclallsm and 
Democracy, New York 1942; and later by Galbraith, John K., American Ca-
pltallsm - The Concept of Countervailing Power, Boston 1952. 
16 Cf. Groner, Helmut, Konzentration und Wettbewerbsordnung, 8 Jura (1986), 
pp. 520-527, 522; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltik und Kartellrecht, op. 
cit., 84 ff. The adherents of the current tenet, perform this trade-off by 
means of the Williamson-model which we have treated supra. 
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and performance criteria such as profits, costs, or rate and extent of tech-
nological innovation. 17 
2. The Range of Economies of Size as an Alternative Explana1Dry Approach 
Whether profitability can be viewed as an adequate indicator of the extent 
of productive efficiency is questionable, since the relative efficiency of a 
firm cannot only be evaluated merely on the basis of its profit rates. It is 
not only the latter which indicates whether the firm Is subject to sufficient 
competitive pressure, but also its relative success In the market, although, 
as we have emphasized, there are problems associated with this approach. 18 
This market success may be evaluated on the basis of the so-called survivor 
test developed by Stigler. 19 The standard of reference for the underlying 
cost situation Is the structure of an industry that for a longer period of 
time has not been subject to legal barriers to entry and, furthermore, has 
not changed its characteristics during that time period.20 Thus, in deter-
mining the optimum firm size, the survivor technique proceeds to 
"classify the firm in an industry by size, and calculate the share of 
industry output coming from each class over time. If the share of a 
given class falls, it is relatively inefficient, and in general Is more In-
efficient the more rapidly the share falls",21 
The other methods used are statistical cost analyses, engineering studies, 
and profitability studies. The question remains as to how valuable different 
17 Cf. Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 434 ff. Additional measures can 
only be determined vaguely, cf. ibid., 458 ff. 
18 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 104 f. 
19 Originally the basis of the test was developed by John Stuart Mill, Prin-
ciples of Political Economy, New York 1929, p. 134. 
20 Cf. Demsetz, Harold, Economics as a Guide ... , supra, 375.; Scherer, Econo-
mies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, op. cit., 18; and for the defi-
ciencies, Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 91. 
21 Stigler, The Organization of Industry, op. cit., 73; and for a critical 
assessment of the test, Bain, Joe S., Survival Ability as a Test of Effi-
ciency, 59 AER (1969), pp. 99-104, and Shepherd, William G., What Does 
the Survivor Technique Show about Economies of Scale, 36 SEJ (1967), 
pp. 113-122. It has to be noted critically that the ability to survive not 
only depends on lntrafirm efficiencies, but also on other determinants, 
such as public policy intervention, economic influences due to foreign 
trade, economic boom or depression scenario, etc., Schmidt, Wettbewerbs-
polltl k und Kartell rec ht, op. cit., 91. 
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techniques are in the attempt to determine a minimum optimal scale22 and, 
furthermore, whether or not the choice of the measurement technique makes 
a difference in determining the extent of efficiencies that can be attained by 
rising industrial concentratlon.23 
The most commonly used technique, and one that is considered at the same 
time to be the most appropriate one, is the engineering study, which tries 
to elaborate on the exact shape and properties of cost functions. This is 
done by the questioning of engineers specialized in the planning of new 
production facilities and currently or formerly employed by differently sized 
companies.24 If the use of statistical cost studies is commonly rejected25, 
the use of such engineering studies is also heavily disputed by some adhe-
rents of current theory: they have put forward a number of arguments 
against the applicability of such studies, the majority of which, however, 
can be rejected to a large extent. 211 
Engineering studies are viewed as incomplete with regard to the full extent 
of efficiencies because "they can cover only technical processes, which 
leaves out ... product design; research; planning; administration; cost and 
22 "Mlnlumum optimum scale is the smallest output per unit of time at which 
the plant or firm can realize the lowest-obtainable unit cost of producti-
on", Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 127. 
23 This also means efficiencies in addition to simple plant or firm economies. 
For detailed and critical surveys on the different measurement tech-
niques, cf. McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, op. cit., 65-88; Mono-
polkommission, Hauptgutachten VI: Gesamtwirtschaftliche Chancen und Ri-
si ken wachsender Unternehmensgrol3en, Baden-Baden 1986, paras. 600-604; 
Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 92-94; and Schmidt, 
Wettbewerbspolitlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 88-92. 
24 "The persons or groups performing these functions accumulate much In-
formation on alternative equipment and plant designs and the associated 
investment and operating costs", Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , 
op. cit., 94. 
25 "Statistical cost studies utilize historical cost-output data to make infe-
rences about economies of scale", Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. 
cit., 128. The main problem of this technique seems to be the secrecy 
problem in data availability and the general Incomparability of interfirm 
cost data; it has to be rejected, therefore, cf. Monopolkommisslon, Haupt-
gutachten VI ... , op. cit., paras. 600 and 604; and Scherer, Industrial 
market structure ... , op. cit., 93. Profit studies are viewed as a comple-
mentary technique to engineering studies and/or survival tests. 
26 Cf. most prominently, McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, op. cit., 
68-80. 
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quality control; finance; marketing; and so on",27 These efficiencies should 
be considered as very insecure in nature, however. They vary considerably 
from case to case, they often resist proper measurement, where they do not, 
ambiguous results are often encountered. We are thus in an area of un-
certainty. At the present, there is no evidence that the inclusion of further 
efficiencies enlarges the efficient size for the individual firm. 28 
The alternative survivor test also shows weaknesses si gnlflcant enough to 
raise strong doubts about Its applicability: 
- Survival ablllty may reflect either superior efficiency, monopoly power, or 
discriminatory legislation depending on various criteria, and there is no 
clear separation of the underlying causes. 29 
This method does not take Into consideration - in addition to costs as an 
expression of efficiency - that other factors such as, e.g., tax policy, 
other forms of public Intervention, or influences of international trade can 
affect competitiveness and the ability to survive. This approach is there-
fore clearly biased methodologically.30 
- As a rule, less efficient firms are not driven out of the market as is sug-
gested by the survival-of-the-fittest doctrine. This lends support to the 
hypothesis that firms within a noncompetitive oligopoly nucleus jointly 
27 McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, op. cit., 69; and Fisher/Lande, 
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 1608: "In short, 
these studies inherently can focus only on part of what determines diffe-
rential firm efficiency, and what the studies omit is frequently very im-
portant." For a general description of the insufficiencies and limitations 
of the scale economies analysis, cf. Gold, Bela, Changing Perspectives on 
Size, Scale, and Returns: An Interpretative Survey, 19 JEL (1981 ), pp. 5-
33. 
28 With regard to the efficiency effects of mergers, "econometric studies 
neither prove nor disprove that mergers yield efficiencies on average", 
Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 
1619. The same line of reasoning holds with regard to multi-plant econo-
mies of scale which for Scherer leads to the critical conclusion that 
"(t)he best available evidence on this point, derived from Interviews with 
125 manufacturing fl rms, suggests that the managerial and central staff 
economies of multi-plant operation are at most slight, and that in many 
Instances, especially beyond some modest threshold, multi-plant size is 
disadvantageous", Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 101. 
29 Cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 93. Furthermore, 
Stigler doubts whether the socially optimum size Is determinable at all by 
any technique; he describes this issue as an ethical concept, cf. Stigler, 
The Organization of Industry, op. cit., 73. 
30 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 62 and 68. 
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perform an umbrella-pricing strategy on the grounds of mutual Interde-
pendence within the nucleus, protecting those firms on the fringe of the 
oligopoly which are less efficient. 31 
A sufficiently large number of competitors is necessary for an application 
of the technique. Small number studies (i.e., esp. oligopolies) result In 
confusing statements and often lead to the conclusion that quite different 
firm sizes are all seen to be optlmal. 32 
Most of the empirical investigations that rely on the survivor technique 
reach conclusions almost identical with those of engineering estimates and 
cost studies. These results are that the minimum optimal size for firm or 
plant economies is usually a small fraction of total market demand, which 
seriously questions the role of economies in determining size and concentra-
tlon.33 
Contrary to the assertion of the efficiency-concentration adherents, the bulk 
of econometric studies of the post-war era34, which relate firm size to effi-
ciency show that "scale economies were not so substantial that most indu-
31 "Conceivably, the competition referred to could involve the foreclosure of 
markets for outputs, monopolization of input markets, predatory pricing, 
and the like. Survival, then, might be an indicator of private efficiency 
but not of social efficiency", Koch, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 
127, which is in accordance with our assumed cost-decreasing and price-
raising effect of large market shares and the assertion that benefits not 
necessarily be passed on to consumers, due to barriers to entry and 
hence a lack of competitive pressure. 
32 Cf. Shepherd, What Does the Survivor Technique ... , supra. 
33 For a survey of the studies of Bain, Haldi and Whitcomb, Pratten, and 
Scherer, cf. McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, op. cit., 71-77. Be-
sides, this seems in accordance with the original tenet of the Chicago 
School, which holds that "full exploitation of available scale economies at 
both the plant and firm levels would ... result In small firms", Koch, 
Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 123, citing Henry C. Simons and Frank 
H. Knight. 
34 Although they assert that a high level of industry concentration is 
warranted by economies of large size, in many, if not most cases, it may 
not be possible to Identify or even quantify these economies. Therefore, 
adherents of current theory see It simply as a matter of faith that mar-
ket structures that result from unrestrained competition are efficient 
market structures, cf. Singleton, Industrial Organization ... , op. cit., 44, 
citing Demsetz. 
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stries should be expected to be oligopolies"35, regardless of what measure-
ment technique was chosen in individual studies. 
From a survey of the measurement of economies or dlseconomies of scale 
relying on engineering estimates, cost studies, and the survivor technique, 
and an inquiry into the main findings resulting from the studies it can be 
concluded that "(d)espite very different analytical approaches in the various 
studies, a general pattern seems to emerge from a very large number of 
studies; beyond a certain point, average costs do not vary substantially 
over wide ranges of plant sizes". 311 Moreover, the cost gradients which are 
responsible for the steepness of the individual cost curve, are generally low 
so that the cost disadvantage of firms that work at suboptimal plant levels 
are comparatively small and can easily be compensated or even more than 
compensated for by sufficient competitive pressure, disciplining costs, and 
the holding down of prices to marginal costs. Using a range from 4 to 14 
percent for the alleged critical market share, after which no significant 
scale economies are likely to be attained, it is estimated that the true cost 
effect that results from a reduction of excess market share varies between 5 
and 20 percent of additional monopoly profits achieved in the case of excess 
market share.37 
35 Pautler, A Review ... , supra, 611; Shepherd, The Treatment of Market 
Power, op. cit., 119, who notes "that scale economies explain only a re-
latively small portion of the major dominant-firm positions". Cf. also 
Scherer, Industrial market structure •.. , op. cit., 94, who states that 
"with few exceptions, the minimum optimal plant scale revealed in studies 
of American manufacturing industries has been small relative to industry 
size." Idem, p. 95: "We conclude then that economies of scale at the plant 
level do not in the vast majority of instances necessitate high national 
concentration levels for U.S. manufacturing industries." 
36 Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 
1606 f.; Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 91-98; and 
Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 181-185 and 
193, who notes that "economies of scale appear to be limited, so that 
market shares above 10 percent commonly embody mainly excess market 
share"; and even Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Con-
centration, supra, 231, who provides empirical evidence for the Chicago 
tenet. For a more recent survey of empirical studies on the topic cf. 
Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., Tabs. 1, 4 10, 12, 17, 
23, 26, 30, and 36, pp. 235-261, summarizing the studies from Bain (1951) 
to Owen (1980), essentially presenting analogous results for individual 
branches. 
37 Cf. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 195; and 
Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 94: "(T)he long-run cost 
curves in most Industries are much less steep at suboptimal plant scales 
than one Is led to believe by typical textbook illustrations." 
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With regard to the underlying cost function, Shepherd reaches the conclu-
sion, therefore that "(t)he typical 'industry' cost curve for the firm is dish-
shaped, with MES at 5 percent of the market or less. The constant-cost 
range may be wide, though presumably average cost rises eventually ... ". 311 
Empirical evidence on this was strongly affirmed by some early Hearings of 
the U.S. Senate from 1964 to 1969 in which the economic and soclopolitical 
consequences of increased concentration in the economy were scrutinized. 
Essentially, these Hearings provided the following results:39 
- There is no reliable correlation between the size of a firm and Its profi-
tability; 
the minimum optimal scale of a firm and hence the minimum efficient size 
in the technical sense may be different from Industry to industry; and 
- in the majority of industries in the U.S. economy the actual level of con-
centration may not be justified by the existence of economies of scale. 40 
Probably the most recent study within the tradition of engineering studies 
which tries to elaborate on the interdependence of economies of scale and 
concentration Is the one performed by the German Monopolies Commission 
(MC) in Its Sixth Main Report. 41 In its report the MC tested the significance 
of economies of scale in 18 branches of the German economy. The relation 
between the planned size of a plant and the average cost of production is 
38 Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 206. 
39 Cf. Economic Concentration: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Se-
nate, Washington, D.C. 1964-1969, Parts 1-8a. An extensive evaluation of 
these Hearings may be found In Petry, Horst, Technischer Fortschritt, 
Integration, internationale Wettbewerbsfahlgkelt und Unternehmensgrof3e, 
183 JNSt (1969), pp. 271-299. 
40 This may be different In the case of relatively small national markets. 
However, economies of scale that bulk large relative to any national mar-
ket, and would therefore lead inevitably to highly concentrated industries 
at the national level, may be smaller relative to the EEC market as a 
whole. Thus, the creation of the Common Market may serve as an anti-
trust policy, curbing what would otherwise be problematic levels of mono-
poly power In some national markets, cf. Krugman, Paul, whose study is 
part of the report "Efficiency, Stability and Equity: A Strategy for the 
Evolution of the Economic System of the European Community", Brussels, 
1987. 
41 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit. 
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portrayed by what is called the 'long-range planning curve'. This planning 
curve comprises technical economies only and not pecuniary economies.42 
In all of the branches analyzed, the MC finds the minimum efficient size to 
become enlarged over time. Specialization as well as automatization advanta-
ges are the primary cause for this development, which seems to provide 
certain evidence for the size/concentration argument. However, industry 
concentration in a number of economic branches Is significantly higher than 
required by economies of scale. In the majority of the branches presented, 
industry concentration is lower than the full exploitation of technical econo-
mies would require them to be.43 
The importance of economies of scale may increase In the presence of a 
number of conditions which can be listed as follows:44 
- Minimum efficient size constitutes a large share of the domestic output; 
- suboptimal scales are associated with above average cost increases (high 
cost gradient of the underlying cost curve); 
- minimum efficient plant sizes are not outweighed by inefficiencies resulting 
from the distribution- or from the input-side of the firm; 
- cost disadvantages cannot be compensated for by smaller plant sizes 
through means of production flexibility; 
the competitiveness of firms is based primarily on pricing policies and not 
on Innovativeness or product differentiation advantages. 
In a number of economic branches the si gnlficance of economies of scale is 
diminished, however. Technical economies may lose some of their significance 
primarily due to a high proportion of transportation costs in relation to 
total costs, which do not allow significant economies to be realized. Other 
factors are fluctuating or stagnating market demand, making the exploitation 
42 Cf. Monopolkommisslon, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., para. 593. The effi-
ciency advantages are seen to be rooted in specialization advantages, 
physical laws (so-called 0.6 rule), economies of massed reserves, manage-
ment capabilities and further residual efficiencies, cf. ibid., paras. 594-
599; and Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 
170-172. 
43 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., tabs. 40 and 41 at 
pp. 263 f.; and for a synopsis, Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartell-
recht, op. cit., 90. 
44 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., paras. 605-609. 
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of economies impossible, and changes In minimum efficient sizes as a result 
of frequent changes in make-or-buy decisions.45 
Summarizing these results, the proposition can be put forward that it is not 
advisable to yield all of the technical economies since the production flexibi-
lity which can be an Important management parameter is restricted In this 
case. Even in the cases In which larger minimum efficient sizes should be 
attained, this cannot solely be attributed to technical economies. It is addi-
tional research and development efficiencies as well as product diffe-
rentiation advantages that underly present observable concentration tenden-
cles.48 
The degree of efficiency gains from cost savings may be consistently over-
stated for two reasons:47 
- First, the mlsallocation burden (dead-weight loss) which can be demonstra-
ted by the welfare triangle is underestimated, as has been demonstrated 
(cf. supra Williamson's trade-off model). 
- Second, the benefits from economies of scale may not be passed on to 
consumers if there is not sufficient competitive pressure on the fl rms; 
this may be the case primarily with efficiencies attainable In addition to 
the technical economies and for sn-called X-lnefflciencies. 
If It is assumed - as is done by the current tenet - that meaningful bar-
riers to potential competition do not exist, the latter argument seems crucial 
for critics of the Chicago School. As has been noted supra, economies of 
large scale production and product differentiation advantages of established 
over potential entrant firms have a dual character and can be regarded as 
efficiency advantages or (so-called) natural barriers to entry. According to 
Bork such natural barriers exist, 
45 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., paras. 750-755. 
46 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., para. 755. These 
economies are difficult to operationalize, however, and hence difficult to 
take Into consideration. Furthermore, it is unclear whether these ad-
ditional efficiencies show up in general and are significant, cf. Schmidt, 
Wettbewerbspoliti k und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 104 f. It is furthermore open 
to question whether external growth via mergers is necessary to attain 
these efficiencies. 
47 Cf. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 195. 
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"(w)hen existing firms are efficient and possess valuable plants, equip-
ment, knowledge, skill, and reputation. (Therefore,) potential entrants 
will find it correspondingly more difficult to enter the industry, since 
they must acquire those things".48 
The ambiguous character of such barriers becomes obvious once again be-
cause they can be seen to impede sufficient competitive pressure, whereas 
they may present efficiencies at the same time. 
Whereas the considerations above emphasized the extent of economies In a 
given state of technology, the additional question has to be raised as to 
what extent technological progress increases economies In research and 
development and hence makes corporate mergers and Internal growth in size 
unavoidable.49 
Basically, economic and financial potentials of large sized companies enable 
them to respond to product differentiation strategies and competition for In-
novations in a more appropriate way than rather small firms because of the 
amount of capital required. There is strong empirical evidence, however, that 
the ability to innovate is not necessarily associated with the willingness to 
innovate.so With regard to the basic Invention leading to the innovation, 
there is no empirical evidence whatsoever that the efficiency-causes-size or 
concentration hypothesis is deterministic In nature.51 The aforementioned 
U.S. Hearings came to the conclusion that the attainment of R&D efficiencies 
cannot necessarily be derived from mergers and internal growth. The reaso-
ning that large sized companies are of extraordinary importance for the 
general rate of technological progress and economic development may be 
verified or falsified according to the individual Industry analyzed and this 
48 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 31 0 f. This explanation for the as-
sertion that persistent competitive pressure might not become real compe-
titive pressure is based on the fact that most of the newcomers are not 
able to survive after entry since they are less efficient than established 
firms. This has been established by simple observation of non-entry over 
a longer period of time, cf. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Ana-
lysis, supra, 945. 
49 This postulate is called the new defense hypothesis, cf. Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspollti k und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 84. 
50 Cf. Petry, Technlscher Fortschritt, ... , supra, 282 f. 
51 For a variety of examples and additional empirical studies, cf. Schmidt, 
Wettbewerbspoliti k und Kartell rec ht, op. cit., 97-101. 
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evaluation may change over a period of time. Hence, economies of R&D cannot 
justify size and concentration in every single case.52 
Empirical evidence suggests that capacity expansions either by internal or 
by external corporate growth cannot be performed In an unlimited manner 
without changing the technical characteristics of the cost function, such as 
the cost gradient and the total level. Starting from a specified quantity of 
output, total average cost may increase, causing dlseconomies of scale.53 
Further complications with regard to the evaluation of the benefits and non-
technical efficiencies associated with economies from rising industry concen-
tration arise from the fact that increased concentration is associated with a 
decrease In competitive pressure due to managerial slack, communication, and 
control problems, etc.54 Especially at high levels of concentration, the likeli-
hood of higher costs increases because of the occurrence of such X-lneffi-
ciencies that would outweigh economies of scale. Originally, It was argued in 
this context that the efficiency-losses due to monopolies were underestimated 
by traditional microeconomic methodology. It was Leibenstein who pointed out 
that a decline of competitive pressure means additional non-allocative effi-
ciency-losses, which have their source in motivation problems and divergent 
goals among managers, owners, and employees of a firm. The assumption of 
average cost minimization as the firm's only goal is not tenable under these 
circumstances.55 Leibenstein's approach is crucially important for the 
assessment of productive efficiency, which is mainly determined by econo-
mies of scale and transaction-cost efficiencies. Whereas the current theoreti-
cal tenet holds that even at high levels of concentration decreasing costs 
are attainable by economies of scale or related efficiencies, the results of 
52 Cf. Petry, Technischer Fortschritt, .•• , supra, 286. 
53 Cf. Herdzina, Wettbewerbspolitl k, op. cit., 41. 
54 Cf. our considerations on the WIiiiamson trade-off in this contribution. Cf. 
as well Lande, Robert H., Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HastLJ 
(1982), pp. 67-151, 79: "(S)ome evidence suggests that the existence of 
monopolies might curtail overall research and Innovation or lead to other 
undesirable economic consequences." 
55 Cf. Leibenstein, Harvey, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efflclency", 35 AER 
1966, pp. 392 - 407. Cf. as well Shepherd who states that "presumably 
average cost rises eventually because of (1) bureaucracy, from absolute 
size, and/or (2) x-inefficiency caused by the firm's market power. The 
constant costs may also mask a significant amount of pecuniary econo-
mies, the typical cost curve may slope upward instead of being flat", 
Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, op. cit., 206. 
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efficiency considerations may become quite different if Leibenstein's ap-
proach is taken Into account, since we have to consider a possible trade-off 
between a positive effect on economies of scale and a detrimental one on X-
i nefficlencles. 59 
These reflections have shown that size and (external) concentration as inde-
pendent variables and efficiency as the dependent variable may increase in 
the same direction up to a certain level. From an overall economic point of 
view, however, X-inefficiencies and diseconomles of scale may contribute to a 
misallocation of economic resources after this level is surpassed. External 
concentration, therefore, Is not necessary to achieve efficiencies in every 
individual case. From an efficiency viewpoint the market solution may be 
superior in these cases. 
Unless non-technical efficiencies - which will be treated infra - change 
these findings significantly, we are able to make the assertion that eco-
nomies of scale may not be attained In an unlimited manner In the sense 
that these economies would require the firms to strive for large market 
shares. Although the points beyond which economies will not occur substan-
tially (minimum efficient size) are a priori indeterminate for the general 
case, since they vary from industry to Industry, the aforementioned provi-
des evidence that supracompetitive profitability beyond these thresholds is 
tendentially a result rather of market power than of efficiency. Increased 
likelihood of an occurrence of X-inefflciencies as concentration rises, tends 
to support this assertion, and hence tends to provide a theoretical basis for 
the rejection of the efficiency differential-hypothesis. 
56 For an extensive survey on these counteracting effects, cf. Schmidt, 
Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 92. With regard to the actual 
trade-off, Scherer comes to the conclusion that "(t)he evidence is frag-
mentary, but it is persuasive. 'X-inefflciency' exists, and it Is more apt 
to be reduced when competitive pressures are strong than when firms 
enjoy insulated market positions. What we do not know is how large are 
the differences systematically correlated with monopoly power. That X-ln-
efficiencies attributable to monopoly are at least as large as the welfare 
losses from resource misallocation seems eminently plausible. And they 
may well be considerably larger", Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , 
op. cit., 446. 
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3. The Evidence of Efficiency on the Basis of Merger Performance 
We have found no explicit definition of the efficiency criterion within the 
current theoretical approach,57 and even Bork had to concede58 that effici-
ency cannot be measured and that substitutes have to be used in order to 
evaluate whether increases in efficiency have occured. The question of how 
efficiency should actually be measured remains unanswered also because 
efficiencies are presumed to encompass much more than just technical econo-
mies. The assertion by advocates of the current tenet that efficiency can 
only be roughly estimated, leaves room for all kinds of subjective judg-
ments. 
The question remains, as to whether efficiencies beyond the technical ones 
can be measured at all. This makes necessary a method of determining these 
efficiencies. The most common attempt has been to cover additional efficien-
cies via an analysis of the effects of mergers. The results of these studies 
have been ambiguous and have shown that mergers do not always increase 
efficiency .59 
Instead of efficiency, improved performance may represent redlstrl butlve 
gains without real efficiency advantages in terms of resource savings, re-
sulting from factors such as from sources of tax avoidance, good bargaining 
due to imperfect or lopsided information, and market power gains. 110 
With regard to studies based on accounting data, stock market data and 
changes in resulting market shares of the merging firms, the outcomes of 
the merger studies performed can be summarized as follows:81 
- As a rule, merging firms are not more profitable than non-merging firms 
57 Cf. Scherer, Separating Wheat from Chaff ... , supra, 995 f. 
58 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 192, who mentions that "effici-
ency cannot be studied directly or quantified." 
59 For a survey, cf. Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger En-
forcement, supra, 1609-1624, who assert that it is mainly technical effi-
ciencies that are important in the case of horizontal and vertical mergers 
and that additional efficiencies ("synergetic effects") are primarily found 
with conglomerate mergers (p. 1599 f.); and Mueller, United States' Anti-
trust: At the Crossroads, op. cit., 226. 
60 Cf. Green, Industrial Organization ... , supra, 495, who holds that "logically 
one cannot rule out the possibility that the rise in share value reflects 
the effects of market power rather than increased efficiency". Cf. also 
Mueller, United States' Antitrust: At the Crossroads, op. cit., 227 f. 
61 Cf. Green, Industrial Organization ... , supra, 495; Fisher/Lande, Efficiency 
Considerations in Merger Enforcement, supra, 1611 et seq.; and Mueller, 
United States' Antitrust: At the Crossroads, op. cit., 226-229. 
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there is no single motivation or effect of a merger (such as efficiency); 
- whereas stockholders of acquired firms show above-average gains from 
mergers, stockholders of acquiring firms experience relatively few gains 
or no gains at a11e2; 
- virtually all of the studies on market shares show that some time after the 
merger the total proportion of the market was less than the ex ante com-
bined totals, which means that - as a rule - the share of the combined 
firm in the relevant market in question declined after the merger-93; and 
- individual case studies on mergers show that there is no unambiguous 
evidence on whether mergers in general, and horizontal ones in particular, 
increase the efficiency of the merging firms. 84 
This may finally lead us to the conclusion that aside from observed returns 
to stockholders of acquired firms there is no empirical evidence for the 
hypothesis that mergers generally improve the efficiency of the combined 
62 It Is considered a flaw In the assumptions about the effects of mergers 
that gains to stockholders are considered to be pure efficiency gains, as 
noted above. 
63 Cf. e.g., Mueller, Dennis C., Mergers and Market Shares, 67 RES (1985), 
pp. 259-267, who reports a significant decline in the after merger com-
bined shares for a sample of 210 acquisitions. From a logical point of 
view and following the reasoning of the current tenet, the combined 
share should have been Increased as a result of superior efficiency in 
comparison to competitors. This does not seem to be the case, however. 
Furthermore, "although firms with large market shares obtained primarily 
through internal growth tend to be more efficient than average, firms 
merging to achieve the same shares would not necessarily obtain compa-
rable efficiencies", Fisher/Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger En-
forcement, supra, 1609. 
64 Cf. e.g., Scherer, On the Current State ..• , op. cit.; recently also, Ravens-
craft, David J., and Frederic M. Scherer, Mergers, Sell-Offs, and Economic 
Efficiency, Washington, D.C. 1987; and Green, Industrial Organization ... , 
supra, 496, who summarize the findings In the assertion that "if one 
examines the post-merger history of many merger partners, one often 
finds divestiture, sell-offs, abandonments and other signs of failure." 
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firms in terms of resources used.85 This may be so in individual cases, how-
ever. 
IV. eoncludlng Remarks 
In Part 3 of the contribution we basically confirmed the validity of the tra-
ditional approach underlying public policy towards horizontal mergers (con-
centration-collusion doctrine), although a variety of refinements were found 
to be important. Strong evidence was found that performance criteria as 
used in the empirical studies on the concentration-collusion doctrine serve 
as indications of market power. However, some problems remained in attemp-
ting to measure market power by means of profitability. Most importantly, 
economic returns and other performance measures were found most likely to 
measure both efficiency and market power effects at the same time, the two 
sets of factors being hard to disentangle from each other properly. 
By comparison, the alternative measurement technique provided by dead-
weight loss, which has already been presented, neglects power considerati-
ons to a large extent and is characterized by practical difficulties. The qua-
lifications necessary to make use of the approach make the model lose its 
analytical clarity and applicability. Furthermore, the dead-weight loss is 
severely handicapped by the fact that It is static as a rule and strictly 
efficiency-oriented, whereas we prefer a multiple-goal approach. The measure 
is not able to offer a basis for generalization and it cannot serve as a 
broad-based concept for the purpose of empirical proof. 
The traditional studies based on various performance criteria were found to 
have a variety of insufficiencies and shortcomings; these, however, do not 
call Into question empirical attempts to test different hypotheses. The fin-
dings on the robustness of such studies with regard to changes in the per-
65 The empirical "experience Is difficult to reconcile with the conjecture that 
mergers turned out on average to be profit-increasing and efficiency-en-
hancing", Ravenscraft, David J., and Frederic M. Scherer, The Profitabili-
ty of Mergers, discussion paper, presented at the Third Meeting on Indu-
strial Economics at the International Institute of Management, Ber Ii n 1986, 
p. 34. For a recent confirmation cf. idem, Life After Takeover, 36 JIE 
(1987), pp. 147-155, 155, who state again that "the hypothesis that tender 
offer takeovers are on average efficiency-increasing warrants much more 
skepticism than it has received thus far in the literatures of economics, 
corporate finance, and securities law". 
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formance measure provide evidence for the validity of the traditional 
studies. Data aggregation biases used to pose the most serious problems for 
these empirical studies. Due to Improved data bases, however, these difficul-
ties have largely been circumvented. 
The test of the rival hypotheses has shown that neither the concentration-
collusion doctrine nor the new learning hypothesis have made obvious to 
what extent horizontal industry concentration and the resulting economic 
performance are based on efficiency and to what extent they are due to 
market power. Also they have not shown whether industry concentration 
reflects market power consequences at the same time and hence serves as a 
basis for an extensive use of that power as a result. 
(Relative) market share has been found to enable an Incumbent to increase 
efficiency but also to take advantage of monopolistic discretion by charging 
higher prices; however, due to a possible lack of competitive pressure, it Is 
not guaranteed that the efficiency gains will also be passed on to consu-
mers. Hence the role of market shares not only serves as a basis for an 
efficiency explanation but also as a basis for a possible market power expla-
nation. The efficiency-differential hypothesis is defective in that efficiency 
would imply higher profits, but higher profits do not necessarily imply effi-
ciency. 
Market share rather than concentration was found to be the crucial structu-
ral element. The supplier with a high market share may be profiting from 
lower costs as well as from higher prices; however, the customers do not 
necessarily gain from these increases in efficiency, a fact which contradicts 
the goal of consumer welfare that is explicitly appealed to by the adherents 
of current theory. With regard to technical economies, this makes it obvious 
that the efficiency differential explanation offered by the new learning 
hypothesis does not find convincing evidence on how one is to distinguish 
those situations where scale economies only have efficiency effects, from 
those where the firms enjoying such economies realize that entry into the 
industry is difficult and thus set high prices. 
Furthermore, additional shortcomings invalidated the contents of the effi-
ciency-causes-concentration explanation: 
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- The approach is characterized by the fact that It tends to understate 
severely or even completely ignores the importance of barriers to compe-
tition. Although former empirical results on the importance of barriers to 
new competition did not justify the emphasis which was put on this ele-
ment of market structure, barriers to new competition do exist and their 
importance In detering sufficient pressure due to potential competition Is 
underestimated by the current tenet. 
- Insufficiencies of the data used were heavily exaggerated. Contrary to the 
implications drawn by some critics, the basic structural relationship esti-
mated, using disaggregated data, turned out to be robust across a wide 
range of variable definitions, sampling frames, and controls of accounting 
method variations. 
- The existing knowledge on oligopolies is neglected. The acceptance of the 
correlation between concentration and the interdependence of firms is not 
enough to settle the question of whether oligopolists must behave in a 
competitive way or not. In order to answer this question, the existing 
structural conditions of the market have to be looked into as well (for in-
stance product life cycle, product homogeneity or heterogeneity, degree of 
information - these being factors which qualify the importance of the 
number of the firms). The fact that the incumbents in an oligopoly nuc-
leus obviously do not compete against each other, do not outcompete less 
efficient rivals and hence protect fringe firms by a price umbrella, pro-
vides evidence for the original collusion explanation, and is at the same 
time consistent with the differential-efficiency explanation. 
- The general consensus that high profits can persist over a longer period 
of time when the observed enterprise has cost advantages or related effi-
ciency advantages, i.e. when a superior good is offered or market power 
is held in comparison to actual or potential competitors, is disregarded or 
misinterpreted In that it is assumed that this is solely due to efficiency 
advantages. Sufficient$fompetitive pressure is presumed to exercise persi-
stent downward pressure on prices and profitability in a constant manner, 
which excludes underlying motives other than efficiency-enhancement. 
Technical economies as well as non-technical efficiencies were found to ex-
plain existing industry concentration only to a limited extent. This result 
can be considered a prima facie proof that beyond a relatively low threshold 
level undue market power may be assumed to emerge. At the same time, 
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firms with non-scale superiorities may increase their share of the market 
without external corporate growth. The attempt to grow primarily via exter-
nal growth can also be seen to be in accordance with the assertion that 
efficiency is not the only motivation of corporate executives (e.g., empire 
building). 
In the case of mergers, increased performance may represent redistributive 
gains without real efficiency advantages in terms of resource savings. Aside 
from observed returns to stockholders of acquired firms, there is no empiri-
cal evidence for the hypothesis that mergers generally improve the efficien-
cy of the combined firms in terms of resources used. 
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fllC1..J; Vertical Mergers: Antlcanpetltlve Effects and the Attainment of 
Efficiencies 
Unlike In the case of policy concerning horizontal mergers, there is no con-
sistent economic approach underlying policy on vertical mergers. For verti-
cal Integration as such, no theoretical basis exists which Is comparable to 
the concentration collusion-doctrine In horizontal merger cases. 1 Thus far, 
antitrust policy has been concerned primarily with the tendency of vertical 
integration In general and vertical mergers In particular to generate anti-
competitive effects by the "establishment of relationships between buyers 
and sellers which deprive their rivals of a fair opportunity to compete".2 
Under the 1968 Merger Guidelines the U.S. Department of Justice challenged 
cases In which the upstream firm held 10% or more of its market and the 
downstream firm 6% or more and a foreclosure of roughly 10% of customers 
or sources of supply.3 
Recent research has focused on comparisons of the costs arising from the 
use of different mechanisms for the mediation of economic activities and has 
emphasized possible economic advantages of contractual ties which lead to 
cost savings in comparison to other linkages.4 This has led to a strong 
notion among economists that vertical arrangements in general and vertical 
mergers in particular are efficiency-enhancing, carry little or no anticompe-
Cf. Areeda, Phillip, and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles, vol. 4, Boston, Toronto 1980, § 1000a; Bork, Robert H., 
Vertical Integration and Competitive Processes, in: Weston, Fred, and Sam 
Peltzmann (eds.), Public Polley Toward Mergers, Pacific Palisades, Cal. 
1969, pp. 139-149, 142; and Kaserman, David L., Theories of Vertical Inte-
gration: Implications for Antitrust Polley, 23 AB (1978), pp. 483-510, 483, 
who regards such a theory of vertical mergers as neither possible nor 
desirable. 
2 House of Representatives Report No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1949, p. 8. 
This was operationalized by the Courts through the notion of foreclosure 
which we will deal with Infra: "The primary vice of a vertical merger .•. is 
that by foreclosing the competitors of either party from a segment of the 
market otherwise open to them, the arrangement may act as a clog on 
competition, which deprives the rivals of a fair opportunity to compete" 
(Italics supplied), Brown Shoe v. U.S., 1962 CCH Trade Casi=!s § 70,366, p. 
76,492. 
3 Cf. Sullivan, Lawrence A., Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, St. Paul, 
Minn. 1977, p. 664. 
4 Cf. Klein, Benjamin, Transaction Cost Determinants of 'Unfair' Contractual 
Arrangements, 70 AER (1980), pp. 356-362; Monteverde, Kirk, and David J. 
Teece, Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration, 25 JLE (1982), 
pp. 321-328. 
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tltlve effects and, therefore, should not be considered (per se) illegal.5 The 
possible occurrence of both desirable efficiency effects as well as un-
desirable anticompetitive effects makes necessary an economic trade-off bet-
ween these two effects.8 
With regard to the evaluation of vertical mergers, three important Questions 
thus arise, which we will try to answer In the subsequent course of the in-
quiry. In this context, we have to determine 
- to what extent the transactions-cost approach may serve as an adeQuate 
basis for an evaluation of efficiency-effects of vertical mergers; 
- how serious and how likely the anticompetitive effects are that are antici-
pated from vertical mergers under certain conditions; and 
- whether we are able to determine at what point vertical mergers become 
anticompetitive in order to formulate administrative rules or presumptions 
reasonably precisely? 
I. Yertlco! Integration and Efflclencv-Enhancement 
Under the conventional microeconomic assumption of zero costs of operating 
competitive markets, vertical integration, and hence the existence of Intra-
company coordination of economic activities, poses an anomaly since there is 
no Incentive to Integrate under competitive conditlons.7 Cost savings due to 
technological linkage In the production process constituted the principal ex-
ception to this view. The underlying reasoning Is that '"successive processes 
which, naturally, follow Immediately In time and place dictate certain efficient 
manufacturing configurations; these, in turn, are believed to have common 
ownership lmpllcatlons'"9, and hence pose an incentive to Integrate. 
5 Cf., e.g., Areeda, Phllllp, and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis 
of Antitrust Principles, vol. 3, Boston, Toronto 1978, § 726b; Posner, 
Richard A., The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 UPLR (1979), pp. 
925-952, 937 f.; WIiiiamson, Oliver E., Assessing Vertical Market Restric-
tions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 UPLR 
(1979), pp. 953-993, 992 f., although not considered Chicagoan. 
6 Cf., e.g., Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1000a. As has 
already been emphasized, this is a general problem in economics, cf. again 
Herdzina, Klaus, Wettbewerbspolltik, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1987, pp. 35 ff. 
7 Cf. Williamson, Oliver E., The Vertical Integration of Production: Market 
Failure Considerations, 61 AER (1971), pp. 112-123, 112. 
8 Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Im-
plications, New York 1975, p. 83; and cf. Bain, Joe S., Industrial Organiza-
tion, 2nd ed., New York et al. 1968, p. 381; and Hovenkamp, Herbert, Eco-
nomics and Federal Antitrust Law, St. Paul, Minn. 1985, p. 193. 
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Nevertheless, this approach was not seen to suffice in explaining why econo-
mic entitles would integrate some of the market activities. Disagreeing with 
the technological Interdependencies approach, Coase stated that it was due 
to "costs of using the price mechanism"9 that economic entities had an In-
centive to Integrate some of the market activities to be carried out at lower 
costs by a joint organization. 
1. Transaction costs and Different Mechanisms for the Organization of 
Economic Exchange 
a. Economic Exchange via Markets: costs of Using the Price Mechanism 
The vertical component of productive efficiency Is associated with the trans-
action-cost advantages that are generated from vertical Integration. The co-
ordination of economic activities and the allocation of economic resources can 
be carried out by different mechanisms. According to the profit maximization 
principle advocated by adherents of the current tenet, the firm will choose 
the most advantageous mechanism. 10 If the coordination is carried out by 
using the market mechanism, transaction-costs arise since the use of price 
as an Instrument of coordination Is assumed to entail costs. According to the 
original approach presented by Coase, transaction-costs consist of several 
components: 11 
- search and Information <D&ts, due to the fact that the production of rele-
vant data or making this data available to the economic entity is costly; 
9 Coase, Ronald, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (1937), pp. 386-405, 
386. Cf. as well Robins, James A., Organizational Economics: Notes on the 
Use of Transaction-Cost Theory in the Study of Organizations, 32 ASQ 
(1987), pp. 68-86, 69: "In basic terms, transaction costs are those costs 
associated with an economic exchange that vary Independent of the com-
petitive market price of the goods or services exchanged." 
10 For a detailed survey on these different mechanisms of coordination cf. 
Ouchi, WIiiiam G., Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans, 25 ASQ (1980), pp. 
129-141; for the basic work on different mechanisms of economic coordina-
tion, cf. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra; and Ibid., 386: "The opera-
tion of a market costs something and by forming an organisation and al-
lowing some authority ('an entrepreneur') to direct the resources certain 
marketing costs are saved." 
11 Cf., e.g., Bossmann, Eva, Weshalb glbt es Unternehmungen?: Der Erkla-
rungsansatz von Ronald H. Coase, 137 JITE (1981), pp. 667-673, 668 f.; Ka-
serman, Theories of Vertical Integration ••• , supra, 485; and Schmidt, Ingo, 
Wettbewerbspolltlk und Kartellrecht: Eine Elnf0hrung, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 
1987, p. 94. 
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negotiation and monitoring <XJSts, arising from the contracting process or 
from activities that attempt to enforce post-contractual performance; 
- <XJSts of reduced flexlblllty that are associated with the uncertainty of 
future events as a result of transaction-specific investments; and 
- <XJSts Imposed on market transactions by governments or the public that 
do not apply to intra-corporate transfers of economic activities. 
The original approach was extended mainly by Oliver E. Williamson who 
attempted to provide a coherent framework for inquiring into the determi-
nants of vertical integration in different industries. 12 The reasoning under-
lying this approach Is that the achievement of transaction-cost advantages 
regarding the elimination of monopoly distortions, technical complementarl-
ties, supply reliability, and economies in the acquisition of information are 
the essential reasons for vertical integration. ,a The causes of Inability of 
the market to perform its functions under certain circumstances, leading to 
the aforementioned outcomes, are presented by the so-called organlzatlonal 
failures framework provided by Williamson. Essentially, three conditions are 
responsible for incentives to integrate:14 
- Conditions of uncertainty and/or complexity, and the bounded rationality 
of human beings. Man Is tendentlally rational but only limitedly so. Thus 
"it is only because Individual human beings are limited in knowledge, 
foresight, skill, and time that organizations are useful Instruments of 
human purpose". 1s 
- Opportunism as an extended form of self-interest on the part of economic 
agents which leads to attempts by economic agents to make false, empty, 
and therefore self-disbelieved threats and promises in order to attain 
individual advantages not included in a contract. This may be particularly 
12 Cf. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies ... , op. cit.; Idem, Transaction-Cost 
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 JLE (1979), pp. 
233-261; and idem, The Vertical Integration of Production ... , supra. 
13 Cf. Levy, David T., The Transaction Cost Approach to Vertical Integration: 
An Empirical Examination, 67 RES (1985), pp. 438-445, 438. 
14 Cf. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies ... , op. cit., 20-40; and for a sum-
marical survey, Bossmann, Weshalb gibt es Unternehmungen? ... , supra, 
671-673. For a survey on alternative and complementary explanatory ap-
proaches, cf. Williamson, Oliver, Antitrust Economics, Mergers, Contracting, 
and Strategic Behavior, Oxford 1987, p. 56 note 3. 
15 Simon, Herbert A., Models of Man, New York 1957, p. 199 and: "The capa-
city of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is 
very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution Is re-
quired for objectively rational behavior in the real world" (p. 198). 
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attractive in cases of small-numbers bargaining or in case of uncertainty 
about the final results of the contract. 16 
Conditions of Information lmpactadness which arise, "when true underlying 
circumstances relevant to the transaction, or related set of transactions, 
are known to one or more parties but cannot be costlessly discerned by 
or displayed for others".17 
Since the operationalization and determination of costs arising from trans-
actions seems an unsolvable problem, an attempt has been made to list 
transaction specific market characteristics as criteria for the determination 
of the extent of vertical integration. According to Richardson, the form of 
exchange depends on the transaction to be carried out. 18 If the economic 
activities to be performed are complementary and similar in their nature, a 
pooling of the activities into a corporation seems advisable. 
Comparable but advanced criteria were set up by Williamson who extricated 
three different characteristics for the determination of integrative cases: 19 
- The frequency with which bilateral economic transactions are repeated de-
termines the incentive to integrate. Depending on the frequency, different 
contractual linkages can be chosen; 
the extent to which bilateral economic transactions require transaction 
specific investment determines the incentive to Integrate. The larger the 
extent of idiosyncratic investment for a sequence of transactions within a 
contract, the stronger the Incentive to intra-company organization; and 
- the future uncertainty associated with bilateral economic transactions de-
termines the Incentive to integrate. There is a large degree of uncertainty 
associated with the quality of goods and services purchased, and also un-
certainty about the development of relevant data in the future. 
The pattern set according to the first two criteria can be summarized In the 
following synopsis: 
16 Cf. Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration .•. , supra, 487; and as well 
Goffman, I., Strategic Interaction, Philadelphia 1969, p. 105. 
17 WIiiiamson, Markets and Hierarchies ... , op. cit., 31. 
18 Cf. Richardson, G.B., The Organisation of Industry, 82 EJ (1972), pp. 888 
f. 
19 Cf. Williamson, Oliver E., Economic Organisation: Firms, Markets and Polley 
Control, Brighton, Sussex 1986, pp. 105-118; and idem, On the Nature of 
the Firm: Some Recent Developments, 137 JITE (1981), pp. 675-680, 676. 
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l.iL..1.; Means of Governance as a Result of Invest•ent Characteristics and Transaction Frequency 
/nves1men1 Charac1eris1ics 
Non-specific Mixed I Jdiosyncraric 
,; Trilateral :governance 
.§ (neoclassical ,contracting) 
,l I 
" " ~ I G' " u - 00 :: c:: I ~; -~ .§ .., - --;- ~-~-~--:, -<:>-
Bilateral I Unified ::E ~ Q, g .., Lt 5 I 00 U governance governance ... I ... 
:, (Relational I " ... 
contracting) : c:,:: 
Source1 Williamson, Oliver E., Econo•ic Organisation: Fir•s, Markets and Policy Control, Brighton, Sussei 
1986, p. 117. 
b. Economic Exchange via Organizations: Costs of Using Internal Organization 
However, in contrast to the aforementioned costs of using the price mecha-
nism In markets, there has to be some explanation as to explain why econo-
mic transactions are not performed by firm organizations altogether. Due to 
costs associated with the exercise of the internal entrepreneurial function, 
vertical Integration leads to costs resulting from the Internal organizing of 
economic transactlons:20 
"Under certain conditions, markets are more efficient because they can 
mediate without paying the costs of managers, accountants, or person-
nel departments. Under other conditions, however, a market mechanism 
becomes so cumbersome that It Is less efficient than a bureaucracy." 
These costs associated with the use of the Internal entrepreneurial function 
comprise primarily the following components:21 
- decreasing returns to scale to the entrepreneurial function; 
- increased llkellhood of Inefficient resource allocation due to an Increased 
organizational size; and 
20 Ouchi, Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans, supra, 129 et seq. 
21 Cf. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra; Kaserman, Theories of Vertical 
Integration .•. , supra, 486; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, 
op. cit., 95; and WIiiiamson, Markets and Hierarchies ... , op. cit., 117-131. 
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- a rising supply price of one or more Inputs to the production process as 
the integration process proceeds. 
Often the defects associated with market exchanges have to surmount a non-
trivial threshold until internal organization offers clear cut efficiency 
advantages.22 It Is the primary task of antitrust theory to provide evidence 
on the level of that threshold in order to perform a possible efficiency 
trade-off. 
2. Efficiency-Enhancement as the Underlylng Reasoning for Vertlcal 
Integration 
According to current theory, vertical strategies in general and vertical mer-
gers In particular, are advantageous for the economic agents performing the 
integration since the anticipated costs of organization are lower than the 
transaction-costs that arise through use of the price mechanism. It has been 
asserted that vertical market restrictions should be assumed to enhance ef-
ficiency per se. There Is virtually no "reason to assume that a vertical mer-
ger which lowers costs and prices, thus benefittlng consumers, is 'unfair' to 
rivals In any reasonable antitrust sense of that term".23 
According to the assertion that efficiency-enhancement Is the primary goal 
of competitors, the best strategy for the firm is to compare market trans-
action and internal organization costs and to merge vertically only to the 
extent that transaction-costs are equal to the costs of organizing. Each of 
the separate stages of the production and distribution process is autono-
mous, and In principle market contracts could be used to bring economic 
activity at successive stages into adjustment. The limits of vertical inte-
gration, however, are found In that the successive Interfaces are organized 
22 Cf. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies ... , op. cit., 130. 
23 Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ••. , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1002. This has been 
emphasized strongly with regard to the Brown Shoe decision, cf. Bork, 
Robert H., and Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CLR (1965), 
pp. 363-376, 372: "The Brown Shoe case employed the theory of exclusio-
nary practices to outlaw vertical Integration that promised lower prices, 
... , and the theory of 'social purpose' to justify the fact that the decision 
prevented the realization of efficiencies by a merger, which, realistically 
viewed, did not even remotely threaten competition." 
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In a way that economizes on transaction costs. 24 Thus, the optimal degree of 
vertical Integration is discovered by an optimization calculus, based on the 
principles that 
"a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an extra 
transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out 
the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or 
the costs of organising In another firm".25 
The reasoning underlying the assertion of efficiency-enhancement as the 
sole purpose of business conduct Is identical to that underlying the eva-
luation of other vertical strategies, as is the case with tying arrange-
ments.215 
The crucial question that remains Is whether efficiency really represents the 
sole motivation for vertical integration or whether vertical integration is also 
performed because vertical mergers can be a source and carrier of market 
power.27 If this were the case, the aforementioned optimization calculus 
would lose its explanatory power with regard to the transaction mechanism 
chosen. Even if the costs of an economic transaction by the market were 
lower than the intra-corporate coordination costs for an economic trans-
action, there would remain a motivation to merge until the excess profits 
from a monopoly or limit price strategy equalled the total cost difference 
resulting from the two transaction mechanisms.28 This in fact entails the 
24 Cf. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions ... , supra, 958 f. 
Furthermore, there are limitations to an Internalization of economic trans-
actions (e.g., organizational span of control) which are widely accepted, 
cf. Blair, Roger D., and David L. Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical 
Integration and Control, New York 1983, p. 25. 
25 coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra, 396. 
26 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School .•• , supra, 936. For a thorough and critical 
analysis of the current tenet, cf. Schmidt, Ingo, and Jan B. Rittaler, Die 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis: Wettbewerbstheoretische und -politi-
sche Analyse eines Credos, Baden-Baden 1986, pp. 84-86. 
27 Cf. Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 178 f., who denotes that mer-
gers even happen in cases where cost savings are not attainable; and 
Kaysen, Carl, and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Polley: An Economic and 
Legal Analysis, 3rd print., Cambridge 1971, p. 120. Furthermore, it is as-
serted that efficiency-enhancement used to be the primary intention of 
economic agents at the turn of the century when the exploitation of mass 
economies in production and distribution was started, cf. Chandler jr., 
Alfred D., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Busi-
ness, 5th print., Cambridge, Mass. 1980, pp. 337-339. 
28 Cf. Dirrhelmer, Manfred J., Karin Wagner and Thomas Hubner, Vertikale 
Integration In der Mlneralol- und chemischen Industrie, Meisenheim am 
Gian 1981, p. 14. 
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consideration of time-lags in market adjustment processes and a questioning 
of the presumption of a market mechanism which works frictionlessly. 
3. Efficiency Gains vs. Anticompetitive Consequences: Necessity for a 
Trade-Off? 
Current theory presupposes on the one hand that efficiency-enhancement is 
the competitor's only goal and on the other that consumer welfare via an 
increase in business efficiency is the legislator's only intent. If both of the 
presumptions are called into question, it becomes obvious that a possible 
trade-off in terms of conflicting goals may involve a positive level (efficien-
cy-enhancement vs. anticompetitive consequences) and a normative one (con-
sumer welfare vs. other public goals), the treatment of which has to be car-
ried out separately. 
Regardless of the likelihood and force of anticompetitive consequences, not 
only the achievement of efficiencies has to be demonstrated but it has to be 
shown that competition is not significantly Impaired by vertical integration 
(e.g., ease of entry, low minimum efficient scale at the foreclosing level ). 29 
The achievement of efficiencies has to be demonstrated because we may not 
presume a priori that efficiency-enhancement is the only objective of an 
economic agent, at least not in the sense of overall economic efficiency that 
translates on a one-to-one basis into consumer welfare.30 Furthermore, con-
sumer welfare in the definition of current theory does not equal economic 
welfare, as the term is used by independent scholars for the evaluation of 
vertical integration. Thus, we have to modify considerably the unrealistic 
qualifications of current theory, i.e. bear in mind that real world markets do 
not work in a frictionless way, barriers to competition exist and are often 
significant; and that a comparison of organization costs with transaction 
costs of the market Is often unfeasible. 
Furthermore, Internal vertical growth is often considered superior in terms 
of efficiency achievement; this becomes even more important in the sense 
29 Cf. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, op. cit., 668. 
30 At the same time, welfare effects of vertical integration are not determin-
able in an unambiguous manner. They have to be evaluated according to 
particular features of the actual market situation, cf. Blair/Kaserman, Law 
and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, op. cit., 82; and War-
ren-Boulton, Frederick, Vertical Control of Markets: Business and Labor 
Practices, Cambridge, Mass. 1978, p. 109. 
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that internal growth is one principal way of expanding business action 
legally:31 
"When a corporation chooses to grow by building it expects to face 
tests in the market for the product over the years required to estab-
lish and develop a new operation. It must fight its way in, that is, 
compete to succeed, and not buy its way In. I consider this a far bet-
ter market test ... than the 'market test' involved in a merger for the 
market for firms is highly imperfect ... " 
On a normative level, public goals other than just consumer welfare have to 
be taken into account.32 This has to be considered a legitimate concern 
because the Incipiency doctrine still considered valid by the courts must be 
viewed as a result of the legislator's willingness to maintain unconcentrated 
structures and eventually sacrifice efficiencies in order to maintain com-
petition. This was demonstrated supra and applies to vertical integration 
Just as well. Currently this is expressed by presumptive rules of illegality 
of vertical mergers.33 
A trade-off is certainly needed for the determination of the counteracting 
effects of vertical Integration or vertical mergers in particular. However, it 
has to be performed on a positive as well as on a normative level of analy-
sis, including a critical appraisal of the shortcomings of current theory on a 
positive level and the intentions of legislation on the normative one. 
31 Heflebower, Richard B., Comments on the F.T.C. Staff Document: Economic 
Report on Mergers and Vertical Integration in the Cement Industry, Was-
hington D.C. 1966, quoted from Mueller, Willard, Public Policy Toward Ver-
tical Mergers, in: Weston, Fred, and Sam Peltzmann (eds.), Public Polley 
Toward Mergers, Pacific Palisades, Cal. 1969, pp. 150-166, 165 f.; cf. as 
well Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 3, op. cit., § 727d,e and idem, 
Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1000c, who note that this may eventu-
ally lead to a resource waste. 
32 This dictinction between a normative and a positive view is emphasized in 
that "(a)lternative views of the objectives of public policy can have a 
considerable effect on the determination of general policy guidelines and 
on the degree of preference for an active interventionist policy approach. 
Differing conclusions can also result, however, from different assumptions 
or beliefs on questions of fact", cf. Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control of 
Markets ... , op. cit., 165. 
33 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law •.• , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1011a; and Sulli-
van, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, op. cit., 664, who mentions a mar-
ket share of 15% and a market share foreclosed on either level of roughly 
10-12%. 
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II. Emolclcol Evidence on the Extent at Yertlcol Integratfon and Asaoclated 
Efficiency Mvaotases 
1. The Measurement of the Extent of Vertical Integration 
In order to draw conclusions on the effects of vertical Integration, It is ne-
cessary to determine the extent of vertical integration along the different 
lines of production and distribution. 1 Only if the degree of vertical inte-
gration, the essential independent variable, is precisely known, can we pos-
sibly determine and isolate particular consequences of an increase in the 
degree of vertical integration via econometric models. In this context, the 
degree of vertical integration is determined by the extent to which a parti-
cular firm substitutes intracorporate production and coordination for market 
transactions.2 
The pioneering work on the issue has been provided by Adelman, who pro-
posed value added as a percentage of sales revenues, representing a sort of 
make-or-buy ratio, an Increase of which would indicate an increase in the 
degree of vertical integration et vice versa.3 The crucial advantage of this 
Index is that neither the number of levels In the chain of production and 
distribution has to be calculated, nor their relative weight concerning the 
total number of the stages along the chain. However, the index has nume-
rous dlsadvantages:4 
- The fact Is systematically neglected that with increasing completeness of 
the product through successive stages of production the degree of pro-
duct heterogeneity as well as corresponding revenues Increase. This leads 
to an overestimation of the degree of Integration at prior stages of the 
process; 
For a detailed survey on the different approaches, cf. Fisher, Alan A., and 
Robert Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Policy, in: Zerbe jr., Richard O. (ed.), Research In Law and Economics, vol. 
6: Antitrust and Regulation, Greenwich, London 1984, pp. 1-133, 64-68. 
2 Cf. Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Polley, op. cit., 64. 
3 Cf. Adelman, Maurice A., Concept and Statistical Measurement of Vertical 
Integration, In: Stigler, George J. (ed.), Business Concentration and Price 
Policy, Princeton 1955, pp. 281-322. 
4 Cf. Dlrrheimer/Wagner/Hubner, Vertlkale Integration in der Mineralol- und 
chemlschen Industrie, op. cit., 28 f. 
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- vertical mergers which change the degree of integration show different 
results, depending on whether one takes the acquiring firm or the 
acquired firm as one's point of departure; and 
- the fact is neglected that the census value added Is also a function of 
labor and capital intensity, which may lead to an overestimation of the 
degree of Integration in the case of labor intensive process chains, et 
vice versa. 
There have been attempts to modify the index, albeit without any great 
degree of success.5 None of the subsequently developed indexes using 
relative employment, percentage of firms in an industry having two or more 
stages of production, vertical Herflndahl Index, or input-output studies have 
overcome the main difficulties of empirical attempts to determine the degree 
of vertical Integration; they suffer from one or all of the following deficien-
cies: inconsistency with economic theory, a lack of operatlonallty, and limited 
usefulness with regard to economic and policy analysis.8 This has evidently 
handicapped studies using Indexes on the degree of vertical integration as 
an Independent variable In econometric models.7 
2. The Empirical Evidence on Efficiency-Enhancement 
Empirical studies attempting to find evidence of the validity of the transac-
tion-cost approach and data on the extent of actual cost savings in the case 
of Increased vertical integration may be placed in two categories: 
- Studies which attempt to Isolate transaction-specific market characteristics 
believed to act as Incentives for vertical integration and In so doing 
attempt to determine the corresponding degree or change of vertical 
integration;8 and 
5 Cf., e.g., Tucker, Irvin B., and Ronald P. Wilder, Trends in Vertical Inte-
gration In the U.S. Manufacturing Sector, 26 JIE (1977), pp. 81-94. 
6 Cf. Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Policy, op. cit., 68. 
7 Currently, the census value added in relation to the sales of a firm Is 
used as the most appropriate Indicator of the extent of vertical integra-
tion, cf., e.g., Monopol kommlsslon, Hauptgutachten der Monopol kommlssion 
VI: Gesamtwlrtschaftliche Chancen und Rislken wachsender Unternehmens-
grol3en, Baden-Baden 1986, tab. II.6, and paras. 233-235 for the qualifica-
tions necessary. 
8 Transaction-specific market characteristics are supposed to serve as a 
proxy variable for anticipated cost savings that may not be operationa-
lized quantitatively. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
267 
studies that attempt to quantify savings in transaction costs In the case 
of a change In the mechanism of economic coordination and which amounts 
to a change In the degree of vertical Integration. 
Whereas the former category represents an Indirect attempt to determine the 
extent to which economic entitles economize on transaction costs, the latter 
represents a direct and quantifiable attempt to do this. 
L Studl• on TranSIIC'tlon-Speclflc Market Characteristics 
A variety of empirical studies have tried to find support for the Implications 
of the transaction-cost approach by citing evidence that transaction-cost 
specific market characteristics pose an Incentive for vertical Integration: 
- In the case of the existence of Idiosyncratic capital, represented by spe-
cialized knowledge In the automobile Industry, it was hypothesized that 
vertical Integration would Increasingly occur If the production process re-
sulted in Idiosyncratic and hardly transferable know-how, such as special 
features of the organizational structure, the organization of the produc-
tion process, or the use of special machines and tools. Since opportunistic 
behavior on behalf of a highly specialized supplier to the automobile Indu-
stry could possibly be expected In order to reap quasi rents, and this In 
turn would result In auppller switching CX>Sts for the automobile manu-
facturer, there was found to be a strong incentive for vertical Integration 
on behalf of the automobile manufacturer In order to avoid opportunism 
and uncertalnty.9 Tendentlally, this was enforced In the case of a small 
number of economic agents at the suppliers' stage. 
- With regard to small numbers of participants at one of the stages In a 
chain of production and distribution, It has been found that there Is a 
"positive relationship between vertical integration and the fewness of 
9 Cf. Crandall, Robert, Vertical Integration and the Market for Repair Parts 
In the United States Automobile Industry, 26 JIE (1967/68), pp. 212-234; 
and Monteverde, Kirk, and David J. Teece, Supplier Switching Costs and 
Vertical Integration In the Automobile Industry, 13 BJE (1982), pp. 206-
213, esp. 206. This was confirmed for the relationship between research 
and development and vertical Integration, cf. Armour, Henry Ogden, and 
David J. Teece, Vertical Integration and Technological Innovation, 62 RES 
(1980), pp. 470-474. 
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firms" which "supports the implications of the transaction cost ap-
proach".1o 
The results of the empirical studies are based on the premise that motivati-
on for vertical Integration other than efficiency do not exist. Only to this 
respect did they confirm the Implications of the transaction-cost approach. 
However, there may be some other causal factors that are responsible for an 
incentive to integrate. Although efficiency increases through economizing on 
transaction costs may result from vertical integration, we are neither sure 
whether these gains are passed on to consumers as a result of sufficient 
competitive pressure, nor do these studies elaborate on possible anticompe-
titive effects as a result of increased vertical lntegration. 11 Furthermore, 
market power effects are largely neglected. 
b. Studies on Actual Cost Savings 
Empirical studies that attempt to measure the actual extent of cost savings 
from Increased vertical integration directly do not distinguish external ver-
tical growth by mergers. Thus we have to accept a lack of knowledge re-
garding the comparison of cost savings associated with vertical mergers on 
the one hand and other forms of vertical Integration on the other.12 
None of the empirical studies on costs savings from Increased vertical inte-
gration show quantitative results on marginal transaction-costs across diffe-
rent mechanisms of coordination through the various stages in the chain of 
production and distributlon. 13 This seems especially important with regard 
to the Isolation of motives underlying an increase in vertical Integration. In 
the case of a net increase in efficiency there would be an affirmation of the 
efficiency-enhancement hypothesis, although we cannot be sure whether this 
increase Is passed on to consumers as the current tenet contends. However, 
empirical findings showing a decrease in efficiency In the case of increased 
vertical integration would suggest a motivation other than efficiency-enhan-
10 Levy, The Transaction Cost Approach to Vertical Integration ... , supra, 
443 f., and cf. Tucker/WIider, Trends In Vertical Integration ••• , supra. 
11 This will be done infra in subsection III, after presentation of the defi-
ciencies of the transaction cost approach concerning antitrust purposes. 
12 Cf. Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Polley, op. cit., 68. 
13 Cf. Bossmann, Weshalb glbt es Unternehmungen? ... , supra, 672. 
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cement. With regard to this respect, empirical studies are scarce and their 
results are ambiguous, to say the least. 14 
The main obstacle to unambiguous conclusions Is the problem of distingui-
shing efficiency or cost saving effects from all other consequences, such as 
market power, price discrimination, evasion of regulation, and the llke. ,s In 
a study on the effects of vertical Integration on the basis of the Federal 
Trade Commission Line of Business data, which used an Index of vertical 
Integration based on Internal transfers as a percentage of the total of 
external sales and Internal transfers, Ravenscraft concludes that transaction 
cost economies exist. However, further studies are considered necessary In 
order to determine countervailing effects of monopoly power that are neces-
sary for a publlc pollcy trade-off. 19 The crucial deficiency seems to be that 
the results are compatible with an efficiency as well as with a market power 
explanation. This becomes obvious If one compares the two polar positions In 
this field. Whereas Chandler attempts to Interpret "the hlstorlcal process of 
American business as Including vertical Integration as a part of a long-run 
strategic process, contributing to the creation of ollgopollstlc structures and 
entry barrlers" 17, WIiiiamson reinterpreted the evidence as being consistent 
with the transaction cost approach, holding that the primary effect of the 
Increase in vertical Integration was lower costs. 11 
14 Cf. Robins, Organizational Economics ••• , supra, 82; and for the studies, 
Demsetz, Harold, The Cost of Transacting, 82 QJE (1968), pp. 33-53; Dlrr-
helmer, Manfred J., Vertical Integration: Transaction Cost Advantages ver-
sus Market Power Disadvantages, unpublished paper, International Insti-
tute of Management, Bertin 1984; Maddlgan, Ruth J., The Measurement of 
Vertical Integration, 63 RES (1981 ), pp. 328-336; and Ravenscraft, David 
J., Economics of Integration, unpublished paper, Federal Trade Commissi-
on, Washington, D.C. 1982. There are a number of further case studies 
presenting qualitative results, cf. Bossmann, Weshalb glbt es Unterneh-
mungen? ..• , supra, 672. 
15 Cf. Dlrrhelmer, Vertical Integration ••• , supra; Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic 
Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement Polley, op. cit., 72; and Maddlgan, 
The Measurement of Vertical Integration, supra. 
16 Cf. Ravenscraft, Economics of Integration, supra; this Is affirmed by the 
studies of Dlrrhelmer, Vertical Integration •.• , supra; and Maddlgan, The 
Measurement of Vertical Integration, supra. 
17 Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement Poll-
ey, op. cit., 69 f.; and for the original source, Chandler, The Visible Hand 
... ,op.cit. 
18 Cf. WIiiiamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions ..• , supra, 968-974. 
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3. A Critical Review of the Applicability of the Transaction-Cost Approach to 
an Efficiency Analysis of Vertical Integration 
The crucial issue is whether the analysis of transaction-cost advantages 
along various degrees of vertical integration and different transaction-cost 
specific market characteristics is operational and practical, and whether it is 
able to supply detailed prognoses on the efficiency consequences that will 
actually result from vertical mergers. 19 
The use of marginal transaction-cost approach, which leads to the calculus 
on market transactions versus intra-organizational transactions, seems plau-
sible at first sight. However, it remains without explanatory power and thus 
an empty box as long as it is not possible to determine exact cost levels and 
margins necessary to perform the trade-off. 20 
Furthermore, the general applicability of the transaction-cost approach and 
similar approaches to a theory of institutional change has to be questioned 
fundamentally. It is held that the microeconomic concept of efficiency has to 
been seen as crucially important for the application of the transaction-cost 
approach and that the ability of the price system to alter the structure of 
systems of economic exchange in the direction of efficient economic arrange-
ments depends on sufficient competitive pressure. If it is reallistically assu-
med, however, that economic equilibria are absent in most if not all of our 
markets, and, furthermore, that market imperfections and oligopolistic struc-
tures prevail, "e=nomic logic supports no causal inferences about the role 
of efficiency in determining social or organizational structure".21 Market im-
perfections make it much less likely that the most efficient competitors will 
survive in the end. Concerning the assumption of an essentially frictionless 
and perfectly competitive market, as assumed by the adherents of current 
theory, there is strong evidence that the imperfections actually found in 
reality may finally be responsible for the fact that "financial and market 
19 Cf. Schmidt/Rittaler, Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis ... , op. cit., 
50. 
20 Cf. Bossmann, Weshalb gibt es Unternehmungen? ... , supra, 672. 
21 Robins, Organizational Economics ... , supra, 71, and ibid., 74: "Transac-
tion-cost analysis adopts a model that has clear meaning for organizations 
only in perfect markets and applies it to highly imperfect situations. The 
role played by efficiency is especially problematic in light of how little 
the neoclassical concept says about the behavior of individual organizati-
ons. 
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power, not economic efficiency, may determine the winners in the competitive 
race".22 
As long as net efficiency gains are concluded from an increase in the de-
gree of vertical Integration, motivations other than efficiency-enhancement 
are simply defined away for the purpose of analytical clarity and on the 
basis of a false assumption that economic agents only have consumer welfare 
on their minds. We have emphasized supra that efficiency does not represent 
the sole motivation for any kind of Internal and external corporate growth 
and this is also the case for vertical Integration. Vertical Integration In 
general and vertical mergers In particular can be a source and carrier of 
market power.23 If this were be the case, the aforementioned optimization 
calculus would lose its explanatory power with regard to the transaction 
mechanism chosen. Even If a net efficiency loss In the short run resulted 
from the integration, there would remain a motivation to merge, until excess 
profits from a monopoly or limit price strategy equalled the total cost diffe-
rence resulting from the two transaction mechanisms. This would be so be-
cause of the belief that monopoly power which could be exploited In the time 
periods after the merger had occurred could be attained.24 Such a rationale 
is ruled out by the adherents of current theory, however, since persistent 
competitive pressure and frictionlessly working markets will not allow com-
petitors to reap monopoly advantages, as a price raise attracts newcomers 
Immediately and the latter provide competition which erodes excess profits. 
The assertion that meaningful barriers to competition do not exist, and 
hence that sufficient competitive pressure is believed to be persistent, re-
gardless of the existing structural features of the markets Involved In ver-
tical lntegratlon25, tends to define market power problems away and under-
states the likelihood of anticompetitive consequences. The absence of power 
22 Mueller, Public Policy Toward Vertical Mergers, op. cit., 165; and again 
Robins, Organizational Economics ••. , supra, 79: "In the absence of perfect 
markets for all Inputs to production, the assumption that firms will be 
pushed In the direction of a common, transaction-cost minimizing organi-
zational form Is unwarranted." 
23 Cf. Bain, Industrial Organization, op. cit., 178 f.; and Kaysen/Turner, An-
titrust Polley ••• , op. cit., 120. 
24 Cf. again Dlrrheimer/Wagner/HObner, Vertikale Integration in der Mlneral-
ol- und chemischen Industrle, op. cit., 14. 
25 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ••• , vol. 3, op. cit., § 724a. 
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results In efficiency and efficiency Is synonymous with consumer welfare. 
However, an examination of actual or supposed Increases In business effi-
ciency, whether they relate to allocative or productive efficiency, Is a 
reflection of a comparative-static way of thinking. The aim of any realistic 
antitrust policy must be to secure the existence of sufficient competitive 
pressure to force firms to be dynamic, innovative and to adjust, as well as 
to compel them to actually pass on their internal welfare gains to the eco-
nomy as a whole. Concerning the Brown Shoe case, for Instance, it Is cor-
rectly noted that 
"(t)he recognition that Integrated and chain operations may result In 
benefits to consumers in no way proves that the Brown-Kinney merger 
actually resulted In such benefits; or that the merger route Is the only 
way to achieve such benefits; or, finally that even If such benefits, In 
fact, achieved by this merger, they would have been passed on to con-
sumers" (citation omitted, Italics supplied).29 
The terms 'transaction-costs' and 'organization costs' are difficult to handle, 
and In specific cases they can neither be determined In a precise manner 
empirically nor quantitatively measured. The terms are largely used In a way 
that allows justification of certain phenomena ex post; this leads to the pos-
sibility that any development may be justified - but only ex post and cru-
dely. As a result, the concept tends to become tautologous: a process that 
can be observed Is efficient because It developed the way It has!27 
Only the restrictive premises of current theory are responsible for the mis-
Interpretation of the transaction cost approach, and these are essentially 
provided by Coase and Wi/111J111son. On reallstlc premises and assumptions, the 
26 Mueller, Public Policy Toward Vertical Mergers, op. cit., 162. The passing 
on of efficiency gains ls neglected on the basis of the assumptions dealt 
with supra. With regard to vertical integration, recent studies, however, 
have found "evidence that higher lntermarket contact between firms, com-
bined with medium to high concentration levels, Increases the probability 
of collusion", Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger En-
forcement Polley, op. cit., 70. We will deal with anticompetitive consequen-
ces of vertical Integration Infra. 
27 This seems to be analogous with the circular logic which we have critici-
zed concerning the premises and assumptions of the current tenet supra. 
Cf. also, Bossmann, Weshalb glbt es Unternehmungen? ... , supra, 672 f.; 
Robins, Organizational Economics ••. , supra, 72, who state that Wllti1J111son 
himself holds that the transaction cost approach Is virtually able to ex-
plain any economic change If It Is not operationalized further; cf. as well, 
Schmldt/Rlttaler, Die Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis ... , op. cit., 50. 
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generality of the pro-efficiency argument is not tenable. As has been em-
phasized, the uncritical use of market models as well as the implicit analogy 
with neoclassical economics and perfect competition Is unwarranted.211 
IIL An Evaluation at P9M1h!a AotlmuPIUtlY• eonaaauancas Raaultloa frqn 
Ylrtlca! Intaaratlon 
1. The Remaonlng Underlying Anticipated Antloompetltlve Conaequencas: 
Forecloaure of Actual and Potential Competitors 
The presumption of illegality of particular vertical mergers Is based on the 
notion of foreclosure of actual or potential competitors. In the Brown Shoe 
case the U.S. Supreme Court held that "(e)very extended vertical arrange-
ment by Its very nature, for at least a time, denies to competitors of the 
supplier the opportunity to compete for part or all the trade of the cus-
tomer party to the vertical arrangement" .1 Thus, foreclosure may be assu-
med If the integrated firms uses its vertically Integrated market position to 
deny comparably efficient non-Integrated competitors equal access to the 
markets for consumers and/ or suppliers. As a result, competitor firms that 
are not Integrated face a smaller output level or market share than would 
be the case If vertical Integration had not been performed.2 The extent of 
the market that Is removed from the competitors at the two successive sta-
ges of a particular vertical merger determines the degree of foreclosure:3 
28 Cf. Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Polley, op. cit., 71; and Robins, Organizational Economics ... , supra, 70. 
1 Brown Shoe v. U.S., 1962 CCH Trade Cases I 70,366, p. 76,492. Cf. as well 
Blalr/Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, 
op. cit., 147-151; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltlk und Kartellrecht, op. 
cit., 178. 
2 Cf. Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Polley, op. cit., 38; and Hamilton, James L., and Soo Bock Lee, Vertical 
Merger, Market Foreclosure, and Economic Welfare, 53 SEJ (1986), pp. 948-
961, 949; and Schmidt, Ingo, us-amerlkanlsche und deutsche Wettbewerbs-
polltlk gegenuber Marktmacht, Berlin 1973, p. 142. 
3 Comanor, William S., Vertical Mergers, Market Power, and the Antitrust 
Laws, 57 AER (1967), pp. 254-265, 256. For one of the early cases, cf. as 
well, U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1957 Trade Cases § 68,723. 
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"If .•. a firm with 50 percent of the market at an early stage acquires 
another who holds 10 percent market share at the only succeeding 
stage, then as a result of the merger, rivals of the latter firm are said 
to be foreclosed potentially from half of the market for needed sup-
plies, while rivals of the former are foreclosed from about 10 percent of 
the market for their input. In this manner, moreover, the theory is 
symmetrical and is used to refer to either stage of production." 
Regarding real cases of vertical integration, three typical forms of foreclo-
sure may be dlscerned:4 
- a firm that possesses market power on an input market and, at the same 
time, acts as a supplier on the final product market, may Impede market 
access for non-Integrated competitors to the Input market on the final 
product market and thus may extend market power from one stage to the 
other; 
- non-Integrated firms competing on the Input market may be disadvantaged 
by the fact that a vertically integrated competitor Impedes their access to 
subsequent stages in the production and distribution process; and 
- potential competitors may be Impeded from entering the market because of 
Increased capital requirements and specialized know-how. This may even 
be enforced by a need to enter vertically Integrated chains of production 
and distribution in order to avoid competitive disadvantages. 
Concerning cases in which market power Is absent in horizontal terms, there 
seems to be general agreement that vertical Integration Is not likely to have 
anticompetitive effects.5 However, the rather small market shares that were 
used by courts to demonstrate that significant parts of the markets were 
foreclosed to rivals, have been challenged by scholarly commentary. In this 
context, the view is put forward that actual and potential competitors cannot 
possibly be foreclosed since vertical Integration as well as exclusionary 
practices are efficiency motivated, and frictionlessly working markets with-
out barriers to entry would Immediately restore sufficient competitive pres-
sure.11 Furthermore, the underlying reasoning of the foreclosure argument 
would be strongly In contrast to neoclassical price theory and the profit 
4 For a different classification cf. Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of 
Vertical Merger Enforcement Polley, op. cit., 38, who distinguish between a 
case of 'self-dealing' and cases of 'discriminatory transfer pricing', 
5 Cf., e.g., Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1004c. 
6 Cf. Bork, Vertical Integration and Competitive Processes, op. cit., 148. 
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maximizing principle that is a logical consequence of the homo oeconomicus 
presumption. Thus, It is concluded that the 
"concern about possible market foreclosure Is misplaced. A manufacturer 
may, In certain circumstances, improve his market position by buying 
retail outlets and foreclosing them to his rivals. But, wherever he can 
do this, there are alternative ways of enhancing his market power 
which are distinctively superior to market foreclosure, which obtain all 
the advantages of foreclosure and avoid the costs specific to this prac-
tice. This being so, we should not expect foreclosure to be Important as 
a predatory tactlc". 7 
Important antitrust cases have shown, however, that cases of foreclosure 
occur and that the actual share of the market that is foreclosured may be 
substantial.8 
In the Volkswagen spare parts case, for Instance, the Volkswagen automobile 
company had Induced company affiliated repair shops to use original brand 
Volkswagen spare parts. These company affiliated repair shops accounted for 
50 percent of the relevant market of spare parts compatible to Volkswagen 
automobiles. The German Federal Cartel Office held that all other producers 
of Volkswagen spare parts as well as spare part wholesalers would be un-
duely Impeded by being foreclosed from the 3.400 company affiliated repair 
shops representing 50 percent of the otherwise accessible relevant market.• 
The particular anticompetitive effects became even more obvious In the Ford 
Motor Company case. 10 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court held unlawful 
the acquisition of the Electric Autolite Company - one of the two unintegra-
7 Peltzmann, Sam, Issues In Vertical Integration Polley, In: Weston, Fred, 
and Sam Peltzmann (eds.), Public Polley Toward Mergers, Pacific Palisa-
des, Cal. 1969, pp. 167-176, 168. Somewhat more moderate, cf. Bork, The 
Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 238: "Whether or not one believes In the Law's 
foreclosure theory, all so-called vertical merger cases should be handled 
through the application of horizontal merger standards" (Italics in origi-
nal). 
8 Cf., e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. U.S., 1972 CCH Trade Cases, § 73,905; and VW-
Identteile, WuW/E BGH, pp. 1829 ff. 
9 Cf. VW-Identteile, WuW/E BKartA, pp. 1781 ff., however, this was not ac-
cepted by the German Federal Supreme Court on account of the argument 
that Volkswagen had a right to protect its quality standards by company 
affiliated repair shops. Foreclosure was accepted since It was not consi-
dered an undue Instrument to attain this objective, cf. again VW-Identtel-
le, WuW/E BGH, pp. 1829 ff. 
10 For a discussion of the case, cf. Schmidt, US-amerikanlsche und deutsche 
Wettbewerbspolitlk ... , op. cit., 138 f.; and for the case, Ford Motor Co. v. 
U.S., op. cit. 
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ted spark plug manufacturers - by the Ford Motor Company that manufac-
tures automobiles. Before the merger, Ford had purchased all of the spark 
plugs from Independent manufacturers. This accounted for roughly 1 o per-
cent. The primary intent of the acquisition was to get a hold of a part of 
the profitable aftermarket for replacement of defective or worn out plugs. 
Concerning the Installation of original equipment, the market structure was 
characterized by a bilateral tight oligopoly. In the spark plug market Auto-
lite held 15 percent of the market, General Motors, the largest U.S. au-
tomobile producer 30 percent, and Champion the other Independent manufac-
turer, 50 percent. General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler as the main purcha-
sers of spark plugs accounted for 90 percent of the original equipment mar-
ket. 
The vertical merger was perceived to transmit the rigidity of the oligopo-
listic structure of the automobile Industry to the spark plug Industry and 
decreased the likelihood of competition between the former Independents, 
Autolite and Champlon.11 
The essential anticompetitive consequences from the vertical merger were 
seen by the Court In the following factors: 
- the disappearance of Ford as the largest purchaser of original equipment 
spark plugs eliminated the tempering Influence on the aftermarket for 
spark plugs; and 
- the vertical merger Impeded the access of newcomers In spark plugs pro-
duction substantially because It foreclosed 10 percent of the total market 
for spark plugs. 
Before elaborating on the possible anticompetitive effects more precisely, we 
wlll take a brief look at the effects of foreclosure on economic welfare. 
Whereas recent work In vertical integration has emphasized the effects of 
vertical Integration on resource allocation and economic welfare, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not made any attempt to reveal the nature of the relati-
onship between the degree of foreclosure and the extent of economic wel-
11 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 235, and Ibid., 237: "The Ford-
Autolite opinion falls to establish a valid theory of vertical foreclosure. It 
Is almost certainly merely another example of efficient Integration de-
stroyed through reliance on an Incorrect economic theory" (Italics origi-
nal). 
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fare. 12 No problem emerges If the degree of foreclosure Is negatively corre-
lated with the extent of attainable economic welfare In the sense that If the 
share of the market foreclosed to actual and potential competitors Increases, 
then economic welfare decreases. This Is the essential reasoning behind the 
pejorative label attached to foreclosure. A trade-off becomes necessary, how-
ever, If "whatever bad effects of foreclosure exist are at least partially off-
set by the lower prices and higher output levels vertical Integration 
brlngs''. 13 
Recent empirical work provides evidence for the necessity of a trade-off 
between the pure foreclosure effect and possible advantageous effects on 
economic welfare. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that "market 
foreclosure can be a poor Indicator of the economic welfare effect of vertical 
merger .•• (and) economic welfare is enhanced even though non-Integrated 
firms are 'foreclosed'". 14 Thus, It seems necessary to postulate conditions 
under which reliable statements are possible about the net effects associated 
with such a trade-off, thereby facilitating a reasonable Judgment on vertical 
mergers In the light of possible counteracting effects. 15 
Thus foreclosure may well be seen as a relevant criterion In the decision to 
give legal screening to vertical merger cases, It does not, however, seem to 
constitute an adequate criterion to condemn any vertical merger a priori. 18 
12 Cf., e.g., Hamilton/Lee, Vertical Merger, Market Foreclosure, and Economic 
Welfare, supra, 948; and Blalr/Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical 
Integration and Control, op. cit., 153. 
13 Allen, Bruce T., Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure: The Case of 
Cement and Concrete, 14 JLE (1971), pp. 251-274, 255. 
14 Hamilton/Lee, Vertical Merger, Market Foreclosure, and Economic Welfare, 
supra, 960; cf. as well Blalr/Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical 
Control, op. cit., 153. 
15 Cf. Hamilton, James L., and Soo Bock Lee, The Paradox of Vertical Inte-
gration, 53 SEJ (1986), pp. 110-126, 125, who state that the paradox bet-
ween foreclosure and economic welfare Is not generally valid and Identify 
barriers to entry and collusion as the essential conditions to determine 
the net effects: "(R)elaxlng the Input monopoly assumption demonstrates 
that vertical Integration can have a much wider range of possible welfare 
outcomes than previous models have shown ... whether or not Integration 
enhances barriers or collusion makes all the difference. In empirically 
relevant settings, no paradox exists to neutralize any anticompetitive ef-
fects." 
16 In fact, foreclosure Is considered largely a symptom rather than a cause 
because It Is believed not to have sufficient microeconomic foundation, cf. 
Blair/Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical Control, op. cit., 150; and 
along the same line, Dlrrhelmer/Wagner/Hubner, Vertlkale Integration In 
der Mlneralol- und chemlschen Industrle, op. cit., 20. 
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2. Particular Anticompetitive Effects A880Clated with Foreclosure 
It is largely disputed to what extent vertical integration carries a potential 
for anticompetitive consequences. Whereas scholars that are associated with 
the traditional approach emphasize the anticompetitive potentlal of vertical 
mergers, Chicago scholars insist on an efficiency-enhancement potentlal of 
vertical arrangements. 17 
L Price and output Consequences 
In classical monopoly theory, a decrease in output and an Increase In price 
are considered to be the consequences of a monopoly. Vertical integration 
that is characterized by a supplier/buyer relationship along distinct chains 
of production and distribution down to the consumer Is perceived not to 
alter market concentration, and hence not have direct price/quantity conse-
quences. Thus, "(v)ertical Integration does not, of Itself, Increase the per-
centage of the market controlled by a fl rm". 18 
This Is an acceptable standpoint, if one refers to the narrow concept of 
price and quantity, I.e. to market concentration in the sense of an Index of 
concentration not altered by an increase In vertical integratlon. 19 However, 
if one takes into account possible leverage effects resulting from the fact 
that firms possess horizontal market power In their original market and un-
17 Cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 303, who mentions 
that members of the Chicago School view vertical Integration as either 
socially desirable or Innocuous: "Vertical Integration Is perceived as en-
hancing efficiency by dissolving bilateral monopoly bargaining stalemates, 
eliminating double marginalization by vertical chain monopolies, and mini-
mizing input substitution distortions." 
18 Bork, Vertical Integration and Competitive Processes, op. cit., 142, and 
ibid., 143, furthermore holding that "a vertical acquisition can never cre-
ate or increase a restriction of output. By cutting costs and creating ef-
ficiencies It can result In an Increase In output"; and cf. Areeda/Turner, 
Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1000a. For some basic discussion of 
the Issue, cf. Westfield, Fred M., Vertical Integration: Does Product Price 
Rise or Fall?, 71 AER (1982), pp. 334-346. 
19 Cf., e.g., Mueller, Public Polley Toward Vertical Mergers, op. cit., 151, who 
Is not a scholar of the current tenet: "Vertical integration, as such, does 
not confer market power on the Integrated firm. After all, few American 
enterprises are more vertically Integrated than the farmer selling his 
apples at a roadside stand. But he gains no market power merely because 
he controls all stages of production and distribution from the orchard to 
the ultlmate consumer." 
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der certain circumstances are able with a certain time-lag to transfer this 
market power via vertical merger to an originally competitive market, prices 
and quantity may change as a result of that leveraged market power.20 
This, in turn may make possible all the evils associated with discretionary 
behavior as a consequence of market power, such as price discrimination, 
supply squeeze, a raise of barriers to entry, and even the facllitatlon of 
collusive behavior on a second stage level.21 Instead of only considering a 
firm's market power as this is reflected by price/quantity conditions, it 
seems advisable to emphasize a firm's market position as defined by Its 
ability to "behave persistently in a manner different from the behavior that 
a competitive market would enforce on a firm facing otherwise similar cost 
and demand conditions".22 This market position is not necessarily identical 
with the market share the firm holds. 
It Is commonly held that In the case of sufficient competition on both the 
markets Involved In a vertical merger the competitive consequences of a 
vertical merger are either neutral, because significant anticompetitive conse-
quences cannot be determined, or pro-competitive because of the efficiency 
gains associated with the merger, the passing on of which is secured by 
sufficient competitive pressure,23 
20 Cf. e.g., Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration ... , supra, 497, who 
asserts that "(t)here Is a possibility, ... , that such Integration may serve 
to solidify or expand the monopoly power that provided the original 
catalyst for vertical combination"; and Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ••• , 
op. cit., 121: "Firms possessing significant market power at one stage In 
a production chain, by Integrating backward or forward, spread that 
power to lower and higher stages." 
21 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law •.• , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1007; and Kaser-
man, Theories of Vertical Integration ••• , supra, 497 note 38, who notes 
that it may well be difficult to trace the origin of such power ex post: 
"(I)f we view a vertically Integrated firm possessing monopoly power at 
successive stages of production, It may be very difficult to determine the 
direction of causation between the integrated structure and the monopoly 
power." 
22 Kaysen/Turner, Antitrust Policy ... , op. cit., 75. The ability, then, to ex-
tend a market position from the original stage In the chain of production 
and distribution to another stage strongly relies on the horizontal market 
power the vertically Integrated firm possesses at the original stage, cf. 
Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., !I 1005; Comanor, Vertical 
Mergers, ... , supra, 255; and Dirrheimer/Wagner/HObner, Vertlkale Inte-
gration In der Mlneralol- und chemlschen Industrle, op. cit., 20 and 25. 
23 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 3, op. cit., § 724 and 724a. 
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Paradoxically, the case of a vertical merger of two monopolists is associated 
with an increase in the final product's output and a decrease In the final 
product's price. It is assumed that prior to a vertical integration the output 
monopolist would have an incentive to buy less of the input and to substi-
tute for other, less efficient, inputs to the greatest possible extent, when-
ever the input monopolist raised its price. This would increase the final 
product's price and decrease its output. This distortion in the allocation of 
resources is believed to be corrected in the case of a vertical merger be-
cause the combined monopolist cannot charge a monopoly price twice, and 
hence would charge an internal transfer price that would amount to his 
marginal costs for the input. Monopoly pricing is assumed to have been sub-
stituted for competitive prici ng.24 
At least two essential qualifications have to be made to this line of reaso-
ning, however: 
- If we depart from the assumption of a use of inputs In fixed proportions 
and assume that the inputs may be combined in variable proportlons25, 
the user firm at the second stage starts to substitute other inputs for 
the monopolist input. Although an independent non-integrated second 
stage buyer of the input minimizes total costs, he does so on the basis of 
artificially high Input prices which means that inputs are not combined as 
efficiently as they would be if inputs were priced at marginal costs. Less 
efficient substitute inputs thus compete with the monopolized input, which 
leads to efficiency in the case of the vertically Integrated buyer relying 
on the monopolized input priced at marginal costs, but leads to a market 
power effect In the case of an independent non-integrated user flrm.29 
24 Cf. primarily Machlup, Fritz, and Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Suc-
cessive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 Economica (1960), pp. 101-
119, esp. 102; and Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger 
Enforcement Polley, op. cit., 18. This is not accepted, however, by Blair/ 
Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical Control, op. cit., 31-36; and War-
ren-Boulton, Vertical Control of Markets ... , op. cit., 75 f. 
25 Cf. Blair/Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical Control, op. cit., 82; 
and Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control of Markets ... , op. cit., ch. 4, parti-
cularly p. 92, who holds that In the case of variable proportions "vertical 
control results in higher prices for the consumers of the final product 
and reduced demand for nonmonopolized inputs." 
26 Cf. Mallela, Parthasaradhi, and Babu Nahata, Theory of Vertical Control 
with Variable Proportions, 88 JPE (1980), pp. 1009-1025; and Vernon, John, 
and Daniel Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 
79 JPE (1971 ), pp. 924 f. 
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Recent empirical studies have tried to verify these Implications. They have 
concluded that It seems Impossible to forecast which of the two effects at 
work will prevail. The potential for a net price raising effect Is greatest 
In cases of non-Integrated second stage buyers' Intermediate substitution 
posslbilltles.27 
- The second qualification necessary concerns the aforementioned extreme 
structural conditions that are assumed. Real markets are often characte-
rized by monopolistic imperfections or ollgopollstlc conditions along all the 
stages In a chain of production and dlstrlbutlon.28 Under these circum-
stances, however, a vertically Integrated firm along all of the stages "can 
earn a larger profit than can be obtained by monopoly pricing at all ... 
stages lndependently",29 The underlying reasoning Is that monopoly rents 
of the upstream producer become costs to the downstream buyer and this 
will change marginal costs and result In below-monopoly output of the 
final product. In these oligopoly cases anticompetitive output and price 
consequences are likely to result.30 
Summarizing, we are able to conclude that, In analogy to the horizontal case, 
vertical integration may be accompanied by efficiency-enhancing effects but 
also by detrimental price/quantity effects,31 These two effects are lnterwo-
27 Cf., e.g., Waterson, Michael, Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and 
Ollgopoly, 92 EJ (1982), pp. 129-144. However, ambiguities are persistent 
since only a marginal change In the underlying conditions may end In 
contrary results, cf Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Mer-
ger Enforcement Polley, op. cit., 21. 
28 Cf. Mueller,· Public Polley Toward Vertical Mergers, op. cit., 153: "In the 
real world vertical Integration generally occurs In that broad range of 
structural situations between the polar extremes of perfect competition 
and monopoly." 
29 Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration ... , supra, 496; and for the ori-
ginal source of the reasonings, cf. Spengler, Joseph J., Vertical Integrati-
on and Antitrust Polley, 58 JPE (1950), pp. 347-352. 
30 Cf., e.g., Salop, Steven C., and David T. Scheffman, Strategic Interaction 
In Multiple Markets: A Beginning to a General Theory of Dominant Firm 
Industries, unpublished paper, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, 
D.C. 1981, cited from Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical 
Merger Enforcement Polley, op. cit., 20. 
Cf. again Mueller, Public Polley Toward Vertical Mergers, op. cit., 155, 
who concludes that In such real cases "we must evaluate the structure of 
the markets In which Integration occurs and then determine how the In-
tegration may affect the structure and behavior of the Industries Invol-
ved. In sum, determining the effects of vertical Integration Is essentially 
an empirical, not a theoretical, question." 
31 Cf. e.g., Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control of Markets ... , op. cit., 92 and 
109. 
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ven In a complex interaction. We should thus be cautious In our judgments 
because efficiency effects may present themselves quickly but anticompeti-
tive effects may occur with a certain tlme-lag.32 
b. Price and Supply Squeeze 
A further anticompetitive option exists for firms In a customer-competitor 
situation with market power at one stage.33 This is the case if the integra-
ted firm produces more than It uses for self-dealing at one stage In the 
chain of production and distribution and hence sells the excess supply to 
non-integrated competitors at the subsequent stage. Thus, the firm's custo-
mers become Its competltors.34 This Is the common basis for a distinct stra-
tegy of impairment of competitors that may be adopted by an Integrated firm 
in order to exert a squeeze on prices or supplies of non-Integrated com-
petitors.35 
Vertically Integrated producers are able to exert a price squeeze by decrea-
sing the margin between the price for raw materials and the final product.311 
Essentially, this may be done In three ways:37 
The single price-squeeze strategy increases the price for raw materials 
and maintains the price for the final product or it leaves the prices for 
32 Cf. Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Polley, op. cit., 21; and Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration .•. , 
supra, 497 and 501. 
33 Cf. Monopolkommlsslon, Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommisslon I: Mehr 
Wettbewerb ist mogllch, 2nd ed., Baden-Baden 1977, para. 920. 
34 Cf. Edwards, Corwin, Vertical Integration and the Monopoly Problem, 17 
JoM (1952/53), pp. 404-410, 409. Price-squeezing does not have to be an 
explicit strategy of an integrated firm; It can also happen due to a 
shortage of raw materials: this will make raw material prices Increase, 
whereas the final product price is kept constant by the Integrated firm. 
35 Cf. Comanor, Vertical Mergers, ... , supra, 254; Monopol kommlsslon, Haupt-
gutachten der Monopolkommlsslon I ..• , op. cit., para. 920. Cf. as well 
House of Representatives Report No. 1191, op. cit, at p. 80: " ••. vertical 
Integration may have certain or other economic effects which may also be 
important in Section 7 lltlgatlon. Thus, It may afford the merged company 
an opportunity to Impose a 'price squeeze' on non-Integrated suppliers". 
36 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 3, op. cit., § 728c; Comanor, 
Vertical Mergers, ••• , supra, 254 f.; Mueller, Public Policy Toward Vertical 
Mergers, op. cit., 152; and Schmidt, US-amerlkanlsche und deutsche Wett-
bewerbspolltlk ••• , op. cit., 140. 
37 Cf., e.g., Adams, Walter, Vertical Power, Dual Distribution and the 
Squeeze: A Case Study in Steel, 9 AB (1964), pp. 493-508; Bain, Joe s., 
Industrial Organization, 2nd ed., New York et al. 1968, p. 362. 
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raw materials constant and lowers the price for the flnal product; 
- the double price-squeeze simultaneously increases the price for raw mate-
rials and decreases the price for the final product, which allows the 
squeezing firm to determine the profits or losses of the non-integrated 
competitors; and finally 
- the semi-price squeeze enables the Integrated firm to strengthen Its fi-
nancial capabilities by selling the raw materials at a profit, whereas the 
non-Integrated competitor suffers from subaverage profits, which In turn 
will protect the integrated firm from aggressive price competition at the 
final product stage. 
A price squeeze is generally assumed to occur only under very rare conditi-
ons or to be altogether unllkely38• However, there are a number of case 
studies that show the empirical relevance of the problem. 
For Instance, between 1955 and 1962 non-integrated competitors were expo-
sed to a single as well as to a double price squeeze in the steel Industry In 
the United States. After 1955 price Increases for wire rods were much hig-
her than those for drawn wire and wire fabrics. The double price squeeze 
started In 1959 when the prices for wire rods and drawn wire remained on a 
high level, whereas the prices for wire fabrics such as welded wire, woven 
wire fences, nails, bale ties and barbed wire partly declined substantlally.39 
These price squeezes were also employed by Integrated steel producers In 
the U.S. to discourage price cutting by less integrated wire product makers 
In the final product stage. In order to achieve this, integrated steel produ-
cers used a mixture of domestic and Imported lnputs:40 
38 Cf., e.g., Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 3, op. cit., § 728c; and 
Peltzman, Issues In Vertical Integration Polley, op. cit., 171. 
39 Cf. Adams, Vertical Power, Dual Distribution and the Squeeze ... , supra, 
499. Cf. as well Comanor, Vertical Mergers, ... , supra, 255, and Scherer, 
Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 304-306 for further examples. For 
the most important court cases cf. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1964 
Trade Cases § 71,243; and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. U.S., 1965 Trade Ca-
ses § 71,458. 
40 Cf. Adams, Walter, and Joel Dirlam, Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly 
Power, 54 AER (1965), pp. 626-655. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
284 
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~ Adm, Walter, Vertical Power, Dual Distribution and the Squem. A Case Study in Steel, 9 AB 
(1964), pp, 493-508, 501. 
Vertically integrated producers are often able to exert a supply squeeze 
upon non-integrated customers by denying supply to these customers In 
times of supply shortage. 41 Integrated firms absorb an increased share of 
the input factors of the production process which leads to quantitative 
restrictions on input for non-integrated competitor or to the utilization of 
raw materials and factors of production that are of poor quality. This was 
the case, for instance, when major petroleum companies denied pipeline 
access and product supplies to non-Integrated refiners and marketers 
during the two periods of worldwide supply shortages of crude oil.42 
The occurrence of supply squeezes is rejected or deemed unlikely by scho-
lars who are adherents of the current theoretical approach.43 As the supply 
stage is assumed to be competitive, shortages can by nature only be tempo-
rary. Integrated firms may not alleviate supply shortage in such situations, 
unless they are willing to accept the loss in purchases of their non-inte-
grated competitors in times after the shortage because "(a) free market 
knows no 'permanent shortage.' When demand exceeds supply, price will rise 
41 Cf. Monopol kommission, Hauptgutachten der Monopol kommisslon I ••• , op. 
cit., para. 920; and Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 304. 
42 Cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 304, who holds that 
thesa tactics had only transitory success in keeping independent refiners 
and retailers in line. For the different forms of supply squeeze, cf. Aree-
da/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 3, op. cit., § 728b. 
43 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1003d; Bork, The 
Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 243. 
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to the market clearing level. At that price there wlll be no 'shortage'."44 
A permanent supply shortage may not be expected on markets without 
governmental or public price regulation, because price/quantity are rede-
fined at the clearing level, If this process Is Impeded by regulatory action, 
this Is not considered an antitrust problem but one of regulation. Even If 
the number of unlntegrated efficient rivals decreases as a result of a per-
manent supply shortage, the Integration of the other firms wlll not lead to a 
doubting of monopoly profits because of the assumptions on price and out-
put made supra.45 We have documented, however, that the assumptions as 
well as the conclusions are quite often not as unambiguous as asserted. 
Regardless of the reasoning of current theory, there are a variety of 
reasons why price as well as supply squeezes may pose a serious problem to 
non-Integrated competitors of vertically Integrated firms: 
- A price squeeze leads the principle of 'survival of the most efficient' ad 
absurdum because the efficiency of non-Integrated firms Is actually no 
longer a guarantee for actual survival In the market because some compe-
titors may have to leave the market, although they might be more efficient 
than their Integrated rivals. 
- Once again the Chicago view Is based on the unrealistic premises of a 
non-existence of barriers to entry and the existence of perfectly competi-
tive markets. By ignoring time-lags and Impediments to potential competi-
tors current theory neglects the fact that vertically Integrated firms may 
forego present profits In order to earn above average profits In the long 
run. 411 
- Price squeezes may occur In competitive markets as well, as Areeda and 
Turner suggest47, but there has to be a certain amount of market power 
to make this price squeeze anticompetitive, because the existence of mar-
ket power makes It far less likely that competitive forces are at work and 
efficiency gains passed on to consumers.48 
- The assumption that forward Integration by a monopolist eliminates mono-
poly profits at the second stage is based on restrictive assumptions. It 
cannot always be assumed that Increased output due to vertical lntegra-
44 Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law •.. , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1003d. 
45 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1003. 
46 Cf. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, op. cit., 659. 
47 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 3, op. cit., § 728c1. 
48 Cf. Comanor, Vertical Mergers, •.• , supra, 255. 
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tlon occurs, and even If It does occur, that It outweighs the effects of the 
supply squeeze. 
- Independent competitors may often be squeezed because the Integrated 
rival Is more efficient, but the main problem of antitrust theory remains 
centred on the separation of efficiency from market power effects. The 
latter do In fact occur, because markets do not work frictionlessly, as 
demonstrated supra. 
- Whether or not shortages that lead to a supply squeeze are temporary Is 
not the crucial point for a competitor that has been driven out of the 
market as a result of an actual supply shortage, unless markets are assu-
med to work frictionlessly. A large number of Independent gas stations 
were driven out of the market especially during the first oil crisis In 
Germany because the large oil companies were Integrated Into refining and 
refused to supply independent stations.49 
- Long-run Implications of vertical integration on market structure are un-
derstated by adherents of current theory because of the restrictive as-
sumptions made. A loosening of the assumptions will demonstrably lead to 
different results and therefore different concluslons.50 
c. Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination Is a pricing strategy by competitors which allows an 
economic agent to sell or purchase different units of an economic good or 
service "at price differentials not directly corresponding to differences In 
supply costs". 51 In a perfectly competitive market price discrimination Is not 
a profitable strategy since price Is determined by the market forces and the 
economic agent as an element of atomistic Industry structure does not have 
discretionary power to change data. Commonly, three different conditions 
49 Cf. Erstes Benzinprelsverfahren, in: Bundeskartellamt, Tiitlgkeitsberlcht 
1967, BTDr. V/2841, p. 41; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltik und Kartell-
recht, op. cit., 140 f. 
50 Cf., e.g., Mueller, Public Policy Toward Vertical Mergers, op. cit., 152. 
51 Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 315, who states that this 
Is not restricted to sales of Identical product units to different buyers at 
varying prices but also Includes the sales of identical units to the same 
buyer. For a further definition and a survey, cf. Koutsoylannls, Anna, 
Modern Microeconomics, 2nd ed., 2nd reprinting, London et al. 1981, p. 
192-201. 
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may be distinguished in this context that must be satisfied for a seller to 
be able to practice price dlscrlmlnatlon:92 
- the seller must possess a minimum amount of market power at one stage In 
order to have some control over prices since the prices are data In per-
fectly competitive markets; 
- buyers must be segregated from each other Into different price segments 
according to their different price elasticities of demand or into discrete 
classes with varying prohibitive prices; and 
- buyers in different price segments must be separated from each other In 
a way that makes arbitrage from low-price customers to high-price custo-
mers difficult or Impossible. 
One of the consequences of vertical Integration that is largely neglected or 
underestimated by adherents of current theory may be the facilitation of 
price dlscrlmination.53 Whether price discrimination may be facilitated de-
pends essentially on the properties of the particular goods Involved. Some 
properties of economic goods, such as high storage or re-packaging costs, 
or the Impossibility of concealing a resale from a low-price to a high-price 
segment, are likely to prevent customers from different segments from arbi-
trage. However, If goods are traded among Independent stages which do not 
possess these properties, vertlcal Integration may enable a firm to Install an 
equivalent mechanism and thus enforce price dlscrlmlnatlon. 54 
52 Cf. Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law, op. cit., 200; Kay-
sen/Turner, Antitrust Polley .•• , op. cit., 77 f.; Scherer, Industrial market 
structure ... , op. cit., 315. For a survey on the strategy and a compari-
son of U.S. American and German policy towards price discrimination, cf. 
Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 90-92; and ibid., 
US-amerlkanlsche und deutsche Wettbewerbspolltlk ••• , op. cit., 283-310. 
53 Cf., e.g., Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 3, op. cit., § 725e; and 
Ibid., Antitrust Law ..• , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1012c; Hovenkamp, Economics 
and Federal Antitrust Law, op. cit., 199 f.; Kaserman, Theories of Vertical 
Integration •.. , supra, 503; and Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control of Mar-
kets ... , op. cit., 75. 
54 Cf. the polish-sausage example by Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal 
Antitrust Law, op. cit., 200, who holds that the best way to enforce price 
discrimination and to prevent arbitrage for a monopoly manufacturer of 
polish sausages selling to grocery stores (home consumption) at a low 
price and to concessionaires (public events) at a high price, is to verti-
cally Integrate Into the concessions business Itself and sell the sausages 
at high prices directly at public events and to grocery stores at low 
prices. 
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A difference In price elasticities of demand among segregated customer seg-
ments of an input monopolist enables the monopolist to increase monopoly 
profits by price discrimination If he acquires the buyer that faces the rela-
tively highest of the price elasticities of the segregated market segments. 
This reduces the Incentive for arbitrage.55 Concerning the U.S. automobile 
industry, for Instance, a strong incentive for backward vertical integration 
was found to exist if price elasticity of demand on the market for new auto-
mobiles and spare parts differed from each other. This incentive was found 
to exist as long as the two economic goods were complementary to each 
other, as in the case of automobiles and spare parts, and the automobile 
market was characterized by a higher price elasticity of demand than the 
market for spare parts. 511 
If we hypothetically assume that economic efficiency and welfare are the 
only real objectives of antitrust, then knowledge of the net effects on eco-
nomic efficiency and welfare that determine the benefits or evils of price 
discrimination due to vertical Integration is essential to the evaluation of 
vertical lntegration.57 
Although vertical integration seems to facilitate price discrimination, no 
generalizations are feasible, however. Price discrimination may have pro-com-
petitive effects or effects which are detrimental to competition, depending on 
the many forms of price discrimination and their effects on different perfor-
mance crlterla.58 Furthermore, price discrimination may lead to a conflict 
between first line, second line, and possibly third and fourth line competi-
tion. For Instance, price discrimination may lead to a revitalization of com-
petition In homogeneous oligopoly markets (first line) but to a disadvanta-
55 Cf. Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law, op. cit., 200; and 
Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration ••• , supra, 503; and empirically 
Crandall, Robert, Vertical Integration and the Market for Repair Parts ..• , 
supra. 
56 Cf. again Crandall, Robert, Vertical Integration and the Market for Repair 
Parts ..• , supra. 
57 It Is unambiguous that price discrimination cause a transfer of wealth 
from consumers to producers, cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure ••. , 
op. cit., 319: "Price discrimination causes a redistribution of Income 
toward the discriminator and away from Its customers." 
58 Some of the authors believe the effects to be generally beneficial rather 
than adverse, cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law .•• , vol. 3, op. cit., § 725e; 
and Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 240: "The law should be Indif-
ferent to this possible use of vertical integration •.. ". For a survey on the 
different forms and their effects, cf. Scherer, Industrial market structure 
... , op. cit., 317-319, and 325-333. 
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glng of firms that are exluded from the purchase at favorable conditions by 
price discrimination (second llne).58 This raises the question of whether 
there is Injury to competitors or Injury to competition or Injury to both, 
and If they are In conflict, which actually outweighs whlch:110 
"Two sharply different objectives have been Incorporated In present 
law, without recognition of their difference. One is to prevent discrimi-
nations Injurious to market competition In the secondary line. This Is 
the counterpart of the objective of the law In the primary line .... The 
second objective Is to assure equality of opportunity for all competing 
enterprises that buy goods from the same seller .... Although Inequali-
ties of opportunity may be of a kind and scope that have anticompeti-
tive effects, there may also be Inequalities that have no necessary re-
lation to the mal ntenance of competition." 
Hence, price discrimination may not be judged as per se beneficial or per se 
detrimental to competitors and/or competition. An evaluation depends on the 
object to be protected, the objectives to be attained and the existence of 
the aforementioned conditions that make price discrimination feaslble.81 With 
regard to the price discrimination potential as a result of vertical integrati-
on, the extent of horizontal market power that the acquiring firm holds 
seems of primary lmportance.82 
The assertion that vertical Integration Is beneficial In general Is further 
weakened by the evidence of possible output consequences which are belie-
ved to outweigh possible price raising effects and which we have treated 
supra. If It can no longer be assumed that vertical mergers are output In-
creasing, the net effect of a vertical merger Is completely Indeterminate for 
the general case.a 
59 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 122 f.; and 
Idem, US-amerlkanlsche und deutsche Wettbewerbspolltlk ... , op. cit., 91. 
60 Edwards, Corwin D., The Price Discrimination Law: A Review of Experi-
ence, Washington D.C. 1959, pp. 638 f. 
61 Cf. again Scherer, Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 334: "Discri-
mination always causes a redistribution of Income whose merits cannot be 
assessed without Invoking value judgments. Some forms of discrimination 
Increase the efficiency of resource allocation compared to simple monopo-
ly, others are essentially neutral, while still other types ... lead to 
serious Inefficiencies .•. Given these complexities, It Is necessary to Judge 
particular cases of discrimination on their Individual merits." 
62 Therefore, under the German ARC price discrimination Is only Illegal If 
firms with market power are Involved (cf. sec. 26 para. 2 ARC). 
63 As asserted by Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1012c; 
and Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 240; Blalr/Kaserman, Law and 
Economics of Vertical Control, op. cit., 124; and Warren-Boulton, Vertical 
Control of Markets ... , op. cit., 80. 
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d. Impediments to New Competition 
There Is no consensus on the question of whether an increase In the degree 
of vertical integration also raises barriers to entry. Aside from the funda-
mental differences between the traditional theoretical approach and the theo-
ry underlying current antitrust policy In the U.S. which we already treated 
supra, studies on the Impact of vertical integration on barriers to entry are 
also rare, so that there Is no evidence, either theoretical or empirical, for 
the general case.M 
In the case of a barrier-raising effect of vertical integration, the assertion 
that there Is no direct short-run increase in market share as a consequence 
of vertical Integration may still hold, but Is weakened under the impression 
that market power could emerge or be Increased as a result of the protec-
tion of barriers to entry. Hence one of the most common competitive objecti-
ons to vertical Integration Is that It may raise barriers to entry to at least 
one of the relevant stages after vertical lntegratlon.85 To the extent that 
vertical Integration Impedes entry, there is an incentive to Internalize suc-
cessive stages of the production and distribution process, even If short-run 
profits suffer, because the preservation of a powerful market position may 
help to extract monopoly rents for a longer period of time:ee 
64 Cf., e.g., Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforce-
ment Polley, op. cit., 44; and Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration 
.•• , supra, 505. Vertical Integration may be seen as an impediment to 
dynamic competition as such, however, cf. Monopolkommlsslon, Hauptgut-
achten der Monopolkommlsslon I ... , op. cit., para. 920. 
65 Cf., e.g., Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforce-
ment Polley, op. cit., 42-44; Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration ... , 
supra, 505; Koch, James V., Industrial Organization and Prices, 2nd ed., 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980, p. 264; and even Stigler, who is closely 
associated with the Chicago School, admits this concerning the aspect of 
capital raising disadvantages among newcomers: "(I)t Is possible that 
vertical Integration Increases the difficulty of entry by new firms, by 
Increasing the capital and knowledge necessary to conduct several types 
of operations rather than depend on rivals for supplies or markets", 
Stigler, The Organization of Industry, op. cit., 138. 
66 Comanor, Vertical Mergers, ... , supra, 261; Blalr/Kaserman, Law and Econo-
mics of Vertical Control, op. cit., 44-46; and Warren-Boulton, Vertical Con-
trol of Markets ••• , op. cit., 75 f. Cf. similarly, Hovenkamp, Economics and 
Federal Antitrust Law, op. cit., 207, although he plays down the role of 
barriers as a result of vertical Integration. 
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"To the firm, entry barriers are an asset which has value similar to 
that of a new machine or a well-received trademark, and, therefore, 
firms can be expected to adopt policies which can be explained only as 
an 'investment In entry barriers' •••. In this fashion, there may be a 
conflict between long-run behavior designed to promote entry barriers 
and a short-run profit maximizing behavior." 
Whereas barriers to entry played a significant role In court cases In the 
attempt to determine whether market power would actually contribute to a 
lessening of competition or whether a firm would hold or Increase a market 
dominating position as a consequence of a vertical or conglomerate merger117, 
recent theoretical discussion emphasizes a position that denies or plays 
down an entry-barrier-raising-effect of vertical integration. This position 
has been a minority position thus far. 1111 
The primary objective of antitrust theory Is to Isolate the conditions under 
which vertical Integration Is likely to have an entry-barrier-raising effect. 
In a two stage case of total integration - all firms at a production stage are 
vertically Integrated with the firms at the successive stage - there are no 
purchase or supply markets open to newcomers. Although vertical Integrati-
on would Increase barriers to entry to a maximum extent, the case is rather 
unlikely. In a two stage case with no barriers to entry at either of the sta-
ges, even a total vertical Integration would not erect barriers to entry. 
Vertical integration is unproblematic In this case. 
The realistic case, however, Is the situation In which market entry Is Impe-
ded at one of the stages in our two stage example and Is not impeded at the 
other stage. In this context, there are three reasons why a need to enter at 
more than one stage extends barriers to entry to the next stage:119 
( 1) If for any reason new firms are forced to enter at more than one stage 
and have to overcome existing entry barriers at, for instance, stage A 
67 Cf., e.g., the cases FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 1967 CCH Trade Cases § 
72,061; Kfz-Kupplungen, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1504 ff.; and Revell-Plastics, 
WuW/E BGH 1620, 1621 ff. 
68 Cf., e.g., Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 240-242, esp. 241: "Clearly, 
however, If (the) more restricted case of the monopolist who seeks to 
block entry in this fashion proves untenable, the entire theory should be 
abandoned."; Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law, op. cit., 
206-208; Llebeler, Wesley J., Toward a Consumer's Antitrust Law: The Fe-
deral Trade Commission and Vertical Integration In the Cement Industry, 
15 UCLALR (1968), pp. 1153-1202; and Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Inte-
gration Polley, op. cit., 172-176. 
69 Cf., e.g., Monopol kommisslon, Hauptgutachten der Monopol kommlsslon I ••. , 
op. cit., para. 921. 
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in order to enter stage B as well, entry Is also Impeded at stage B be-
cause barriers to entry thus are factually present at stage B that would 
otherwise not be exlstent.70 Vertical Integration may conceivably exert 
influence on entry barriers because "the necessity of multistage entry 
will transmit this barrier, a fortiori, from the former to the latter 
(and) Integrated entry can be expected to be at least as difficult as 
single-stage entry at the most restricted stage''.71 
(2) Capltal needs for potential entrants might Increase If entry at more than 
one stage Is required slmultaneously.72 This not only happens as a 
result of capita! market Imperfections but also due to the fact that a 
monitoring of large vertically Integrated firms may result In higher 
returns being required by investors. This In turn may drive up the 
costs of capital If It Is raised In the equity market.73 However, this 
view Is not shared by all scholars, particularly not by adherents to the 
current theoretical approach. Posner, for Instance, holds that this 
reasoning Is trlvial and contains "a meaningless usage, since It is ob-
vious that a new entrant must Incur cost to enter the market, Just as 
his predecessors, the firms now occupying the market, did previous-
ly".74 Nevertheless, this criticism only considers the aspect of the 
capital which has to be raised. It does not take Into consideration that 
conditions on the capital market might alter to the disadvantage of new-
70 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1011 b. 
71 Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration ... , supra, 507; cf. as well 
Comanor, Vertical Mergers, ... , supra, 259; Fisher/ Sciacca, An Economic 
Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement Polley, op. cit., 42; Kaysen/Tur-
ner, Antitrust Polley ... , op. cit., 121 f. 
72 Cf. Fisher/ Sciacca, An Economic Analysts of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Polley, op. cit., 42; Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration •.• , supra, 
507; Mueller, Public Polley Toward Vertical Mergers, op. cit., 157; Scherer, 
Industrial market structure ..• , op. cit., 303 f., who holds that "whether 
the Interaction between vertical Integration and capltal market 
Imperfections leads to significantly elevated entry barriers depends upon 
how large the required capital lump Is" and upon a number of other 
factors; and even an adherent to current theory partly accepts the 
capital argument, Peltzman, Issues In Vertical Integration Polley, op. cit., 
173. 
73 Cf. WIiiiamson, The Vertical Integration of Production •.• , supra. But cf. 
Bork, Vertical Integration and Competitive Processes, op. cit., 142, who 
argues that such an effect Is not likely. 
74 Posner, Antitrust Law ••• , op. cit., 59. Cf. as well, Bork, The Antitrust 
Paradox, op. cit., 242: "Neither of the entrants will have a capital cost 
greater than If the manufacturer had not Integrated, and they will have 
a significant cost advantage over the monopolist." 
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comers trying to enter at more than one stage. Market entry at more 
than one stage reduces the production capabilities of newcomers because 
they have to start to produce at both stages. This Is the reason why 
well Informed capital lenders will demand a premium rate for Increased 
risk. This may particularly be so In the case of transaction-specific 
Investments that require large amounts of capital and If production pro-
cesses are necessary at any stage that have to be supervised closely.75 
Emplrlcal evidence on the Issue Is ambivalent, however. Whereas evi-
dence can be found that the amount of capital necessary and capital 
conditions pose a barrier to entry, the opposite Is found as weJl.78 
(3) Vertical integration Is also believed to enhance product differentiation 
which Is considered a further reason why It Is believed to Increase bar-
riers to entry.n _Although product differentiation may be seen as a bar-
rier to entry as well as a means of entry because of Its Informational 
function, as has been noted supra, It may stifle price competition In oli-
gopolies Just because of Its dual character.71 
This has demonstrated that It is not as unlikely as assumed by Chicago 
theorists that vertical Integration raises barriers to entry. The majority of 
75 Cf. Dlrrheimer/Wagner/HObner, Vertlkale Integration In der MineralOI- und 
chemlschen Industrie, op. cit., 17, concerning the capital market conditi-
ons; and WIiiiamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions ... , supra, 926; 
and Idem, Economic Organisation ... , op. cit., 210 f., concerning the additi-
onal cost of transaction and information for newcomers. 
76 Affirmed by Orr, Dale, The Determinants of Entry: A Study of Canadian 
Manufacturing Industries, 56 RES (1974), pp. 58-73, 65; rejected by Mas-
son, Robert T., and Joseph Shaanan, Stochastic-Dynamic Limit Pricing: An 
Empirical Test, 64 RES (1982), pp. 413-423, 418. One should be aware of 
the cartel-like behavior of lenders and Incumbents, however, which has 
been mentioned supra. 
77 Cf. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, op. cit., 142; Comanor, Vertical 
Mergers, ... , supra, 262; Kaserman, Theories of Vertlcal Integration ... , 
supra, 507 f.: "Where firms manufacture their own Inputs, homogeneity of 
the final product will be less llkely to result since variations In Interme-
diate product specifications wlll be facilitated by an lnternallzatlon of the 
coordinating function." 
78 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 70 f., who em-
phasizes the effectiveness of price competition In comparison to non-price 
parameters, the use of which may make It more difficult to respond to a 
competitor's action In the short run. Cf. as well Comanor, Vertical Mer-
gers, ... , supra, 262. 
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empirical evidence confirms this assertlon.79 
L Collusive Effects 
Another possible anticompetitive consequence of vertical Integration may be 
the furthering of oligopolistic coordination, and hence collusion. For adhe-
rents of the current theoretical edifice, there Is no connection whatsoever 
between vertical Integration and colluslon. 111 It Is thus appropriate at this 
point to recall briefly what the Chicago position on explicit and Implicit col-
lusion actually Is. 
The representatives of the theoretical approach underlying current U.S. an-
titrust policy judge explicit collusion, i.e., conspiracy or concerted action, 
and implicit collusion or spontaneous coordination, which Is not covered by 
U.S. antitrust law, In a different manner.81 
In order not to reject American antitrust policy In toto Chicagoans express 
the opinion - partly for tactical reasons82 - that horizontal price conspira-
cies should be prohibited, since collective monopolies have the same effect 
on price and output as an Individual monopoly. The tendency towards con-
spiracy increases when concentration Increases and the number of competi-
tors decreases. The necessity of public policy and legislation Is accepted at 
least to this extent. 113 
79 Cf., e.g., Clevenger, Thomas s., and Gerald R. Campbell, Vertical Integra-
tion: A Neglected Element In Market Structure-Profit Models, 5 JIO (1977), 
pp. 60-66; Johns, J.C.H., The Economics of the National Hockey League, 2 
CJE (1969), pp. 1-20; Orr, The Determinants of Entry •.. , supra. 
80 This becomes obvious If one makes a general review of the relevant 
works, cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 239-245; Posner, 
Antitrust Law ... , op. cit., 196-201; and Stigler, The Organization of 
Industry, op. cit., 134 ff. For scholars that assume evidence on such a 
connection, cf., e.g., Comanor, Vertical Mergers, ... , supra, 262 f.; Hoven-
kamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law, op. cit., 202; Kaserman, 
Theories of Vertical Integration ••• , supra, 510. 
81 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School ••. , supra, 932 f. and 944-946. 
82 Posner, The Chicago School •.. , supra, 932: "Partly, perhaps, for tactical 
reasons (not to seem to reject antitrust policy in Its entirety), the mem-
bers of the Chicago School would sometimes denounce price fixing." 
83 Cf., e.g., Demsetz, Harold, Economics as a Gulde to Antitrust Regulation, 
19 JLE (1976), pp. 371-384, 383; and Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 
406. 
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Stigler, certainly, regards tacit or Implicit collusion, I.e., spontaneous coor-
dination, as a problem in markets with high interdependence due to a high 
degree of concentration. However, the other representatives of the Chicago 
School deny that implicit collusion actually restrains competition (Harvard 
School: conscious parallellsm).84 The Chicago School does not deny that con-
centration is an Important factor in facllltatlng collusion; but the question 
which Interests them much more Is how excessive profits may be persistent 
without attracting newcomers in the long run since the entry of newcomers 
should actually cause a price decline. 
Accordingly, market power positions that have not been caused by efficiency 
but rather by implicit colluslon would be eroded because of entry by newco-
mers or it would force firms to lower their prices In order to prevent new-
comers from entering the market. However, this reasoning takes for granted 
Ideal markets without any barriers to entry - an assumption which we have 
already dealt with crltlcally in one of the preceding sections. 
The tenet on vertical Integration and collusion formerly valid asserts that 
ollgopollsts may Increase their ability to coordinate their economic activities 
by vertical Integration because "structural and behavioral factors may Inter-
act to open a route through which vertically integrated firms may bypass 
markets which resist oligopolistic control In favor of others which do not".8!5 
This enables ollgopollsts to act like a collective monopolist and It enhances 
the likelihood of joint profit maximization. This may actually be the case, If 
at least one of two conditions is prevalent:• 
(1) There are some chains of production and distribution, the different sta-
ges of which are characterized by extreme fluctuations in supply or 
demand. In the case of a second stage purchaser, for Instance, heavily 
84 Cf. the omnibus volume on the economic and legal problems of conscious 
parallelism, 13 The Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics 
581 ff. (1982). 
85 Comanor, Vertical Mergers, ... , supra, 262 f. Cf. as well, Chandler, The 
Visible Hand ... , op. cit., 367; and Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control of 
Markets ... , op. cit., 73 f. 
86 Cf. Fisher/ Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Policy, op. cit., 46, who state the Incorrect assumption that Input ollgopo-
llsts have no interest in enforcing price discipline In the output market. 
As has been demonstrated supra, this holds only for restrictive condi-
tions and for a transfer of the reasoning of a monopoly case to an oli-
gopoly case. 
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fluctuating available supplies control his output In the sense that the 
output is determined by factors largely exogenous to the industry and 
not subject to effective oligopolistic control. Backward vertical Inte-
gration may now Install patterns of oligopolistic rationality at the supply 
stage.rn 
(2) An elimination of Independent economic decision units along the chain of 
production and distribution of an industry by means of vertical Integra-
tion may lead to 'interdependent planning uncertainty' which Is likely to 
Improve the ability of firms to cooperate. This may have two separate 
effects. On the one hand, a vertically integrated ollgopollst who elimi-
nates frequent price changes as an external factor contributes to oligo-
polistic communication and harmonizes divergent interests among the 
leading firms.• 
On the other hand, the costs of maintaining collusive behavior In an oli-
gopoly may be reduced by vertical integration since the number of eco-
nomic decision units Is reduced. This can be assumed to make the har-
monization of divergent Interests easier and less costly on the horizon-
tal level.89 
However, there Is also a potential In vertical integration that may make pri-
cing more competitive. In case where there Is a loose oligopolistic structure 
among sellers on one hand, and a tight oligopoly structure among buyers on 
the other, the presumed pattern of behavior Is more competitive than If the 
buyers' side were characterized by an atomistic structure. This effect may 
87 For the classical example on the ollgopollstically structured U.S. steel In-
dustry, cf. Adams/Dirlam, Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power, 
supra, who found out that the pricing discipline In the Industry In terms 
of final product prices was maintained because producers of steel were 
vertically integrated backward Into the Input market and controlled 
prices there. Cf. as well, Comanor, Vertical Mergers, ... , supra, 262-264; 
Perry, Martin K., Forward Integration by Alcoa: 1888-1930, 29 JIE (1980), 
pp. 37-53. 
88 Cf. Comanor, Vertical Mergers, ... , supra, 263 f.; and Malmgren, H.B., 
Information, Expectation and the Theory of the Firm, 75 QJE (1961 ), pp. 
339-421. This argument corresponds with the assertion that vertical Inte-
gration Increases the longevity of collusive agreements, cf. Kaserman, 
Theories of Vertical Integration ... , supra, 510. 
89 Cf. Dirrhelmer/Wagner/H0bner, Vertlkale Integration In der Mlneral61- und 
chemlschen Industrle, op. cit., 16. There is some limited empirical eviden-
ce that vertically Integrated firms enjoy higher profit rates, cf. Cleven-
ger/Campbell, Vertical Integration •.. , supra; but cf. the critique by Koch, 
Industrial Organization and Prices, op. cit., 264 note 31. 
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actually be strengthened If the tight oligopoly on the buyers' side Is asym-
metric (disruptive buyers).90 This Is so because the buyer may receive con-
cealed extra conditions from various suppliers which may vitalize price com-
petition. The elimination of a disruptive buyer would tend to harm the 
intensity of price competition, enhance the potential for price discrimination, 
and thus deter effective competition. 
There are a number of conditions, however, that potentially weakens the 
above conclusion:91 
- The buyer has bargaining leverage which the smaller buyers lack and 
which enables the large buyer to extract advantages over his smaller com-
petitors and thus discriminate prices, the effect of which Is ambiguous; 
- whether all the benefits of countervailing power are passed on to the con-
sumers depends on the absence or presence of market power on the sel-
ling side of the market; and 
- concessions unrelated to costs may be squeezed from the suppliers, unless 
discipline in the supplier oligopoly is strong (spreading). Although this 
may be beneficial to consumers in the short run, it may lead to market 
power and anticompetitive consequences in the long run. 
Contrary to current theory, we have seen that the arguments that vertical 
Integration enhances the ability to collude has some force, although only 
under specific condltions:92 
"The anticompetitive story becomes more convincing when conditions at 
the manufacturing level are most conducive to oligopolistic coordina-
tion - for example, In mature, highly concentrated, homogeneous pro-
duct industries with uniform cost conditions, significant entry bar-
riers, and a comprehensive pattern of vertical integration Into distri-
bution." 
90 This argument Is based on the 'Concept of Countervailing Power', origi-
nally Introduced by Galbraith, John K., American Capitalism: Concept of 
Countervailing Power, London 1957, p. 111. Cf. on the aspects of antitrust 
as well, Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ..• , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1006; Hoven-
kamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law, op. cit., 212; and Fisher/ 
Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, op. 
cit., 46. 
91 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1006; and Scherer, 
Industrial market structure ... , op. cit., 310-312. 
92 Fisher/Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement Poll-
ey, op. cit., 45. Cf. as well, Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restric-
tions ... , supra, 965. 
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The comprehensive pattern of vertical Integration seems to be of particular 
importance. Often, oligopolies show a behavioral pattern that rules out price 
competition. Price competition is replaced by nonprice competition through 
the acquisition of downstream enterprises. Disadvantaged rivals tend to have 
an incentive to buy further potential customers because of their fear of 
being foreclosed:93 "The first to integrate continued to dominate." 
3. The Llkellhood of Anticompetitive Effects and Revised Polley Conclusions 
According to the aforementioned view, vertical strategies in general and 
vertical mergers in particular are perceived only to serve as a means for 
the achievement of an increase in productive efficiency and not to obtain 
monopoly power, since "firms cannot in general obtain or enhance monopoly 
power by unilateral action - unless, of course, they are irrationally willing 
to trade profits for position. "!M 
Because a coherent economic approach underlying the anticompetitive effects 
of vertical mergers has not presented thus far and vertical Integration is 
viewed as primarily efficiency-enhancing, these arrangements should not 
merit legal scrutiny.95 According to Bork, U.S. antitrust policy has dealt 
with the effects of vertical mergers for more than 60 years without having 
succeeded in the development of an adequate theory that demonstrates the 
negative effects of such mergers on competition in a clear way. It is empha-
93 Chandler, The Visible Hand ... , op. cit., 365. Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspoli-
tik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 178; Scherer, Industrial market structure 
... , op. cit., 306, who mentions the cement manufacturers that acquired 
ready-mix concrete companies, despite any prospect of efficiency enhan-
cement or anticompetitive potential; cf. as well Allen, Vertical Integration 
and Market Foreclosure ... , supra. 
94 Posner, The Chicago School ... , supra, 928. Cf. the critique on the anti-
competitive emphasis associated with vertical mergers by Cease, Ronald H., 
Industrial Organisation: A Proposal for Research, in: Fuchs, Victor (ed.), 
Policy Issues and Research Opportunities, New York, 1972, pp. 59-73, 67: 
"If an economist finds something - a business practice of one sort or 
another - that he does not understand, he looks for monopoly explanati-
on. 
95 Cf. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 228: "Vertical Integration is 
often believed somehow to cause or permit a firm to behave differently 
than it would in the absence of integration. Aside from the efficiency ef-
fect, however, it is clear that vertical Integration does not affect the 
firm's pricing and output policies." 
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sized that vertical mergers do not increase the firm's ability to restrict out-
put because the ability to restrict output depends upon the market share in 
the market occupied by the firm. Whereas horizontal mergers increase mar-
ket share, vertical mergers do not. Therefore, It is concluded that 
"(a)ntitrust concern with vertical mergers Is mistaken. Vertical mergers 
are means of creating efficiency, not of injuring competition. There is a 
faint theoretical case, hardly worth mentioning, that vertical mergers 
can be used by very large firms for purposes of predation under ex-
ceptional circumstances, but it is highly doubtful that that narrow pos-
sibility has any application to reality". 96 
In this context, Posner emphasizes that at least in academic circles a posi-
tive evaluation of vertical mergers is gaining ground. The peril that vertical 
mergers pose Is regarded as small or rare in occurrence due to underlying 
ci rcumstances.97 
However, Williamson correctly emphasizes the likelihood of the occurrence of 
anticompetitive effects in that the attempt to realize an increase in effici-
ency may have adverse effects on competitors at the same time. While for-
ward integration may represent an effort to realize private gains with resul-
ting efficiency advantages at one stage, "it may constitute an unneeded re-
straint at a later stage and indeed may serve strategically to disadvantage 
rivals If it is contlnued".98 We have pointed out conclusively that anticompe-
titive consequences are realistic outcomes of vertical integration under spe-
cific circumstances. 
Efficiency considerations are important in evaluating vertical integration; 
nevertheless anti-competitive effects should not be left out of consideration. 
96 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 226; and idem, Vertical Integration 
and Competitive Processes, op. cit., 149. 
97 Cf. Posner, The Chicago School ..• , supra, 937 f. 
98 Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions ... , supra, 965. Along 
the same line, cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ••• , vol. 4, op. cit., §1015a, 
but see, ibid., § 1002, who denotes that vertical mergers are primarily 
efficiency-motivated and that there is no "reason to assume that a 
vertical merger which lowers costs and prices, thus benefltting consu-
mers, Is 'unfair' to rivals in any reasonable antitrust sense of that term, 
particularly when those rivals can achieve comparable economies through 
vertical integration, by merger or otherwise." 
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This makes it necessary to determine the circumstances under which compe-
tition will be reduced unduly.99 
The aforementioned line of reasoning emphasized three standards for pre-
sumptive illegality of a vertical merger. It should presumed to be Illegal if: 
- horizontal market shares of the integrating firms are substantial In terms 
of our considerations regarding horizontal mergers100; 
- substantial market barriers are already present or created at either stage 
by vertical integration 101; and/or 
- the market the firm vertically integrates into Is already a tight oligopoly 
and collusion Is promoted further by this merger. 102 
The actual problem is that these standards are hardly used in the enforce-
ment process under the current guidelines, which becomes obvious If one 
considers the number of cases brought before court. If they were enforced, 
however, they would largely act as appropriate standards for the evaluation 
of vertical mergers.103 
99 Cf., e.g., Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law •.• , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1015; 
Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, op. cit., 667-669; and William-
son, Oliver E., Vertical Merger Guidelines: Interpreting the 1982 Reforms, 
71 CLR (1983), pp. 604-617, 614. This reasoning was accepted in the 1982 
Merger Guidelines but the threshold for challenging non-horizontal mer-
gers was set rather high. It would have been better to lower the thres-
hold and to Introduce an efficiency defense with the burden of proof on 
the defendant. 
100 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1O15d, who 
propose that a merger should not be challenged If the market share is 
below 15 percent; cf. as well Shepherd, Public Policies •.. , op. cit., 234. 
This implies that vertical Integration Is primarily a horizontal problem, 
cf. Dirrheimer/ Wagner/Hubner, Vertikale Integration In der Mineralol-
und chemischen Industrie, op. cit., 15. A real exception would be a 
toehold acquisition which would enable a low market share firm acquired 
to receive resources and Intensify competition at Its stage. 
101 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1O15a, who 
propose that these barriers have to be at both stages; cf. as well Shep-
herd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 235; and Williamson, Antitrust Economics 
.•• , op. cit., 57. 
102 Cf. Areeda/Turner, Antitrust Law ... , vol. 4, op. cit., § 1O15a, who 
require a concentration ration of CR4=75% in both of the markets; cf. as 
well Shepherd, Public Policies ... , op. cit., 236; and WIiiiamson, Antitrust 
Economics ..• , op. cit., 58. Currently the Merger Guidelines propose a 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of 1.800 which resembles a CR4 of 70%, cf. 
WIiiiamson, Oliver E., Vertical Merger Guidelines ... , supra 615. 
103 If welfare is considered to be the only goal of antitrust policy, enforce-
ment became somewhat more lenient towards vertical Integration, cf. 
Blalr/Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical Control, op. cit., 192 f. 
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IV. Concludlng Remarks 
Unlike in the case of antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers, there is 
no consistent economic approach underlying the policy regarding vertical 
mergers, i.e. there exists no theoretical basis comparable to the concentra-
tion collusion-doctrine. 
Whereas vertical integration traditionally used to be associated primarily 
with anticompetitive effects, recent research has emphasized possible econo-
mic advantages of contractual linkages and vertical integration, particularly 
in comparison to the market mechanism, which are supposed to lead to real 
resource and cost savings. This resulted in a strong notion among econo-
mists that vertical arrangements in general and vertical mergers in particu-
lar are efficiency-enhancing, carry little or no anticompetitive effects, and 
therefore should not be considered per se illegal. The possible occurrence of 
both desirable efficiency effects as well as undesirable anticompetitive 
effects seems to make necessary an economic trade-off between these two 
effects. As far as our view is concerned, the multiple-goal perspective of 
antitrust policy has to be born in mind. 
The question whether efficiency-enhancement really represents the sole 
motivation of merging firms for vertical integration or whether vertical inte-
gration is also performed because it may be a source and carrier of market 
power strongly determines the effectiveness of the transaction-cost approach 
as an adequate basis for the evaluation of efficiency-effects of vertical 
mergers. Vertical integration is indeed a source and carrier of market 
power, which makes the trade-off lose its explanatory power concerning the 
transaction mechanism chosen. Even if the cost of an economic transaction 
by the market were less than the intra-corporate coordination costs for an 
economic transaction, there would remain a motivation to merge, until the 
excess profits from a monopoly or limit price strategy would equal the total 
cost difference resulting from the two transaction mechanisms. Such a ratio-
nale is ruled out by the adherents of current theory, however, because of 
restrictive premises and assumptions. Under realistic premises and assumpti-
ons, the generality of the pro-efficiency argument is not tenable. Private 
efficiency gains and social efficiency gains must be separated from each 
other in such a case. 
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A trade-off is certainly needed for the determination of the counteracting 
effects of vertical integration or vertical mergers. However, it has to be 
performed on a positive as well as on a normative level of analysis, encom-
passing the shortcomings of current theory on the positive level and the 
intentions of legislation on the normative one. 
The achievement of efficiencies has to be demonstrated because we may not 
presume a priori that efficiency-enhancement is the only objective of an 
economic agent, at least not In the sense of overall economic efficiency that 
translates on a one-to-one basis into consumer welfare. Thus we have to 
include qualifications to the unrealistic assumptions of current theory, i.e., 
bear in mind that real world markets do not work in a frictionless manner, 
barriers to competition do exist, and are often significant, and that a com-
parison of organization costs with transaction costs of the market is often 
unfeasible. 
On a normative level, public goals other than just consumer welfare have to 
be taken into account. This Is considered a legitimate Intention because the 
incipiency doctrine still considered valid by the courts has to be viewed as 
a result of the legislator's willingness to maintain unconcentrated structures 
and eventually sacrifice efficiencies in order to maintain competition. 
A variety of empirical studies have tried to find support for the implications 
of the transaction-cost approach by citing evidence that transaction-cost 
specific market characteristics pose an incentive for vertical integration: 
- The results confirm the implications of the transaction-cost approach only 
when grounds for vertical integration other than efficiency can be exclu-
ded. Nevertheless, there may be other causal factors responsible for an 
incentive to integrate (e.g., tax avoidance). 
We are not sure in any case whether efficiency gains are passed on to 
consumers, i.e. whether sufficient competitive pressure to ensure this 
actually prevails, nor have we empirical studies thus far explicitly elabo-
rated on possible anticompetitive effects as a result of increased vertical 
Integration. 
None of the empirical studies on cost savings from increased vertical Inte-
gration show quantitative results on marginal transaction-costs across diffe-
rent mechanisms of ooordlnatlon along the various stages In the chain of 
production and distribution. This seems particularly important concerning 
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the isolation of motives underlying an increase in vertical integration. In the 
case of a net increase in efficiency there would be an affirmation of the 
efficiency-enhancement hypothesis, although we would not be sure whether 
this increase would necessarily be passed on to consumers as current 
theory contends. However, empirical findings which show a decrease in effi-
ciency in the case of increased vertical integration - reversing the reaso-
ning - suggest a motivation other than efficiency-enhancement. Empirical 
studies on this aspect are scarce and their results are ambiguous, to say 
the least. 
The main obstacle to unambiguous conclusions is the problem of distingui-
shing efficiency, i.e. cost saving effects from all other consequences, such 
as market power, price discrimination, evasion of regulation, tax avoidance, 
and the like. The crucial deficiency seems to be that the results are compa-
tible with an efficiency as well as with a market power explanation. 
Thus, the use of a marginal transaction-cost approach which leads to the 
aforementioned trade-off, seems plausible at first sight. However, It remains 
ineffective and thus an empty box as long as It is not possible to determine 
the correct amounts In order to perform the trade-off. 
Furthermore, the general applicability of the transaction-cost approach and 
similar approaches to a theory of institutional change has to be questioned. 
The microeconomic concept of efficiency is to been seen as crucially impor-
tant for the application of the transaction-cost approach. The ability of the 
price system to alter economic systems in the direction of efficient economic 
arrangements in vertical terms depends on sufficient competitive pressure in 
horizontal terms. It may be realistically asserted, however, that economic 
equilibrium is absent in most If not all of our markets and furthermore that 
market imperfections and oligopolistic structures prevail. In this case, eco-
nomic logic supports no causal inferences about the role of efficiency in 
determining social or organizational structures. The market imperfections 
make It less likely that the most efficient competitors will prevail in the end. 
Concerning the assumption of an essentially frictionless and perfectly com-
petitive market, as assumed by the adherents of current theory, it can be 
held that the imperfections actually found in reality may finally be respon-
sible for the fact that financial and market power, not economic efficiency, 
may determine the winners in the competitive process. 
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The assertion that meaningful barriers to competition do not exist and, 
hence, sufficient competitive pressure is continuously present - regardless 
of the existing structural features of the markets Involved in vertical Inte-
gration - tends to define market power problems away, as well as the likeli-
hood of anticompetitive consequences. The absence of power results in effi-
ciency and this efficiency is considered synonymous with consumer welfare. 
The terms transaction-costs and organization costs are difficult to handle 
and in specific cases they can neither be determined in a precise manner 
empirically nor quantitatively measured. The terms are largely used in a way 
that allows justification of certain phenomena ex post; this leads to the pos-
sibility that any development can be justified - but only ex post and cru-
dely. As a result, the concept tends to become tautologous. 
Whereas horizontal mergers increase market share, vertical mergers do not. 
However, one must emphasize the likelihood of the occurrence of anticompeti-
tive effects Insofar as the attempt to realize an Increase in efficiency may 
have adverse effects on competitors at the same time. While forward inte-
gration may represent an effort to realize private gains with resulting effi-
ciency advantages at one stage, it may constitute a restraint at a later 
stage and Indeed may serve strategically to disadvantage rivals If It Is con-
tinued. 
Although a coherent economic approach on anticompetitive effects of vertical 
mergers has not been presented thus far and antitrust policy has dealt with 
the effects of vertical mergers without having succeeded in developing an 
adequate theory that demonstrates the negative effects of such mergers on 
competition In a clear way, there may be anticompetitive effects under cer-
tain conditions that have to be anticipated from vertical mergers. In this 
context, large market shares as a proxy for Individual market power at the 
Integrating firm's stage, creation or elevation of market barriers at either 
stage, and/or the existence of a tight oligopoly at the stage of Integration 
should be considered appropriate to serve as standards for presumptive Il-
legality. 
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R'8ym6e: Application of the Results of an Analysis of the Chicago School 
Approach Towards Industrial Concentration 
This resumee will deal mainly with the question of whether the German Act 
Against Restraints of Competition (ARC) needs a reform along the lines of 
Chicago School theory. The evaluation will be based on the conclusions 
resulting from this contribution. 
In order to derive conclusions from the developments in the Unites States 
which are relevant to the Fifth Amendment of the German Act Against Re-
straints of Competition, we have to inquire into the question of whether a 
basic comparability of the two bodies of law may be established. 1 
Furthermore, we have to analyze to what extent policy elements based on 
Chicago theory have already found introduction into German antitrust enfor-
cement and jurisdiction. Finally, and In the ligth of our conclusions on the 
hypotheses of Chicago theory, we will evaluate proposals for the Fifth 
Amendment of the ARC which are currently discussed. 
I. The Legal Treatment of Industrial Concentration 
In Part 1 we have briefly evaluated different approaches that can be taken 
by public policy-makers toward restraints of competition. Control over indu-
strial concentration and in particular mergers, with a view to limiting and 
controlling economic power, is carried out according to various criteria. The 
different approaches that we are able to distinguish emphasize either market 
structure, market conduct, or a combination of both factors, the so-called 
market process test: these variations are analogous to the approaches of 
public policy already presented.2 
Public policy intervention in cases where undue economic power accumulates 
needs specification by operational criteria on the basis of antitrust theory. 
These criteria have to be laid down by legal statutes and should determine 
the point at which undue economic power can be said to emerge.3 
On the comparability of the two legal systems, cf., e.g., Markert, Kurt, 
Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen des US-Antitrustrechts 1987 aus der 
Sicht eines deutschen Kartellrechtsanwenders, In: FIW (ed.), Schwerpunkte 
des Kartellrechts 1985/86. Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungspraxis Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland, EG und USA, Koln et al. 1987, pp. 201-224, 203 f. 
2 Cf. Nagel, Bernhard, Fusion und Fusionskontrolle, in: Cox, Helmut, et al. 
(eds.), Handbuch des Wettbewerbs, M0nchen 1981, pp. 331-365, 337 f. 
3 Cf. Giesel, Harald B., Unternehmungswachstum und Wettbewerb, Baden-Ba-
den 1975, 195. 
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We will first present the approach that the U.S. American and the German 
legislators have chosen, also comparing the statutes and the prerequisites 
for application. We will then go on to compare the two legal systems and the 
way by which they have solved the three fundamental problems common to 
every merger control system4, namely: 
- the determination of the point at which mergers are sufficiently relevant 
to merit legal scrutiny (so-called minimum threshold); 
- the determination of the conditions under which mergers are subject to 
legal prohibition (so-called point of Intervention); and 
- the defenses which are available in order to have an illegal merger 
exceptionally declared legal (so-called overall justifications). 
We will conclude by showing recent tendencies with regard to the deve-
lopment of the statutes in both countries. 
1. The Approach 
The approaches in both countries can be characterized as structural approa-
ches, which attempt to prevent the emergence of anticompetitive market 
structures.5 As a rule, both approaches are ex post-control approaches, 
4 Cf. Hopt, Klaus J., Merger Control in Germany: Philosophies, Experiences, 
Reforms, in: Hopt, Klaus J. (ed.), European Merger Control: Legal and Eco-
nomic Analyses on Multinational Enterprises, vol. 1, Berlin and New York 
1982, pp. 71-99, 79. 
5 Cf. Adams, Walter, and James W. Brock, The Bigness Complex: Industry, La-
bor, and Government in the American Economy, New York 1986, p. 155, who 
note that it is "easier to maintain competitive market structures than to 
reestablish them once they had been destroyed through acquisition and 
consolidation", p. 153; Neiser, Jens, Die Praxis der deutschen Fusionskon-
trolle, Berlin 1981, p. 54; Ruppelt, HansjUrgen, Wettbewerbspolitik und 
wirtschaftliche Konzentratlon, TUbingen 1978, p. 194, who emphasizes the 
advantages of such a preventive merger control system (p. 185); Schmidt, 
Ingo, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht: Eine EinfUhrung, 2nd ed., 
Stuttgart 1987, pp. 178 and 277. 
As documented by Chief Justice Earl Warren of the U.S. Federal Supreme 
Court in Brown Shoe: " ... , It is apparent that a keystone in the erection 
of a barrier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic con-
centration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time 
when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was 
still In Its Incipiency" (emphasis added), Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 1962 
Trade Cases § 70,366 at p. 76,489; this is also documented in the papers 
of the government bill on the Second Amendment to the ARC, cf. BegrUn-
dung zum Regierungsentwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Anderung des 
GWB, BTDr. VI/2520, p. 29. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
307 
making exemptions from this rule only under certain conditions. These con-
ditions will be dealt with infra. 
In the Federal Republic this ex post-control by means of postmerger notifi-
cation was introduced by the Second Amendment to the Act Against Re-
straints of Competition in 1973 and replaced a mere obligation to notify a 
limited class of mergers.a The requirement for this postmerger notification 
exists in two cases. First, if a market share of 20 percent is reached or 
surpassed in the relevant market as a result of the merger, or, second, if 
the two merging parties had a combined turnover of DM 500 millions or at 
least 10,000 employees In the year preceding the merger. The German Bun-
desgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) has extended the requirements on 
information subject to publication and has therefore made this postmerger 
notification effective.7 The same amendment introduced an ex ante-control 
for mergers as well. 
The Fourth Amendment In 1980 was primarily aimed at large sized companies, 
including an obligation to prenotify mergers in which one of the merging 
parties had DM 2,000 millions turnover or alternatively, each of the merging 
parties involved had a turnover of DM 1,000 millions or more.a 
In addition, the ARC contains a check on abuses of market dominating enter-
prises in cases In which this dominance emerged from internal growth of 
companies in particular markets or from uncontrolled external growth in the 
past.9 
Sec. 7 Clayton Act, as amended by the Cellar-Kefauver Act in 1950, is the 
main merger law In the United States. In addition to this instrument, a pre-
merger notification has been institutionalized in 1976 by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Improvement Act, requiring firms to give the antitrust enforcement 
6 Cf. Moschel, Wernhard, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrlinkungen, Koln et al., 
pp. 465 f.; Ruppelt, Wettbewerbspolitik und wirtschaftliche Konzentratlon, 
op. cit., 206; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 
160. 
7 Cf. Sec. 23 para. 1, lit. 1 and 2 ARC; and Hopt, Merger Control in Germany 
... , op. cit., 82. 
8 Cf. Sec. 24a para. 1; OECD (ed.), Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Bu-
siness Practices, vol. 1, Germany, p. 12; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik 
und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 160. 
9 Cf. Sec. 22 ARC; and Schmidt, Ingo, Different Approaches and Problems In 
Dealing with Control of Market Power: A Comparison of German, European, 
and U.S. Polley towards Market-Dominating Enterprises, 28 AB (1983), pp. 
417-460, 435 ff. 
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agencies advance notice of certain mergers. The merging parties become 
subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC "where the transaction involves 
acquisition of firms with sales or assets of $ 10 million or more and the 
acquiring firm, or the combined firms, have sales or assets of $ 250 million 
or more." 10 Mergers falling within this category can be stopped by prelimi-
nary injunctions imposed by the courts or administrative law judges. 
Unlike the ARC, United States law does not provide for control of possible 
abuses of market dominating enterprises with regard to a bad perfor-
mance.11 
2. The Relevant Statutes 
Secs. 24 ARC and 7 Clayton Act, as the central statutes, are aimed at all 
possible mergers regardless of whether they are horizontal, vertical or 
conglomerate. 12 Sec. 24 ARC connects the control and prohibition of mergers 
to the criterion that the actual merger is expected to create or strengthen a 
dominant position in a market. This allows for two kinds of cases. An enter-
prise is in a dominant position, firstly, if a buyer or seller has no competi-
tor in a relevant market (monopoly), or secondly, the enterprise is not sub-
ject to any substantial competition, i.e., it dominates the market by a para-
mount position in relation to its competitors (dominant firm). Essentially, the 
same applies for tight oligopolies with or without a noncompetitive fringe 
under Sec. 24 ARC. 13 
10 OECD (ed.), Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices, vol. 4, 
U.S.A., part 2.0, pp. 26 f.; cf. as well Sec. 7A Clayton Act; FTC Merger 
Notification Program, 1 CCH TRRer, § 4455; Neiser, Die Praxis der deut-
schen Fuslonskontrolle, op. cit., 54; and Schmidt, Ingo, US-amerikanische 
und deutsche Wettbewerbspol iti k gegenuber Marktmacht, Berl In 1973, p. 
157. 
11 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartell recht, op. cit., 181; and idem, 
Different Approaches and Problems •.. , supra, 421-432. 
The U.S. statutes try to treat the emergence of dominant positions in 
their incipiency by prosecuting attempts to monopolize under Sec. 2 of 
the Sherman Act. Insofar, there is a parallel to Sec. 22 ARC. 
12 Cf. Sandrock, Otto, Vertikale Konzentrationen im USamerikanlschen Antl-
trustrecht, Heidelberg 1984, p. 175; and Adams/Brock, The Bigness Com-
plex ... , op. cit., 154. 
Actually the relevant legal statutes encompass the Secs. 23, 24, 24a, 24b 
ARC and the Secs. 7, 7A and 8 Clayton Act. We will extract Issues from 
these sections as far as necessary in the following. 
13 Cf. Hopt, Merger Control in Germany •.• , op. cit., 80; OECD (ed.), Guide to 
Legislation: Germany ... , op. cit., 12. 
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The U.S. legislator has connected interference by public policy to the crite-
rion of the creation of a monopoly and/or to a substantial lessening of com-
petltion:14 
"With limited exceptions, Section 7 forbids the acquisition by one corpo-
ration in commerce of the stock or assets of another corporation In 
commerce where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition 
or the tendency to create a monopoly in any line of commerce in any 
section of the country" (emphasis added). 
The point of intervention is therefore earlier in the U.S.A. 
3. The Merger Tenn In the Statutes 
The merger control law definition of mergers is different from the narrow 
one used in corporate law. 
With regard to Sec. 23 para. 2 ARC the definition encompasses a variety of 
forms. Mergers within the meaning of this section are: 
- acquisitions of the assets of other enterprises, wholly or to a significant 
extent (Sec. 23 para. 2 lit. 1 ARC); 
- acquisitions of shares where the total, held individually or jointly with 
other enterprises or linked firms, amounts to 25 percent of the voting 
capital, or if 25 percent are already held, amounts to 50 percent, or if the 
merger secures the acquiring firm a majority interest (Sec. 23 para. 2 lit. 
2 ARC); 
- also certain forms of combined firms (concerns) and certain forms of in-
terlocking directorates (Sec. 23 para. 2 lits. 3 and 4 ARC); 
- any direct or indirect dominant control relationships between two enter-
prises (Sec. 23 para. 2 lit. 5 grants a catch-all clause). 15 
Sec. 7 Clayton Act is not as specified as Sec. 23 para. 2 ARC. It just refers 
to stock and assets in that the Act forbids any corporation engaged in com-
merce to "acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock 
or other share capital ... (or) the whole or any part of the assets of any 
other such corporation ... , where in any line of commerce .•• " (emphasis ad-
14 Sullivan, Lawrence A., Handbook of the Law of A~titrust, St. Paul, Minn. 
1977, p. 601; cf. as well Adams/Brock, The Bigness Complex ... , op. cit., 
154; and OECD (ed.), Guide to Legislation: U.S.A .... , op. cit., part 1.2, 5. 
15 Cf. Hopt, Merger Control in Germany ... , op. cit., 83-85; OECD (ed.), Guide 
to Legislation: Germany .•. , op. cit., 11. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
310 
ded). 18 This resembles more or less a catch-all clause strongly emphasizing 
whether competition is substantially lessened or a monopoly created, regard-
less of the quantity of stock or assets that is responsible for this.17 
4. The Minimum Thresholds 
As noted above, the choice of minimum thresholds is supposed to determine 
at what point mergers are sufficiently relevant to merit legal scrutiny. 1a 
Firstly, under German law the combination of two originally separate enter-
prises must be a merger in the sense of Sec. 23 para. 2 ARC. Second, there 
is a de minimls-conslderation in the ARC, which views mergers as legally re-
levant only if the combined turnover of the participating enterprises equals 
or exceeds 500 million DM. 19 
With regard to the U.S. antitrust statutes, there are no such minimum thres-
holds in the laws. There are only thresholds that are created by the anti-
trust agencies by means of administrative enforcement rules such as the 
Merger Guidelines and the Vertical Restraints Guidelines of the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice, which make the circumstances explicit 
under which the agencies will interfere.20 These enforcement rules are not 
legally binding, however, and are therefore subject to the discretion of the 
courts. 
5. The Point of Intervention 
The point of public intervention determines the conditions under which mer-
gers are subject to legal prohibition. This point of intervention Is actually 
16 OECD (ed.), Gulde to Legislation: U.S.A .... , op. cit., part 1.2, 5; and Sulli-
van, Antitrust Law •.. , op. cit., 592. 
17 For a fundamental treatment of the differences, cf. Harms, Wolfgang, Zu-
sammenschlu13 und Merger - rechtsvergleichende Anmerkungen zum Be-
reich der Fuslonskontrolle, in: Gamm, Otto Friedrich Freiherr von, et al. 
(eds.), Strafrecht, Unternehmensrecht, Anwaltsrecht: Festschrift fur Gerd 
Pfeiffer, Koln et al. 1987, pp. 501- 515. 
18 Cf. Hopt, Merger Control in Germany ••• , op. cit., 79 f. 
19 Cf. Hopt, Merger Control in Germany •.• , op. cit., 80; cf. as well Nagel, Fu-
sion und Fusionskontrolle, op. cit., 340; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik 
und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 276. 
20 Cf. Neiser, Die Praxis der deutschen Fusionskontrolle, op. cit., 52; and 
Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 180. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
311 
an attempt to specify the wording of Secs. 24 para. 1 ARC and 7 Clayton 
Act. 21 
As has been noted, German law makes intervention dependent on the expec-
tation that the actual merger will create or strengthen a dominant position 
in a market; in this respect a certain level of probability of its occurence is 
sufficient. The dominant position Is evaluated first by defining the relevant 
market and then it is evaluated with regard to the criteria enumerated in 
Sec. 22 para. 3 ARC which constitute rebuttable presumptions of market 
dominatlon.22 An enterprise Is seen as having a dominant position if It pos-
sesses a share of the relevant market of at least one third, unless it had a 
turnover of less than DM 250 million in the year preceding the merger. For 
a group of enterprises (oligopoly) this applies if three enterprises or fewer 
possess a joint share of the relevant market of 50 percent or more, or five 
enterprises or less possess a share of the relevant market of two thirds or 
more. This does not apply if the turnover was less than DM 150 million each, 
in the year prior to the merger.23 
Moreover, the German law has specified refutable presumptions In Sec. 23a 
ARC covering typical groups of vertical and conglomerate mergers which 
tend to be subject to these presumptions and are thus assumed to create or 
strengthen a dominant position. This applies to mergers of single dominant 
firms (Sec. 23a para. 1 ARC) as well as to a group of enterprises dominating 
a market (Sec. 23a para. 2 ARC). The latter paragraph reverses the burden 
of proof, which now rests on the firms participating in the merger.24 
Sec. 7 Clayton Act uses the criterion of the creation of a monopoly or of a 
substantial lessening of competition as a point of intervention. The statute is 
viewed as a preventive Instrument which attempts to rule out anticompetitive 
effects that can be expected with reuonable probablllty in statu nascendl 
(Incipiency doctrlne).25 The guidelines that are Issued by the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice deserve special attention, as has been 
21 Cf. Hopt, Merger Control in Germany ... , op. cit., 80. 
22 Cf. OECD (ed.), Gulde to Legislation: Germany ••• , op. cit., 10. 
23 Cf. Hopt, Merger Control In Germany •.. , op. cit., 80; Sandrock, Vertlkale 
Konzentratlonen ... , op. cit., 175 f.; and Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolltl k und 
Kartell rec ht, op. cit., 160. 
24 Cf. MOschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, op. cit., 551 f. 
25 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitlk und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 178. 
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noted above, since they determine the point of intervention from the view of 
the enforcement agencies. 
The criteria of the statutes, however, have been operationalized by decisions 
of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court. The court ruled a horizontal merger pre-
sumptively illegal on the basis of the evaluation of the participants' market 
shares, the concentration ratio of the four or eight largest enterprises in 
the relevant market, and the concentration trend in the past. 
No definite market share was postulated, but the court noticed that a market 
share of 20 to 30 percent was considered undue.211 Somewhat of a change 
has been brought about by the Federal Supreme Court's decision ruling that 
circumstances in addition to the market share and concentration ratios would 
have to be evaluated In an actual case (e.g., future competitiveness).27 
Vertical mergers were judged by the foreclosure effect they were bound to 
initiate, the nature and purpose of the merger, the probability that squee-
zing of non-Integrated competitors will occur, the trend towards future ver-
tical integration, the effect on barriers to entry, and the financial capabili-
ties of the participating parties.28 As in the case of horizontal mergers, 
market shares of 20 to 30 percent were considered undue.29 
With regard to conglomerate mergers, only geographic or product extension 
mergers and mergers allowing for reciprocal dealings, deserve special atten-
tion with regard to past cases.30 The U.S. Federal Supreme Court has es-
sentially postulated three criteria of intervention.31 The merger is deemed 
unlawful if: 
- it creates possibilities of extensive reciprocal dealings; 
- potential competition is substantially reduced; and/ or 
- a dominant position of an enterprise in an already relatively concentrated 
market is strengthened. 
26 Cf. U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank, 1963 Trade Cases § 70,812. For the 
evaluation cf. Ruppelt, Wettbewerbspolitik und wirtschaftliche Konzentra-
tlon, op. cit., 186; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 
178. 
27 Cf. U.S. v. General Dynamics, 1974-1 Trade Cases § 74,967. 
28 Cf. Sandrock, Vertlkale Konzentrationen ... , op. cit., 176 f.; Schmidt, Wett-
bewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 178 f., the latter presenting the 
relevant court cases. 
29 Cf. U. S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1957 Trade Cases § 68,723. 
30 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspollti k und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 179 f. 
31 Cf. Ruppelt, Wettbewerbspolitik und wirtschaftliche Konzentratlon, op. cit., 
187 f., and for the cases FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1965 Trade 
Cases § 71,432; FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 1967 Trade Cases § 72,061; 
and Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, 1962 Trade Cases § 70,471. 
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The Federal Supreme Court has not thus far been able to develop criteria 
for judging pure conglomerate mergers,32 
6. Overall Justification 
Overall justification specifies the defenses which are available in order to 
have an illegal merger exceptionally declared legal.33 This is not aimed at 
procedural issues but at substantive merger rules. 
Sec. 24 paras. 1 and 3 ARC contain a relief in two cases. Firstly, the merger 
can be declared exceptionally legal by Sec. 24 para. 1 ARC if it will also lead 
to improvements in competitive conditions and these improvements, at the 
same time, outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the market dominating 
position brought about by the merger. The burden of proof lies with the 
enterprise.34 
Second, on the basis of Sec. 24 para 3, the merger can be declared legal by 
the German Federal Minister for Economic Affairs if the detrimental effects 
on competition are balanced by overall economic advantages or Justified by 
an overriding public interest.35 
Sec. 7 Clayton Act does not contain such an arbitrary disposition as a kind 
of rule of reason. 38 However, two defenses have been Introduced by adjudi-
cation, i.e. the so-called failing-company defense and the defense due to 
perceived efficiencies as a result of a merger.37 
32 Cf. Aarts, Jacobus W., Antitrust Policy versus Economic Power, Leiden 
1975, p. 285. 
33 Cf. Hopt, Merger Control in Germany ... , op. cit., 80. 
34 Cf. Sandrock, Vertikaie Konzentrationen ... , op. cit., 178; Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 160. 
35 Cf. Hopt, Merger Control in Germany ... , op. cit., 80; Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 160. 
36 "We are clear •.. that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially 
to lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of 
social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A 
value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial 
competence, ..• ", U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank, op. cit., at p. 78,271. 
37 Cf. the Introduction to this contribution; and Sandrock, Vertikale Konzen-
trationen ... , op. cit., 153-160 for a detailed analysis and 178 for this 
evaluation; Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 180. For 
the contrary position cf. Areeda, Phillip, and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust 
Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Boston 
and Toronto 1980, vol. 4, § 941, p. 151: "In our view, neither the langu-
age nor the legislative history of §7 forecloses an economic defense. Limi-
ted case law suggestions to the contrary are dicta, internally contradic-
tory, unsupported, or otherwise unpersuasl ve." 
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II. Trends and Tendencies In Enforcement and Ad ludlcatlon 
Mainly because of the former accord of antitrust policies in the United 
States and the Federal Republic of Germany and their currently diverging 
patterns, the question arises as to whether there is a new state of the art 
in antitrust theory based on recent findings, and whether, albeit with a 
certain time-lag, these may soon beginn to exert influence on German anti-
trust policy.1 
1. The Use of Economic Evidence In Enforcement and Adjudication 
In comparison to (current) antitrust policy in the United States, German 
legislation does not offer as much room for economic evidence. Although this 
applies to a somewhat lesser extent to efficiency considerations In the field 
of merger control 2, the German law is statutory law and legislature has 
decided to be restrictive on the use of economic evidence which also implies 
that there is not much room for a broad application of a rule of reason. 
This is considered binding for the courts. 3 
This basic attitude is enforced by the philosophy underlying the ARC. It is 
much more influenced by what has been described as the ordollberal view of 
competition in this contribution, because it "is understood as an lndlspens-
Cf., e.g., Herdzlna, Klaus, Mogllchkelten und Grenzen einer wlrtschaftstheo-
retlschen Fundierung der Wettbewerbspolltik, Tublngen 1988, pp. 39 f. The 
question is of particular relevance because of the assertion that this 
former accord has been terminated by recent changes In U.S. antitrust 
policy, cf., e.g., Kantzenbach, Erhard, The Treatment of Dominance in Ger-
man Antitrust Policy, in: de Jong, Henk W., and William G. Shepherd (eds.), 
Mainstreams in Industrial Organization - Book 2, Dordrecht et al. 1986, pp. 
273-285, 282 f. 
2 Cf. the exception in Sec. 24 paras. 1 and 3 ARC, dealing with the efficien-
cy defense that may be granted by the Minister for Economic Affairs. This 
does not apply for increases in Internal business efficiency, however. 
Furthermore, the criteria for the determination of the degree of dominati-
on In Sec. 22 para. 1 lit. 2 allow for an immediate Influence of economic 
evidence. 
3 Cf. Geberth, Rolf, and Thomas Janicki, Kartellrecht zwischen Kontinuitiit 
und Anpassung, 37 WuW (1987), pp. 447-463, 453; Kartte, Wolfgang, Markt-
struktur und voikswirtschaftliche Effizienz - ein Wlderspruch?, in: FIW 
(ed.), Neuorlentlerung des Wettbewerbsschutzes, Koln et al. 1986, pp. 49-
60, 49; Moschel, Wernhard, Use of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litiga-
tion in the Federal Republic of Germany, 32 AB (1987), pp. 523-550, 524 f., 
544 and 550. 
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able correlative of an economic order which rests on freedom of action".4 
Based on this understanding, there is a restrictive position towards a ten-
dency to increase the use of economic evidence in general and efficiency 
considerations in particular because of the ambiguous nature of the latter 
kind. 5 
This reasoning is affirmed by recent adjudication, which is rather unwilling 
to accept economic evidence contrary to recent tendencies in U.S. enforce-
ment and jurisdiction. For instance, conglomerate mergers were not permit-
ted if a large-sized, financially strong firm merges with a firm that Is domi-
nant in a market characterized by small business, although this might even-
tually have resulted in efficiencies.8 
2. An Evaluation of Trends and Tendencies 
On the basis of the structure approach and market domination, the German 
Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has developed a unified standard of reference, 
which is largely affirmed by the courts.7 In the following, we will try to 
reveal to what extent current U.S. antitrust policy and thus efficiency con-
siderations have found Introduction into current enforcement and how these 
are to be evaluated in the light of our findings. 
a. Determining Market Dellneatlon 
Demarcation of the relevant market is considered to be the essential prere-
quisite for the determination of market domination because the more restric-
4 Moschel, Use of Economic Evidence ... , supra, 524; cf. Idem, Wettbewerbspo-
litl k aus ordoliberaler Slcht, In: Gamm, Otto Friedrich Freiherr von, et al. 
(eds.), Strafrecht, Unternehmensrecht, Anwaltsrecht: Festschrift fur Gerd 
Pfeiffer, Koln et al. 1987, pp. 707-725, 707 f. 
5 Cf. Geberth/Janicki, Kartellrecht zwischen Kontinuitiit und Anpassung, sup-
ra, 453. 
6 For the case, cf. Edelstahlbestecke, WuW/E BGH 2150; and for criticism of 
the ruling, Moschel, Wernhard, Finanzkraft und konglomerater Zusammen-
schlu13, 29 AG (1984), pp. 257-260. 
7 Cf. Niederleithinger, Ernst, Praxis der Fuslonskontrolle und der Mil3-
brauchsaufslcht 1985/86, in: FIW (ed.), Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 
1985/86. Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungspraxis Bundesrepubllk Deut-
schland, EG und USA, Koln et al. 1987, pp. 21-82, 39-54; Monopolkommis-
sion, Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission V: Okonomlsche Krlterlen fur 
die Rechtsanwendung, Baden-Baden 1984, para 422. This does not apply to 
the retailing sector, however, cf. Kirschner, Ulrich, Fusionskontrolle Im 
Lebensmitteleinzelhandel: Anmerkungen zum Fall Coop-Wandmaker, 37 WuW 
(1987), pp. 789-796, 789 f. 
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tive, i.e. the more narrowly the market is delineated, the more likely a mer-
ger is found to violate Sec. 24 para. 1 ARC.8 
Although generalizations beyond an evaluation of single cases and actual 
facts are not possible, the underlying concept of substitution possibilities in 
consumption, which we have proposed supra, Is accepted as a common basis 
for the definition of the relevant market, i.e. if the products are held to 
belong to the same relevant market, then in respect of consumers' needs the 
products should be substitutable for each other.9 
This basic Idea of substitution has led to the attempt to measure these flexi-
bilities by cross-price elasticities of demand. On the demand side the con-
cept holds that goods belong to the same relevant market if they show sig-
nificant cross-price elasticlties. 10 
Although theoretically correct, attempts to calculate precise numerical values 
for these elasticities, in addition to a 'soft' and qualitative evaluation of the 
substitution possibilities, is unrealistic because impracticable. 
The attempt to determine whether buyers would respond to a 5% price in-
crease by shifting to other products within a particular period of time, or 
whether entry of potential competition would occur, in no way furthers a 
realistic definition of the relevant market. This is the reason why attempts 
in current U.S. antitrust policy to introduce such a quantitative analysis 
should not be adopted. 11 This procedure would not substitute taking into 
consideration qualitative criteria such as particular characteristics and par-
8 Cf., e.g., Bechthold, Rainer, Die Entwicklung des deutschen Kartellrechts 
von 1981 bis 1983, 37 NJW (1984), pp. 145-152; Emmerich, Volker, Fusions-
kontroiie 1986/87, 32 AG (1987), pp. 357-368, 358; Pfeiffer, Gerd, Von der 
Autokupplung bis zu Chanel No. 5, in: Heimrich, Herbert (ed.), Wettbe-
werbspolitik und Wettbewerbsrecht: Zur Diskussion um die Noveilierung 
des GWB, Koln et al. 1987, pp. 209-220, 212. 
9 Cf. Emmerich, Fusionskontrolle 1986/87, supra, 358 f; Monopolkommission, 
Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., paras. 606 f. and 611 f.; and Schmidt, Wett-
bewerbspoliti k und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 52. 
10 Cf. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspoliti k und Kartellrecht, op. cit., 51; Sosnick, A 
Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition, 72 QJE (1958), pp. 380-423, 
401. 
11 Cf. the attempt in the U.S. Merger Guidelines to quantify these conside-
rations, Harris, Robert G., and Thomas M. Jorde, Market Definition in the 
Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CLR (1983), 
pp. 464-496, 481; these findings are obviously agreed upon by Knopfle, 
Robert, Aktuelle Probleme der ZusammenschluBkontrolle, 40 DB (1987), pp. 
1-20, 4. For criticism, cf. Monopol kommlssion, Hauptgutachten V ... , op. 
cit., para. 618; 
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ticular uses of a product. 12 As has been demonstrated by this contri butlon, 
this criticism also applies to the attempt to consider potential competition 
within a concept of the relevant market determined by production flexibi-
lities, as has been made by the U.S. Merger Guidelines. 13 
The procedure used by the Monopolies Commission to distinguish the rele-
vant market from an area that is close enough to it to encompass substitu-
tion possibilities and potential competition, is adequate insofar as the pro-
cedure is based on a reliable definition of the relevant market. Although 
this definition Is rather restrictive, the area close to the relevant market is 
nevertheless considered additionally through a comprehensive view of the 
deli neatlon. 14 
Contrary to widespread opinlon 15, the international competitiveness of Ger-
man firms is thoroughly appreciated and taken account of by this two stage 
procedure and particularly by a comprehensive view. This makes it unneces-
sary to adopt the current policy approach in the U.S. because this approach 
attempts to take into consideration foreign competition directly through the 
definition of the relevant market. 18 
b. Determining Market Domination 
A merger is prohibited according to Sec. 24 para. 1 ARC if it is to be expec-
ted to create or strengthen a market dominating position. The confirmation 
12 For an encompassing criticism, cf. Harris/Jorde, Market Definition in the 
Merger Guidelines ... , supra, 476-486. Cf. as well this contribution supra. 
13 Cf. Merger Guidelines 1984, CCH TRR No. 655, June 18, 1984, Part II, pp. 
33-37 and 38 f .. 
14 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., para. 609. 
15 Cf. Berg, Hartmut, Internationale Wettbewerbsfahlgkelt und nationale Zu-
sammenschlu13kontrolle, Koln et al. 1985; and Holzler, Heinrich, Der Markt-
anteil In der Fusionskontrolle bei internationaler Wlrtschaftsverflechtung, 
In: Gamm, Otto Friedrich Freiherr von, et al. (eds.), Strafrecht, Unterneh-
mensrecht, Anwaltsrecht: Festschrlft fur Gerd Pfeiffer, Koln et al. 1987, 
pp. 517-529, 518 f. 
16 Cf. Kartte, Wolfgang, Internationale Wettbewerbsfahlgkeit und Zusammen-
schlu13kontrolle, in: Gamm, Otto Friedrich Frelherr von, et al. (eds.), 
Strafrecht, Unternehmensrecht, Anwaltsrecht: Festschrift fur Gerd Pfeif-
fer, Koln et al. 1987, pp. 531-536, 531 f., who views this as an overt at-
tempt to introduce Chicago ideas; Monopolkommlsslon, Hauptgutachten der 
Monopolkommlssion III: Fusionskontrolle bleibt vorranglg, Baden-Baden 
1980, paras. 619 ff., and again Idem, Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommis-
sion IV: Fortschritte bei der Konzentrationserfassung, Baden-Baden 1982, 
paras. 515 ff.; and Pfeiffer, Von der Autokupplung bis zu Chanel No. 5, 
op. cit., 212. 
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of a market dominating position requires the proof of a lack of sufficient 
competition (Sec. 22 para. 1 lit. 1 ARC), resp. a superior market position on 
the part of the merging parties (Sec. 22 para. 1 lit. 2 ARC), or the creation 
of an oligopoly (Sec. 22 para. 2).17 Since the lack of sufficient competition is 
of minor practical importance, we will emphasize the superior market position 
and the oligopoly as factual findings. 
aa. Superior Market Position 
The confirmation of a superior market position in turn is based primarily on 
a comprehensive evaluation of the essential structural factors of the parti-
cular market in question, which may allow a firm to have at its disposal a 
free area of conduct which is insufficiently controlled by competition. 1B 
(1) Market Structure 
On the basis of Sec. 22 para. 1 lit. 2 ARC a certain dominance of market 
share, financial strength, and market barriers as crucial structural criteria 
for the determination of a superior market position has evolved in legal pro-
ceedlngs.19 It is of importance at this point to analyze whether recent 
developments in U.S. antitrust influenced enforcement and adjudication In 
the direction of the propositions of the Chicago School and thus weakened 
structural predominance. We must therefore evaluate the developments on 
the basis of our crucial findings in this contribution. 
17 Cf. Kantzenbach, Erhard, Grol3fusionen bed0rfen einer expliziten politl-
schen Legitimation, 66 WO (1986), pp. 379-382, 381; and Pfeiffer, Von der 
Autokupplung bis zu Chanel No. 5, op. cit., 211 f., who emphasizes that 
the presumptions have a normative character and are thus subject to in-
terpretation on the basis of changes In fundamental knowledge in anti-
trust theory. 
18 Cf. Emmerich, Kartell recht, op. cit., 268; Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der 
Zusammenschiul3kontrolle, supra, 2-5, Markert, Kurt, Zur Bedeutung von 
Marktstruktur und -verhaiten in der materiellen Fusionskontroile des 
GWB, in: FIW (ed.), Neuorientlerung des Wettbewerbsschutzes, Koln et al. 
1986, pp. 123-135, 123-125, for a survey on the current majority view; 
Moschei, Use of Economic Evidence .•. , supra, 542; and for the cases Kfz-
Kupplungen, WuW/E BGH 1501, Klockner-Becorit, WuW/E BGH 1749, 1754 f., 
Mannesmann-Brueninghaus, WuW/E BGH 1754, and Rheinmetail/WMF, WuW/E 
BGH 2150. 
19 Cf. Holzier, Der Marktanteil in der Fusionskontrolle •.• , op. cit., 519-523; 
Mestmiicker, Ernst-Joachim, Zur Fusionskontroile in der Wettbewerbspoll-
tik, 31 AG (1986), pp. 181-187, 183; Moschel, Use of Economic Evidence ... , 
supra, 542. 
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(a) Market Share 
For the characterization of real circumstances in a relevant market, German 
merger control ascribes a crucial role to the criterion of market share. It 
becomes obvious that on the basis of legislation in Secs. 22 paras. 1 lit. 2 
and 3 lit. 1, and 23a para. 1 enforcement and jurisdiction currently view 
market share as the central element of market structure. The underlying 
reasoning does not hold that market share and relative market share are 
determinants of market power, but rather that they are direct or Indirect 
indicators of it in the sense of refutable presumptions.20 Decreasing market 
share differences among competitors over time are tendentially viewed as 
refuting the presumption of a superior market position. Accordingly, all 
cases - either in enforcement or before the courts - in which a superior 
market position was confirmed were based on persistent and substantial 
market share differences among competitors in the relevant market,21 
However, this majority view22 is challenged on the basis of recent findings 
by the Chicago School on the role of market structure in determining com-
petitive conduct. They hold that market share expresses efficiency only and 
that there is no connection between market share and the extent of competi-
tiveness of conduct or the extent of individual market power23, or that mar-
ket share will at the most play only a minor role in the future because of 
20 Cf. Emmerich, Volker, Kartellrecht, 4th ed., Munchen 1982, pp. 268 and 
271; Holzler, Der Marktanteil in der Fuslonskontrolle ... , op. cit., 519; 
Pfeiffer, Gerd, Entwlcklung der deutschen Rechtspraxis In der Bestim-
mung von Marktmacht, In: FIW (ed.), Neuorlentlerung des Wettbewerbs-
schutzes, Koln et al. 1986, pp. 61-82, 71. 
21 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., para. 781 f. For the 
cases, cf. GKN/Sachs, WuW/E BGH 1501, 1510; Pillsbury/Sonnen-Basser-
mann, WuW/E OLG 3759, 3764; Rewe-Florimex, WuW/E OLG 2862, 2865. 
22 Cf., e.g., Mestmii.cker, Ernst-Joachim, in: Immenga/Mestmii.cker (eds.), Ge-
mei nschaftskommentar zum GWB, 1981, § 24, sec. 66; Monopol kommlssion, 
Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., para. 781 f.; Pfeiffer, Entwicklung der 
deutschen Rechtspraxls in der Bestimmung von Marktmacht, op. cit., 71. 
23 Cf. Berg, Internationale Wettbewerbsfii.hlgkelt und natlonale Zusammen-
schlu'3kontrolle, op. cit.; Harms, Wolfgang, in: Immenga/Mestmii.cker (eds.), 
Gemei nschaftskommentar zum GWB, 4th ed. 1981, § 23, sec. 205; Knopfle, 
Robert, Indlziert der Marktantell den Wettbewerbsgrad?, 37 BB (1982), pp. 
1805-1814, 1814; Idem, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusammenschlu'3kontrolle, 
supra, 6. 
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the globalization of markets and the worldwide scale of the competitive 
game.24 
The Klockner-Becorit decision in the German Federal Supreme Court has led 
to speculations on whether this ruling has diminished the role of market 
structure and market share as presumptions in determining a superior mar-
ket posltlon.25 This can not be confirmed generally, however, because the 
Court has emphasized that the reasoning applies only to this particular case 
and its circumstances. This becomes even more obvious and plausible If one 
acknowledges that the FCO and courts have ruled cases illegal in which a 
market share of only 12% was considered to be criticai2&, while others in 
which market snares !'.mounted to roughly 50% have not been subject to 
legal examination at all.27 This option for discretionary decisions results 
from the comprehensive view that enforcement agencies and jurisdiction by 
the courts take of concerning the actual circumstances of individual cases. 
Thus, general criticism on the role that market share and relative market 
share play as legal presumptions seems inappropriate28, although such a 
case can be made in the circumstances of a particular instance. Apart from 
this, scholars who plead for the adoption of principles underlying current 
antitrust policy in the U.S. neglect the fact that the current Merger Guide-
lines of the U.S. Department of Justice almost encompasslngly adopted the 
24 Cf., e.g., Hi:ilzler, Der Marktanteil In der Fusionskontrolle ... , op. cit., 524 
f. We have demonstrated that this reasoning does not seem very convin-
cing, cf. again, Kartte, Wolfgang, Internationale Wettbewerbsfii.higkeit und 
Zusammenschlul3kontrolle, op. cit., 531 f. For more moderate criticism, cf. 
Herdzina, Klaus, Wettbewerbstheorie und Wettbewerbspolitik: Stand und 
Entwicklungstendenzen, 66 WO (1986), pp. 525-532, 529, who holds that 
the final evaluation on whether market share expresses efficiency or 
power is still heavily disputed; but see the results of our contribution. 
25 Cf., e.g., Markert, Zur Bedeutung von Marktstruktur und -verhalten ... , 
op. cit., 125-127; and for the case Klockner-Becorit, op. cit., 1759. 
26 Cf., e.g., Rewe-Florimex, op. cit., 2863 f. 
27 In an Internal discussion paper the FCO mentions Dyckerhoff/Kli:ickner, 
Siemens/Garbe Lahmeyer, Nukem/British Nuclear Fuels, and Henkel/Loctite. 
Cf. as well the Fichtel & Sachs/Mannesmann merger with a market share 
of roughly 50%, cf. Kurzinformationen, 37 WuW (1987), pp. 445 f., 446. 
28 Cf., e.g., Berg, Internationale Wettbewerbsfii.higkeit und nationale Zusam-
menschlu13kontrolle, op. cit.; Hi:ilzler, Der Marktanteil In der Fusionskont-
rolle ... , op. cit., 524 f.; Kni:ipfle, Indiziert der Marktantei I den Wett-
bewerbsgrad?, supr~ 181~ 
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comprehensive view of the German FCO and the German courts, acknowledg-
ing a structural predominance,29 
As we have emphasized in our contribution, recent research strongly focuses 
on the role of market share as a predominant indicator of individual market 
power.30 This allows us to reject a line of reasoning that asserts that the 
market share orientation Is based on plausibility considerations that lack a 
profound theoretical basls.31 The use of strategic planning and of portfolio 
and associated techniques by the management of modern corporations demon-
strates the importance of elements of market structure, particularly that of 
(relative) market share for profitability and thus partly for market power 
(Michael E. Porter. "Key factors of success").32 
(b) Financial Strength 
As a rule, the confirmation of a superior market position is based on a com-
prehensive view of market share and (financial) resources. This applies in 
the sense that a firm possessing a large market share is unlikely to be con-
sidered to hold a superior market position vis-a-vis its competitors if it cle-
arly succumbs to its competitors on the basis of Its (financial) resources.33 
The underlying reasoning is based on the so-called entrenchment-doctrine. 
This holds that the alleged anti-competitive effect of financial resources lies 
within their potential for discouraging smaller rivals from competing aggres-
29 Cf. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, op. cit., 271. This means that the rigid prohi-
bition policy demonstrated in several cases (e.g., United States: U.S. v. 
Philadelphia National Bank, 1963 Trade Cases § 70,812, p. 268; Germany: 
GKN/Sachs, op. cit., 1510) has largely been harmonized now on the basis 
of a comprehensive view in which even the U.S. Merger Guidelines have 
neglected to adopt some important principles underlying Chicago theory. 
Concerning court findings, this is pointed out by Markert, Stand und 
Entwicklungstendenzen des US-Antitrustrechts 1987 ... , op. cit., 210. 
30 Cf. again for a survey on empirical studies, Pautler, Paul A., A Review of 
the Economic Basis for Broad-Based Horizontal-Merger Policy, 28 AB 
(1983), pp. 571-651. 
31 Cf., e.g., Holzler, Der Marktanteil in der Fusionskontrolle ... , op. cit., 519 
and 524 f. For the contrary position, cf. Monopol kommission, Hauptgut-
achten V ... , op. cit., para. 781 f. 
32 Cf., e.g., Abell, Derek F., and John S. Hammond, Strategic Market Plan-
ning: Problems and Analytical Approaches, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1979, 
pp. 283-289; and Porter, Michael, Competitive Advantage: Creating and 
Sustaining Superior Performance, New York, London 1985, pp. 221-226. 
33 Cf. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, op. cit., 271 f. Fundamental criticism of this 
view is found in Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der ZusammenschluBkontrolle, 
supra, 6-8; and Moschel, Wernhard, Finanzkraft und konglomerater Zusam-
menschluB, 29 AG (1984), pp. 257-260. 
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sively in the market or for discouraging potential competitors from entering 
the market.34 In the case of conglomerate mergers, in the context of which 
financial resources are primarily of relevance, this is enhanced by a poten-
tial for decreasing the sales volume of competitors by reciprocal dealings. 
Thus, if we appeal to the position which we have presented In the case of 
vertical mergers, conglomerate mergers cannot currently be regarded as 
harmful to competition because they are not output-restricting and must as 
a rule therefore be primarily considered efflciency-enhancing.35 The con-
ceptions that have been developed by the traditional theory for determining 
the negative effects of conglomerate mergers allow the conclusion to be 
drawn that such mergers should in no case be impeded. 311 
However, this position is not held unanimously. Moderate representatives of 
the Chicago School or independent scholars regard conglomerate mergers in 
specific situations as a problem. In this context, it is held that "(p)ubllc 
policy will be served by identifying specific instances where conglomerates 
pose problems rather than by mounting a broadscale attack".37 
34 For severe criticism, cf. Harms, Gemeinschaftskommentar zum GWB, op. 
cit., § 24, sec. 467; Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusammenschlul3-
kontrolle, supra, 6 f.; and somewhat more moderate, Moschel, Wernhard, 
Abschreckungstheorie und Fusionskontrolle, in: FIW (ed.), Schwerpunkte 
des Kartellrechts 1984/85. Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungspraxis 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EG und USA, Koln et al. 1986, pp. 1-13. Ten-
dentially approved, however, by Emmerich, Fusionskontrolle 1986/87, sup-
ra, 364; Monopol kommission, Hauptgutachten der Monopol kommlssion VI: 
Gesamtwirtschaftllche Chancen und Risi ken wachsender Unternehmens-
groi3en, Baden-Baden 1986, para 454; and for the cases, cf. GKN/Sachs, 
op. cit.; Mannesmann-Brueninghaus, op. cit.; and Pillsbury/Sonnen-Basser-
mann, op. cit. 
35 Cf., e.g., Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, New 
York 1976, 248: "It seems quite clear that antitrust should never inter-
fere with any conglomerate merger. Like the vertical merger, the conglo-
merate merger does not put together rivals, and so does not create or 
increase the ability to restrict output through an increase in market 
share. Whatever their other virtues or sins, conglomerates do not threa-
ten competition, and they may contribute valuable efficiencies." 
36 Cf. again Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, op. cit., 262: "We have examined all 
the major theories of the ways in which conglomerate mergers may injure 
competition and found that none of them ( ... ) bears analysis. The conclu-
sion must be, therefore, that conglomerate mergers should not be prohi-
bited by judicial Interpretation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act." 
37 Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Im-
plications, New York 1975, p. 170. 
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Based on this reasoning and the fact that the use of the entrenchment-doc-
trine has disappeared in enforcement and jurisdiction in the U.S.38, there is 
a strong tendency for enforcement agencies and courts' jurisdiction in Ger-
many to assert that financial resources on the part of firms possessing mar-
ket dominant positions pose no problem whatsoever, and may even be essen-
tial to the rigor of competition.39 It is believed that firms with large 
resources are the driving motor of the economy, and enable structural 
change and a revitalization of markets that are often rigid and uncompeti-
tive. A more moderate view that emphasizes a comprehensive approach and 
the consideration of particular circumstances does not want to apply the 
entrenchment-doctrine in an undifferentiated manner.40 It becomes obvious 
that this reasoning alms at an adoption of current U.S. antitrust policy. 
It is undisputed that an accretion of financial resources does not pose a 
competitive problem per se, and is thus not necessarily detrimental to com-
petitive conditions. However, there has to be an Inquiry into the actual cir-
cumstances of the individual case in the context of a qualitative analysis. 41 
For even if we confirmed that conglomerate mergers were unharmful as a 
rule, this does not provide evidence that the accretion of financial resources 
in combination with a market dominating share can also be judged unharm-
ful. 42 
38 Cf. Holzler, Heinrich, Okonomische Realitiit in der Fuslonskontrolle: Erfah-
rungen in den USA, in: Heimrich, Herbert (ed.), Wettbewerbspolltlk und 
Wettbewerbsrecht: Zur Diskussion um die Novelllerung des GWB, Koln et 
al. 1987, pp. 161-183, 174 and 181 f.; and Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der 
Zusammenschlu13kontrolle, supra, 7. However, the last two leading cases 
were decided on the basis of the entrenchment-doctrine and reciprocity, 
cf. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1965 Trade Cases § 71,432; and FTC 
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 1967 CCH Trade Cases § 72,061. 
39 Cf. Harms, Gemeinschaftskommentar zum GWB, op. cit., § 24, sec. 444; and 
Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusammenschlu13kontrolle, supra, 6-8 
40 This corresponds to the view put forward by Williamson, cf. Dlrrheimer, 
Manfred J., Ressourcenstiirke und Abschreckungswirkung in der Fusions-
kontrolle, In: FIW (ed.), Neuorientlerung des Wettbewerbsschutzes, Koln et 
al. 1986, pp. 137-156; Markert, Zur Bedeutung von Marktstruktur und 
-verhalten •.. , op. cit. 
41 Cf. Bundeskartellamt, Tii.tigkeitsberlcht 1985/86, BTDr. 11 /554, pp. 12 and 
61 f., referring to the AEG/Daimler-Benz case; Emmerich, Fusionskontrolle 
1986/87, supra, 364, who notes that this is the guiding principle of cur-
rent application; Markert, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen des US-Anti-
trustrechts 1987 •.. , op. cit., 222; Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI 
.•. , op. cit., para. 449; and Pfeiffer, Von der Autokupplung bis zu Chanel 
No. 5, op. cit., 216. 
42 Cf. Schmidt, Ist Grol3e an sich gefahrlich?, supra. 
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The criticism that rejects the whole notion that an accretion of financial re-
sources can act as a restriction of competition does not consider all the 
possible cases. Even if potential competition Is not deterred at the moment, 
the merger may lead to that deterrence effect in the future. Furthermore, 
we should not forget that capital markets and the market for corporate 
control do not work as frictionlessly as assumed. This tends to produce a 
leverage effect In favor of financially strong firms vis-a-vis their smaller 
(potential) competitors. There is every reason to be careful in the applica-
tion of the entrenchment-doctrine and to look for further refinements; how-
ever, there is no reason for the time being to drop It completely. 43 
(c) Market Barriers 
The use of financial resources is also closely connected with the importance 
and height of market barriers. Superior market shares and financial resour-
ces are necessary conditions as a rule, although not sufficient ones. Their 
relevance may only be determined In the light of additional structural fac-
tors, such as market barriers, market stage, technological development, 
structure of demand, etc. Market barriers, and particularly entry barriers, 
are a further element indicating whether a superior market position in an 
actual case may be confirmed. 44 
Low market barriers indicate rather strong potential competition which 
should be able to control free areas of conduct among Incumbent competi-
tors, even If they may be superior In terms of other structural features. 
The FCO as well as the courts have emphasized this aspect as well as the 
comprehensive view of market share and market barriers in relevant cases. 
43 Cf. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, op. cit., 276 f. There Is some criticism that the 
German Federal Supreme Court neglects this carefulness, cf. Bechthold, 
Rainer, Die Entwicklung des deutschen Kartellrechts seit Ende 1983, 39 
NJW (1986), pp. 3053-3061, 3060. 
44 Cf. Moschel, Use of Economic Evidence ... , supra, 542 and 549; Monopol-
kommisslon, Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., paras. 786 ff. 
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This applies particularly to the combination of low barriers and aggressive 
foreign competitors.45 
Thus, the existence and height of market barriers have been considered 
sufficiently in actual merger cases, and there seems to be no dispute that 
they have to be considered if they exist.48 We have demonstrated that ac-
cording to our definition, market barriers do exist and often tend to impede 
the proper working of the competitive mechanism. Thus, as a rule they 
should be taken Into account. This also applies to the case of International 
competition, which we have emphasized in the context of the relevant mar-
ket. It is often asserted that the globalization of competition renders the 
market barriers concept obsolete because there is always sufficient competi-
tive pressure. Nevertheless, despite some liberalization tendencies in world 
trade, sufficient legal and factual barriers to new competition exist which 
tend to impede sufficient competitive pressure in such cases. We should be 
aware of that these markets often do not work frictionlessly. In this context, 
it is of crucial importance to what extent the national market is interwoven 
with international competition and what the circumstances of the individual 
case are.47 
However, the concept of market barriers is limited in application because 
there are extreme difficulties of operationalization in terms of measurement. 
This leads to rather significant ambiguities as to the nature and meaning of 
market barriers. In the contribution submitted, we have pointed out that 
45 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., para. 803 ff. Just 
recently the Mannesmann Co. has acquired the Fichtel & Sachs Co. becau-
se its market share decreased from 80 to roughly 50~ over ten years, 
whereas in 1978 it was prohibited for Guest, Keen & Nettlefold to acquire 
Fichte! & Sachs because of its dominant position. Prof. Markert of the 
FCO has in essence argued that increasing globalization tended to lower 
market barriers and that this changed the ruling, cf. Kurzinformationen, 
supra, 446. 
46 This seems to be a matter of restrictive qualitative judgment on the basis 
of the comprehensive view mentioned. For instance, in the Rewe-Florlmex 
case the Federal Supreme Court prohibited a merger with a share of only 
12~ of the relevant market, despite extremely low barriers, because the 
rest of the market showed an almost atomistic structure concerning 
individual competitors' shares, cf. Rewe-Florimex, op. cit., 2865; and as 
well Llnde-Agefko, WuW/E BKartA 2213, 2220, and Pillsbury/ Sonnen-Bas-
sermann, op. cit., 3764, that also considers market barriers. 
47 In the aircraft manufacturing industry, In ship-building, or the enginee-
ring of industrial plants, for Instance, even a structural monopolist in a 
national market might be controlled by sufficient competition on a global 
scale. 
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this seems to be a major reason for problems of appllcation.41 Hence, the 
potential for an application of the market barriers concept seems rather 
limited which tends to give it a qualitative nature.49 Thus far, there is no 
adoption of a more lenient line of U.S. antitrust policy concerning market 
barriers in the context of mergers. Furthermore, there is no necessity to 
follow the trend. 
(2) Market Conduct 
The comprehensive view necessary to confirm a superior market position is 
not only based on structural features of the relevant market but eventually 
on actual competitive conduct also, although structural elements prevail.!IO 
However, the severe criticism by the advocates of the theoretical edifice un-
derlying current U.S. antitrust policy has revived the discussion on the Im-
portance of market structure vis-a-vis market conduct. In this context, it is 
argued that there is assumed to be a tension between a structural perspec-
tive and the consideration of conduct. A dilemma is believed to arise in 
having to perform evaluations on a case-by-case basis whereas one is only 
able to judge on the basis of a general interrelation between structure, con-
duct, and performance, the theoretical foundation of which has been serious-
ly challenged.51 
48 Cf. Part 2 sec. III; cf. as well Herdzlna, Wettbewerbstheorie und Wettbe-
werbspolitlk ... , supra, 529, on the normative nature. The former Chief 
Justice of the German Federal Supreme Court, Pfeiffer, does not even list 
barriers explicitly, cf. Pfeiffer, Von der Autokupplung bis zu Chanel No. 
5, op. cit., 213-218. 
49 Current U.S. antitrust policy has not adopted the extreme Chicago versi-
on that meaningful barriers to entry do not exist. For instance, they are 
considered In the Merger Guidelines 1984 In the context of the necessity 
of two stage entry of newcomers in vertically Integrated markets; with 
the same emphasis concerning jurisdiction, cf. Holzler, Okonomlsche Reali-
tii.t in der Fusionskontrolle ••. , op. cit., 175 note 7, although much more 
lenient. 
50 Cf., e.g., Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ..• , op. cit., paras. 443-
454; Pfeiffer, Entwicklung der deutschen Rechtspraxis In der Bestlmmung 
von Marktmacht, op. cit., 72. The structural predominance was confirmed 
in a variety of cases, cf. GKN/Sachs, op. cit., 1506; Klockner-Becorit, op. 
cit., 1754; Mannesmann-Brueninghaus, op. cit, 1716. 
51 Cf. Markert, Zur Bedeutung von Marktstruktur und -verhalten ... , op. 
cit., 125. A number of scholars have concluded that actual conduct is the 
essential basis for evaluation and that structure Is more or less meaning-
less, cf. Baur, ZGR (1982), 324; Holzler, Der Marktantell In der Fuslons-
kontrolle ••. , op. cit., 519 and 525; Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusam-
menschluBkontrolle, supra, 2 f. 
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If we presuppose that the legal market domination criteria In Sec. 22 para. 1 
lits. 1 and 2 are real alternatives to one another then a superior market 
position may be confirmed regardless of whether substantial competition is 
confirmed. In this context, structural predominance is interpreted in the 
sense that if structural features point unambiguously towards a superior 
market position the question of whether substantial competition is present, 
which Is believed to control free areas of conduct becomes meaningless.52 In 
these cases It is not expected that a superior area of free conduct will be 
controlled permanently by substantial competition. 
Actual market conduct Is only taken into account in terms of a comprehen-
sive view If a superior market position is not confirmed unambiguously on 
the basis of the underlying structural features. 53 A number of recent court 
decisions demonstrate that there Is no tendency to weaken the structural 
dominance criterion in the sense that market conduct is taken into account 
on the basis of equlvalence.54 
Even if substantial competition Is con fl rmed, despite an ambiguous result 
concerning structural features it becomes necessary to determine whether 
substantiality results from structural conditions and whether these are 
changed by the merger. Intensity and permanence of competition, as well as 
the strength of the structure-based superior market position have to be 
predicted. 55 This leaves ample room for evaluation and judgment, particu-
larly in the face of ambiguities concerning the Interrelation between struc-
ture, conduct, and performance.se 
On the basis of our findings in the contribution submitted that most of the 
hypotheses (e.g., the new learning) underlying current antitrust policy In 
52 Cf. Lange/Niederlelthinger/Rltter/Schmidt, Kommentar zum Kartellgesetz, 
6th ed., Neuwled and Darmstadt 1982, Sec. 22, para. 46; Moschel, Wern-
hard, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrii.nkungen, Koln et al. 1983, p. 307 f.; 
and for the most recent case, Kfz-Kupplungen, op. cit., 1504. Cf. as well 
Holzler, Der Marktantell In der Fusionskontrolle ... , op. cit., 522; Markert, 
Zur Bedeutung von Marktstruktur und -verhalten ... , op. cit., 126; GKN/ 
Sachs, op. cit., 1506; Rheinmetall/WMF, op. cit. 
53 Cf. Markert, Kurt, Die Fuslonskontrollpraxis des Kartellamts im Wandel?, 
31 AG (1986), pp. 173-180, 179; and Klockner/Becorlt, op. cit., 1711. 
54 Cf. Coop Schleswig Holstein/Deutscher Supermarkt, WuW/E OLG 3591 and 
WuW/E BGH 2389; Metro/Kaufhof, WuW/E OLG 3367 and WuW/E BGH 2231; 
Munchener Wochenblatt, WuW/E BGH 1905; and Rheinmetall/WMF, op. cit. 
55 Cf. Mestmii.cker, in: Immenga/Mestmii.cker (eds.), Gemeinschaftskommentar 
zum GWB, 4th ed. 1981, § 24, sec. 13; and Monopolkommisslon, Hauptgut-
achten der Monopolkommisslon IV ... , op. cit., paras. 466 ff. 
56 Cf., e.g., Markert, Die Fusionskontrollpraxis des Kartellamts im Wandel?, 
supra, 180. 
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the United States cannot for the time being be confirmed unambiguously in 
empirical terms, we are able to conclude that for the most part these hypo-
theses represent more or less reinterpretations of traditional findings, al-
though based on a different set of values and beliefs. 57 This applies parti-
cularly to the hypothesis underlying current merger policy In the U.S. that 
market structure is virtually of no importance for the determination of 
actual conduct within a relevant market. 
There is no doubt about the notion that deterministic kinds of statements on 
structure-, conduct-, performance-relationships are of little use. This is not 
disputed by the adherents of the traditional tenet, however. The knowledge 
of this deficiency results in the necessity for a comprehensive analysis of 
the structural factors of a relevant market Including actual conduct in 
ambiguous cases.58 This Implies, for instance, that factors in addition to the 
ones listed In Sec. 22 para. 1 lit. 2 must be considered. This applies for 
example to the use of the market stage as a structural criterion for the 
determination of a dominant position.59 
Contrary to current antitrust policy in the U.S., however, our findings in-
dicate that a structural predominance must be confirmed; at the same time, 
however, the traditional paradigm faces a rather severe modification as now 
the emphasis is placed on superior market positions of individual firms 
rather than on collective domlnation.eo 
57 Cf. again, e.g., Scherer, Frederic M., On the Current State of Knowledge 
In Industrial Organization, in: de Jong, Henk W., and William G. Shepherd 
(eds.), Mainstreams in Industrial Organization - Book 1, Dordrecht et al. 
1986, pp. 5-22. 
58 Cf. Kantzenbach, Erhard, and Hermann H. Kallfass, Das Konzept des funk-
tionsfahlgen Wettbewerbs - workable competition, in: Cox, Helmut, et al. 
(eds.), Handbuch des Wettbewerbs, Munchen 1981, pp. 103-127, 105 f. To 
speak of a complete breakdown of the structure-, conduct-, performance 
paradigm must be considered a strong and false exaggeration, cf. for this 
exaggeration, e.g., Markert, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen des US-
Antitrustrechts 1987 ... , op. cit., 221; and Scherer, On the Current State 
of Knowledge in Industrial Organization, op. cit., 5 f. 
59 It Is pointed out, for instance, that there Is no need for a merger control 
In markets that are in an introductory or growth stage because competi-
tion will sufficiently control market power. This does not render merger 
control obsolete In a later stage (e.g., stagnation of a market), cf. Berg, 
Internationale Wettbewerbsfahigkeit und natlonale Zusammenschlu(3kontrol-
le, op. cit., 142 ff.; and for a case, Klockner-Becorlt, op. cit., 1754. 
60 Cf. the main results of Part 3 of this contribution. 
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bb. Ollgopollstlc Domination 
Alternative to a proof of a superior market position on behalf of the mer-
ging parties, the confirmation of a market-dominating position can also be 
conducted by proving the creation or strengthening of an oligopoly, i.e. by 
collective domination (Sec. 22 para. 2).81 
Collective domination via oligopoly encompasses two relevant aspects. Firstly, 
there is a necessity to analyze the intensity of competition within the oligo-
poly core, and secondly, we have to determine whether the oligopoly core Is 
exposed to substantial competition by the fringe of firms which do not be-
long to the core. 112 
Based on traditional oligopoly theory, it was asserted In the first case that 
with the emergence of an oligopoly there would be a tendency for mutual 
interdependence among the ollgopolists which would lead to conscious paral-
lelism, I.e. collective monopolist conduct.83 In the contribution submitted we 
have found that the studies which attempted to prove the traditional con-
centration-collusion doctrine were largely flawed due to aggregation biases. 
We have concluded that Individual market dominance rather than collective 
dominance poses the essential antitrust problem. Thus, with increasing con-
centration the tendency towards conscious parallelism was not confirmed In 
general.'14 This implies that additional structural features of the market in 
the sense of a comprehensive analysis have to be considered in order to 
provide evidence on whether the potential for conscious parallelism is really 
increased.85 
The German courts allow for these findings by setting relatively high stan-
dards concerning the proof that competition within the oligopoly core does 
61 Cf. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, op, cit., 272; Pfeiffer, Von der Autokupplung 
bis ZU Chanel No. 5, op. cit., 211 f. 
62 This was emphasized again in the context of the Fourth Amendment of the 
ARC, cf. Markert, Die Fusionskontrollpraxis des Kartellamts im Wandel?, 
supra, 178. 
63 Cf. Reglerungsbegrundung zum Entwurf elnes Zwelten Gesetzes zur Ande-
rung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, BTDr. VI/2520, p, 
23. 
64 The reasoning originally underlying the oligopoly prohibition emphasized 
only market share aggregation, neglecting decisive structural features 
which would Influence the conduct of the oligopolists in addition, cf. 
Markert, Die Fusionskontrollpraxis des Kartellamts im Wandel?, supra, 178. 
65 Cf. Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusammenschlu13kontrolle, supra, 13. It 
is emphasized that empirical studies often provide evidence against the 
emergence of conscious parallelism, cf. Markert, Die Fusionskontrollpraxis 
des Kartellamts im Wandel?, supra, 178. 
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not exist.ee This has shifted the emphasis towards an application of the 
qualified oligopoly presumption in Sec. 23a para. 2, which reverses the bur-
den of proof to the defendant. Experience thus far shows that even in high-
ly concentrated markets, where the market share presumptions are met, ef-
fective competition may still be present, particularly in the context of a spe-
cific market stage. 
Refutation of the qualified oligopoly presumptions can only be attained by 
application of structural crlterla.87 For the prognosis on the development of 
future Intensity of competition the existence of substantial competition 
before a merger serves as an indicator of whether these competitive con-
ditions will persistently exist after the merger has been performed. Thus 
there is reference to structural criteria again. There is no tendency In 
court cases to give up the underlying reasoning.ee However, there is a 
rather wide area of uncertainty regarding the conditions which are thought 
to provide for substantial competition within an oligopoly. This is the case 
on the one hand because the conditions providing for substantial competition 
differ from industry to industry, and on the other, possibly because there 
is still ambiguity about the nature of the qualified presumptions in Sec. 23a 
para. 2 ARC. 89 
As a rule, the refutation is carried out successfully by the defcnrtant on the 
basis of structural criteria. These include particularly low market barriers, 
technological developments, specific sales conditions for investment goods, 
and structural overcapacity in an Industry. Whereas for a variety of cases 
in the retailing sector this refutation was rejected by the FCO, the Berlin 
Court of Appeals as well as the Federal Supreme Court have reversed a 
66 Cf. Texaco/Zerssen, WuW/E BGH 2025; and Tonolli/Blei- und Silberhutte 
Braubach, WuW/E BGH 1824. 
67 Cf. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, op. cit., 282 f. This policy of the FCO has 
been affirmed by the Berlin Court of Appeals, cf. Klockner-Becorit, op. 
cit., 1749. 
68 Cf. Emmerich, Fusionskontrolle 1986/87, supra, 366 f., presenting a varie-
ty of recent cases decided by the FCO and the Berlin Court of Appeals, 
notes 127-132. Cf. as well Bundeskartellamt, Tii.tlgkeitsbericht 1985/86, op. 
cit., 59, 63, 70 f., 73, and 93. 
69 The reasoning underlying the government proposal of the Fourth Amend-
ment tends to view Sec. 23a para. 2 ARC as a rule for per se-prohibition 
for ollgopollsts with exemptions by the possibility for refutation, cf. 
Regierungsbegrundung zum Entwurf eines Vierten Gesetzes zur Anderung 
des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrii.nkungen, BTDr. 8/2136, p. 21 f. In 
contrast, It is asserted that the provision Just provides a relief regar-
ding the burden of proof, cf. Harms, Gemeinschaftskommentar zum GWB, 
op. cit., § 23a, sec. 233. 
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great number of these rulings because of structural features which in the 
Court's opinion would provide for sufficient competition even after the mer-
ger.70 
c. Strengthening Market Domination 
All the factors that are used to prove the emergence or existence of a supe-
rior market position can principally also be used to prove the confirmation 
of a strengthening of this position, regardless of the intensity of the 
strengthening.71 Confirmation of the strengthening does not necessarily en-
tail proof of a further worsening of competitive conditions. However, there 
has to be a market relevant impact.n This leaves ample room for discretio-
nary judgment. 
Concerning horizontal merger cases, confirmation of the strengthening of a 
superior rAarket position does not pose serious problems, since market 
shares of the merging parties are added to each other and recalculated on 
the basis of the disappearance of one business unit. So far, it has been 
ruled that even marginal market share accretions suffice to generate a mar-
ket relevant impact.73 
The problems which arise in confirming a strengthening in a conglomerate 
case have partly been discussed supra in the context of financial resources. 
We have emphasized that an analysis of the individual case has to be per-
formed considering the likelihood of anticompetitive effects under actual cir-
cumstances. Market interrelatedness and the purpose of the merger (e.g., di-
versification) are considered to be the relevant criteria. 74 As a rule, the 
generation of a market relevant impact is assumed in cases of entrepreneu-
70 Cf. Emmerich, Fusionskontrolle 1986/87, supra, 367. For a listing of suc-
cessful refutations cf. ibid., 366 f. notes 127-132; and for the AEG/Daim-
ler-Benz case, Kni:ipfle, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusammenschlu13kontrolle, 
supra, 13 f. 
71 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., para. 449; and 
Springer/Elbe Wochenblatt, WuW/E BGH 1691; and for more cases, cf. 
Kni:ipfle, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusammenschlu13kontrolle, supra, 8 note 49. 
72 Cf. Emmerich, Kartell recht, op. cit., 270. 
73 Cf. Coop Schleswig Holstein/Deutscher Supermarkt, WuW/E OLG 3591 in 
which the Berlin Court of Appeals has ruled that accretions of 1 or 2% 
suffice to confirm the strengthening, although circumstances of the 
individual case have to be taken into consideration; cf. as well Coop/ 
Wandmaker, WuW/E BKartA 2161; and recently, EGWA/L. Fiebig GmbH in 
the report of the FCO, Bundeskartellamt, Ta.ti g keitsbericht 1985/ 86, op. 
cit., 59. 
74 Cf. GKN/Sachs, op. cit.; and Rheinmetall/WMF, op. cit. 
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rial diversifications but not in cases of financial ones. 
We have emphasized that it is undisputed that an accretion of financial 
resources does not pose a competitive problem per se and thus does not ne-
cessarily generate a market relevant impact. It becomes obvious once again 
that we have to inquire into the actual circumstances of the Individual case 
in the context of a qualitative analysis. 75 
The so-called toehold-acquisition poses a specific problem in the context of 
the strengthening of oligopolistic market domination. Legislation has empha-
sized that a toehold-acquisition may be used as an particular argument for 
the refutation of the qualified presumption of oligopoly in Sec. 23a para. 2 
ARC. As a rule, this does not apply to members of the oligopoly core. 
Advantages resulting from an improvement in competitiveness vis-a-vis the 
market leader have to be balanced against the disadvantage resulting form a 
deterioration of the competitive situation of the members of the oligopoly 
fringe. 78 
III. An Evaluation of the propositions for a Reform of Merger Control in the 
Fifth Amendment of the ARC 
Although Its permanent function as a sort of "constitution of economic or-
der" was emphasized when the German Act Against Restraints of Competition 
was passed, its public policy objectives are nevertheless based on know-
ledge from antitrust theory and are thus changeable. Changed economic con-
ditions as well as new knowledge in antitrust theory are basically able to 
alter this constitution. This applies to the instrument of merger control as 
well. Thus far, only the German Association of Manufacturers (Bundesver-
band der deutschen Industrie) seems to have adopted explicitly and without 
any major modifications the theory and reasoning underlying Chicago School 
antitrust pol icy. 1 
75 Cf. Bundeskartellamt, Tatigkeitsberlcht 1985/86, BTDr. 11 /554, pp. 12 and 
61 f., referring to the AEG/Dalmler-Benz case; Emmerich, Fusionskontrolle 
1986/87, supra, 364, who notes that this is the guiding principle of cur-
rent application; Markert, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen des US-Anti-
trustrechts 1987 ... , op. cit., 222; Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI 
... , op. cit., para. 449; and Pfeiffer, Von der Autokupplung bis zu Chanel 
No. 5, op. cit., 216. 
76 Cf. Emmerich, Fusionskontrolle 1986/87, supra, 365, who mentions the case 
AEG/Daimler-Benz. 
Cf. Kantzenbach, The Treatment of Dominance ... , op. cit., 282. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
333 
However, with some exceptions this has not led to an attempt to modify the 
antitrust laws in the direction of Chicago School theory but to an attempt to 
retain the status quo.2 
1. Polltlcal and Economic Order: Thoughts on Structural Complementarity 
The aim of competition policy as it is understood by German and European 
Community Law is to maintain or help to establish competitive market struc-
tures. In this view, competition is the only means of ensuring that entre-
preneurial forces are mobilized and the full potential of the efficiency of 
firms is exploited. This process leads not only to greater overall economic 
efficiency and competitiveness, but also to increased consumer welfare. Com-
petition, in this sense, can be viewed as an unlimited sequence of moves and 
responses In which profits can be seen as a motive for initiation and imita-
tion of economic efforts. The time competition needs to erode these profits 
indicates the degree of effectiveness of competition, i.e., determines whether 
competition itself performs its function in a sufficient manner and exerts 
sufficient competitive pressure which cannot be controlled by the incum-
bents. Although structure-orientated, this makes it obvious that this view of 
competition is a dynamic one.3 
The maintenance of these competitive structures requires merger restric-
tions, which should be pre-merger control, as well as a legal instrument for 
deconcentrating industries. Until now there has been no divorcement instru-
ment under German or European antitrust law; the EEC law contains practi-
cally no merger control at all, though the European Court of Justice has 
just recently pointed out in the Reynolds/BAT case that Art. 85 Treaty of 
2 Cf. Geberth/Janicki, Kartellrecht zwischen Kontinuitiit und Anpassung, sup-
ra, 447 ff.; Lambsdorff, Otto Graf, Fur eine JS.nderung der gesetzlichen 
Kriterien besteht keine Veranlassung, 66 WD (1986), pp. 384-388; Schlecht, 
Otto, Konsequente Anwendung des Rechts erforderlich, 66 WD (1986), pp. 
382-384; Weizsiicker, Carl-Christian von, Mul3 der Leistungswettbewerb 
starker geschutzt werden?, 37 WuW (1987), pp. 706-709; Wissenschaftlicher 
Beirat beim Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft ... , op. cit., 32; n.n., "Der 
Novellierungszweck darf nicht der Schutz vor dem Wettbewerb seln", in: 
Handelsblatt, July 24/25, 1987; and n.n., "Kein Anla13 fur eine Novelle", in: 
Handelsblatt, September 22, 1987. 
3 Besides, the structure-approach is much more conducive to the functioning 
of a free enterprise system than an approach that tries to control compe-
titors' conduct, cf. Geberth/Janicki, Kartellrecht zwischen Kontinuitiit und 
Anpassung, supra, 452 and 458. 
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Rome might be applied to mergers as well. Besides, the European Commission 
is pressing on the European Ministerial Council to adopt a merger control 
system proposed by the Commission in various forms since 1973.4 
Furthermore, an essential aspect of competition policy is what came to be 
called by the German ordoliberal economists, the "'ordnungspolitische'" func-
tion.5 This view emphasizes that competition also has a sociopolltical function 
which should be deemed at least as important in value as its economic func-
tion of enhancing consumer welfare. In this sense, competition, acting as a 
controlling, selecting, and driving force through decentralized decision-
making units, becomes the only appropriate counterpart and basic economic 
principle appropriate for free democratic states because it deprives economic 
aggregations of their power.6 
To this extent, this view on competition and competition policy coincides with 
the one that was traditionally put forward by United States antitrust policy 
in numerous court cases until the early 1970s.7 In these court decisions, 
based on undisputed economic foundations, competition law was understood 
as a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and 
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. The unrestrained Interaction of 
competitive forces, it was argued, would yield the best allocation of the eco-
nomic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest ma-
terial progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive 
to the preservation of democratic, political, and social institutions. 
4 Cf. BNA, Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report No. 1343, December 3, 1987, 
p. 863; and Vorschlag einer Verordnung (EWG) des Rates Ober die Kontrol-
le von UnternehmenszusammenschlOssen, 38 WuW (1988), pp. 405-412. 
5 Cf., e.g., Moschel, Wernhard, Wettbewerbspolitik aus ordollberaler Sicht, in: 
Gamm, Otto Fried rich Frei herr von, et al. (eds.), Strafrecht, Unterneh-
mensrecht, Anwaltsrecht: Festschrift fur Gerd Pfeiffer, Koln et al. 1987, 
pp. 707-725. 
6 Cf. Adams, Walter, and James W. Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Com-
ment, 62 NYU LR ( 1987), pp. 1116-1124, 1116; Moschel, Wettbewerbspoliti k 
aus ordoliberaler Sicht, 714 f. Aside from this, the coherent development 
of fundamental ideas underlying the ARC is another crucial reason why an 
abrupt reorientation of German antitrust legislation towards Chicago ideals 
is rather unlikely, cf. Herdzlna, Moglichkeiten und Grenzen einer wirt-
schaftstheoretischen Fundierung ... , op. cit., 37 f. 
7 Cf. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 1958 CCH Trade Cases § 68,961. 
Cf. as well Schmidt, Ingo, and Jan B. Rittaler, Die Chicago School of Anti-
trust Analysis: Wettbewerbstheoretische und -politische Analyse eines Cre-
dos, Baden-Baden 1986, pp. 37-44. 
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This fundamental socioeconomic idea has been given up by the Chicago 
School, which may be viewed as a laisser-faire or "Nihilist" School. 8 In es-
sence, as we have pointed out, this school advocates dismantling the entire 
institution of antitrust, since competition develops almost of its own accord 
if the public, the government, and its agencies refrain from taking measures 
to control and shape it.9 
Giving up this ordoliberal idea and thus omitting non-economic objectives 
can have serious effects, since highly concentrated markets lead to decrea-
sed flexibility of large companies and to an increase in their (potential) 
political influence. 10 This may lead to the use of economic power to exercise 
political pressure in order to get protection from competition or direct 
government subsidies. Adams and Brock, for instance, have stressed the 
close links between politics and economic organization, referring to "volun-
tary" export quotas in the U.S. steel and automobile industries or govern-
ment subsidies as in the Lockheed or Chrysler cases: 11 
8 Cf. the fundamentally different opinion of Edwards, Corwing D., Maintai-
ning Competition, New York et al. 1949, p. 8: "But although the mainte-
nance of competition will not guarantee that the economy will work well, 
impairment of competition by monopolistic restrictions, public or private, 
increases the chance that it will work badly"; cf. as well Audretsch, 
David, Divergent Views in Antitrust Economics, 33 AB (1988), forthcoming; 
and Moschel, Wettbewerbspolitik aus ordoliberaler Slcht, 714 f. 
9 At the other end of the scale is the "Industrial Policy" School - called the 
'"Evolutionary" School in economic literature - which calls for government 
planning and industrial targeting. Antitrust policy is allowed only a se-
condary role, if any, as a means of ensuring that planning targets are 
achieved. These two points of view, both sharing a strong rejection of the 
need for an active antitrust policy, are adopted with varying degrees of 
intensity by academic circles, business pressure groups or - as far as 
the latter school is concerned - mercantilist and Colbertarian, bureau-
cratic planning ideologues who advocate central planning. For profound 
criticism, cf. Geberth/Janicki, Kartellrecht zwischen Kontinuitat und An-
passung, supra, 454-456. 
10 Considering the close links between the Chicago School and the Public 
Choice approach it seems to be curious that Chicagoans often overlook 
the contradictions between these two mainstream ideologies. 
Mancur Olson, one of the leading representatives of the Public Choice ap-
proach, has pointed to the important macroeconomic policy implications for 
microeconomic policy In his contribution on "The Rise and Decline of Nati-
ons", New Haven, Conn. 1982, at p. 232 in holding that "(i)f combinations 
dominate markets throughout the economy and the government is always 
intervening on behalf of special interests, there is no macroeconomic po-
licy that can put things right". 
11 Adams, Walter, and James W. Brock, The "New Learning" and the Euthana-
sia of Antitrust, 74 CLR (1986), pp. 1516-1566, 1562. 
Jan B. Rittaler - 978-3-631-75388-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:36:55AM
via free access
336 
"Contrary to current apologetics, bigness does not meekly submit to the 
rules of the global competitive game when confronted with the conse-
quences of delinquent economic performance. Instead, giant corporations 
- often in concert with allied interest groups - reach out to manipulate 
the state in order to change the rules of the game, to avoid the com-
petitive market's sanctions for poor performance, and to shift them onto 
society. In reality, bigness mobilizes the vast political resources at its 
command - funds, employees, executives, labor unions, subcontractors, 
suppliers, governors and mayors, senators and representatives, Repu-
blicans and Democrats - to neutralize global competition through go-
vernment-imposed import quotas, tariffs, 'voluntary export' restraints, 
'orderly' marketing agreements, and the like." 
This kind of cooperation between industry, labor, and government leads to 
an economic oligarchy that strongly resembles that of a centralized planning 
economy. 12 
Competition policies in the European Community, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and the United States should have nothing in common with these ex-
treme positions. In both continents, one actually departs from the assumpti-
on, and accordingly the laws distinctively state as much, that certain forms 
of behaviour and action by firms are not permissible on grounds of competi-
tion considerations. Both sides, it seems, start from the basic idea that, in 
assessing such matters, economic criteria are ultimately of crucial impor-
tance. Competition is an economic phenomenon which is taken as fact. How-
ever, legal rules must be drawn up and adopted so as to ensure certainty 
and clarity as to the meaning of law, and to avoid arbitrariness. 
2. The Object of Protection: Competition vs. Competitors 
Basic differences concerning the law's object of protection become obvious if 
one compares the emphasis of 1984 U.S. Merger Guidelines to that of the 
ARC. Whereas the ARC protects the freedom of competition and thus views 
competition as a controlling, selecting, and driving force through decentrali-
zed decision-making units, current U.S. antitrust policy, although verbally 
emphasizing competition as the object of protection, puts efficiency conside-
rations in the centre of its concern. Implicitly, a permanent dilemma or con-
flict between efficiency-enhancement and maintaining competition is 
12 Cf. Tinbergen, Jan, Do Communist and Free Societies Show a Converging 
Pattern?, 12 Soviet Studies (1961 ), pp. 333 ff. 
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assumed; in contrast, the German legislator did not presume such conflict as 
the rule. 13 
The tendency to protect competitors and not competition can also be found 
in the discussion on the reform of the ARC. In this context, it is held that 
the competitiveness of firms in the national economy vis-a-vis global com-
petition is much more important than the protection of competition as an in-
stitution.14 In addition to Industrial policy via promotion of sector- or pro-
duct-orientated innovations, there also seems to be a renaissance of anti-
trust-specific protectionism. This includes export cartels, legalized cartel-like 
cooperations and an untrammeled laissez-faire pol icy towards external corpo-
rate growth. 
In a general sense, the alleged goal conflict between maintaining competition 
and enhancing efficiency is not confirmed by the empirical studies reviewed 
and the conclusions drawn in our contribution. There is no case thus far, 
that proves the inability of German firms to compete on a global scale 
because of the strict merger control. Besides, in cases where a real conflict 
actually occurs the ARC has provided for a solution by a political decision 
on the part of the German Federal Minister for Economic Affairs. Aside from 
the aspect of global competitiveness, the aforementioned reasoning presumes 
that it is not the rigor of competition but relief from that rigor that makes 
firms more competitive. This argument may easily be reversed, however, by 
asserting that it was the restrictive cartel law that in the past made German 
firms competitive on a global scale. 15 
13 The ARC allows for efficiency considerations only in a few exceptional 
cases, whereas the permanent conflict assumed in the Merger Guidelines 
led to a more lenient attitude towards competition as an object of pro-
tection, cf. the Merger Guidelines of 1984, supra. 
14 Cf., e.g., Berg, Internationale Wettbewerbsfahigkeit und nationale Zusam-
menschluJ3kontrolle, op. cit.; Harms, Wolfgang, Fehlentwicklungen in der 
Wettbewerbspoliti k gegenuber marktbeherrschenden Unternehmen, in: FIW 
(ed.), Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1981/82. Verwaltungs- und Recht-
sprechungspraxis Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EG und USA, Koln et al. 
1983, pp. 95-128, 106; Holzler, Der Marktanteil in der Fusionskontrolle .•. , 
op. cit.; and Knopfle, Robert, Wettbewerbsbeschrankung durch Anwendung 
des GWB bei Zusammenschl Qssen, 37 JZ ( 1982), pp. 521-530. 
15 The German foreign trade balance does not show any signs of a weakness 
concerning the abillty of German firms to compete on a global scale; cf. 
also Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zum Tatigkeitsbericht des Bun-
deskartellamtes 1985/86, op. cit., IV. 
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The same tendency may be confirmed by the argument that small business 
has to be protected particularly because the legislator considered maintai-
ning a small business structure an objective in itself. However, small busi-
ness is best protected if the freedom to compete and thus competition as an 
institution are protected, provided that there are no substantial competitive 
impai rments.1e 
It can be confirmed that the protection of freedom to compete and the pro-
tection of competition as an institution are closely interwoven with each 
other and that they may not be considered separately without endangering 
the workability of the competitive mechanism permanently. 17 A reorientation 
would thus not improve the functioning of the free enterprise system. 
3. An Evaluation of the Proposals on the Basis of Our State of Knowledge 
There is as yet no consensus among relevant participating groups in the 
Federal Republic about whether the German ARC needs a reform by the 
addition to it of a Fifth Amendment. Nevertheless, with regard to the legal 
treatment of mergers there are a variety of specific pondering questions. 
Although we want to present most of the proposals discussed in the context 
of the Fifth Amendment, we will only evaluate the ones important within the 
context of the Chicago emphasis in the contribution submitted. 
a. The Proposals 
Concerning merger control, a variety of proposals for improvement of this 
instrument in the ARC are currently under discussion by German scholars. 
Subsequent proposals are either valid for a general reform of merger con-
16 For affirmation of this tendency and strong criticism, cf. Geberth/Janicki, 
Kartellrecht zwischen Kontinuitat und Anpassung, supra, 454-456, and 455: 
"Such a reasoning can neither be based on the history of the Act nor on 
the ratio legis. It is in strict opposition to fundamental knowledge in an-
titrust theory on how the competitive mechanism works and faces sub-
stantial reservations concerning competition and small business", (transla-
ted by the author). 
17 Cf. Geberth/Janicki, Kartellrecht zwischen Kontinuitat und Anpassung, 
supra, 455; and Immenga, Ulrich, in: Immenga/Mestmacker (eds.), Gemein-
schaftskommentar zum GWB, 4th ed. 1981, note 11 to § 1 ARC. 
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trol or are particularly aimed at preventing concentration tendencies in the 
retailing sector:1a 
Uncoupling the criterion of intervention in sec. 24 para. 1 ARC from the 
aspect of market dominance; 
a supplementation of the criterion of market dominance in sec. 22 para. 1 
ARC; 
a reform of the legal presumptions in terms of secs. 22 para. 3 and 23a 
para. 2 ARC; and 
a revision of the merger definition in terms of sec. 23 para. 2 ARC. 
An uncoupling of the criterion of intervention from the aspect of market 
dominance has been stated in two forms thus far: 
(1) Firstly, the criterion of market dominance should be abandoned and re-
placed by the criterion of an "essential lessening of competitive condi-
tions". This may either be performed for all mergers, regardless of their 
size19, or only for large-sized mergers20, or only for mergers having 
perceived impact in a variety of markets.21 
(2) Secondly, a per se-prohibition for large-sized mergers that are in excess 
of a distinct amount in terms of their revenues should be inserted; such 
mergers would be permitted only under certain circumstances In analogy 
to sec. 24 para. 3 ARC. 22 
18 Cf. Hopt, Merger Control in Germany ... , op. cit., 95-98; Knopfle, Aktuelle 
Probleme der Zusammenschlu13kontrolle, supra, 15-20; Krakowski, Michael, 
Aktuelle Probleme der Fusionskontrolle, 66 WD (1986), pp. 67-74; Monopol-
kommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., 175-192; Schmidt, Ist Grol3e an 
slch gefii.hrlich?, supra; and the discussion in Wirtschaftsdienst No. 8 
( 1986) between Kantzenbach, Schlecht, Graf Lambsdorff, and Jens. 
We will restrict ourselves to the proposals for a general reform. For a 
treatment of the retailing sector, cf. Kirschner, Ulrich, Die Erfassung der 
Nachfragemacht von Handelsunternehmen: Eine Analyse der okonomischen 
Beurteilungskrlterien und der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Instrumente im Be-
relch der Verhaltenskontrolle, Frankfurt a.M. et al. 1988 (forthcoming). 
19 Cf. Antrag der Fraktion der SPD: Stii.rkung des Wettbewerbs und Verhin-
derung des Ml13brauchs wirtschaftlicher Macht (Novellierung des Gesetzes 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen), BTDr. 11 /2017; and Schmidt, Ingo, Ist 
"'Grol3e an sich" gefahrlich?, 36 WuW (1986), pp. 193-196. 
20 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., paras. 468-483. 
21 Cf. Greiffenberg, Horst, Strukturentwicklung und Konzentration - wettbe-
werbspolltlsche Bewertung II, in: Strukturentwlckl ung und Konzentration 
im Einzelhandel. Dokumentation eines Fachgesprii.chs am 2. Juli 1987 im 
Hause der Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Mittel- und Grol3betriebe des 
Einzelhandels e.V. (BAG), pp. 70 ff. 
22 Cf. Antrag der Fraktion der SPD •.. , op. cit.; and Monopolkommission, 
Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., paras. 469 and 475. 
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According to the paper of the ad hoc-Council of Experts with the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs which was passed by the German Cabinett of Ministers, 
June 29, 1988, the criterion of market dominance in sec. 22 para. 1 ARC 
should be supplemented by adding three criteria to sec. 22 para. 1 lit. 2: 
- a vertical component ("vis-a-vis a substantial number of sellers and buy-
ers") should be introduced in order to emphasize that market dominance 
is not to be interpreted solely in terms of a horizontal relationship of 
direct competitors; 
- the criterion of "flexibility" should be introduced in order to consider the 
extreme flexibility of the retailing sector concerning changes In its 
assortment which are in contrast to the low production flexibility of the 
manufacturing sector; and 
an introduction of a multi-market view in order to take into account con-
glomerate power by corporations. 
Another area of reform concerns the legal presumptions in terms of secs. 22 
para. 3 and 23a para. 2 ARC: 
There is a pressure for a reduction of the market share thresholds given 
in sec. 22 para. 3 ARC solely for the retailing sector, in order to empha-
size that market dominance may emerge at market shares well below the 
ones indicating market power in the case of the manufacturing sector.23 
- Furthermore, the refutability of the legal presumptions concerning the 
core of an oligopoly in terms of sec. 23a para. 2 ARC should be abandoned 
so that a check on the relation between the core of the oligopoly and the 
oligopoly fringe would suffice in order to confirm oligopolistic market 
domination. 
The legal nature of these presumptions is strongly disputed. Although they 
were meant to exert material influence, from a majority's point of view they 
are actually of little importance in application in individual cases. In this 
context, their amendment would only be of a flanking character, i.e. it would 
be a signal for jurisdiction. 
Finally, a revision of the merger definition in terms of sec. 23 para. 2 ARC 
is being considered in order to treat acquisitions which circumvent the 25 
23 Cf. Markenverband, 49 MA (1987), p. 199; Ruschen, Gerhard, Wettbewerbs-
politi k im Umbruch?, 49 MA (1987), pp. 218-224. 
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percent share rule: 
In order to prevent an evasion of merger control a lowering of the share 
threshold for mergers that have to be notified from 25 to 10% is being 
discussed.24 This takes the possibility into consideration that firms may 
exert a dominating influence on others well below 25% of the share. 
- This sort of formal merger definition is to be supplemented by a material 
one, i.e. instead of setting the threshold at a distinct predefined market 
share level, what should really be done is to emphasize the possible "com-
petitively significant impact of a firm on another".25 This would entail 
significant legal uncertainty concerning court proceedings, however. 
b. The Evaluation 
The AEG/Daimler-Benz merger has revived the discussion on the evils of 
corporate size once again and led to proposals to abandon the criterion of 
market domination and substitute for it the criterion of a "substantial lesse-
ning of competitive conditions" in order to be able to treat possible evils.29 
Although sec. 23a para. 1 lit. 2 ARC contains a provision or presumption 
aiming at absolute firm size this does not free the FCO from the duty of 
proving market domination in the individual case. This has rendered the 
rule ineffective concerning a vast number of large sized, particularly con-
glomerate mergers.27 
24 Cf. Antrag der Fraktion der SPD ... , op. cit. 
25 Cf. the special vote of Prof. Immenga, Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 
VI ... , op. cit., paras. 439-441; Immenga, Ulrich, ZusammenschlQsse zwi-
schen Grol3unternehmen als Gegenstand des Rechts der Wettbewerbsbesch-
rii.n kungen, in: Heimrich, Herbert (ed.), Wettbewerbspolitik und Wettbe-
werbsrecht: Zur Diskussion um die Novellierung des GWB, Koln et al. 1987, 
pp. 185-198; and Schlecht, Otto, Ein neuer Ordnungsrahmen fur dynami-
schen Wettbewerb?, in: Heimrich, Herbert (ed.), Wettbewerbspolitik und 
Wettbewerbsrecht: Zur Diskussion um die Novellierung des GWB, Koln et 
al. 1987, pp. 35-48. 
26 Cf. Immenga, Zusammenschlusse zwischen Grol3unternehmen ... , op. cit., 193 
f.; Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI •.• , op. cit., paras. 461 ff. and 
468 ff.; and Schmidt, Ist "Grol3e an sich" gefii.hrlich?, supra. 
27 Cf. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, op. cit., 278 f.; Immenga, ZusammenschlQsse 
zwischen Grol3unternehmen ... , op. cit., 189 f.; Kantzenbach, Erhard, Grol3-
fusionen bedQrfen einer expliziten politischen Legitimation, 66 WD (1986), 
pp. 379-382, 381; Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusammenschlul3kontrolle, 
supra, 15; Monopolkommisslon, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., paras. 469. 
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Anticompetitive effects of large sized mergers, such as an accumulation of 
resources, potential for predation, effects of reciprocal dealings and the 
like, are treated only insufficiently by the current concept of market domi-
nation. This is also the case, e.g., because of the necessity of providing 
distinct proof of the use of financial resources in the individual case.28 
Furthermore, strong doubts have to be advanced on whether the market do-
mination concept is able to comprehend the political dimension of such large-
sized mergers29, particularly against the background of the fact that these 
conglomerations often represent a large proportion of relevant economic 
quantities nationwide, which tends to enlarge their political influence 
overp roportionatel y. 30 
However, there are some doubts about whether an uncoupling of the merger 
prohibition from the market domination criterion Is the appropriate instru-
ment for a general improvement in merger control. Theoretically, the level 
required for an intervention against mergers would be lowered; however, the 
U.S. American experience shows that indeterminate legal criteria often tend 
to grant large free areas for discretionary judgment to enforcement agencies 
and the courts, and that this might even lead to a relaxation of a strict 
enforcement. Furthermore, the pressure of public opinion and political lob-
byists on this potential for discretionary judgment has to be considered se-
28 Cf. Immenga, ZusammenschlQsse zwischen Grol3unternehmen ... , op. cit., 191 
f.; Mestmacker, Zur Fusionskontrolle in der Wettbewerbspolitik, supra, 
184; Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI ..• , op. cit., paras. 470. 
29 Cf. Immenga, ZusammenschlQsse zwischen Grol3unternehmen ... , op. cit., 188 
f. and 193; Kantzenbach, Grol3fusionen bedQrfen einer expliziten politi-
schen Legitimation, supra, 381; Krakowski, Aktuelle Probleme der Fusions-
kontrolle, supra, 72. Cf. as well Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusam-
menschlu13kontrolle, supra, 17 f., who considers this an irrelevant aspect. 
30 Cf. the remarks of the CEO of Daimler-Benz, Edzard Reuter, at the Inter-
national Cartel Conference Berlin 1986, who holds that his company ac-
counts for 5 to 10% of the total of corporate income tax revenues of the 
Federal Republic and that 3.8% of the employees in the manufacturing 
sector in Germany are employed by the Daimler-Benz Company, cf. Han-
sen, Knud (ed.), Firm Size and International Competitiveness, Proceedings 
of the International Cartel Conference Berlin 1986, Berlin 1987, pp. 60-77, 
61 f. Global competition does not deprive such conglomerations of their 
power, since elections are conducted on a national basis and the unem-
ployment argument always convinces politicians in the case of large firms 
and during sensitive election periods. 
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rlously. 31 Certainly, this applies in the general case and it is questionable 
whether it would necessarily be otherwise in cases of large-sized mergers. 32 
In terms of undesirable economic consequences, uncertainty in the treatment 
of these mergers would remain. 
As is clear from our conclusions, a general uncoupling from the criterion of 
market dominance may not be justified from an economic point of view. How-
ever, such a case can be made for large-sized conglomerate mergers because 
of the serious problems in comprehending their anticompetitive economic 
consequences and their potential for a negative sociopolitical impact. This 
would best be taken care of by amending sec. 24 para. 1 by inserting a 
second sentence which reads as follows:33 
"In case of neither horizontal nor vertical merger, the Cartel Authority 
is also entitled to the competences enumerated in the subsequent pro-
visions if the merger is expected to result in a substantial impairment 
of competitive conditions in a multitude of markets." 
The advantage of such a ruling would not only be an improved comprehen-
sion of large-sized conglomerate mergers but also a potential for the FCO to 
employ a comprehensive view because of the low number of such mergers. 
On the basis of our findings, an improved comprehension of anticompetitive 
consequences of vertical mergers can also be attained by attaching impor-
tance to horizontal aspects at both levels of the markets affected. However, 
this would not make necessary an uncoupling of the intervention criterion 
from market domination. The intention would rather be taken into account by 
amending Sec. 22 para. 1 lit. 2 ARC, which is primarily aimed at horizontal 
relations, by a vertical component as follows (insertion in italics):34 
31 Cf. Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme der Zusammenschlu13kontrolle, supra, 16; 
Mestmiicker, Zur Fusionskontrolle in der Wettbewerbspolltik, supra, 184; 
cf. the special vote of the member of the MC, Murawski, Monopolkommissi-
on, Hauptgutachten VI ... , op. cit., para. 482; Schlecht, Ein neuer Ord-
nungsrahmen ... , op. cit., 38. 
32 Cf. for this reasoning, e.g., Kantzenbach, Erhard, Bewertung bisheriger 
Vorschliige zu einer wirksameren Fusionskontrolle, Venusbergseminare der 
Fried rich-Ebert-Stiftung zur Wi rtschaftspolitl k: Fusionskontrolle und 
Wettbewerbsrecht, Bonn 1986, pp. 17-31, 25 f. 
33 This proposal for an amendment is based on an idea by Greiffenberg, 
Strukturentwicklung und Konzentration ... , supra. 
34 This is based on the idea of the ad hoc-Council of Experts with the 
Ministry for Economic Affairs, who want to supplement the criterion of 
market dominance in sec. 22 para. 1 lit. 2 ARC by a vertical component 
( "vis-a-vis a substantial number of sellers and buyers"). 
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"(1) An enterprise is market dominating within the meaning of this Act 
insofar as, in its capacity as a supplier or buyer of a certain type of 
goods or commercial services, 
1. 
2. it has a dominant market position in relation to its competitors or 
vis-a-vis a substantial number of sellers and buyers; for this pur-
pose, in addition to its share of the market, its financial strength, ... " 
The provision should be introduced in order to emphasize that the evalua-
tion of vertical market relations must also include power considerations In 
horizontal terms, and vice versa, and thus be interpreted in terms of 
competitors in subsequent or preceding levels of the market. 
Strong doubts have to be raised as to whether the political influence of 
large economic conglomeratlons may be effectively stopped by an uncoupling 
from the criterion of market domination. In this context it seems much more 
effective to take into consideration a per se-prohibition of large-sized mer-
gers because their political influence transcends economic market domination 
reflections. This is especially so, since efficiency increases of such large 
mergers are limited in their scope and as a rule rather unlikely. Further-
more, their political influence may not be comprehended accurately, although 
it Is undoubtedly existent.35 
Because large-sized mergers have economic and anticompetitive consequences 
they are subject to review by cartel law. However, one has to be aware of 
the per se-prohibition of large-sized mergers being a matter of sociopolitical 
35 Cf. Adams/Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency ... , supra, 1117 f. note 8; 
Geberth/Janicki, Kartellrecht zwischen Kontinuitat und Anpassung, supra, 
453; Jens, Uwe, Grof3fusionen: Eine Gefahr fur die Marktwirtschaft, 66 WD 
(1986), pp. 388-390, 390; Kantzenbach, Grof3fusionen bedurfen einer 
expliziten politischen Legitimation, supra, 381 f.; Monopolkommisslon, 
Hauptgutachten V ... , op. cit., para. 750; Schmidt, Ist "Grof3e an sich" 
gefahrlich?, supra. For a contrary position, cf. Knopfle, Aktuelle Probleme 
der Zusammenschluf3kontrolle, supra, 17. 
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choice, since outside of the market domination concept such a decision can 
hardly be based on economic knowledge.38 
If such a per se-prohibition for large-sized mergers is taken into considera-
tion, a strong case can be made against an escape clause which acts in 
favor of well-defined exceptions in analogy to sec. 24 para. 3 ARC, since a 
serious danger results from lobbyists exerting pressure for the purpose of 
influencing the decision in order to receive political privileges. This argu-
ment is even strengthened by the fact that such political decisions cannot 
be reviewed by the courts. 37 Because such a prohibition has a political cha-
racter the decision on the criterion of prohibition seems rather subjective. 
However, a plausible case can be made for the prime one hundred firms in a 
national economy being subject to such a ruling. This would mean that firms 
with sales more than or equal to 1% of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
would be subject to such a ruling. 38 Combined with a cap-and-spin-off con-
cept, this would to some extent include considerations of efficiency and 
diversification on the part of the merging parties and considerations of 
overall structural change in the national economy.39 Apart from this, the 
possi bi I ity for internal corporate growth remains untouched. Such a cap-
36 Cf. Immenga, ZusammenschlUsse zwischen GroBunternehmen ... , op. cit., 
187, 193 and 197; Kantzenbach, Grol3fusionen bedUrfen einer expliziten 
politischen Legitimation, supra, 381 f.; Schmidt, Ist '"GroBe an sich'" ge-
fahrlich?, supra. Rejecting this line of action, Harms, Wolfgang, Repara-
turnovelle fUr das GWB, in: Heimrich, Herbert (ed.), Wettbewerbspolitik 
und Wettbewerbsrecht: Zur Diskussion um die Novellierung des GWB, Koln 
et al. 1987, pp. 137-146, 144; Moschel, Use of Economic Evidence ... , supra, 
541; and Schlecht, Ein neuer Ordnungsrahmen ... , op. cit., 38. 
37 Cf. Krakowski, Aktuelle Probleme der Fusionskontrolle, supra, 72; Mest-
miicker, Zur Fusionskontrolle in der Wettbewerbspolltik, supra, 184; Mo-
schel, Wettbewerbspol iti k aus ordoli beraler Sic ht, op. cit., 721 f., who 
emphasizes the ordoliberal 'rule of law' as a guiding principle; cf. as well 
Noll, Bernd, Wettbewerbs- und ordnungspolitische Probleme der Konzen-
tration, Spardorf 1986, pp. 194 f. 
38 Cf., e.g., Jens, GroBfusionen ... , supra, 390, who emphasizes that this 
ruling could be modified by the so-called cap-and-spin-off conception 
which would provide for a refutable presumption in cases of sell-offs of 
parts of the merging firms. This was originally provided for by the Ken-
nedy Bill in the United States, cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VI 
... , op. cit., para. 478. 
39 The German FCO views this as a viable option, cf. Bundeskartellamt, Tii-
tigkeitsbericht 1985/86, op. cit., 43-46; Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 
der Monopolkommission IV: Fortschritte bei der Konzentratlonserfassung, 
Baden-Baden 1982, paras. 649 ff.; and just recently the Vice President of 
the FCO, Niederleithinger, Praxis der Fusionskontrolle und der MiB-
brauchsaufsicht 1985/86, op. cit., 54 f. 
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and-spin-off concept must furthermore include an amendment of corporate 
and tax laws, as well as an amendment of the legal framework for the market 
of corporate control."° 
The reduction of the market share thresholds given in Sec. 22 para. 3 ARC 
is solely aimed at the retailing sector. Its purpose is to emphasize that mar-
ket dominance may emerge at market shares well below the ones indicating 
market power in the case of the manufacturing sector. However, a change in 
these thresholds can also serve the general purpose of making a possible 
conflict between efficiency increases and maintenance of sufficient competi-
tive pressure less likely by differentiating the thresholds which serve as 
refutable legal presumptions. This has to be accompanied by shaping the 
burden of proof. As we have noted supra, the presumptions are virtually of 
little material importance in application. In this context, their amendment 
would only be of a flanking character, i.e. it would constitute solely a guide 
and signal for jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, this particular problem has to be viewed in the context of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), since the Community's Commission pre-
sented a proposal for legislation on merger control. 41 This proposal will 
have to be considered binding for the Member States if the proposal is ac-
cepted by the European Council because Community Law represents supra-
national law und thus precedes national law. 42 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The derivation of conclusions from the developments in the United States for 
the Fifth Amendment of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition is 
justified by the basic comparability of the two bodies of law. 
Whereas the German law contains so-called minimum thresholds that are sup-
posed to determine at what point mergers are sufficiently relevant to merit 
40 Cf. Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zum Tatigkeitsberlcht des Bun-
deskartellamtes 1985/86, op. cit., III f.; Immenga, ZusammenschlUsse zwi-
schen GroJ3unternehmen ... , op. cit., 192 and 198. 
41 Cf. Vorschlag einer Verordnung (EWG) des Rates ... , supra, pp. 405-412. 
42 The proposal prohibits mergers that create or strengthen a market domi-
nating position in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it (cri-
terion of intervention). A merger is considered compatible with the Com-
mon Market if the joint market share of the combining firms is less than 
20% of the Common Market or a substantial part of it. The latter criterion 
also serves as a refutable presumption. 
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legal scrutiny, the U.S. antitrust statutes have no such minimum thresholds. 
However, minimum thresholds are created by the antitrust enforcement agen-
cies such as the Merger Guidelines of the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice by means of administrative enforcement rules, making expli-
cit the circumstances under which the agencies start legal scrutiny. 
Only German law contains overall justifications which specify the defenses 
which are available in order to have an illegal merger exceptionally declared 
legal. The merger can be declared legal by the German Federal Minister for 
Economic Affairs if the detrimental effects on competition are outweighed by 
overall economic advantages or justified by an overriding public Interest. 
The U.S. statute does not contain such an arbitrary disposition; however, 
the efficiency defense is used by the Antitrust Authorities increasingly. 
There is a restrictive position applying the ARC towards a tendency to in-
crease the use of economic evidence in general, and with efficiency conside-
rations In particular, because of the ambiguous nature of the latter. 
This reasoning is affirmed by recent adjudication, which is rather unwilling 
to accept economic evidence contrary to recent tendencies In U.S. enforce-
ment and jurisdiction. This applies to a variety of developments: 
(1) Concerning the definition of the relevant market, attempts to extract 
precise numerical values for these elasticities in addition to a 'soft' and 
qualitative evaluation of the substitution possibilities is unrealistic sim-
ply because it is unfeasible. This is why attempts In current U.S. anti-
trust policy to introduce such a quantitative analysis are not adopted. 
Contrary to widespread opinion, the international competitiveness of Ger-
man firms is taken into account by current market delineation procedure 
and particularly by the comprehensive view applied. This makes It unne-
cessary to adopt the current policy approach in the U.S., which attempts 
to take Into consideration foreign competition directly through the defi-
nition of the relevant market. In addition, in case of a conflict between 
maintaining competition and ensuring the ability to compete internatio-
nally the Federal Minister of Economics may grant an exemption accor-
ding to sec. 24 para. 3 ARC. 1 
It should be noted that there have only been four cases since 1973 where 
this Justification for a merger was put forward by the merging firms, cf. 
Bundesminlsterlum fur Wlrtschaft, Erfahrungsbericht Ober Mlnistererlaub-
nls-Verfahren bel Firmen-Fuslonen, 36 WuW (1986), pp. 788 ff. 
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(2) On the basis of our results in the contribution submitted we have found 
that market structure is important for the determination of actual con-
duct within a relevant market. Contrary to current antitrust policy in 
the U.S., our findings indicate that a structural predominance is to be 
confirmed, although the traditional paradigm faces a rather severe modi-
fication, which now puts emphasis on superior market positions of indivi-
dual firms rather than on collective domination. The general criticism on 
the role that market share and relative market share play as legal pre-
sumptions seems inappropriate. 
(3) In Germany it is still undisputed that an accretion of financial resources 
does not pose a competitive problem per se and thus is not necessarily 
detrimental to competitive conditions. But even If It was confirmed that 
conglomerate mergers were unharmful as a rule, this does not provide 
evidence that the accretion of financial resources in combination with a 
market dominating share can equally be evaluated as unharmful. This 
calls for a case by case analysis. The disappearance of the use of the 
entrenchment-doctrine in U.S. enforcement and adjudication in the U.S. 
has not (yet) initiated such a tendency in German antitrust policy. 
(4) In contrast to the theory guiding U.S. antitrust policy, the existence and 
height of market barriers have been suf1\iciently considered in actual 
merger cases in German antitrust policy and there seems to be no dis-
pute that they have to be considered if they exist. This also applies to 
the case of international competition, which we have emphasized in the 
context of the relevant market. It is often asserted that the globalization 
of competition renders the market barriers concept obsolete because 
there is always sufficient competitive pressure. Nevertheless, despite 
that liberalization, meaningful legal and factual barriers to new competi-
tion do exist which tend to impede sufficient competitive pressure in 
such cases. In this context, it is of crucial importance to what extent the 
national market is interwoven with international competition and what the 
circumstances of the individual case are. 
Thus far, there is no adoption of the somewhat more lenient line of U.S. an-
titrust policy in the context of mergers and there is no necessity to follow 
this trend. 
There is no doubt about the notion that deterministic kinds of statements on 
structure-, conduct-, performance-relationships are of little use. This is not 
disputed by the adherents of traditional theory, however. This knowledge 
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points to the necessity for a comprehensive analysis of the structural fac-
tors of a relevant market including actual conduct in ambiguous cases. This 
entails, for instance, that factors in addition to the ones listed in para. 22 
sec. 1 lit. 2 are to be considered. This applies for example to the use of 
market stage as a structural criterion for the determination of a dominant 
position. 
An essential aspect of competition policy is, as it came to be called by the 
German ordoliberal economists, the "ordnungspolitische" function. This view 
emphasizes that competition also has a sociopolitical function which should 
be given at least as much importance as the economic function of enhancing 
consumer welfare. In this sense, competition, acting as a controlling, selec-
ting, and driving force through decentralized decision-making units, should 
be seen as the only appropriate counterpart and basic economic principle 
appropriate for free, democratic states, since it deprives economic aggre-
gations of their economic power. 
Surrendering this ordoliberal idea and thus omitting non-economic objectives 
can have serious effects, since highly concentrated markets lead to a de-
creased flexibility of large companies and to an increase in their (potential) 
political influence. This may lead to the use of economic power for exercising 
political pressure in order to get protection from competition or receive 
direct government subsidies. 
In current U.S. antitrust policy a permanent dilemma is Implicitly assumed 
between efficiency-enhancement and maintaining competition; the German 
legislator, by contrast, has not presumed such a conflict as a rule. In a 
general sense, the alleged goal conflict between maintaining competition and 
enhancing efficiency is not confirmed by the empirical studies reviewed and 
the conclusions drawn in our contribution. There has not thus far been any 
case which demonstrates the inability of national companies to compete on a 
global scale because of the strict German merger control. 
The same tendency may be confirmed in the argument that small business 
has to be protected particularly because the legislator considered maintain-
ing a small business structure an objective In its own right. However, small 
business is best protected if freedom to compete, and thus competition as an 
institution, Is protected, provided that there are no substantial competitive 
impairments. 
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Concerning merger control, the subsequent proposals for improvement of 
this Instrument that are currently being discussed by German scholars may 
be evaluated as follows: 
(1) There are some serious doubts as to whether an uncoupling of the mer-
ger prohibition from the market domination criterion Is the appropriate 
measure for a general improvement of merger control. However, such a 
case can be made for large-sized, particularly conglomerate mergers 
because of the serious problems in comprehending their anticompetitive 
consequences. This would best be taken care of by prohibiting any mer-
ger if it "Is expected to result in a substantial impairment of the compe-
titive conditions in a multitude of markets." 
(2) An improved comprehension of the anticompetitive consequences of verti-
cal mergers can be attained by attaching Importance not only to the 
vertical aspects of such mergers but also by taking into consideration 
the horizontal conditions and structural features of the markets affected. 
This is best taken into account by amending the law such that an enter-
prise Is also viewed as market dominating if it has a paramount market 
position "vis-a-vis a significant number of sellers and buyers". 
(3) It seems effective to consider a per se-prohibition of large-sized mer-
gers because their pollttcal Influence transcends economic market domi-
nation reflections. A plausible case can be made for firms with sales 
more than or equal to 1% of the gross domestic product (GDP) to be 
subject to such a ruling. Combined with a cap-and-spin-off concept, this 
would to some extent entail considerations of efficiency and diversifica-
tion on the part of the merging parties and considerations of overall 
structural change in the national economy. 
The reduction of the market share thresholds in Sec. 22 para. 3 ARC can 
serve the purpose of making a possible conflict between efficiency Increases 
and maintaining sufficient competitive pressure less likely by differentiating 
the thresholds which serve as refutable legal presumptions. 
However, this particular problem has to be viewed In the context of the EEC, 
since its Commission presented a proposal for legislation on merger control. 
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